EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND 
THE TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEX

by
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ABSTRACT. Detractors of European integration and many of its protagonists invoke state territoriality where the social and the spatial come together in a “Territorial-Administrative Complex”. Like the military-industrial complex claiming once to procure security, protagonists claim to guarantee democratic legitimacy. At the same time, the interests of the territorial constituencies prevail over others. The underlying notion of space is absolute and of territory that of a container. Costs and benefits are calculated in terms pertaining to it. The underlying “meta-geometry” is one of boxes-in-boxes, but rather than viewing space as a container, based on academic literature in the matter, planners now pursue soft planning for soft spaces. In the face of the apparently incontestable claim of the Territorial-Administrative Complex to a monopoly on the production of democratic legitimacy, the article points out, albeit rare examples of constitutional theorists challenging this monopoly. Voting in territorial constituencies, they claim, has never been properly argued for, making it an arbitrary institution.

Keywords: European integration, territoriality, soft spaces, democratic legitimacy

Introduction
This article builds on Faludi and Waterhout (2002), Faludi (2010), Dühr et al. (2010) and other sources on the theory and practice, such as it is, of European spatial planning. The planning they write about is controversial and has no prospect of becoming a function of the ‘EU policy-making state’ (Richardson 2012). The message is that the territoriality of the nation state stands in the way, not only of spatial planning, but also of taking European integration to new levels. Under state territoriality, the social and the spatial come together (Mamadouh 2001) in a “Territorial-Administrative Complex”. Many such complexes seamlessly fill the social and physical world. The alternative would be to conceive of state territories, in fact all administrative territories and their governing institutions as malleable constructs embedded in a jumble of cross-cutting spatial networks and social relations. However, there are interests vested in each Territorial-Administrative Complex, in fact in the entire system with its claims to possessing democratic legitimacy.

Democratic legitimacy generally is a matter of growing concern in the European Union (EU), but when push comes to shove, elected member state governments are considered to be more legitimate than EU institutions. Key actors in European integration, governments have to be seen to defend the concerns of their constituencies. From the start this has been problematic for integration.

The next section discusses Jean Monnet considered to have had a key role in bringing European integration about. He pursued another logic dealing with interdependences. In the EU, differences between these two logics continue to manifest themselves. The following section explores the notion of a Territorial-Administrative Complex itself. Like the military-industrial complex, whilst representing the interests of its territorial constituency, it also serves the interests of politicians and bureaucrats, so much so that the Barca Report (Barca 2009) castigates their “rent-seeking” behaviour. The third section discusses works conceptualizing planning rather than in terms of territory, in terms of place and place management. These works do not, however, address the monopoly which the Territorial-Administrative Complex claims on the production of democratic legitimacy. Referring to constitutional theorists, the fourth section goes at least as far as raising questions about this claim. However, the Conclusions admit that there is no clear alternative. More thought is needed to make representative government fit to deal with an interrelated world.

Jean Monnet and European integration
Monnet nowhere addressed space or territory as such but is credited with having been an instigator of European integration. Inevitably this also means integrating state territories. In reconstructing Monnet’s thinking, this part draws on his Mémoires (Monnet 1976) and on a biography under the telling title, one that immediately suggests relevance to spatial planning, of First Statesman of Interdependence (Duchêne 1994).
Monnet never held nor aspired to elected office. He was a negotiator, a facilitator and worldwide networker. Charles de Gaulle appointed him to set up the French Commissariat Général du Plan in 1946. In this capacity, Monnet formed numerous committees with stakeholders working on economic modernization away from parliamentary politics. Elected politicians he thought were beholden to defend a specific concept of the national interest resulting from numerous influences among which the most conservative ones carried the most weight (Monnet 1976, p. 314). Even clear-sighted politicians were hamstrung by their accountability to parliament, dependent as the latter was on public opinion. According to Duchêne (1994, p. 19) Monnet thought that ‘the more democratic a system is and the more representative of domestic interests, the more it emphasises roots rather than horizons. There is no deep or widespread constituency for international ties, which nevertheless exist.’ Duchêne juxtaposes this logic beholden to a territorially defined constituency to a logic of interdependence. That this implies a different spatial logic and different notions of territory is obvious, but when it comes to democratic legitimacy, the logic of government, being one of territorial closure, is hardly ever questioned. Anyhow, the logic of interdependence relies on expertise, personal contacts, imagination and single-minded perseverance in pursuing links between issues.

