Boolean Negotiation Games

Nils Bulling, Koen V. Hindriks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsGal A. Kaminka, Maria Fox, Paolo Bouquet, Eyke Hüllermeier, Virginia Dignum, Frank Dignum, Frank van Harmelen
PublisherIOS Press
Pages1748-1749
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-61499-672-9
ISBN (Print)978-1-61499-671-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
EventECAI 2016: 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2016 - World Forum, The Hague, Netherlands
Duration: 29 Aug 20162 Sept 2016
Conference number: 22
http://www.ecai2016.org/

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume285
ISSN (Print)0922-6389

Conference

ConferenceECAI 2016
Abbreviated titleECAI 2016
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityThe Hague
Period29/08/162/09/16
OtherIncluding Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2016
Internet address

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