Detect Me If You... Oh Wait.
An Internet-Wide View of Self-Revealing Honeypots

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Abstract

Open-source honeypots are a vital component in the protection of networks and the observation of trends in the threat landscape. Their open nature also enables adversaries to identify the characteristics of these honeypots in order to detect and avoid them. In this study, we investigate the prevalence of 14 open-source honeypots running more or less default configurations, making them easily detectable by attackers. We deploy 20 simple signatures and test them for false positives against servers for domains in the Alexa top 10,000, official FTP mirrors, mail servers in real operation, and real IoT devices running telnet. We find no matches, suggesting good accuracy. We then measure the Internet-wide prevalence of default open-source honeypots by matching the signatures with Censys scan data and our own scans. We discovered 19,208 honeypots across 637 Autonomous Systems that are trivially easy to identify. Concentrations are found in research networks, but also in enterprise, cloud and hosting networks. While some of these honeypots probably have no operational relevance, e.g., they are student projects, this explanation does not fit the wider population. One cluster of honeypots was confirmed to belong to a well-known security center and was in use for ongoing attack monitoring. Concentrations in an another cluster appear to be the result of government incentives. We contacted 11 honeypot operators and received response from 4 operators, suggesting the problem of lack of network hygiene. Finally, we find that some honeypots are actively abused by attackers for hosting malicious binaries. We notified the owners of the detected honeypots via their network operators and provided recommendations for customization to avoid simple signature-based detection. We also shared our results with the honeypot developers.

1 Introduction

Honeypots have long been a valuable tool for network monitoring, helping to analyze and detect attacks against resources in the network. Beyond protecting a network, academia and the security industry have deployed larger collections of honeypots—i.e., honeynets—to observe attack trends across networks and the Internet as a whole. They expose what vulnerabilities are targeted, capture malicious binaries and enable observation of intruders.

When it comes to low-interaction honeypots, many operators rely on open-source software to emulate vulnerable network services. However, this use of emulation also implies weaknesses, as the attacker might leverage discrepancies between the emulation and the actual service to detect and avoid these types of honeypots.

Various tools and services for detecting honeypots have been released\cite{43,45,50,52}. These automated tools allow attackers to distinguish honeypots from real systems without having to dive into intricacies of how to leverage telltale signs for large-scale detection. The tools range from resource-intensive to lightweight and highly scalable. An example of the latter is the use of simple signatures that can be deployed via tools like Zmap\cite{26}, as most recently was done by Vetterl and Clayton\cite{60}. Such lightweight approaches offer attackers a low-cost solution to detecting and avoiding honeypots. The question is, of course, how many honeypots are discoverable by simple signatures. In other words, how many honeypot developers make no effort to avoid discovery?

The objective of our study is to investigate the prevalence of honeypots that fail to take even the most basic precautions against detection by attackers. We present a simple signature-based detection method that looks for the characteristic responses—e.g., banners and web contents—of the default installations of open-source honeypots. (Though simple, we actually find a larger population of honeypots than the recent and more sophisticated approach of \cite{60}.) To put it differently, our main goal is to find out if, where, and why operators forsake even the most minimal effort to hide their honeypots. Rather than improving on existing honeypot detection techniques, we use 20 signatures for the characteristic responses of 14 open-source honeypot solutions. We first test these signatures for false positives and then run them against available scan data from Censys and against additional scan results that
we collected ourselves. In sum, the contributions of this paper are:

• Using 20 signatures, we were able to discover 19,208 honeypots across 637 Autonomous Systems for which not even a minimal attempt was made to hide them. Concentrations are found in research networks, but also in enterprise, cloud and hosting networks. In terms of geography, we observe high prevalence of these honeypots in Taiwanese networks.

• We explore potential explanations for the prevalence of default honeypots by contacting their operators. Some of these are probably operationally irrelevant, but we also find honeypots deployed as part of professional security operations and project of a national research institute.

• We find that some of the honeypots pose security threats themselves, as they are abused by attackers for hosting malicious binaries.

• We informed developers and operators of the easy discoverability of their honeypots and provided simple recommendations to prevent this.