When it came to establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, a matter of functional integration, it was only logical, therefore, that Monnet as a key advisor wanted to keep national politicians at arm’s length. A simple reading would be that he was for a United States of Europe. His Mémoires invoke this notion, and to this day some courageous – or foolhardy – politicians, the likes of Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt (2012) defend this idea. The academic literature sometimes sees the EU differently, as sui generis, as not fitting into any known categories. The European Commission’s President in 1985–1995, Jacques Delors, at age ninety named Citizen of Europe, has described it as an ‘unknown political object’ (Ross 1995; Schmitter 1996). In talking about a United States of Europe, Monnet’s notion was closer to an unknown object than a federal model proper. The latter would imply something like a European nation, but Duchêne (1994, p. 401) relates Monnet saying, ‘[w]e should not create a nation Europe instead of a nation France’.

Nonetheless, civilizing relations required the joint management of shared problems, Monnet thought, and the right policies were those that ‘reflected the special convictions of tiny, temporarily dominant groups, imbued with the internationalism that flourishes after wars, and working together across frontiers, often against latent opposition at home’ (Duchêne 1994, p. 403). Elsewhere, Duchêne in his biography of Monnet says (Duchêne 1994, p. 409):

In an age of increasingly intense global interactions, Europe may never quite replicate the classic features of a federation … It could for a long time be unclear whether the European Union is moving to the clear-cut federal destination its founding fathers [but apparently not Monnet; AF] assumed or to some different terminus, perhaps a kind of collective geared to the global bargaining of contentious interdependence, a ganglion in a ganglionic international system. European Union is inter alia a way of exploring a new world.

This suggests that Monnet’s intuition – he was no social or political theorist – was one of European integration leading to some new configuration. Rifkin (2004) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2010), all from the US, have expressed similar views.

Monnet’s international background apart – he had been amongst others Deputy-Secretary General of the League of Nations – in De Vichy à la Communauté Européenne, Cohen (2012) points to his advisers, Paul Reuter and Pierre Uri, as his sources of inspiration. Both had been involved in the pre-war Communautarian Movement seeking to transcend class conflict and the divisive parliamentary politics of the Third Republic (Paxton 1997). With the radical Action Française and the French Royalists, this movement had helped shaping the “National Revolution” under Marshall Philippe Pétain and his regime collaborating with Nazi Germany after the defeat of 1940. Massively supported by a population relieved that the fighting was over, the National Revolution created the opportunity for a radical reversal such as France had not known since the end of the Second Empire in 1870 or even the French Revolution in 1789 (Paxton 1997, p. 185). Importantly for this article, there was outright rejection of universal suffrage introduced in the mid-nineteenth century and of party politics emerging around the turn of the twentieth (Rosanvallon 2011), all held responsible for the
defeat. There was also home-grown anti-Semitism and the wish to cuddle up to the victorious Germans. Sometimes the Vichy regime went further in persecuting Jewish refugees and later also French citizens of the Jewish faith than what the Germans required. Being Jewish, Uri himself had been in danger.

Anyway, critics of pre-war French parliamentary politics fitted comfortably into the Vichy establishment, and many of the “Jacobin mandarins” of the high civil service (Rosanvallon 2011, p. 4) did not object. Before the war, more and more politicians had come from the lower classes while administrative positions had remained in the hands of the grands corps drawing on the Parisian elite (Wesseling 2006, p. 239). Vichy promised expert rule, but party politics returned after the war. Communsists had a large following and there was the threat of a renewal of the Popular Front of before the war. This was not lost on the “American Foreign Policy Establishment” to which Jean Monnet with his pre-war contacts had unique access. This formed the backdrop to him keeping his distance from politics and to his trying to undercut – unsuccessfully, it should be said – the influence of governments on European integration in favour of functional expertise. To this day, the EU bears Monnet’s mark, but resistance, not the least from the Territorial Administrative Complex, continues and is even mounting.

The Territorial-Administrative Complex

The politics Monnet distanced himself from is shaped by an all-pervasive territorialism: the business of government being conducted in terms of districts, towns, provinces, countries and regions. In times of statist territorialism more particularly, countries have held pride of place above the other kinds of territorial realms’ (Scholte 2000, p. 47). Territorialism is all-pervasive because constituencies, too, are territorially defined. This section discussed the Territorial-Administrative Complex resulting from privileging them. The allusion to the notorious military-industrial complex is deliberate.

