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How to Apply the Capability Approach to Housing Policy? Concepts, Theories and Challenges

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ABSTRACT
Housing has played a significant role in increasing inequality. It has been financialised and losing its human and social dimensions. A critical review of housing policy directions is needed to explore a new housing approach. This article revisits the underpinning perspectives of housing policy discussions through the lens of the capability approach. The capability approach is a normative evaluative approach to understanding poverty, well-being, and justice. It argues that policy should primarily focus on expanding individuals' capabilities instead of resources and utilities. From its perspective, understanding the sources and nature of capability deprivation and inequity is central to removing existing injustice in our society, and to re-establishing ethics at the centre of policy discussions. What implications for housing studies can we draw from the capability approach? The article presents a conceptual application of the capability approach to housing policy discussions, and concludes that a capability-oriented housing policy framework has an added value.

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Introduction
Housing policy discussions have been losing human and social dimensions in recent decades. Housing has increasingly become financialised (UN Human Rights Council 2017; Aalbers 2016) and treated as “a commodity, a means of accumulating wealth and often as security for financial instruments” and disconnected from its social function (UN Human Rights Council 2017, 3). Homeownership has been promoted in Western countries since the 1990s with a belief in its role in ensuring individuals’ economic security. The critical analysis of Piketty and Goldhammer (2014) on the increased inequality in capital and the role of housing in it rings alarm bells for the current housing policy directions. In the Global South, the financialisation of housing has often resulted in evictions and displacements for luxurious residential and high-end commercial real estate (UN Human Rights Council, 4). Various housing programmes have been tried for the last twenty years but benefited only middle-income groups (UN-Habitat 2016). There are increasing calls for housing researchers to review the housing policy directions, and to explore a new housing approach in response to these challenges.
The notions of welfare economics and utilitarianism have implicitly or explicitly formed the underpinning perspectives of housing policy discussions. A good starting point for housing researchers to respond to the calls for a new housing approach would be a critical re-examination of such underpinning perspectives and taken for granted notions of housing policy discussions: they determine how to diagnose housing problems, analyse their causes and thus define solutions. This article re-examines these notions through the lens of the capability approach.

The capability approach is a normative evaluative approach. It proposes freedoms (or capabilities as proxies of the freedoms) as an appropriate evaluative space of well-being, social arrangements and social justice. For assessing well-being, the standard focus has been on opulence (real income, wealth, and commodities), and utility (satisfaction or desire-fulfilment) (Sen 1985). The capability approach criticizes these notions in welfare economics and its philosophical foundation of utilitarianism, in which housing policy studies have been deeply rooted traditionally. What implications does this provide for housing policy studies, particularly for its evaluative approach that eventually defines what housing policy is desirable? How will this be related to housing policy development and influence on it? The paper will explore these topics.

For more than twenty years, the capability approach has widely been recognized and discussed in the field of poverty and development studies, and accepted in the UN agenda framework, such as the human development framework. The United Nations Development Programme annually publishes the Human Development Reports (HDRs) since 1990. The reports assess a country’s development not solely by income dimension (e.g. GDP per capita) but by multi-dimensions of human development – such as a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, a decent standard of living, participation in the life of the community and influence on the decisions affecting their lives – which enhance people’s capabilities and enlarge their choices of the lives that they value. Amartya Sen’s capability approach has provided the core principles of the human development approach and formed a conceptual framework for the HDRs (for the concepts, measurement tools and policy perspective of human development, see, for example, Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar 2003, a collection of papers that have shaped the human development approach).

In the field of social welfare and policy, only since the late 2000s, the discussion on the capability approach appears in a few sub-domains of social welfare agendas regarding, for example, youth unemployment, mental health service, and the early childhood interventions (Evans 2017). Although its practicality and compatibility with social welfare agendas are yet controversial, it is drawing more attention from some governments. In 2004, for example, the German government decided to adopt Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a theoretical framework for its official Poverty and Wealth Reports and its national action plan for poverty reduction (Amdt and Volkert 2011). In 2015, the Re-InVEST research project (Research for Rebuilding an Inclusive, Value-based Europe of Solidarity and Trust through Social Investments), which was funded by the EU Horizon 2020 programme, has adopted the capability approach as the main theoretical framework in order to strengthen the theoretical and empirical bases of the Social Investment Package in Europe (Re-InVEST 2015).