The prevalence of easily discoverable honeypots is worrying. It seems prudent to assume that at least some attackers will leverage these evasion techniques or share their results in the form of blacklist. This means that all measurement projects and attack monitoring efforts based on these honeypots will be biased towards certain types of attacks and attackers – i.e., the less sophisticated ones. These biased observations potentially suck resources away from detecting and observing more skilled attackers. Last, but not least, we have also observed that poorly maintained honeypots can themselves become tools for the attackers. With our study, we aim to contribute to improving the security practices around honeypot deployment and safeguarding the validity of the measurement of attack trends.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a related work. In Section 3, we outline a method to detect open-source honeypots. In Section 4, we describe our experiments. In Section 5 we discuss the experiment results. In Section 6, we describe ethical considerations and responsible disclosure. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.

2 Related Work

We use the term honeypot to refer a decoy system that are extensively leveraged to obtain threat information [3, 30], [31,32,47], capture malicious binaries [48,62] and to detect previously-unseen attacks [46,49]. Nawrocki et al. give a comprehensive overview of known honeypots [33].

Honeypot design: There is a wealth of work on honeypot design, roughly divided among on two types of designs: low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots. The latter provides a truly vulnerable system, thus allowing the attacker to interact with the application or service. The former type provides is less realistic, but it prevents hijacking and provides more control over what the attacker can do, as it emulate only a part of network services.

Many low-interaction honeypots are based on open-source. Table 1 provides an overview. The Honeynet Project is a popular organization that is dedicated to investigating the latest network attacks [57]. It has developed many open-source honeypots and voluntaries all over the world are deploying these honeypots. Similarly, there are many other services that share open-source honeypots. It is not surprising for operators to deploy these honeypots without changing their settings. For this reason, we focus on the discoverability open-source honeypots. Our findings provide input for design decisions regarding to their discoverability.

Honeypot detection: There is a rich literature on honeypots detection and evasion [5,29]. Various studies have showed how to distinguish between regular servers and honeypots by detecting the virtual environment and debugger [27], by using the latency of the network links [61], by sending out unmodified malicious traffics [42], by collecting evidence of the machine [6] or by fingerprinting network data [10].

Over time, automated tools for detecting honeypots have been released. Honeypot Hunter [50] is a tool to validate proxy from honeypot. Nmap [40] is one of the most well-known scanner that has signatures to detect known honeypots. The famous vulnerability scan tool Metasploit [44] also has a module to detect Kippo [18]. There are also services that perform honeypot detection. Honeyscore [52] is a service that rates the likelihood of an IP address being connected to a honeypot by drawing on Shodan [53].

A related body of work is the extension of large-scale scanning tools and techniques such as ZMap [26], to detect honeypots. Various studies have showed how to detect honeypots by systematically generating fingerprints for 9 different honeypots and scanning the Internet [60], by finding publicly accessible Industrial Control Systems on the public IPv4 address [36]. Similar to these studies, we base our approach on Internet-wide scanning tools. We use Censys data [8], which logs the results of ongoing ZMap scans, and combine it with our own scans. Our study contributes to this literature; not by improving the detection capability as such, but by providing a simple lightweight approach that still manages to uncover a large population of honeypots – larger, in fact, than via the more novel approach of [60]. That being said, our main goal is not to advance detection, but rather to find out if, where, and why operators forsake even the most minimal effort to hide their honeypots.

Detection resistance: In light of improved detection techniques, researchers have developed more stealthy honeypots,
in order to observe further attacks. Various studies have shown how to develop stealthy honeypots by revising a small part of the toolkit code of Honeypot [39] and appropriately patching the operating system to counter fingerprint attacks [61], by developing a system that redirect attacking service connections to the honeypot and redirect non-attacking service connections or probing connections to the production servers [51], by proposing a method to distinguish honeypots from real bots and provide a higher chance to join botnets [35], or by reacting to botnets with an intelligent deceptive response to improve the depth of deception [7].

Vise verse, researches have revealed how human actors are affected from the underlying environment by implementing honeypots with different properties [58], or by proposing a mathematical model of what would make a computer system to pretend as if a fake honeypot and scare away smarter attackers [38]. This demonstrates an ongoing arm race between honeypot operators and attackers. Indeed for sure, honeypot operators should take care of detection resistance.

To the best of our knowledge, very little research has been done for surveying the prevalence of honeypots across the Internet. Given the diversity of honeypots and their varying degrees of discoverability, this is a hard task. We aim to survey a specific subset of this population: open-source honeypots that are running with the default configuration, as well as identify where concentrations of such honeypots occur. This raises new questions about the incentives of honeypot operators.