The military-industrial complex has become notorious. The one-time supreme World War Two allied commander and later two-term US President Dwight D. Eisenhower invoked it in his “Good night speech” before handing over to John F. Kennedy, questioning the undue political influence of a network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. A quarter of a century later, US diplomat and commentator George F. Kennan would claim in his Foreword to The Pathology of Power (Cousins 1987) that, were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial complex would have to remain until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy. Presently, the “War on Terror” fulfils the same function, with similar accusations being levelled against the top-secret world created in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is alleged having become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agencies do the same work’ writes The Washington Post after investigations lasting for two years (Priest and Arkin 2010). Like the military-industrial complex, the Territorial-Administrative Complex shapes views and paints a threat scenario, that of loss of democratic legitimacy. Like the military-industrial complex, it makes us believe that there is no alternative. The complex is prominently present in planning where the horizon of politicians is their territory and their constituency with a time horizon until the next election. This is how representative democracy works. Where this entails crossing boundaries, the Territorial-Administrative Complex severely limits the ability of planners to deal with the no-man’s lands (Faludi 2015) of places, to be discussed below.

The inherent logic of each Territorial-Administrative Complex defines what elected representatives can and cannot do. Much like with the military-industrial complex which, like in the Iraq War defines issue according to its own capabilities, this logic may work to the detriment of finding adequate solutions to real, boundary-crossing planning issues. Once again as with the military-industrial complex, the Territorial-Administrative Complex sustains itself respectively for those who occupy positions of power in it. However, it does necessarily so by maintaining definitions that no longer fit the situation. It is based on a meta-geography (Murphy 2008) assuming territories to be closed. So the Territorial-Administrative Complex celebrates territories-as-containers for citizens to whom it ascribes unique identities shaped by the territorial roots and forebears. Where they did not exist, democratic governments have constructed, and continue to construct, their territories and populations. This is of course the story of nation-building, of imposing
standard school curricula, languages and obligations, offering welfare and security in return. Weber (1976) in his work on Peasants into Frenchmen gives an example, often replicated since the times of the French Third Republic.

To reiterate, politicians and administrators do all this for respectable reasons, but also because they owe their livelihood and raison-d’être to the Territorial-Administrative Complex within which they operate. Each complex is said to produce democratic legitimacy by embodying a constituency whose interests it defends and to whom it renders services and provides the structure of meaning to the lives of its citizens. But such complexes are always and necessarily particularistic: come what may, the interests of specific constituencies and their territories prevail.

Driven by quite different concerns and invoking different terminology, the Barca Report castigates the capture of EU Cohesion policies by local elites (Barca 2009). With a brief to give advice to the then Commissioner for regional policy, Danuta Hübner, on the future of EU Cohesion policy, Barca rests his case, implicitly that is; he nowhere mentions the term on a critique of the Territorial-Administrative Complex at work. His source is one of the Background Reports drawing on New Regional Economics. Subsequently published as a paper, it points to research showing that institutions are ‘a fundamental determinant of a region’s or a nation’s economic growth trajectory’. Lagging areas are thus ‘beset by problems of institutional sclerosis, clientelism, corruption, and pervasive rent seeking by durable local elites’. So the affected regions are unlikely ‘to break out of low growth and low productivity traps. Weak institutions may have negative influence on the provision of public goods and on the development and delivery of policies aimed at improving skills or innovation capacity, or other potential sources of growth’ (all three quotes from Farole et al. 2011, p. 1098). From here, the authors launch into a critique of, in the terms of this article, the Territorial-Administrative Complex, noting amongst the reasons why institutional environments are poor the entrenching of ‘existing elites by propping up ineffective, clientelistic institutions and fuelling rent extracting machines’ (Farole et al. 2011, p. 1101).

Barca is of course known for advocating place-based territorial development policies, but he uses the terms region, agglomeration, local area and so forth interchangeably with place, none necessarily a territorial jurisdiction. This amounts to a critique of the Territorial-Administrative Complex couched in terms of a critique of rent-seeking local elites. This implies a critique also of – without invoking that term, because Barca does not draw on geographic thought – the meta-geography underlying.

