Design of a Haptic Feedback System for Flight Envelope Protection

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Several modern aircraft use a passive control manipulator: a spring–damper system that generates command signals to the flight control computers in combination with a flight envelope protection system that limits pilot inputs when approaching the aircraft limits. This research project aims to increase pilot awareness of this protection system through the use of force feedback on the control device, that is, haptics. This paper describes in detail how the haptic feedback works and when it triggers; another paper will discuss the results of an experimental evaluation. With the current haptic design, pilots can get five cues: first, a discrete force cue when approaching the limits; second, an increased spring coefficient for control deflections that bring the aircraft closer to its limits; third, a stick shaker for low velocities; fourth, if a low-velocity condition requires an input, the stick is moved forward to the desired control input; and finally, the stick follows the automatic Airbus “pitch-up” command during an overspeed condition. This novel system is expected to help pilots correctly assess the situation and decide upon the right control action. It will be evaluated in two scenarios close to the flight envelope limits: a wind shear and an icing event.

I. Introduction

Modern cockpits provide an abundance of information to pilots, primarily using the visual and auditory communication channels. Examples of visual displays are the primary flight display (PFD) for the most important aircraft states and the navigation display for a planar top-down overview of the environment. Auditory signals are often used to provide urgent messages, such as to warn pilots for too high velocities and to provide altitude readouts and throttle back commands on landing [1].

But, apart from these senses, pilots are able to perceive information in several other ways. This paper will elaborate on the use of the pilot’s haptic sense by providing haptic feedback through the control device. As shown in Fig. 1, within the field of haptic research, two main categories are identified: touch (stimuli to the skin) and kinaesthesis (stimuli to the receptors in the muscles, joints, and tendons) [2,3]. The design discussed in this paper uses both touch and kinaesthesis; hence, the term haptic feedback is used.

In classical aircraft, the control manipulator “feel” provided information on, for instance, aerodynamic forces, buffeting when close to a stall, actuator saturation through hard stops of the controls, and other control-related phenomena. With the introduction of fly-by-wire, however, the forces on the control surfaces and the control devices were decoupled, eliminating this potentially very useful haptic information channel [4].

A reason that haptic feedback was not integrated after the introduction of fly-by-wire systems in the 1980s and 1990s was the rather bulky device required to implement the haptic forces. Whereas these old devices had issues regarding their size, weight, power, and stability requirements, current-day devices have become much smaller and lighter while still being able to provide reliable haptic feedback [5]. This offers the possibility to reconsider this type of feedback in fly-by-wire control systems [6].

Together with the advances in control devices, automation in cockpits is rising, resulting in a more supervisory role for the pilot instead of direct manual control. Despite these advances, pilots are still often required to take over manual control of the aircraft in landing, takeoff, or during emergency scenarios. An example of the latter could be a computer or sensor malfunction, which was the case for Air France flight 447 [7]. The crew, startled by unexpected high-altitude dynamics, lost situation awareness despite the information available from the visual and aural displays. Unaware of the loss of the usual flight envelope protections due to the malfunction,
pilots stalled the aircraft. The control manipulator, which was the Airbus A330 sidestick, provided the pilots with neither direct feedback on their control actions nor the aerodynamic stall cues; i.e., it did not help them in properly identifying the situation as a stall. As this tragic example shows, when manual control is needed, the lack of haptic information through the control device might contribute to a reduced situation awareness.

Combining the ever-increasing sophistication of automation on the flight deck and the current generation of small and powerful control devices provides designers a new opportunity, namely, to increase pilot awareness through haptic feedback. Some aircraft already include “augmented forces” on the control device, which can be provided on both control devices (in a two-pilot cockpit) linked to the surfaces or fly-by-wire control systems. An example of this is the “Q-feel force,” which changes the stiffness of the controls with changing dynamic pressure/velocity in Boeing-type aircraft [8]. Another example is a stick shaker or pusher, which warns pilots of moving closer to extreme aircraft states [9]. The control device can also be loaded with two passive springs to create a change in spring coefficient when pilots exert large control deflections, irrespective of the aircraft state, such as done in Airbus aircraft. Active control can be used to have an increased (artificial) spring force when rolling beyond the safe roll limit, irrespective of the control surfaces, as used in a Boeing 777 [10].

Although examples of haptic feedback implementations exist, there is limited research published in the open literature to prove the benefits of such a system. Within the field of aerospace, one example uses a passive spring or an active counterforce to communicate the distance to the flight envelope limits. The latter gave the best tracking performance increase as compared to the baseline condition [11]. A second example is the work by Stepanyan et al. that showed the limit on the available control space both visually and haptically [12]. For the haptics, they changed the input neutral point and the maximum deflection, which was used by the pilots to operate the aircraft at the limits. A soft stop (i.e., a local step in the force required for a certain deflection) can be used to indicate the engine limitations in the collective of a helicopter. It was shown in simulations that such a system can reduce the workload of the pilot [13,14]; this was implemented in an experimental helicopter of the DLR, German Aerospace Center [15]. Tactile feedback through the use of vibrating elements on a vest, i.e. tactors, enabled spatial awareness and reduced spatial disorientation [16]. These examples use haptic feedback to inform the pilot about the flight envelope limits. Note that research in supplying the pilot with such information is not limited to haptic only; new visual displays are investigated as well and show positive results [17]. Aside from information on the flight envelope limits, the haptic channel can additionally be used to supply guidance support, of which a haptic flight director showed great potential to increase the pilot tracking error and reduce workload [18]. Other fields do show a larger public research interest in this domain, for example, in teleoperation: the control of an unmanned vehicle was supported by haptically showing the proximity to objects in its surroundings. It resulted in decreased workload and increased situation awareness for the given navigation task [19]. In the automotive field, haptics can be used on the gas pedal to show the proximity of a car in front, resulting in an increased performance while reducing input magnitudes [20]. Haptics can additionally be used to support curve negotiation through the steering wheel using two approaches: i) warning systems which reduce the reaction time of the driver while have a potential to induce driver-anxiety, and ii) guidance systems (for example to the center of the road) improved performance yet are subjective to after-effects [21].