## 3 Signature-based Honeypot Detection

In this section, we outline our method to detect 14 open-source honeypots, listed in Table 1. In order to perform Internet-wide scans for these honeypots, we focused on their characteristic responses that can be obtained by a single request packet so that the detection can be implemented with scalable scanners like ZMap [26].

We use 3 existing signatures implemented in Nmap for detecting 2 open-source honeypots, that is Nepenthes (FTP) and Dionaea (FTP, HTTP). For the remaining honeypots, we ran and scanned each of them in our local environment to find characteristic responses. We were able to create 8 signatures for 5 honeypots. For 7 honeypots, we could not find any characteristic response. We investigated their source code and were able to develop a further 9 signatures for these honeypots. In sum, we created 17 signatures for 12 open-source honeypots and by combining them with the 3 Nmap signatures for 2 open-source honeypots, we used 20 signatures in total for detecting 14 open-source honeypots. Table 2 summarizes the signatures. We categorize our signatures into: banner, HTTP response, and error response. We show details of each signature in Appendix, listed in Table 7.

**Banner:** Banner is the string that is returned first when connecting to a service. Services such as FTP, SSH, and Telnet can return a banner. Telnet service often sends negotiation option data before sending the actual banner string. For simplicity, we treat this option data as part of the banner. We find that the default banners of many open-source honeypots are unique enough to be used as signatures for their detection. We compared all FTP and Telnet banners of the honeypots with 694 FTP banners and 1,056 Telnet banners registered in Nmap-service-probe and found no match, indicating that these honeypot banners are indeed different from those common services that Nmap can identify. We note that it is technically easy to change the banners of the honeypots to avoid detection since they are indeed open source. Many of them even have a configuration file so that operators can customize the banner without changing the source code of the honeypot.

**HTTP response:** For those honeypots running HTTP services, the default HTTP response can be an easy signature for their detection. Indeed, we found that all 8 open-source honeypots that run HTTP service responded with some unique patterns if used in their default configuration (e.g., a hardcoded timestamp in HTTP header, unique HTML content, fixed response for any requests). Like banners, the HTTP response of these honeypots can be rather easily customized to avoid detection.

**Error response:** We found that intentionally erroneous requests were poorly handled by some of the honeypots and their responses are unique enough to be used as a signature. For example, an SSH negotiation with a non-existing SSH version would trigger a unique error message of some honeypots.

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### Table 1: Open-source Honeypots and Listening Port (TCP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honeypot</th>
<th>Version (Installed date)</th>
<th>Listening Port (TCP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kippo</td>
<td>0.013 (2017)</td>
<td>22*, 23*, 2222, 24722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catbear</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>21*, 23*, 2222, 2223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>softologger</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFTPel</td>
<td>10/10/2017</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telnet honeypot</td>
<td>0.094/2017</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaunpipe</td>
<td>3.1.3-dev</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shockpot</td>
<td>10/18/2017</td>
<td>80*, 8080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wordpot</td>
<td>0.09/2017</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoneyHoneypot</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>80, 7542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compot</td>
<td>0.5-0.5-default-template</td>
<td>80, 102, 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepenthes</td>
<td>0.2.2</td>
<td>21, 25, 22, 80, 110, 135, 139, 143, 230, 443, 465, 995, 995, 1023, 1025, 2103, 2105, 2107, 2745, 3127, 3140, 3372, 5000, 5554, 6129, 10000, 17500, 27347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dionaea</td>
<td>0.1.0</td>
<td>21, 22, 80, 135, 443, 445, 1433, 1723, 3306, 5060, 5061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amun</td>
<td>0.2.3-devel</td>
<td>21, 35, 42, 106, 110, 135, 139, 143, 443, 455, 554, 587, 617, 1023, 1025, 1080, 1111, 1581, 1900, 2101, 2103, 2954, 2967, 2968, 3127, 3126, 3268, 3372, 3839, 3628, 5000, 5166, 5554, 6070, 6101, 6129, 7144, 7547, 8080, 9999, 10203, 27347, 38292, 41523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that port numbers with asterisk (*) indicate target port that honeypot operators additionally set up for further observation.
Table 2: Signature Category of Open-source Honeypots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honeypot</th>
<th>Signature Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepenthes (21/TCP, FTP)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dionaea (21/TCP, FTP)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amun (21/TCP, FTP)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kippo (22/TCP, SSH)</td>
<td>Error response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowrie (22/TCP, SSH)</td>
<td>Error response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowrie (23/TCP, Telnet)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>telnetlogger (23/TCP, Telnet)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTPot (23/TCP, Telnet)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telnet IoT honeypot (23/TCP, Telnet)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoneyPy (23/TCP, Telnet)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amun (25/TCP, SMTP)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glastopf (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shockpot (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wordpot (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoneyThing (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compot (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dionaea (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amun (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoneyPy (80/TCP, HTTP)</td>
<td>HTTP response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amun (143/TCP, IMAP)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that signatures with asterisk (*) are existing signatures registered in Nmap-service-probe.