Much of his effort goes towards suggesting that policies need to be tailor-made to suit local conditions, local once again not coinciding with the territory of local authorities. So, where Barca discusses arguments for external intervention, he claims that proper economic institutions cannot be put into place because they are contrary to the self-interest of local elites, thus the need for outside intervention. In so doing, Barca (2009, p. 21) argues for a new institutional approach, discarding the assumption of local policy makers being benevolent. In the terms of this article, the Territorial-Administrative Complex stands in the way of institutional change, so external intervention is needed to bring about agency, trust and social capital.

A further reason for taking a place-based approach is interdependencies between different public goods and services. They can only be exploited at the local level and through the active involvement of local actors. Economic theory articulates this by saying policies should be place based rather than place neutral (Barca et al. 2012; McCann 2015). As against that, a policy involving financial redistribution to authorities often benefits – here comes again Barca’s basic misgiving – existing rent-seeking elites. So he warns against capture of place-based policies by local elites entrenched, as they are, in their Territorial-Administrative Complex. Negative effects of such capture are inappropriate investments, the maintenance of a dependency culture and the further entrenchment of existing elites and the propping up of ineffective institutions.

In the above, once again, “local” does not mean local government. More broadly speaking Barca (2009, pp. 40–49) criticizes jurisdictional regions, in the terms of this paper Territorial-Administrative Complexes. They are not benevolent actors and not always effective either. Improvement depends on local involvement, in other words on governance. So he advises against jurisdictional regions, local governments amongst them, being the units of intervention of the place-based development policies he recommends. Neither their boundaries nor their governments are coherent with the specific and changing objective of place-based policy. Barca (2009, p. 45) sees inclusive networks, associations, districts
and agencies as alternative coordination frameworks. Their purpose can be to provide one service or bundles of services and they can embrace different administrative levels. Barca thus provides a critique of, and also the outlines of, alternatives to the Territorial-Administrative Complex as a dominant configuration.

The meta-geography underlying

There is literature relevant to the assumption of territory as a container and of the *raison d’être* of the Territorial-Administrative Complex being to keep it spick and span and its constituency happy. To begin with, as indicated, there is a meta-geography underlying: a spatial structure of thought shaping perceptions of the world that ‘casts states as the … most important internal spaces and that treats political–territorial developments at other levels largely in terms of the ideological norms that underpin the modern state system’, says a geographer writing about European integration (Murphy 2008, p. 9). Under this meta-geography, multi-tier systems of government like federations or, indeed, the EU are seen as boxes stacked into larger boxes (Faludi 2010, 2012) with each box a Territorial-Administrative Complex in its own right. This meta-geography constraints politicians and planners and in fact also researchers to operate with variations of ‘methodological nationalism’, being the ‘tendency … to focus on the nation-state as the main unit of analysis in studying social and political life’ (Jeffrey and Schakel 2013, p. 299).

Many authors propose an alternative, relational concept of space. Not the least amongst them is Thrift (2003) pointing out that spaces are constituted by the interactions taking place within them. Harvey (1969) has already posed the ‘relational’ or ‘relative’ alternative to the ‘absolute’ or ‘territorial’ view. Referring to Graham and Healey (1999, p. 62), Hillier (2013, p. 32) points out that the ‘focus on physical – and social – integration of a differentiated, but already existing, urban fabric located in absolute Euclidean space, reveals a traditional essentialist approach to planning which maintains a reductionist consideration of cities as “single, integrated, unitary, material objects”’. Quoting Massey, she insists that, instead of ‘thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can rather be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understanding’ (Hillier 2013, p. 33). This has implications for the Territorial-Administrative Complex and its monopolistic claims, as if there was no outside that carried weight.

Discussing Danish planning, Oleson (2014) invokes Healey, and so do Albrechts and Balducci (2013) discussing the permeable boundaries of metropolitan plans highlighting tensions ‘between the well-known scale and related government structure of a nested hierarchy from large to small or from top to bottom and scale in terms of the reach of relationships in time and space’ and a complex reality (Albrechts and Balducci 2013, p. 23). Referring to Friedmann (1993), Graham and Healey (1999) already criticized what they called the object-centred Euclidean conception of space. Places, they said, must be understood in multiple space times. They thus argued for a better understanding of “multiplex” socially constructed time-space experiences which imply multiple perspectives on space. In her later work, Healey argues that traditional planning concepts reflect:

a view of geography which assumes that objects and things exist objectively in contiguous space and that the dimensions of this space can be discovered by analysis, that physical proximity is a primary social ordering principle and that place qualities exist objectively (Healey 2004, p. 47).