The aim of the current project is to investigate the use of haptic feedback to give the pilot more information on the augmentation with respect to the limits of the aircraft during manual control within the modern fly-by-wire cockpit. In other words, the design presented in the following aims to provide feedback to the pilot on the proximity of the state to the flight envelope limits. Only longitudinal haptic feedback is considered here; lateral cues can be added in a future design using the same design ideas. This work builds on an initial study [22], which already showed a potential benefit of such a haptic feedback system. The goal of this paper is to elaborate on a new iteration and give a thorough description on the how and when of the haptics, as well as the expected practical implications.

Section II will first discuss some basic flight dynamics and will introduce the control laws and flight envelope protection system present in current fly-by-wire Airbus aircraft. Section III discusses the rationale of our haptic interface, which is designed to present some of the functions of these automated systems. We then discuss two operational scenarios where the flight envelope protection system will trigger (a windshear and an icing event) to explain in detail how our haptic interface works (Sec. IV). Finally, conclusions are given in Sec. V.

II. Flight Dynamics and Control Laws

This section provides the background needed to understand the design rationale of our haptic interface. Section II.A covers some basic flight dynamics properties and variables. Readers familiar with aircraft flight dynamics can skip this subsection. Because our haptic design focuses on supporting pilots in working with the complex Airbus control law and flight envelope protection structures, a brief recap of these structures is provided in Sec. II.B. This recap only discusses the (highly coupled) protections; yet, the level of detail is sufficient to support the design of the haptic feedback system in the following.

A. Flight Dynamics

This subsection explains a basic set of flight dynamics variables that is essential to understand the aircraft control laws and the application of the haptics. A full discussion on flight dynamics can be found in the literature [23]. The bank angle \( \theta \), indicating how much the aircraft wing is tilted with respect to the horizontal plane, is the most important lateral variable and is depicted in Fig. 2a. The relevant longitudinal angles are shown in Fig. 2b; the pitch angle \( \alpha \) depicts the angle of the nose of the airplane relative to the horizon, the flight path angle \( \gamma \) gives the elevation of the true velocity vector \( V \) with respect to the horizon, and the angle of attack \( \alpha \) is the angle of incidence of the air with the wing section. Accelerations are expressed in the aircraft body reference frame; the vertical acceleration \( a_v \) is commonly expressed in the load factor \( n = (a_v/g) \) and is shown in Fig. 2b. Typical level cruise flight is performed with a load factor of one: the lift is equal to the weight. By pitching up, the load factor is increased, which is experienced as “being pushed in the seat,” and vice versa.

Limits of the aircraft are typically expressed in a flight envelope (FE). Different combinations of variables are possible; yet, as Airbus control laws are mostly load factor dependent, this research considers only the relation between the aircraft velocity \( V \) and the load factor \( n \).
This FE is depicted by the solid black line in Fig. 3. The upper velocity limit (right-hand vertical line) is due to the maximum velocity $V_{\text{max}}$ created by aerodynamic and vibration limits. Extreme load factor values are determined by static structural limits and indicated by the upper $n_{\text{max}}$ and lower $n_{\text{min}}$ horizontal lines. The lower velocity limits $V_{\alpha_{\text{max}}}$ (the left-hand side of Fig. 3) follow a quadratic relation with velocity due to the lift equation shown in Eq. (1), where $\rho$ is the density of the air, $S$ is the lifting surface of the wing; and $C_L$ is the lift coefficient:

$$L = \frac{1}{2} \rho V^2 S C_L$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

The latter coefficient $C_L$ depends on the wing shape and on the angle of attack: the higher the $\alpha$, the higher the lift coefficient, up to a maximum value $\alpha_{\text{max}}$, where this coefficient suddenly drops and a stall occurs.

B. Airbus Control Laws

To better understand when the haptic feedback is applied, it is important to understand how the pilot controls the aircraft. As such, the FCCs can override the pilot inputs and, in doing that, provide an additional layer of safety to keep the aircraft states inside the allowed FE region. This process is called flight envelope protection (FEP) and is applied for both lateral and longitudinal inputs, as will be elaborated on in the following.

The FCCs consist of seven computers with three functions: i) two elevator and aileron computers (ELACs) for elevator and stabilizer control, and constant aileron control; ii) three spoilers and elevator computers (SECs) for spoilers control and standby elevator and stabilizer control; iii) two flight augmentation computers (FACs) for electrical rudder control. These computers are provided with information on the aircraft states by a number of systems and sensors: 1) air data and inertial reference unit, 2) slat flap control computer (SFCC), 3) accelerometers, 4) landing gear control interface unit (LGCIU), 5) radio altimeter (RA), and 6) flight management guidance computer.

Five control laws with different levels of support are possible within the Airbus philosophy. This paper will not discuss in detail when each of the control laws is active. The selection of control law is based on internal sensor validity checks, for which more details can be found in the FCOM (Ref. [24]). Only a general description, together with the control laws, follows. We start with the “normal law,” which provides the most assistance to pilots, and then we move to the configurations that provide less assistance (“alternate control law with reduced protections” and “alternate control law without reduced protections”). The “direct law” and “mechanical backup” are included for the sake of completeness but will not be used in the sections that follow. A summary of the control laws can be found in Table 1, and all the protections are in Table 2.

1. Normal Control Law

When all systems are functioning nominally, the FCCs operate in the normal control law (NL), which is the default control mode. The pilot longitudinal and lateral control inputs are both interpreted as “reference” signals for the FCCs, as will be discussed in the following. In addition, the FEP applies a number of protections to prevent the aircraft from moving outside the, what is considered safe, flight envelope. Examples are the bank angle limitation, the load factor limitation, the pitch attitude protection, the high angle-of-attack protection, and the high-speed protection.

a. Lateral Control. The FCC interprets lateral stick deflections as commands to change the bank angle. From 0 to 33 deg of bank, the sidestick lateral deflection is a bank angle rate command, whereas the
bank from 33 deg up to 67 deg is a bank angle command. The maximum bank angle rate achievable with full deflection is 15 deg/s. The FEP in the FCCs limits the maximum achievable bank to 67 deg, which is the first hard envelope limit. If the bank angle exceeds 33 deg, positive bank stability is present such that the aircraft automatically rolls back to 33 deg when the sidestick is not deflected. Hence, in case the pilot intends to execute a steep turn, a constant stick deflection is required. To assist the pilot during horizontal turns, for bank angles up to 33 deg, an automatic pitch command is added such that the pilot does not need to maintain backpressure on the stick to compensate for the required increase in lift.