We note that our signature can be used for honeypot detection with sending just a single fixed request packet and capturing the corresponding response packet from the target host. This allows us to implement the detector with ZMap and thus Internet-wide scans are possible. Since SSH honeypots Kippo [18] and Cowrie [13] have similar error responses, we can distinguish these honeypots from each other with more interactions. We show details of the detection flow in Appendix, explained in figure 3.

4 Experiments

In this section, we first evaluate the accuracy of the signatures to ensure a sufficiently low rate of false positives. We then match our signatures with scan data from Censys [8] and our own scans using ZMap [9, 26].

4.1 Evaluating Accuracy

As we derived our signatures from the default installations of the open-source honeypots and their source codes, it is confirmed that the signatures do match the characteristic responses of these honeypots. The key question regarding accuracy is, therefore, the rate of false positives, rather than false negatives. We evaluate the false positive rate by matching the signatures to four datasets of benign services that we assume to contain no honeypots.

Alexa Ranking: First, we used Alexa top 10,000 ranking [1] for our evaluation. It is highly unlikely that the high-ranked domains are actually connected to a honeypot. We conducted a DNS lookup for the 10,000 domains, which results in 8,744 unique IP addresses. We then scanned these addresses and matched the results against our 20 signatures. We found open ports around services for which we have signatures. Since Alexa ranking is web site ranking, most of them were running on HTTP: 8,581. We also found 749 open ports for FTP, 1,128 for SSH, 53 for Telnet, 841 for SMTP, and 557 for IMAP. None of these results contained matches – in other words, we found no false positives.

Official FTP Mirrors: The second data source consisted of the official mirrors of Ubuntu [59], Apache [55], and CentOS [56] for evaluation of FTP honeypot signatures. We assume that these official mirrors contain no honeypots. We compiled a list of 531 unique domains running an FTP server: 299 domains for Ubuntu, 119 domains for Apache, and 258 domains for CentOS. The DNS lookup on these domains resulted in 457 IP addresses. Again, the results of our scans of these addresses contained no matches. Moreover, as described earlier, we confirmed that none of the honeypot FTP banners matched with 694 FTP banners registered in Nmap, showing honeypot banners are different from common FTP services that can be identified by Nmap.

University Email Domains: Third, we used university email domains for evaluation of the SMTP and IMAP honeypot signatures. We used the university domains of the GitHub repository [23] to make a list of domains and requested a DNS lookup to get their corresponding MX records. We collected 6,463 unique IP addresses where SMTP service was open and 1,683 unique IP addresses where IMAP service was open. We conducted a scan and confirmed that there were no false positives for any of these IP addresses.

IoT Device Telnet Services: Unlike other network services, Telnet service is often not meant to be provided for global use. Instead, it is running on many IoT devices like IP camera and routers [2]. We could only obtain six real IoT devices running Telnet services including four routers and two network storages. Our signatures did not create any false positives against the six devices. Moreover, we recall that our Telnet signatures did not match with any of the existing 1,056 banners registered in Nmap, showing their uniqueness.

4.2 Investigating Prevalence of Honeypots

After establishing that our approach has a sufficiently low false positive rate, we matched the signatures against Internet-wide scan data to measure the prevalence of default installations of open-source honeypots. While we could have scanned the whole Internet by ourselves using ZMap, we decided to take advantage of Censys data. The data contains periodic Internet-wide scan results using ZMap and ZGrab [25] and that we can reduce additional scans for the investigation.