She criticizes the assumption also of networks being contained in a coherent entity called a city. Our social worlds, she says, ‘may stretch well beyond … As a result, the “places” of cities and urban areas cannot be understood as integrated units with a singular driving dynamic, contained within clearly defined boundaries’ (Healey 2007, p. 2).

Her work on place governance ‘with a planning orientation’ (Healey 2010) touches on what this article describes as the Territorial-Administrative Complex, saying that:

those with a “stake” in what happens in a place are not only local residents, or citizens, of a specific administrative-political jurisdiction. “Stakeholders” may come from other places … The webs of relationships that produce and are affected by the qualities of a place are thus potentially very various in spatial reach and temporal span (Healey 2010, p. 32).

This leads her to re-assert place making being a social activity ‘in which meanings and values are created in interaction with lived experiences and,
often, with available formalised scientific evidence’ (Healey 2010, p. 33). Place is not coterminous with any particular administrative jurisdiction. It follows that place government practices need to ‘consider a broad public, with multiple stakes in a place, both now and in the future’ (Healey 2010, p. 50).

All this can be articulated in terms of Territorial-Administrative Complexes and their tendency to promote their own interests rather than any collective good. Indeed, in a passage worth quoting more extensively, Healey (2010, p. 52) says that the twentieth century:

has come to be considered as the age of big governments, centred around the national state as the framer of laws and provider of resources for welfare services … This set up an organisation-al dynamic that created great bastions of government centred on each service around which policy communities developed …

Over time, it was these policy communities that tended to shape political programmes, rather than political ideology or political representation … The democratic welfare state … seemed itself to have become a new form of oppressive bureaucratic state.

In the concluding chapter, she reiterates what place-based governance with a planning orientation is about: a complex mixture of political activity, technical expertise and moral sensibility, adding that it ‘is important to move away from conceiving such relations as a kind of nested hierarchy of systems, each one tiered above the other … Instead, systems are better imagined as overlapping, loosely bounded and “loosely coupled” sets of relations’ (Healey 2010, pp. 226–227).

Healey has been influenced by literature on the “spatial turn”. This article merely points to the summary by Jessop et al. (2008) reiterating what has become common wisdom: that the view of place as a fixed, areal, self-contained, and more or less unique unit of socio-spatial organization has to be rejected. Places must be understood as relationally constituted (Jessop et al. 2008, p. 390). Amongst the four terms around which the authors discuss the spatial turn, this article only mentions territory and place, terms that have already been used frequently. Thus, territory is defined by past, present and emergent frontiers (Jessop et al. 2008, p. 395). Place refers to locales, milieux, cities, sites, regions, localities and to what the article calls globalities. The authors do not elaborate on any but merely invite ‘the reader to add other examples with a view to methodological strategies for investigating the polymorphy of socio-spatial relations’ (Jessop et al. 2008, p. 396). It is this polymorphy that this article juxtaposes to the notion of the Territorial-Administrative Complex as the presumed monopolist on managing space.

Reviewing the literature as of then, Varró and Lagendijk (2013) conclude that “territorially embedded” and “relational and unbounded” conceptions of regions are complementary. With reference English regional planning, Harrison (2013) thus shows the succession of statutory “key diagrams” for North West England reflecting changing emphases on one and the other. He concludes that what is needed are ever-more-complex configurations in order to make emergent strategies compatible with inherited landscapes of sociopolitical organization. This is reminiscent of Healey’s observation that place governance is complex. They may have primarily their jurisdictions in mind, but political representatives and the bureaucracies serving them are embedded in more complex configurations.