Additionally, the autopilot disconnects when the bank angle exceeds 45 deg; at which point, the flight director (FD) bars (indication of the guidance by the FCC on the PFD) disappear. The bars return when the bank angle reduces below 40 deg. To prevent excessive trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) deflections due to the manual or autotrim functionality, the deflection is limited between the value on entering of the protection and 3.5 deg nose-down. Finally, limits for the bank angle depend on the longitudinal protections, which are elaborated on in the following. A visual summary of the lateral protections can be found in Fig. 5 [24].

### Table 1 Summary of airbus flight control laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Normal law</th>
<th>Alternate law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lateral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Bank rate demand</td>
<td>1) Bank direct stick-to-surface</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 15 deg/s for full lateral deflection</td>
<td>of 30 deg/s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Otherwise, 25 deg/s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longitudinal</td>
<td>C* control law</td>
<td>Control law equal to NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Autotrim for changing speed or configuration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Automatic pitch compensation for φ ≤ ±33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2 Summary of airbus flight envelope protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Normal law</th>
<th>Alternate law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank φ</td>
<td>THS limited between entry value and 3.5 deg nose-down</td>
<td>Autopilot disconnects when φ &gt; 45 deg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autopilot disconnects when φ &gt; 45 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FD bars disappear when φ &gt; 45 deg</td>
<td>No other protections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FD bars return when φ &lt; 40 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominal maximum: 67 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum with αprot active: 45 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum with V &gt; Vmax; 40 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominal protection: positive bank stability to ±33 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection with V &gt; Vmax; positive bank stability to 0 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch θ</td>
<td>No limit for Autopilot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nose-up maximum, flaps 0–3: 30 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nose-up maximum, full flaps: 25 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nose-down maximum: −15 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FD bars disappear when θ &gt; 25 deg or θ &lt; −13 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FD bars return when θ &lt; 22 deg or θ &gt; −10 deg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High angle of attack α</td>
<td>THS limited between entry value and 3.5 deg nose-down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autopilot disconnects when α &gt; αprot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot input proportional in region: αprot → αmax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection deactivates: when 8 deg forward input or 0.5 deg forward for 0.5 s when α &lt; αmax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below 200 ft, protection deactivates when pilot input half of nose-up input or when α &lt; αprot − 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When α &gt; αflap, thrust is set to takeoff/go-around a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low velocity V</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High velocity V</td>
<td>THS limited between entry value and 11 deg nose-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When V &gt; Vmax; autopilot disconnects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pilot nose-down authority is reduced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an automatic nose-up command is introduced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>command cannot be overruled by pilot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load factor nz</td>
<td>THS limited between entry value and 3.5 deg nose-down when n &gt; 1.25</td>
<td>Equal to normal law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum, clean: 2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum, with flaps/slats: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum, clean: −1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum, with flaps/slats: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a: autopilot disconnects Nose-up command is inserted
b: autopilot disconnects

*αprot = 9.5 deg without flaps/slats (15 deg for configurations 1 and 2, 14 deg for configuration 3, and 13 deg for full) or when pilot inputs 14 deg pitch-up with either pitch or angle-of-attack protection active.

Speed margin according to Airbus documentation: “Based on the aircraft gross weight and slats/flaps configuration.”

Airbus documentation is unclear on the exact activation point: “at/above Vmax.”
b. Longitudinal Control. For longitudinal control, Airbus uses the $C^*$ approach, which is a combination of both the pitch rate $\dot{\alpha}$ and the load factor $n$ [24–27]. In the low-speed regime, up to approximately 240 kt, the pilot stick deflections are interpreted as pitch rate commands; in high-speed regions, the stick deflections are interpreted as load factor commands [27]. Due to this setup, there is no need for the pilot to trim the aircraft for changing velocity or configuration.

On top of the $C^*$ control law, protections are present on the pitch angle, the angle of attack, the load factor, and high velocities. The limit on the pitch angle and load factor is without any buffer zone: when approaching the limit, the FCC gradually reduces the pitch rate/load factor until the maximum value is reached and no further control can be achieved. For the other limit, which is the angle of attack, there is a zone from a protected value $\alpha_{prot}$ up to the maximum value $\alpha_{max}$ where the $C^*$ control law is altered to provide position control from the control device deflection, which is proportional to the angle of attack approaching the limit. Additionally, the autopilot disconnects when entering the protected region, and the maximum achievable bank is reduced to 45 deg to prevent asymmetric stall. The throttle input is automatically set to takeoff/go-around setting when the angle of attack increases beyond $\alpha_{floor}$ (9.5 deg without flaps/slats, 15 deg for configurations 1 and 2, 14 deg for configuration 3, and 13 deg for full) or the control device deflection is larger than 14 deg nose-up with pitch or angle-of-attack protection active.

The angle-of-attack protection deactivates when the pilot pushes the control device more than 8 deg forward, or when it pushes at least 0.5 s with a deflection of a minimal of 0.5 deg forward when the angle attack is below the maximum value. Below 200 ft, the protection is also deactivated by using less than half of the nose-up input or when the angle of attack is less than $\alpha_{prot} = 2$ deg.

For all three limits, the maximum value (and, if applicable, the size of the position control zone) depends on the particular flight conditions and the state of the aircraft. The pitch angle limits are between $-15$ and $30$ deg (25 deg for full flaps/slats); the load factor must remain between $-1$ and $2.5g$ without flaps/slats (0 and $2g$ for any other configuration); and the angle of attack must remain less than 12 deg, with a protection zone of 2 deg. The buffer zone for the angle of attack is shown on the PFD through the velocity indication, whereas no indication for the load factor is available in the current Airbus setup; hence, this could be useful extra information to the pilot. Note that the pitch limits do not apply to the autopilot and that the FD bars disappear when the pitch increases above 25 deg nose-up or below 13 deg nose-down, and they return when the pitch is between 22 deg nose-up and 10 deg nose-down.

To prevent structural damage when controlling the aircraft at high velocities, a high-speed protection is present. This protection triggers or below 13 deg nose-down, and they return when the pitch is increased above 25 deg nose-up. When the high-velocity protection is active, maximum values are the entry value and 11 deg nose-up.

