Standard

CCP game : A game theoretical model for improving the scheduling of chemical cluster patrolling. / Zhang, Laobing; Reniers, Genserik; Chen, Bin; Qiu, Xiaogang.

In: Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 191, 106186, 01.11.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Zhang, Laobing ; Reniers, Genserik ; Chen, Bin ; Qiu, Xiaogang. / CCP game : A game theoretical model for improving the scheduling of chemical cluster patrolling. In: Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 2019 ; Vol. 191.

BibTeX

@article{fe2d9a1819064e3eb4151aa3857692c7,
title = "CCP game: A game theoretical model for improving the scheduling of chemical cluster patrolling",
abstract = "Chemical clusters can be attractive targets for terrorism, due to the extreme importance of them as well as due to the existence of dangerous materials. Patrolling is scheduled for better securing chemical clusters. However, the current patrolling strategies fail on competing with intelligent attackers and therefore can be non-optimal. The so-called chemical cluster patrolling (CCP) game is proposed in this paper. The CCP game employs game theory as a methodology, aiming at randomly but strategically scheduling security patrols in chemical clusters. The patroller and the attacker are modelled as the two rational players in the CCP game. The patroller's strategy is defined as probabilistically traveling within the cluster or patrolling some plants while the attacker's strategy is formulated as a combination of an attack target, the start time of the attack, and the attack scenario to be used. The Stackelberg equilibrium and a robust solution which takes into consideration of the patroller's distribution-free uncertainties on the attacker's parameters are defined for predicting the outcome of the CCP game. Results of the case study indicate that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCP game outperforms both the fixed patrolling route strategy and the purely randomized patrolling strategy.",
keywords = "Chemical cluster security, Game theory, Patrolling game",
author = "Laobing Zhang and Genserik Reniers and Bin Chen and Xiaogang Qiu",
year = "2019",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ress.2018.06.014",
language = "English",
volume = "191",
journal = "Reliability Engineering & System Safety",
issn = "0951-8320",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - CCP game

T2 - Reliability Engineering & System Safety

AU - Zhang, Laobing

AU - Reniers, Genserik

AU - Chen, Bin

AU - Qiu, Xiaogang

PY - 2019/11/1

Y1 - 2019/11/1

N2 - Chemical clusters can be attractive targets for terrorism, due to the extreme importance of them as well as due to the existence of dangerous materials. Patrolling is scheduled for better securing chemical clusters. However, the current patrolling strategies fail on competing with intelligent attackers and therefore can be non-optimal. The so-called chemical cluster patrolling (CCP) game is proposed in this paper. The CCP game employs game theory as a methodology, aiming at randomly but strategically scheduling security patrols in chemical clusters. The patroller and the attacker are modelled as the two rational players in the CCP game. The patroller's strategy is defined as probabilistically traveling within the cluster or patrolling some plants while the attacker's strategy is formulated as a combination of an attack target, the start time of the attack, and the attack scenario to be used. The Stackelberg equilibrium and a robust solution which takes into consideration of the patroller's distribution-free uncertainties on the attacker's parameters are defined for predicting the outcome of the CCP game. Results of the case study indicate that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCP game outperforms both the fixed patrolling route strategy and the purely randomized patrolling strategy.

AB - Chemical clusters can be attractive targets for terrorism, due to the extreme importance of them as well as due to the existence of dangerous materials. Patrolling is scheduled for better securing chemical clusters. However, the current patrolling strategies fail on competing with intelligent attackers and therefore can be non-optimal. The so-called chemical cluster patrolling (CCP) game is proposed in this paper. The CCP game employs game theory as a methodology, aiming at randomly but strategically scheduling security patrols in chemical clusters. The patroller and the attacker are modelled as the two rational players in the CCP game. The patroller's strategy is defined as probabilistically traveling within the cluster or patrolling some plants while the attacker's strategy is formulated as a combination of an attack target, the start time of the attack, and the attack scenario to be used. The Stackelberg equilibrium and a robust solution which takes into consideration of the patroller's distribution-free uncertainties on the attacker's parameters are defined for predicting the outcome of the CCP game. Results of the case study indicate that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCP game outperforms both the fixed patrolling route strategy and the purely randomized patrolling strategy.

KW - Chemical cluster security

KW - Game theory

KW - Patrolling game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049864113&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ress.2018.06.014

DO - 10.1016/j.ress.2018.06.014

M3 - Article

VL - 191

JO - Reliability Engineering & System Safety

JF - Reliability Engineering & System Safety

SN - 0951-8320

M1 - 106186

ER -

ID: 57396877