Standard

An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries. / Zhu, Zhengqiu; Chen, Bin; Qiu, Sihang; Wang, Rongxiao; Chen, Feiran; Wang, Yiping; Qiu, Xiaogang.

In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Vol. 15, No. 4, 609, 2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Harvard

Zhu, Z, Chen, B, Qiu, S, Wang, R, Chen, F, Wang, Y & Qiu, X 2018, 'An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries' International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol. 15, no. 4, 609. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040609

APA

Zhu, Z., Chen, B., Qiu, S., Wang, R., Chen, F., Wang, Y., & Qiu, X. (2018). An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 15(4), [609]. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040609

Vancouver

Zhu Z, Chen B, Qiu S, Wang R, Chen F, Wang Y et al. An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2018;15(4). 609. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15040609

Author

Zhu, Zhengqiu ; Chen, Bin ; Qiu, Sihang ; Wang, Rongxiao ; Chen, Feiran ; Wang, Yiping ; Qiu, Xiaogang. / An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries. In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2018 ; Vol. 15, No. 4.

BibTeX

@article{dcc76b446b024c209cde8895edc8aa48,
title = "An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries",
abstract = "Chemical production activities in industrial districts pose great threats to the surroundingatmospheric environment and human health. Therefore, developing appropriate and intelligentpollution controlling strategies for the management team to monitor chemical production processesis significantly essential in a chemical industrial district. The literature shows that playing a chemicalplant environmental protection (CPEP) game can force the chemical plants to be more compliantwith environmental protection authorities and reduce the potential risks of hazardous gas dispersionaccidents. However, results of the current literature strictly rely on several perfect assumptions whichrarely hold in real-world domains, especially when dealing with human adversaries. To addressbounded rationality and limited observability in human cognition, the CPEP game is extended togenerate robust schedules of inspection resources for inspection agencies. The present paper isinnovative on the following contributions: (i) The CPEP model is extended by taking observationfrequency and observation cost of adversaries into account, and thus better reflects the industrialreality; (ii) Uncertainties such as attackers with bounded rationality, attackers with limited observationand incomplete information (i.e., the attacker’s parameters) are integrated into the extended CPEPmodel; (iii) Learning curve theory is employed to determine the attacker’s observability in the gamesolver. Results in the case study imply that this work improves the decision-making process forenvironmental protection authorities in practical fields by bringing more rewards to the inspectionagencies and by acquiring more compliance from chemical plants.",
keywords = "Bounded rationality, Chemical plant environmental protection game, Human cognition, Learning curves, Limited observation",
author = "Zhengqiu Zhu and Bin Chen and Sihang Qiu and Rongxiao Wang and Feiran Chen and Yiping Wang and Xiaogang Qiu",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.3390/ijerph15040609",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
journal = "International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health",
issn = "1660-4601",
publisher = "Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An Extended Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Game on Addressing Uncertainties of Human Adversaries

AU - Zhu, Zhengqiu

AU - Chen, Bin

AU - Qiu, Sihang

AU - Wang, Rongxiao

AU - Chen, Feiran

AU - Wang, Yiping

AU - Qiu, Xiaogang

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Chemical production activities in industrial districts pose great threats to the surroundingatmospheric environment and human health. Therefore, developing appropriate and intelligentpollution controlling strategies for the management team to monitor chemical production processesis significantly essential in a chemical industrial district. The literature shows that playing a chemicalplant environmental protection (CPEP) game can force the chemical plants to be more compliantwith environmental protection authorities and reduce the potential risks of hazardous gas dispersionaccidents. However, results of the current literature strictly rely on several perfect assumptions whichrarely hold in real-world domains, especially when dealing with human adversaries. To addressbounded rationality and limited observability in human cognition, the CPEP game is extended togenerate robust schedules of inspection resources for inspection agencies. The present paper isinnovative on the following contributions: (i) The CPEP model is extended by taking observationfrequency and observation cost of adversaries into account, and thus better reflects the industrialreality; (ii) Uncertainties such as attackers with bounded rationality, attackers with limited observationand incomplete information (i.e., the attacker’s parameters) are integrated into the extended CPEPmodel; (iii) Learning curve theory is employed to determine the attacker’s observability in the gamesolver. Results in the case study imply that this work improves the decision-making process forenvironmental protection authorities in practical fields by bringing more rewards to the inspectionagencies and by acquiring more compliance from chemical plants.

AB - Chemical production activities in industrial districts pose great threats to the surroundingatmospheric environment and human health. Therefore, developing appropriate and intelligentpollution controlling strategies for the management team to monitor chemical production processesis significantly essential in a chemical industrial district. The literature shows that playing a chemicalplant environmental protection (CPEP) game can force the chemical plants to be more compliantwith environmental protection authorities and reduce the potential risks of hazardous gas dispersionaccidents. However, results of the current literature strictly rely on several perfect assumptions whichrarely hold in real-world domains, especially when dealing with human adversaries. To addressbounded rationality and limited observability in human cognition, the CPEP game is extended togenerate robust schedules of inspection resources for inspection agencies. The present paper isinnovative on the following contributions: (i) The CPEP model is extended by taking observationfrequency and observation cost of adversaries into account, and thus better reflects the industrialreality; (ii) Uncertainties such as attackers with bounded rationality, attackers with limited observationand incomplete information (i.e., the attacker’s parameters) are integrated into the extended CPEPmodel; (iii) Learning curve theory is employed to determine the attacker’s observability in the gamesolver. Results in the case study imply that this work improves the decision-making process forenvironmental protection authorities in practical fields by bringing more rewards to the inspectionagencies and by acquiring more compliance from chemical plants.

KW - Bounded rationality

KW - Chemical plant environmental protection game

KW - Human cognition

KW - Learning curves

KW - Limited observation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044717846&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dcc76b44-6b02-4c20-9cde-8895edc8aa48

U2 - 10.3390/ijerph15040609

DO - 10.3390/ijerph15040609

M3 - Article

VL - 15

JO - International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

T2 - International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

JF - International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

SN - 1660-4601

IS - 4

M1 - 609

ER -

ID: 44902907