As for the lateral control, here, the THS is limited to prevent excessive deflections. During the angle-of-attack protection and load factor values above 1.25g, the limits are the entry value and 3.5 deg nose-down. When the high-velocity protection is active, maximum values are the entry value and 11 deg nose-up.

Figure 3 already showed the nominal flight envelope. Here, we discuss the angle of attack [related to velocity through Eq. (1)], the load factor, and high-velocity protections present in the A320 control laws. The angle-of-attack protection can be visualized on the flight envelope, as shown with the red dashed line on Fig. 6, where every state where no protection is active is defined as belonging to the safe flight envelope (SFE). As can be seen in the figure, the zone where a protection is active provides a buffer for the pilot when approaching the limits.

2. Alternate Control Law with Reduced Velocity Protections

In case of sensor or computer failures, the FCC reverts back to control laws that provide less support for the pilot. The first of these degraded control laws is the alternate control law (AL), with reduced protections, which triggers when a dual failure of the computers are present.

a. Lateral Control. Lateral control becomes a direct stick-to-control-surface-position relationship with maximum bank rate of 30 deg/ s for the clean configuration and 25 deg/ s otherwise. Hence, the positive bank stability and the bank angle protection are lost. Furthermore, if the autopilot is engaged, it disconnects at 45 deg, requiring the pilot to take over control.

b. Longitudinal Control. The control law for longitudinal control is not changed. The only major change with respect to the NL, when considering safety, is the loss of the angle-of-attack and pitch protections. This includes the buffer zone described before, as well as the protection against excessive control inputs. Load factor protection is present equal to the NL.

Too large angle-of-attack angles can lead to an aircraft stall and pilots are trained to avoid this event in all circumstances. Most of the time the aircraft flies in the NL, and the aircraft simply cannot stall. But, in the very rare situation that the NL is deactivated and the degraded control laws become active, the angle-of-attack protection is lost. Pilots may fail to notice this control law degradation, and the corresponding loss of protection, which could lead to a stall. This possibly catastrophic event will be taken into consideration in our haptic interface design.

To assist the pilot in this control law, a region with low-speed stability is introduced by Airbus. Dependent on the configuration, 5–10 kt above the stall warning speed $V_{SW}$, a nose-down signal is introduced. Additionally, an aural “STALL” warning is added with, according to the Airbus documentation, “appropriate margin from stall.” Furthermore, bank angle compensation is added to maintain a constant angle of attack.

![Fig. 6 Flight envelope with A320 longitudinal flight envelope protection limits indicated.](image_url)
The high-speed stability from the NL remains, yet the pilot is now able to overrule the imposed nose-up command. Autopilot disconnection occurs when the velocity exceeds $V_{\text{max}}$; at $V_{\text{max}} + 4$, an aural “OVERSPEED” warning is present.

3. Alternate Control Law Without Reduced Velocity Protections

In some cases (for example, when all three air data reference units fail), the control laws further degrade and have even less protections. Both lateral and longitudinal control laws remain equal to the AL with the protections, except that the low- and high-speed stabilities are lost. The load factor limitation does remain available for the pilot.

4. Direct Law

When all three inertial reference units fail, the RA fails when the landing gear is down, or when flaps are selected while the LGCIUs disagree, the control law is reverted even more to the direct law. In this law, control surface deflections become equal to sidestick inputs.

a. Lateral Control. Although direct stick to roll is low-level control, the FCC still aids the pilot, inputting the right magnitude of inputs by scaling the control gains based on the configuration. Yaw damping and turn coordination are lost in this case, as is the maximum bank angle.

b. Longitudinal Control. Stick-to-pitch direct control is aided by scaling the control gains, depending on the center of gravity of the aircraft. In this control law, no protections are active and the pilot can therefore bring the aircraft outside the flight envelope limits.

5. Mechanical Backup

When a complete loss of electrical power is detected, the sidestick is unusable due to the transducers used in the design. Therefore, a mechanical backup is available, which is a very basic and crude control.

a. Lateral Control. Lateral control is achieved solely by operating the rudder pedals, without any direct bank control. Rolling is achieved due to the coupling of yaw and roll but, because this is a slow response, Airbus indicates in the chapter titled “Operational Philosophy—020 Flight Controls” of Ref. [28] to “Gently apply an input and wait for the response.” Care should be taken to not exaggerate the input as to not over-control the aircraft.

b. Longitudinal Control. The mechanical backup for the pitch control is made by manually trimming the horizontal stabilizer. Again, this provides a slow control method and should be executed with caution.

Now that the basic flight dynamics are discussed, and the Airbus flight control philosophy summarized, we can move to the design of our haptic interface. That is, how can we use haptics to assist pilots in maintaining situation awareness of the state of the aircraft and the automation, especially in high workload situations when the aircraft operates close to the flight envelope limits?

III. Haptic Display Design

This section describes the haptic display that is used to show the flight envelope boundaries to the pilot. First, the definition of haptic feedback for this research is shown, followed by the goal of the support system. Next, the information is used to elaborate on how and when haptic feedback is provided in the current design. Note that the values for all tuning parameters introduced in the following are summarized in Table 3.

A. Haptic Feedback Definitions

Haptic feedback can be considered as a process that deliberately changes the feel of the control device. This research focuses on changing the haptic profile, i.e., the relation between the deflection of the control device $\delta$ and the amount of force required to do so $F$. A default profile for many sticks (and other control manipulators such as rudder pedals) is a piecewise linear function, as shown in Fig. 7. Here, $\delta_{\text{top}}$ is the position of the control device when no force is applied, which is referred to as the neutral point. The location of the break point is given by $\delta_{\text{br}}$, where the stick has a spring coefficient $k_{\text{br}}$. The break point is limited to haptically show pilots where the “zero stick deflection” position lies. Outside this zone, $k^+$ and $k^-$ are the spring coefficients for, respectively, positive and negative control device deflections. The default case for this design, as for the Airbus sidestick, is a symmetric profile using a nominal stiffness $k_{\text{nom}}$ for positive and negative deflections until a maximum deflection $\delta_{\text{max}}$. Deviations from this default haptic profile can be used to provide the pilot with feedback through the control device. Although not considered here, haptic feedback can also be considered by changing the dynamic properties of the control device such as the natural frequency, the damping coefficient, the static friction (force required to move from a standstill), the dynamic friction (friction due to movement), or other nonlinear phenomena [3].