The Censys data we used for the investigation was from Apr 9, 2018 to Apr 15, 2018. The Censys data contained 16.2M hosts with 21/tcp (FTP) open, 8.4M hosts with 23/tcp (Telnet) open, 13.6M hosts with 25/tcp (SMTP) open, 64.6M hosts with 80/tcp (HTTP), and 9.1M hosts with 143/tcp (IMAP) open, respectively. Among our 20 signatures, 14 of them could be directly matched with Censys data without additional scans (i.e. Censys data contained all necessary requests...
and responses to test these signatures). For the remaining 6 signatures, which could not be directly matched with Censys data, we first created more generic signatures to extract the candidate hosts from Censys data and then scanned the candidate hosts by ourselves using ZMap with the 6 signatures. Because the time when we performed our own scan (May 19, 2018) was about one month after Censys scan, we might underestimate the popularity of the honeypots due to their IP address churn. In order to measure the change over time, we also scanned the detected honeypots by the 14 signatures one month after the last Censys scan.

Table 3 summarizes the detection results. The first column is our honeypot signature. The second column is the number of honeypots detected from Censys data. The third column is the number of honeypots detected by our own scans on the candidates extracted from Censys data. The fourth column is the number of honeypots detected from the combination of Censys and our own scans with the 6 remaining signatures. The fifth column is the surviving ratio of honeypots within the one month. The sixth column is the detection result of related work [60]. In summary, we detected 17,698 honeypots from Censys data by the 14 signatures. The most popular ones were telnetlogger with 2,984 hosts, Glastopf with 2,487 hosts, and Dionaea with 2,220 hosts. From the combination of Censys and our own scans with the 6 remaining signatures, we detected 1,510 honeypots with 2 popular solutions Cowrie with 998 hosts and Kippo with 505 hosts. In total, we detected 19,208 honeypots from 14 open-source honeypots. Compared to the related work [60] that detected 7,605 honeypots from 9 open-source honeypots, our result shows that our lightweight approach has the same or even better ability to detect honeypots.

Our re-scanning after the Censys scan revealed that at least 6,333 (35.8%) of 17,698 honeypots were still in operation after one month. Considering the lost honeypots by IP address churn, this gives us an impression of how many of these honeypots remained alive for more than a month. For most honeypots, a significant fraction was still running at the later time. There is one notable exception: almost all of the nearly 3,000 telnetlogger honeypots have disappeared. All of these honeypots were operated in the IP address range of a French research institution.

We also compared the FTP and Telnet banners of the honeypots against the total population of banners in the Censys data. Tables 4 and 5 summarize how infrequent the banners of honeypots occur in the population. This implies that they can be used as detection signatures. Instead, an easy solution to prevent detection would be to use the popular banners.

Table 4: Frequently observed FTP banner on the Internet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>IP Ratio</th>
<th>Banner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1    | 5,436,627 33.5% | \texttt{220 Microsoft FTP Service}
| 2    | 800,771 4.93% | \texttt{220 Serv-U FTP Server v6.4 for Windows}
| 3    | 518,558 3.19% | \texttt{220 FTP service ready.\n}
| 4    | 343,316 2.11% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 2.2.2)\n}
| 5    | 216,232 1.33% | \texttt{220 Ftp firmware update utility}
| 6    | 205,967 1.27% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)\n}
| 7    | 141,608 0.872% | \texttt{220 FTP service ready.\n}
| 8    | 119,395 0.736% | \texttt{220 Serv-U FTP Server v6.4 for Windows}
| 9    | 118,699 0.731% | \texttt{220 Microsoft FTD Server\n}
| 10   | 85,602 0.527% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 3.0.1)\n}
| ...  | ...      | Dionaea banner
| ...  | ...      | Amun banner
| ...  | ...      | Nepenthes banner
| Total | 16,232,733 100% |        |

Table 5: Frequently observed Telnet banner on the Internet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>IP Ratio</th>
<th>Banner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1    | 1,720 0.0106% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 3.0.1)\n}
| 2    | 1,720 0.0106% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 3.0.1)\n}
| 3    | 1,720 0.0106% | \texttt{220 (vsFTPd 3.0.1)\n}
| 4    | ...      | Nepenthes banner
| 5    | ...      | Dionaea banner
| 6    | ...      | Amun banner
| 7    | ...      | Nepenthes banner

5 Discussion

Discovering honeypots in the wild is a daunting task as by design they are meant to be deceptive. While our approach proved that it is possible to easily map off-the-self honeypots that are running default configuration, it is not feasible to map at scale all the honeypots that actually exist that are
we have studied the patterns of honeypot traffic, and we find that opportunities for criminal activities are well configured. For example, among the 14 open-source honeypots which we investigated, Conpot developers mention customization and explain how operators can tailor their honeypot (e.g., HTTP headers, response latency). We believe this is the main reason why we couldn’t find many Conpot honeypots with default settings. We leave for future research detecting customized honeypots, and focus on understanding the prevalence of honeypots with default settings.

