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Competition between Cooperative Projects. / Polevoy, Gleb; de Weerdt, Mathijs.

BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. ed. / Bart Verheij; Marco Wiering. 2017. p. 17-31.

Research output: Scientific - peer-reviewConference contribution

Harvard

Polevoy, G & de Weerdt, M 2017, Competition between Cooperative Projects. in B Verheij & M Wiering (eds), BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. pp. 17-31, BNAIC 2017, Groningen, Netherlands, 8/11/17.

APA

Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative Projects. In B. Verheij, & M. Wiering (Eds.), BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 17-31)

Vancouver

Polevoy G, de Weerdt M. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In Verheij B, Wiering M, editors, BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2017. p. 17-31.

Author

Polevoy, Gleb ; de Weerdt, Mathijs. / Competition between Cooperative Projects. BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. editor / Bart Verheij ; Marco Wiering. 2017. pp. 17-31

BibTeX

@inbook{61d50fe0bedd409f952702aae01331b9,
title = "Competition between Cooperative Projects",
abstract = "A paper needs to be good enough to be published; a grant proposal needs to be suciently convincing compared to the other proposals, in order to get funded. Papers and proposals are examples of cooperative projects that compete with each other and require eort from the involved agents, while often these agents need to divide their eorts across several such projects. We aim to provide advice how an agent can act optimally and how the designer of such a competition (e.g., the program chairs) can create the conditions under which a socially optimal outcome can be obtained. We therefore extend a model for dividing eort across projects with two types of competition: a quota or a suc-cess threshold. In the quota competition type, only a given number ofthe best projects survive, while in the second competition type, only the projects that are better than a predened success threshold survive. For these two types of games we prove conditions for equilibrium existence and eciency. Additionally we nd that competitions using a success threshold can more often have an ecient equilibrium than those using a quota. We also show that often a socially optimal Nash equilibrium exists, but there exist inecient equilibria as well, requiring regulation",
author = "Gleb Polevoy and {de Weerdt}, Mathijs",
year = "2017",
month = "11",
pages = "17--31",
editor = "Bart Verheij and Marco Wiering",
booktitle = "BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Competition between Cooperative Projects

AU - Polevoy,Gleb

AU - de Weerdt,Mathijs

PY - 2017/11/8

Y1 - 2017/11/8

N2 - A paper needs to be good enough to be published; a grant proposal needs to be suciently convincing compared to the other proposals, in order to get funded. Papers and proposals are examples of cooperative projects that compete with each other and require eort from the involved agents, while often these agents need to divide their eorts across several such projects. We aim to provide advice how an agent can act optimally and how the designer of such a competition (e.g., the program chairs) can create the conditions under which a socially optimal outcome can be obtained. We therefore extend a model for dividing eort across projects with two types of competition: a quota or a suc-cess threshold. In the quota competition type, only a given number ofthe best projects survive, while in the second competition type, only the projects that are better than a predened success threshold survive. For these two types of games we prove conditions for equilibrium existence and eciency. Additionally we nd that competitions using a success threshold can more often have an ecient equilibrium than those using a quota. We also show that often a socially optimal Nash equilibrium exists, but there exist inecient equilibria as well, requiring regulation

AB - A paper needs to be good enough to be published; a grant proposal needs to be suciently convincing compared to the other proposals, in order to get funded. Papers and proposals are examples of cooperative projects that compete with each other and require eort from the involved agents, while often these agents need to divide their eorts across several such projects. We aim to provide advice how an agent can act optimally and how the designer of such a competition (e.g., the program chairs) can create the conditions under which a socially optimal outcome can be obtained. We therefore extend a model for dividing eort across projects with two types of competition: a quota or a suc-cess threshold. In the quota competition type, only a given number ofthe best projects survive, while in the second competition type, only the projects that are better than a predened success threshold survive. For these two types of games we prove conditions for equilibrium existence and eciency. Additionally we nd that competitions using a success threshold can more often have an ecient equilibrium than those using a quota. We also show that often a socially optimal Nash equilibrium exists, but there exist inecient equilibria as well, requiring regulation

UR - http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:61d50fe0-bedd-409f-9527-02aae01331b9

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 17

EP - 31

BT - BNAIC 2017 pre-proceedings

ER -

ID: 32947932