The literature shows different ways of changing the haptic profile: in the automotive field, there is a strong focus on using a forcing function that can be used as both a warning signal [29,30] or as a guidance force [20,21]. Aerospace applications show examples that add a soft stop (a local step in the amount of force required), a hardstop (a change in maximum deflection) [5], forcing functions [31], changes in the stick neutral position [12], and changes in nominal stick stiffness [32–33]. An example of haptic feedback in the current Airbus A320 flight deck is the detent present on the thrust levers: the controls “click” in the important thrust positions (such as maximum thrust, or the take-off/go-around setting) and require a threshold force to move away from this position.

B. Goal of Support System

We aim to use haptic cues to provide pilots with information on whether the aircraft approaches the limits of the FEP: increase situation awareness. In Sec II.B, we discussed how moving the
Fig. 8 Flight envelope: load factor \( n_g \) versus velocity \( V \), with inset for Fig. 11.

The result on the system architecture is a dependency of the control device properties on the aircraft states and the FEP through the haptic feedback law (HFL), shown on Fig. 9. Note that the HFL is not dependent on the current control device state: the haptic display shows when limits are near, it does not show the control device position where these limits become near. Information on the limits is assumed to be calculated by an external model and is therefore not discussed in this paper.

This paper discusses only longitudinal haptic feedback. Furthermore, it is assumed that the pilot is flying with hands on the controls, which is verified in conversations with pilots to be a common airline procedure below an altitude of 10,000 ft and in emergency situations. Additionally, Airbus specifies three phases in flight with different control modes: on the ground, during flare, and in flight [24]. In this research, only “flight mode” is considered. The transitioning modes during flare and on the ground, as well as lateral haptic feedback, are left to a next iteration.

Note that the FE used for the design of the haptic display presented in Fig. 8 has three differences with respect to the FE for Airbus control laws shown in Fig. 6. First, we decreased the upper aircraft velocity limit in the SFE, and we provide a buffer of 20 kt (\( V_{\text{max,prot}} = V_{\text{max}} - 20 \)). Second, to complete the buffer zone toward the hard flight limits, we added a buffer on the load factor of 0.5g. Third, we implemented a critical low-velocity zone, which will be communicated through the use of forcing functions.

In normal operations, the aircraft is operated within the SFE in the normal control law. In the case of abnormal situations, as discussed in Sec. II.B, the aircraft can revert to an alternate control law in which fewer protections are active and the pilot has more control to move outside the FE. In the current stage of our project, the haptic display is designed such that, in both cases (NL and AL), the haptic settings are identical. The full haptic display can still be applied in the AL because the intensities of the cues will be chosen such that pilots can always overrule the haptic signals: they have the final authority of the sidestick. Hence, in both conditions, in case the aircraft is maneuvered outside the SFE, the haptic cues are designed such that they should support the pilot in identifying the situation, and deciding on an effective mitigation strategy, to keep the aircraft safe.

The remainder of this section elaborates more on how and when the haptic cues are provided.

C. Change the Position of the Neutral Point

The position of the neutral point can be changed through manipulating the value of \( \delta_{np} \). If applied, the information provided by the haptic display is directly proportional to a required control command and, in principle, the pilot can “just follow the position.” Previous research showed that using such an approach increased tracking performance while reducing the physical effort [31]. If the pilot does not agree, however, (s)he can choose to override the cue and keep the stick position fixed by actively counteracting, using co-contraction of the muscles [36]. Nevertheless, the shift in neutral position gives a clear message to the pilot on what (s)he should do. The effect of this change in neutral position on the profile can be seen in Fig. 10 by the shift of the entire graph to the right.

In the Airbus philosophy, a zero stick deflection gives a commanded load factor of one. This is a safe and desired load factor for most of the flight; but, in some cases, a different load factor is needed to return to the SFE. To indicate this, the neutral point can be altered. Looking at the FE in Fig. 8, two such regions can be identified: 1) in case of overspeed, when an active pull-up is required; and 2) at high load factors for low velocities because the maximum safe load factor is below one. The next sections therefore investigate this required load factor \( r_{\text{req}} \) for both situations, respectively, followed by the translation of the required load factor to the required change in stick neutral position.

1. Overspeed

When an overspeed occurs, the speed has to be reduced actively by the pilot by either reducing the throttle or by pitching up such that

![Fig. 9 Block diagram representing the Airbus control loop combined with the haptic feedback law.](image-url)

Fig. 9 Block diagram representing the Airbus control loop combined with the haptic feedback law.
2. G-Loading for Low Velocities

As mentioned before, the stick neutral position commands a load factor of one. In case the aircraft velocity becomes too low (that is, too far to the left in Fig. 8, with a zoomed-in view shown by Fig. 11), returning to a load factor of “one” is not sufficient to re-enter the safe flight envelope, and the pilot has to be informed that action is required.

This is done by shifting the stick neutral point. The prerequisites for this cue are that the current safe load factor is below one and the current load factor (the green circle in Fig. 11) is above the safe load factor. Note that the current load factor is measured by sensors, and it is assumed that the aircraft (model) calculates the safe load factor. The required load factor to return to the SFE is therefore the safe load factor itself \( n_{maxprot} \).  

