TY - GEN
T1 - Combined Heat and Power Markets by Double-Sided Auction Mechanisms
AU - Saur, Roland
AU - Yorke-Smith, Neil
AU - La Poutré, Han
N1 - Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.
PY - 2019/9/1
Y1 - 2019/9/1
N2 - In order to reduce CO2 emissions, energy systems using different energy carriers (e.g., heat and power) are becoming more intertwined and integrated. However, coordination between non-cooperative participants of these systems in the combined heat and power domain has been limited to single-sided auctions with one centralised seller. In this paper, we present a double-sided auction mechanism in which prosumers as well as consumers and producers of heat and power can participate. By showing that our mechanism is Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational, we ensure that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy, simplifying the bidding process and thus accommodating agents with limited computational resources. Finally, we show that our mechanism is fiscally sustainable, i.e., Weakly Budget Balanced.
AB - In order to reduce CO2 emissions, energy systems using different energy carriers (e.g., heat and power) are becoming more intertwined and integrated. However, coordination between non-cooperative participants of these systems in the combined heat and power domain has been limited to single-sided auctions with one centralised seller. In this paper, we present a double-sided auction mechanism in which prosumers as well as consumers and producers of heat and power can participate. By showing that our mechanism is Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational, we ensure that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy, simplifying the bidding process and thus accommodating agents with limited computational resources. Finally, we show that our mechanism is fiscally sustainable, i.e., Weakly Budget Balanced.
KW - Combined Heat and Power
KW - Double Sided Auctions
KW - Mechanism Design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075862160&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISGTEurope.2019.8905714
DO - 10.1109/ISGTEurope.2019.8905714
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of 2019 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT-Europe 2019
BT - Proceedings of 2019 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT-Europe 2019
PB - IEEE
T2 - 2019 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT-Europe 2019
Y2 - 29 September 2019 through 2 October 2019
ER -
