DOI

We present a technique for automatically detecting security vulnerabilities in client-side self-contained components, called web widgets, that can co-exist independently on a single web page. In this paper we focus on two security scenarios, namely the case in which (1) a malicious widget changes the content (DOM) of another widget, and (2) a widget steals data from another widget and sends it to the server via an HTTP request. We propose a dynamic analysis approach for automatically executing the web application and analyzing the runtime changes in the user interface, as well as the outgoing HTTP calls, to detect inter-widget interaction violations.
Our approach, implemented in a number of open source ATUSA plugins, called DIVA, requires no modification of application code, and has few false positives. We discuss the results of an empirical evaluation of the violation revealing capabilities, performance, and scalability of our approach, by means of two case studies, on the Exact Widget Framework and Pageflakes, a commercial, widely used widget framework.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 7th joint meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE'09)
EditorsH van Vliet, V Issarny
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages81-90
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)978-1-60558-001-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event7th joint meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE'09) - New York
Duration: 24 Aug 200928 Aug 2009

Conference

Conference7th joint meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE'09)
Period24/08/0928/08/09

ID: 3149904