3. Change in Neutral Point Implementation

For the two cases discussed earlier, a required load factor is calculated, which needs to be shown to the pilot using a change in stick neutral deflection. Because zero stick deflection indicates a required load factor of zero, the required shift in the neutral point \( \Delta \delta_{req} \) given a required load factor \( n_{req} \) can be determined using

\[
\Delta \delta_{req} = \frac{\delta_{max}}{n_{max} - 1} (n_{req} - n)
\]

In case this required change in neutral point is implemented immediately, abrupt changes in the control feel can be observed. The change in neutral point would then be perceived more as an “alert” rather than a guidance cue. Therefore, the required change in the neutral point is ramped in linearly using an iterative formula that can be easily implemented in software. With the previous neutral position \( \delta_{np_{prev}} \), the time difference with the previous step \( \Delta t \), and the rate \( \delta \), the current neutral position \( \delta_{np} \) is calculated using

\[
\delta_{np} = \min (\delta_{np_{prev}} + \Delta \delta_{req} + \Delta t \delta)
\]

D. Add a Forcing Function to the Device

When a forcing function is added to the control device, the whole force/position profile is shifted vertically up or down. Depending on the magnitude of the cue, and whether the pilot is holding the stick or not, it can change the control device deflection, as shown in the illustrative example in Fig. 12a. In our design, we intend to use this cue mainly to alert or warn the pilot, and not to impose a required control input. Hence, the forcing function should be of a small period, or a small amplitude. The effect is therefore short and not predefined in terms of deflection: the effect can be difficult to grasp in one snapshot of a haptic profile. As such, the time trace of the forcing function is visualized by an added graph as shown in Fig. 12b, where zero time is current, and times to the right represent past times. A pragmatic approach is used to evaluate whether the cue complies
with the assumption of a small period or amplitude. In the current design, two forcing functions are used: a discrete cue to communicate the exit of the SFE, and a stick shaker to alert for low velocities. Note that the addition of a forcing function and a pure change of neutral point both result in a change of position of the control device. Nevertheless, their driving principle is different: a forcing function does not have a predefined effect on the control position. The effect depends on the position of the control device in the haptic profile and the pilot’s arm stiffness. In contrast, a pure neutral point shift results in one desired control input to guide a pilot through a maneuver.

1. Discrete Cue

Discrete cues are limited in time and can have a wide variety of shapes, ranging from a square block signal to a noise input. They can be a useful tool to warn the pilot of entering a certain region while not giving a constant signal. The intent of this cue can be compared to a soft stop: an indication of entering a region where caution is required. For example, a soft stop can indicate a position where the maximum engine limits are exceeded [13,37]. In contrast, a forcing function is added to the controls when the (protection) limit is exceeded. The forcing function is chosen in the design because it does not have a dependency on the state of the control device, as do all cues used in the design.

One region that can be entered, with or without the intention of the pilot, is the protected region close to the edge of the FE, shown in Fig. 8 by the dashed line, corresponding to the buffers created on $\alpha$, $n$, and $V$. An example where entering this zone can go unnoticed by the pilot is when he/she is busy scanning the instruments or involved in other tasks. Therefore, to provide a clear transition cue when exceeding the SFE, a warning cue in the form of a square pulse signal (width of 0.1 s and magnitude of 10 N, shown in Fig. 13a) is given. This shape and intensity of the forcing function were chosen based on a preliminary test with a single test pilot; future research is needed for the further definition of this shape. By adding this cue, the pilot is triggered about the SFE departure and the attention is drawn to the event.

The direction of the cue should indicate the direction of the “correct action” for the pilot to perform if (s)he intends to solve the limit violation. For this reason, a stick forward cue (“pitch-down” indication) is given for extreme positive load factors, high angles of attack for positive load factors, and low-velocity violations. A stick backward cue (“pitch-up” indication) is given when crossing all other boundaries.

2. Stick Shaker

A periodic cue is a signal that repeats itself in time, and it can be used as a persistent way to alert pilots of an imminent critical state. An example is the motor priming used by Navarro et al. [29] to warn drivers of a lane departure. Analogous to this event, in aerospace, exceeding the maximum angle of attack should be avoided at all times. Hence, to bring extra attention to the proximity to stall, a second forcing function is added: a stick shaker following a sinusoidal forcing function with a frequency of 20 Hz and a 5 N amplitude, shown in Fig. 13b. The frequency and amplitude are tuned to match the stick shaker present in other aircraft (such as Boeing [10]), and they were initially designed to represent the aerodynamic buffeting on the control surfaces.

The stick shaker is activated when the aircraft velocity drops below a half of the protected range hence, $(V_{prot} - V_{nom})/2$. In terms of the flight envelope, this means that, close to the left-hand limits of the FE (indicated in Fig. 8 with a dashed-dotted green line), the stick shaker activates. This cue is additional to the existing flight envelope protection as described in Sec. II.B; yet, it is intended to clearly indicate to pilots that the aircraft is moving closer to the lower velocity limit.

E. Change in Spring Coefficient

Previous research increased the spring stiffness to indicate that continued control inputs would result in a hazard, effectively reducing the occurrences of imminent pilot-induced oscillation [32,33], signal a lagging adaptive controller [38], or indicate a helicopter main rotor setting below the limit [37]. In our design, a continued control input results in a hazard when it brings the aircraft closer to the limit. Looking at the FE, it is not just any input that poses a hazard; it is one direction of input that worsens the situation. For example, when the aircraft is close to an overspeed condition, pushing the stick results in a state closer to the actual overspeed, and pulling on the controls is a possible mitigation strategy. Therefore, to show the undesired input, a continuous single-sided spring cue is used, resulting in a haptic profile as shown in Fig. 14c. In this figure, the positive (push) deflection requires more force, indicating an unwanted input as in the preceding examples; a negative (pull) deflection is easier to obtain because the spring stiffness is equal to the nominal value. Note that a change in spring coefficient is only noticeable to pilots when they move the stick away from the neutral point, hence when the pilot is actively controlling. This haptic cue does not necessarily change the control input itself.

Similar to the further spring coefficient increase when the adaptive controller increases lags [38], increasing the spring coefficient can additionally be used to communicate the magnitude of the SFE excursion. As such, starting at the edge of the SFE (the red dashed line in Fig. 8), and up to the edge of the nominal FE (the solid black line in Fig. 8), the stiffness is increased. For the load factor, the velocity, and the angle of attack, we use $\nu$ as generic symbol; the default stiffness is multiplied with a factor $K_\nu$ determined by the gain $K_\nu$ and the severity of the violation:

$$K_\nu = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \nu < \nu_{prot} \\ 1 + K_\nu & \text{if } \nu > \nu_{prot} \\ 1 + K_\nu \frac{\nu - \nu_{prot}}{\nu_{prot} - \nu_{nom}} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$  

(8)
The severity is defined as the ratio of the violation of the SFE \((\nu - \nu_{\text{prot}}\), where \(\nu_{\text{prot}}\) is the value at the edge of the SFE) and the distance between the safe and the nominal FEIs \((\nu_{\text{nom}} - \nu_{\text{prot}}\), where \(\nu_{\text{nom}}\) is the value at the edge of the nominal FE). To guarantee that the pilot has the final authority of the sidestick, the stiffness does not increase when the state exceeds the nominal FE. The haptic display is defined to trigger on the maximum \(\alpha_{\text{max}}\) and protected \(\alpha_{\text{prot}}\) angles of attack instead of the lower velocity; nevertheless, these variables are related through Eq. (1).

