Arrow’s Theorem Through a Fixpoint Argument

Frank Feys, Helle Hansen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We present a proof of Arrow's theorem from social choice theory that uses a fixpoint argument. Specifically, we use Banach's result on the existence of a fixpoint of a contractive map defined on a complete metric space. Conceptually, our approach shows that dictatorships can be seen as fixpoints of a certain process.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication Proceedings TARK 2019
PublisherElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Pages175-188
Number of pages14
Volume297
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
EventTheoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Toulouse, France
Duration: 17 Jul 201919 Jul 2019
Conference number: 17

Publication series

NameElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS
PublisherOpen Publishing Association
ISSN (Print)2075-2180

Conference

ConferenceTheoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Abbreviated titleTARK
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityToulouse
Period17/07/1919/07/19

Keywords

  • Social choice theory
  • voting
  • Arrow’s impossibility theorem
  • Banach’s fixpoint theorem
  • dictatorship
  • force
  • fixpoint
  • metric

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