We now investigate the population of honeypots discovered via the scan data. We first turn to the locations of the main concentrations of honeypots can be found, both in terms of geography and Autonomous Systems (AS). We then conduct an investigation of their lifespan. Finally, we discuss feedback we received after reaching out to several of the network operators with significant concentrations of honeypots in their networks. We end with another angle of this problem: the active abuse of these honeypots by criminals.

5.1 Location

We used GeoIP2 ISP Database [34] to acquire AS as well as ipinfo.io [28] to acquire geographical information for the population of honeypots. Table 6 summarize the number of honeypots per /16 of the top 20 ASes. We then conduct an investigation of their lifespan. Finally, we discuss feedback we received after reaching out to several of the network operators with significant concentrations of honeypots in their networks. We end with another angle of this problem: the active abuse of these honeypots by criminals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>IP Ratio</th>
<th>Banner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,651,675</td>
<td>28.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>176,906</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>120,561</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>102,624</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>100,768</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>86,023</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>64,764</td>
<td>0.767%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>53,498</td>
<td>0.633%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>41,949</td>
<td>0.497%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>39,792</td>
<td>0.245%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>0.035%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>0.0212%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>0.00205%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0000037%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 16,252,233 (2095)

Table 5: Frequently observed Telnet banner on the Internet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>IP Ratio</th>
<th>Banner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,651,675</td>
<td>28.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>176,906</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>120,561</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>102,624</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>100,768</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>86,023</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>64,764</td>
<td>0.767%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>53,498</td>
<td>0.633%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>41,949</td>
<td>0.497%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>39,792</td>
<td>0.245%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>0.035%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>0.0212%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>0.00205%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.0000037%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 16,252,233 (2095)

Table 6: AS, Country and Network Type of Honeypot Population.
lations cannot explain their high prevalence across different networks in Taiwan. To get a better sense of the factors that might explain these concentrations, we reached out to a number of network operators using public contacts.

### 5.2 Lifespan

To understand the lifespan of the honeypots, we analyze close to one year historical data of Censys data (Aug 8, 2017 to Jul 17, 2018). Figure 1 shows the number of detected honeypots in different ASes in one year. The number of detected honeypots is mostly steady except that there are several events of bulk initiation and termination of honeypots in particular ASes. For example, in Nov 2017, 4,383 honeypots started operating in AS1, which is an academic network in Ireland, but in next month, all of them were shut down. Another huge termination of 6,917 honeypots was detected in Dec 2017 in AS2, which is an ISP in US.

Figure 2 shows the survival ratio of honeypots we detected on Aug 8, 2017. Counting from this first observation, the honeypots had an average lifespan of 200.42 days (SD=127.54). To see if lifespan varied across different networks types, we selected 53 ASes that had more than 10 detected IP addresses and manually categorized them into Academic, ISP, and Hosting. As a result, we have 5,553, 11,390, and 1,455 honeypots detected on Aug 8, 2017 in Academic, ISP, Hosting networks, respectively. Remarkably, 80% of honeypots in academic networks were still operating after one year. These honeypots are obviously prime candidates for being detected and blacklisted by attackers. The honeypots in ISP and hosting networks show shorter lifespans, perhaps reflecting the higher economic value of the assigned resources. Still, about 20% of them run for at least one year in such a self-revealing manner. Note that the huge drop in ISP networks in Dec 2017 is due to the bulk termination of the honeypots in a U.S ISP. The drop in hosting networks in Apr 2018 comes from a bulk termination at a hosting service provider in U.S.