To illustrate the working principle in the overspeed condition mentioned before, Fig. 14 shows three instances where the velocity is outside the SFE. Figure 14a represents a situation where the severity is 0.2: the velocity is slightly over \(V_{\text{maxprot}}\). If the situation gradually evolves, an increased velocity results in Fig. 14b, which shows an increased single-sided stiffness with a severity of 0.5. Finally, Fig. 14c shows a condition at or above \(V_{\text{max}}\) where the spring stiffness is maximal; hence, severity is one.

The direction of the stiffness cue is inverted from the discrete cue. That is, the stick feels “stiffer” for backward movement in cases of high angles of attack for positive load factors, and low-velocity violations. All other violations of the SFE will lead to increased stiffness for forward movements. As such, the direction of the stiffness cue informs pilots of control actions that will bring the aircraft closer to its limits: the discrete cue informs which action can resolve the current situation.

As the stiffness changes with continuous variables, no sudden changes in stiffness should occur. Nevertheless, if it occurs, a large change in stiffness could be observed by pilots as a forcing function, hence as an alert and not as a continuous guidance cue. Therefore, to guarantee a smooth change in stiffness, the change is ramped in linearly, similar to Eq. (7).

## IV. Operational Test Scenarios

Two relevant operational scenarios will be discussed in this section, which were chosen because we expect that our haptic interface can provide pilots intuitive and useful information to deal with these events; both scenarios are based on Ref. [35]. The first example describes a case in which pilots are required to maneuver close to the edges of the flight envelope limits: a windshear. The second example shows how pilots can use the system when the flight envelope is shrinking and the envelope limits approach the current aircraft status, ultimately limiting pilots in their control: icing. For both scenarios, we will discuss the origin of the event, the required (or: desired) actions to be taken by the pilot, and how we expect that the new haptic system supports the pilot in deciding and performing the necessary actions. In addition, Sec. IV.C discusses some possible undesired actions, which can be further investigated in our experimental evaluation.

### A. Windshear: Aircraft Operates Close to the Envelope Limits

A windshear is a meteorological phenomenon in which a large cylinder of air suddenly “drops” toward the Earth [39]. When this cylinder plunges on the Earth surface, the air spreads out, as illustrated in Fig. 15, with the numbers in circles corresponding to those used in the following text, as well as the figures that follow. If an aircraft flies through the wind field, the headwind initially causes its airspeed to increase as in point 2. When the pilots do not recognize the windshear and fail to take action, the downwind that follows will push the aircraft toward the ground (points 3 and 4). The next tailwind drastically reduces the velocity (point 5). Near the final stage of the recovery, the aircraft is flying with high throttle settings and almost level flight: a potential problem is an overspeed (point 6). At the end of this event, the pilots hopefully are able to return to normal flight (point 7). All things considered, windshear forms a severe risk to the safety of the flight, especially during takeoff or landing when already close to the ground [40]. Throughout the windshear recovery, it is vital that pilots use all available aircraft performance to climb, irrespective of forward velocity, with one catch: the aircraft should not be stalled.

If this event occurs with the autopilot active, most actions are handled automatically while the pilot maintains a close watch on the autopilot actions. Here, we focus on manual flight control, and the autopilot is assumed to be turned off. The pilots must perform a set of actions, which are put forward by the manufacturer as described in the FCOM [24].

The initial warnings for the pilot of the oncoming event are a visual and an aural warning: a red “WINDSHEAR” message on the PFD and a synthetic voice that announces “windshear” three times. At this point, the FCOM states that the pilots must take the following six actions:

A) Do not change configuration (flaps, slats, gear) until out of the windshear.
B) Set thrust levers at go-around position.
C) Set pitch attitude initially at 17.5 deg.
D) Increase pitch if necessary to minimize loss of height above terrain.
E) Closely monitor flight path and speed.
F) Recover smoothly to normal climb out of shear.

The first step is a straightforward command to make sure that no time is lost before starting the recovery. Next, one must assure that maximum energy is available (step B), followed by an initial pitch attitude to start increasing altitude (step C). Then, steps D and E are crucial to the safety of the aircraft: here, we see a tradeoff between, on the one hand, reducing altitude loss and, on the other hand, maintaining sufficient airspeed. In case of an extreme windshear, this recovery procedure might require pilots to move dangerously close to the limits of the flight envelope, namely, at very low velocities to use all available energy to climb out of the shear. The final step (step F)
assures that, when clear of the dangerous winds (yet still with high throttle settings), the aircraft velocity does not exceed the upper limit.

Throughout the procedure, pilots are likely to work under high workload levels and could develop a mental state of “cognitive tunneling,” heavily monitoring the loss of height [41]. A support to improve the attention division of the pilot is of crucial importance, and we show in the following that our haptic interface can enable this.

The trajectory in the FE of the seven selected timeframes is shown in Fig. 16. For each frame, the leftmost column of Fig. 17 shows the aircraft FEs, with the current aircraft state shown using a circle. The center column shows the corresponding PFDs, with the velocity (left), altitude (right), and attitude (center). The rightmost column of Fig. 17 shows the haptic profile. These frames are used here to show how the haptic interface is working during operations. For example, the first of these frames is the starting point when the windshear warning becomes active; the corresponding FE, PFD, and haptic profile can be seen in, respectively, Figs. 17a–17c.

After the warning is given, our haptic interface is expected to help in the following steps (corresponding to the list of actions stipulated by the FCOM):

C) The pilot must pitch-up the aircraft, and this increases the load factor somewhat (frame 2). If this maneuver is executed too fast, the pilot is informed of the g-loading limit through the load factor protection cues.

D) During this step, as much energy as possible should be used to climb; and the haptic system is expected to help pilots to operate at or close to the flight envelope limits. The initial cue of approaching limits is the discrete cue, corresponding to frame 3 in Fig. 17.

