DOI

When self-interested agents plan individually, interactions that prevent them from executing their actions as planned may arise. In these coordination problems, game-theoretic planning can be used to enhance the agents’ strategic behavior considering the interactions as part of the agents’ utility. In this work, we define a general-sum game in which interactions such as conflicts and congestions are reflected in the agents’ utility. We propose a better-response planning strategy that guarantees convergence to an equilibrium joint plan by imposing a tax to agents involved in conflicts. We apply our approach to a real-world problem in which agents are Electric Autonomous Vehicles (EAVs). The EAVs intend to find a joint plan that ensures their individual goals are achievable in a transportation scenario where congestion and conflicting situations may arise. Although the task is computationally hard, as we theoretically prove, the experimental results show that our approach outperforms similar approaches in both performance and solution quality.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-21
Number of pages21
JournalApplied Intelligence: the international journal of artificial intelligence, neural networks, and complex problem-solving technologies
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - 2017

    Research areas

  • Best-response, Better-response, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Planning

ID: 30557800