All this relates to where the planning literature talks about soft spaces as supplements to – not as replacements of – hard ones. Popularizers of the concept, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009, p. 3) review the relevant literature reflecting ‘an apparent predilection for promoting new policy scales, initially at least through the device of fuzzy boundaries’. Allmendinger et al. (2016, p. 39) review more literature on the interplay between territorial and relational perspectives on space, apply it in research, once again, English planning practice as a complex ensemble of statutory, regulatory visionary, consultative, analytical, administrative, political functions. Such complexes including vision-making also exist in cross-border and transnational planning under European Territorial Cooperation, the third objective of EU Cohesion policy (Ek and Santamaria 2009). Acting on the authority of the European Council, the European Commission also coordinates relevant policies and brokers agreements on concrete actions in the Baltic Sea Area, the Danube Area, the Adriatic and Ionian Sea and the Alpine Space (European Parliament 2015; Gänzle and Kern 2016). The spaces concerned are soft, and so are their planning, such as it is. Referring to situations in Scandinavia, Nilsson et al. (2010) say that such exercises involve the re-negotiation of socially and historically constructed identities. However, the literature discussed does not confront the source on
which Territorial-Administrative Complexes rest their claim to legitimacy, which is what the next section discusses.

**Territorial representation**

In her work already quoted, albeit implicitly, Healey raises the issue of democratic legitimacy. Formally, Healey (2010, p. 69) says networks are:

> held in check by the accountability of each body to its elected politicians and its legal specification of powers and duties. But many governance activities these days involve joint action … Arrangements that are outside formal government, or that involve some combination across government boundaries, raise difficult questions about accountability.

This touches upon the very rationale of the existence of Territorial-Administrative Complexes. Their unique selling point is their monopoly on the production of democratic legitimacy through universal suffrage, long fought over but now a standard to which, at peril of not being recognized as democratic, countries worldwide are encouraged to aspire. This is said to bind citizens together, so much so that their legitimacy allows states to make demands on citizens, including demands to put their lives on the line which is what France did during the Revolutionary Wars, threatened as she was by foreign monarchies and exiled royalists invading, famously, the first occasion for La Marseillaise being sung by citizen soldiers at the Battle of Valmy. Less dramatically, but more insistently, citizens pay taxes to maintain the Territorial-Administrative Complex to which they belong, and the complex in turn supports a level of welfare considered essential, a mutual relation felt particularly strongly in France (Faludi et al. 2015).

Needless to say, the Territorial-Administrative Complex is a historic construct. It has been invented, fought over and has become common, so much so that its continuing dominance goes unquestioned. Although having become naturalized in the eyes of many, the complex is not immutable, and this is also true for the production of democratic legitimacy.

There are variations in the way legitimacy can be achieved, and this already proves that its production can and must be subject to critical examination. Credited with having said that democracy is the worst system of government except for all other known systems, what for instance Churchill must have had in mind was what he was familiar with, the “first past the post” system. Other countries have proportional representation giving smaller parties a better chance to be represented. It should be clear also that the drawing of boundaries of electoral districts influences outcomes, sometimes making a mockery of the principle of equal representation. A striking example is the elections to the European Parliament. Proportional representation is mandatory, even in the UK where it is otherwise absent, but the number of seats per member state is heavily skewed in favour of the smaller ones. Necessarily electoral districts are contained, therefore, within member states. Rather than being truly European, elections to the European Parliament thus become indicators of the popularity of national governments.

The more general point which this section raises is democratic legitimacy being produced through territorial representation. Office holders depend on the Territorial-Administrative Complex, so they want to hold on to it. Gone are the days when serving was a gentlemanly obligation of otherwise independent personalities. If not the livelihood – sometimes that too – then at least the career prospects of politicians and indirectly sometimes also of bureaucrats depend on electoral results. The pursuit of the public good may be secondary to remaining in power. Surely, therefore, one must critically examine ways in which democratic legitimacy comes about. To do so should not lay oneself open to the accusation of being undemocratic. In fact, such critical discussion takes place all the time. The procedures for arriving at legitimate decisions, including voting, general suffrage and the formation of parties, are anything but self-evident. They have developed over time and are being developed further by addressing new concerns and adding new dimensions to the process.