E) As the pilot has to divide attention over two elements of the PFD (the velocity and altitude indicators) and possible cognitive tunneling may develop on the vertical speed, the haptic system is expected to serve as a velocity monitoring aid. This can be achieved by both the continuous spring cue and the change in neutral position for low velocities, as illustrated in frames 4 and 5 in Fig. 17, respectively. Additionally, we expect pilots to use the stick shaker as a possible control aid to “ride the stick shaker,” adjusting the input such that the stick shaker remains on the verge of activation.

F) When approaching the upper limit on velocity, the high-velocity cues alert the pilot of an imminent limit violation with an extra control aid by which the pilot can follow the stick backward position, shown in frame 6 in Fig. 17.

In general, for each of the steps, the discrete haptic pulse cue (frame 3) is expected to first alert the pilot that a FE limit is approaching, and then the continuous spring cue (frame 4) follows to clearly communicate the distance left to the ultimate flight envelope boundaries.

B. Icing: Limits Move Toward the Aircraft

The second scenario we will use to evaluate our haptic interface is an extreme form of ice formation on the aircraft wings. Especially when flying through cold humid air, the risk of such an event is severe [42]. The effect of ice formation is a degradation of the aircraft aerodynamic performance, resulting in a reduced lift from the wings and, with that, an increase in the aircraft minimum velocity. Here, it is assumed that the FEP has an updating algorithm, which was presented with icing implementation in Ref. [35]. The decrease in minimal velocity highlights the main difference with the previous scenario: in this case, the flight envelope shrinks, the FE limits “approach the pilot,” and (s)he must identify this situation properly and act on it.

An example case of such an event is during a manual instrument landing in which the landing is performed in the clouds. If extreme ice accumulation is present, or when the deicing system is not working properly, the ice formation is an inherently slow yet detrimental process. It is very likely that, for considerable time, pilots may not be aware of the deteriorating aerodynamic properties.

In principle, pilots can notice the degradation of the aerodynamic properties due to icing through two clues. First, the increase in drag requires a higher throttle setting; and second, the decrease of lift requires a higher angle of attack.

Especially when the pilot is flying with the autothrust active, the increase in throttle setting can be more difficult to notice and, as Airbus aircraft by default do not have an angle-of-attack indicator, pilots might be unaware of the creeping danger. Nevertheless, the haptic feedback system uses information on the angle-of-attack sensor, and therefore the pilot will get new information without adding another element on the, already comprehensive, visual display.

To illustrate how the state is developing and how the haptic feedback is supplying flight envelope information, Fig. 18 shows five frames of an icing event in which the FE is shrinking. The leftmost column shows the aircraft FEs, with the current aircraft state shown using a circle. The center column shows the corresponding PFDs, with the velocity (left), altitude (right), and attitude (center). The rightmost column shows the haptic profile. Starting from the nominal condition in frame 1, icing forms and the minimal velocity is increasing as stated before. If the pilots do not react to this, the first signal from the haptic display is the discrete cue when exiting the SFE as in frame 2. At this point, the pilots should become aware that something is going on. Additionally, they have received the correct action by the direction of the cue: reduce the angle of attack. When the pilot keeps controlling in the low-velocity region, the increased spring coefficient for negative deflections (pull) in frame 3 indicates that pulling should be executed with caution. Crossing the stick shaker activation threshold gives a clear cue that a stall is imminent, shown by frame 4. Finally, if the pilot still does not react, the state in frame 5 is at the upper angle-of-attack limit where the stiffness is maximum, the stick shaker is active, and the neutral point shift is most observable: all cues that inform the pilot of the proximity of the FE to the state.

C. Possible Undesired Actions

The previous sections discussed the intended use of the proposed haptic feedback system. We now look at possible undesired actions, which are discussed using the concepts of misuse, disuse, and abuse as proposed by Parasuraman and Riley [43].

Misuse is the use of the automation for an unintended goal, typically due to overreliance on the system. In the case of the haptic feedback system, overreliance can result in a lack of scanning the instruments: the pilot might expect the haptic feedback to signal an approaching limit and focus on other tasks besides the primary flight duty. As the feedback system is reliant on sensor measurements, if these sensors fail, the haptic system might not trigger, whereas a scan of the instruments might show the erroneous measurement. In an evaluation experiment, the presence of overreliance on the haptic feedback system might give different results in the scenarios discussed previously: in the case of windshear, the pilot is actively maneuvering the aircraft closer to the limits and more likely to be aware of a closing limit; in the case of icing, the limits move to the current state; and in the case of overreliance, this event can surprise the pilots.

Disuse is deliberately not using the automation available, which is commonly caused by a distrust in the system due to a significant false alarm rate. Looking at the haptic feedback system while assuming that it functions as intended (no false positives), pilots might still consider the haptic feedback as false when it would be perceived as out of tune with respect to the magnitude of the flight envelope protection zones. For instance, the haptic feedback might signal a
Fig. 17  FEs, PFDs, and haptic profiles for the windshear recovery according to the frames from Fig. 15.
limit as close, whereas the pilot does not experience it as such. In that case, the haptic feedback might be considered as distracting when controlling the airplane; in a worse case, the pilots can feel that they are fighting the haptic feedback system. An evaluation of the system therefore has to check that the workload of the pilots does not increase, and that pilot actions and haptic feedback are in line.

Abuse is the automation of functions by designers without due regard for the consequences for human performance. In the haptic feedback design, part of the design parameters (for example, the magnitude of the discrete cue) is heuristically tuned using one test pilot. Due to this heuristic tuning, the haptic feedback might be experienced by some pilots as intrusive. As such, an evaluation has to investigate whether the current setup does not increase workload, and it allows the pilot to keep performing the nominal mission.

V. Conclusions

This paper describes the design of a haptic feedback system, i.e., using force feedback through the control device to provide intuitive information on the state of the aircraft relative to the flight envelope protection. The system 1) informs the pilot about an approaching limit using a discrete cue, 2) indicates a non-desired control direction using the spring coefficient, 3) warns the pilot of a dangerously low velocity using a stick shaker, 4) shows a desired control input during an overspeed event by moving the control device, and 5) indicates the required control input at low velocities when a stick neutral position is not sufficient by moving the control device.

Fig. 18  FE, PFD, and haptic profiles for an icing event illustrating shrinking of the FE.