### 5.3 Operator Feedback

After we discovered many clusters of default honeypot installations, we were interested in understanding the reasons for running easily-discoverable honeypots. We contacted 11 operators of networks where these clusters were observed and received some insightful responses. We detailed the threat of honeypot detection (false negatives and other biases in monitoring and analysis) and offered suggestion on how to reduce discoverability. We asked the recipients, first, for confirmation of whether the IP addresses indeed hosted honeypots and, second, why these honeypots were running the default configurations, since that would make the easily detectable. However, we didn’t receive any response from 7 operators. The lack of response already signals lack of network hygiene. So it is not surprising that these operators don’t mind that their honeypots can be easily discovered. Other than the above, we received insightful responses from 4 operators.

One business ISP confirmed that there were indeed honeypots running on the IP addresses that we provided. As a courtesy, the ISP had temporarily routed some of its unused addresses space to a threat monitoring center of a world-famous security organization. The ISP put us in touch with the Chief Technical Officer of that center. When asked why they were running honeypots with default configurations, the CTO responded: ‘Well, the quick answer is that detection by attackers is not a big issue.’

The operator of a national research network confirmed we did indeed correctly identified several clusters of honeypots in their network. One cluster was being operated by a researcher who was monitoring attacks on building automation. Another cluster was being operated by a security non-profit for threat monitoring ‘to actively make the Internet more secure’. Other clusters were in address space delegated to universities.

The operator of a national research institute confirmed that we correctly identified honeypots in their network. Although they were not aware of honeypot detection issues, they explained that they are operating other type of honeypots (such
A researcher in a university in Taiwan, where we found a number of honeypots, explained that there has been a series of government supported cyber security projects to encourage the honeypots setups in different organizations and that it may be the reason for the disproportionately large concentration in this specific region.

5.4 Abuse

Prior work by Springall et al. reported that anonymous FTP servers were being abused by attackers to upload and distribute malware [54]. We also discovered 21 FTP honeypots that seems to be abused by an attacker. These honeypots had malicious binaries uploaded to them and other hosts were able to download them. We used VirusTotal to classify these binaries. We collected 54 malicious binaries (unique 17 malicious binaries): 12 CoinMiner, 2 Downloader, 2 Backdoor, and 1 Ransomware. This setup fits with a scenario where the hosts are used as download servers for when an attacker has established a foothold inside a network and then wants to download malware to the compromised host. We also note that these 21 abused honeypots were uploaded with similarly named files, so there is a possibility that the same attacker abused them. In short, it is clear that the poorly configured population of honeypots we uncovered can pose a direct security threat to the rest of the Internet.

6 Ethics and Responsible Disclosure

Strictly speaking, our study could be considered a form of offensive research, in the sense that we reveal the presence of honeypots, which adversaries may use to evade monitoring. Note, however, that this approach is already available to anyone who is willing to look at the default installations and design simple signatures from their characteristics. We therefore consider the information in this paper to be public knowledge. However, for ethical reasons we remove all AS names and IP addresses when referring individual honeypots.

As part of the responsible disclosure process, we have contacted 6 honeypot developers who has a contact list addressed on the Github page (Conpot, Glastopf, Cowrie, MTPot, Shockpot, and telnetlogger). We sent them an executive summary of our results and a full description of our methodology. We received responses from two developers associated with Conpot and Glastopf, one of whom works on both: Lukas Rist. In light of our disclosure, he added a paragraph on customization to the Glastopf repository. For Conpot, he pointed out that there is an extensive section in the documentation on customizing the exposed content [37]. He also stated that while discoverability is inherent to low-interaction honeypots, it is correct to point out that a honeypot in its default configuration is low hanging fruit for an adversary. Hence, they usual recommend to customize honeypots when deploying them. Also, the developer suggested that an operator could handle this limitation by identifying when an adversary attempts to make the distinction between real and emulated.

We also contacted all network operators who had honeypots that seems to be abused by attackers. We used three different ways to contact each operator: an email address listed on their web sites, a contact form on their web site, or the email addresses listed in WHOIS. We sent messages detailing potential threats that can be posed by their honeypots and offered suggestions on how to reduce discoverability.

Related works have already provided how to build well configured honeypots [5]. We further explain recommendations for honeypot operators who run open-source honeypots.

1. Regarding open-source honeypots running FTP, Telnet, SMTP, and IMAP services: their default banners are different from those of common services. To avoid honeypot detection, it is effective to change their banner to a popular banner that is actually used in practice. The top 10 banners of FTP and Telnet are listed in Tables 4 and 5. Of course, it is possible to investigate other services from Censys data as well. Most honeypots can change their banner from the configuration file.