Scharpf (1999) distinguishes “input legitimacy” generated through the electoral process from “output legitimacy” produced by delivering acceptable results. Similarly, Rosanvallon (2011) points to rival claims of technical elites, the likes of Monnet and his advisers, to represent the public interest, but what is it? Representation by way of elections has come about to further “local interests” leading to the rallying cry of the American Revolution that taxation without representation is tyranny (Pitkin 1976, p. 3). Involving many heated discussions about the modalities documented in the Federalist Papers, representation has become popular representation, but
Pitkin nowhere discusses representation being by territories. At the same time, she asks whether representatives are bound by what their constituents want. Her conclusion is that representatives must look after the public interest and be responsive to public opinion, except insofar as non-responsive-ness can be justified in terms of the public interest (Pitkin 1976, p. 224). Surely, not bowing to public opinion could also be justified in terms of a definition of the public interest wider than what pertains to the territory concerned. However, the crux is that this may reduce the chances of the representative to be re-elected, so this may not happen as often as it should.

In a world that no longer fits into boxes, one where territorial and functional areas overlap, forming places of many shapes and sizes criss-crossing jurisdictions, the public itself is not clearly circumscribed but rather diffuse. The monopoly of territorial representation on the production of democratic legitimacy no longer fits this situation. Surprisingly, there seems little discussion of this amongst constitutional theorists. An exception is a US author, Rehfeld (2008, p. ii), asking: ‘why do democratic governments define political representation in this way? Are territorial electoral constituencies commensurate with basic principles of democratic legitimacy?’ He claims that ‘the use of territory for representation has never been explained or justified … In never having been contested … territorial constituencies qualify as an arbitrary institution’ (Rehfeld 2008, p. xv). Urbinati and Warren (2008, p. 396) concur: the ‘idea that constituencies should be defined by territorial districts has been all but unquestioned until very recently’. It follows that ‘the use of territory for representation has never been explained or justified … In never having been contested … territorial constituencies qualify as an arbitrary institution’ (Rehfeld 2008, p. xv). Urbinati and Warren (2008, pp. 396–397). So the ‘geography-based constituency definition introduces an arbitrary criterion … Exclusion works not on people … but rather on issues, since residence-based constituencies define residency-based interests as most worthy of political conversation and decision’ (Urbinati and Warren 2008, p. 397).

For the US congress, Rehfeld proposes random constituencies as an alternative. Schmitter (2009, pp. 487–488) agrees that the ‘territorial base of representation has become so habitual that it is almost never questioned’, adding that territory ‘may have seemed the “natural” and logistically effective solution in the past, but why continue to rely so exclusively upon it in the present?’ Schmitter cannot agree, however, that random constituencies would be a solution. For the purpose of this article, this is neither here nor there. The point was merely to show the existence of alternatives to representation being organized by geographically circumscribed districts.

What the reader might take from this is to be circumspect about conventional arguments extolling the dominance of territorial government on grounds of democratic legitimacy. One must be open for experimenting with other forms.

Conclusions
The point has not been to criticize democracy as such but to ask whether the manner in which it has been operationalized through territorial representation is the best way, in so doing laying bare systemic problems which this way of producing democratic legitimacy creates. Arrangements for dealing with polymorphic and multidimensional social relations in a territorial-cum-relational reality are – and are sure to remain – opaque, though. This is the price to be paid for recognizing complexity. The same is emphatically true for European integration. Representative government, as against this, suggests that clear choices can be put before territorial constituencies as the ultimate arbiters of policies. The problem is, this may lead to the construction of a make-believe world, evident in Eurosceptic positions. This make-believe world suggests that present-day reality can be contained within existing Territorial-Administrative Complexes. In the case of the EU, the boxes are of course the nation-states, but the same applies throughout the entire system of government. It is not the size of government areas that is the principal problem. Maybe some jurisdictions are too small and others too large. Maybe adjusting the reach of an existing Territorial-Administrative Complex can fix some problems, but this is a partial solution at best. Space and place and territory come in multiple and overlapping forms. The essay has discussed literature suggesting that not only space, but also the production of legitimacy as such needs to be reconsidered. Admittedly, neither that literature nor this essay offers clear alternatives to the present system. As Allmendinger and Haughton (2009, p. 631) say, formal scales of planning are not becoming irrelevant, but planning at formal scales is not sufficient. Such planning veers towards what Faludi (2016) calls ‘absolutistic territorialism’. What is needed are more sophisticated frameworks that
reflect how complex, associational networks work with and through the boundaries of different institutional geographies where the material practices of planning, as Allmendinger et al. (2016) have it, take place. For institutional geographies read, Territorial-Administrative Complexes. They need to exhibit more dynamism and adaptability, but this may of course run against their grain.

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