2. In case of HTTP service: their default Web contents are unique and that can be used for honeypot detection (e.g., a hard-coded timestamp in HTTP header, unique HTML content, fixed response for any requests). Most honeypots store HTML elements in a prescribed directory and it is possible to change their Web contents.

3. For SSH service: their intentional erroneous requests are poorly handled. It is necessary to patch the source code to deal with this issue and that it may be more difficult than others cases.

7 Conclusion

Our study has found that there are over 19,000 open-source honeypots online that can be detected with the simplest of signatures, as these systems have received no customization from their operators and are running in a basically self-revealing state. We found concentrations in research networks, but also in commercial hosting and access networks. In geographical terms, we found a high concentration in Taiwan.

The prevalence of these honeypots raise a number of questions. Why would anyone run a honeypot that is so easy to detect? One answer is that these honeypots serve no real operational purpose for ongoing security efforts. This explanation does not fit with the wider pattern, however. Thousands of honeypots are found in commercial networks, meaning that real resources are being spent on them. Furthermore, we confirmed that several clusters of honeypots were serving real
operational purposes for threat monitoring, either as part of security operations or as part of academic research.

How problematic is this large-scale use of easily-discoverable honeypots? Operators should, of course, make their own tradeoffs in terms of how they set up their honeypots. We do want to point out, however, that the practice we uncovered presents serious problems to the field. First, for scientific research on the threat landscape, using such honeypots are likely to be biased towards the least sophisticated attacks and attackers. Nobody knows to what extent attackers care about evading honeypots. We know anecdotally that attackers share lists of honeypots. For example, we found a list of SSH honeypots on Pastebin [41]. In light of the uncertainty about the extent of avoidance by attackers, good scientific practice requires that researchers should assume that this is a source of bias in their results.

Second, and related, honeypots in operational security monitoring are also impacted by this bias – a bias, we might add, that will draw scarce attention towards attacks of low sophistication. Some professionals might argue, as one of our respondents did, that honeypot detection by attackers is not a big issue. It is unclear, however, what this assessment is based on and how much confidence we can award to it. We know of no systematic comparison of such honeypots. Perhaps it is because they still see plenty of traffic coming in to the honey-pot. That does not tell them, however, what they are missing, which is likely to have higher value for their security operations that the traffic they do see. A third and final problem is that these honeypots themselves pose a security threat, as we found evidence of ongoing abuse by attackers.

In the end, the situation we have observed is the result of an incentive issue. Are honeypot operators incentivized to customize their installation, as the documentation tells them to do? Given that in thousands of cases the answer turns out to be negative, we see three paths forward to improve the situation. First, the installation procedures could incentivize more customization and perhaps even include some forms by default. Second, in the absence of customization, at least the default configuration could be using more generic characteristics – e.g., Telnet or FTP banners – that are widely shared by real hosts (see Section 4.2). Third, we should improve our understanding of the negative impacts of easily-discoverable honeypots – that is, to see when and where attackers try to detect and evade and how this influences our observations. This require rigorous protocols to measure the degree of bias that is introduced both in scientific results and in operational security monitoring and incident response.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A  Honeypot Detection Signatures

Table 7 summarize all 20 signatures of 14 open-source honeypots. We note that although some response patterns in the signatures seem legitimate, they indeed differ from the actual legitimate responses. For example, default banner for telnetd in Debian 7.0 is "Debian GNU/Linux 7.0\r\ndebian login:", which is different from those used by HoneyPy "Debian GNU/Linux 7.0\r\nLogin:". All detection can be done by a single scan packet. For two SSH honeypots Kippo and Cowrie, more interactions are required to distinguishing each other. Figure 3 show this detection flow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honeypot</th>
<th>Signature Category</th>
<th>Input Data</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepenthes (25/TCP, FTP) (Nmap)</td>
<td>Banner</td>
<td>NULL</td>
<td>220 --freeFTPd 1.0--warFTPd 1.65--warFTPd 1.65--magic</td>
</tr><tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dionaea (25/TCP, FTP) (Nmap) | Banner | NULL | 220 Welcome to the ftp server in

Table 7: Signatures of Open-source Honeypots.

Figure 3: Flow of SSH honeypot distinction.
References