In the housing domain, there is surprisingly little research applying the capability approach. As Bengtsson (1995) noted earlier, normative discussions in housing research had been rare, and still are very seldom made. Only a handful of studies applying the capability approach are observed in housing research. Some examples are: theoretical discussions of King (2003) and
Fitzpatrick, Bengtsson, and Watts (2014), which discuss the right to housing and Nussbaum’s (2003, 2011) central human capabilities; and empirical studies of Frediani (2007), Nicholls (2010), and Morris (2012), which examine the effects of slum upgrading programmes, changed housing circumstances, and social ties and activities at the neighbourhood level, on the capabilities of slum dwellers in Brazil, homeless people in the UK, and the older tenants in Australia, respectively. Some conceptual studies on homelessness propose to broaden the conception of homelessness by applying the capability approach (Evangelista 2010; Batterham 2018). These studies provide an opening for capability approach applications, but remain at a trial phase. Rigorous studies on the capability approach at both the theoretical and empirical level have not been conducted yet in housing studies.

This article discusses the extent to which the capability approach can be applied to housing studies and thus can contribute to discussions on housing policy directions. It consists of five parts. It first summarizes the core concepts of the capability approach. The second part analyses the implications of the capability approach for housing policy studies. It is followed by a conceptual discussion on how the core concepts of the capability approach – functionings and capabilities – can be applied to housing and the implications this might have. The fourth section suggests some possible areas of application of the capability approach in housing research. Finally, it concludes by addressing the challenges and potentialities of its application.

**Capability Approach: A Brief Introduction**

The capability approach was pioneered by Amartya Sen, an economist-philosopher. It has been further developed and expanded by many scholars in political philosophy, economics, humanities and social science, such as Nussbaum (1988, 1992, 2003), Alkire (2002), Robeyns (2003, 2017), Crocker (2008), Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) and Berry (2017). Although all thinkers’ contributions provide valuable theoretical grounds and a useful way for applying the capability approach, the discussion here will mainly refer to the account of Sen. The earliest root of the capability approach is based on his fundamental questioning of the assumptions and notions of welfare economics and utilitarianism in the 1970s. He then developed it further into the concept of the capability approach (Sen 1980). Meanwhile, the account of Nussbaum, another leading scholar of the capability approach, is more oriented to a philosophical journey on human rights and moral concerns in the humanities. Given that housing policy studies are largely influenced by the notions of welfare economics, I find that Sen’s account is a good starting point for opening a discussion in the housing field. Secondly, while Nussbaum (2003, 2011) argues that a set of universal capabilities necessary for human flourishing can be defined and suggests ten central capabilities (see Appendix A for detailed descriptions of these central capabilities), Sen disputes this by highlighting that the capability set is highly contextual and purpose specific. Nussbaum’s list is providing a good philosophical ground and framework while keeping a flexible space for defining specific contextual central capabilities. However, I find that there is much to explore about capabilities related to housing, before we promptly define a boundary of the exploration.
**Key Concepts**

The key concepts of the capability approach are freedoms, capabilities, and functionings (see Figure 1 for their relationships). In Sen’s term, the concept of *functionings* is “the various things a person may value doing or being”. Functionings are “beings and doings”, such as being adequately nourished, being free from avoidable disease, being happy, having self-respect, and being able to take part in the life of the community (Sen 1999, 75). A person’s *Capability* is “the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve (ibid.).” The capabilities indicate to what extent a person has *real opportunities* or *abilities* to choose valuable options of lives. “A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve (Sen 1987, 36).” Having such capabilities implies that she has *freedoms* to achieve valuable functionings as an active agent, and not because she has no other options or is coerced to do so.

The key concepts are defined in a range of Sen’s literature and numerous studies that adopt the capability approach have recited or rephrased the definitions. However, the problem is that the meaning of these terms is not intrinsically captured. It requires several readings to get a sense of meaning within its reasoning texts. Alkire (2002) elaborates the meaning of *functioning, capabilities* and *freedoms* by comparing Sen’s concepts and what the terms usually connote to readers, and by tracking the subtle changes in which Amartya Sen uses them in his literature. It helps readers to form a clearer understanding. However, as Alkire emphasizes, what has to be focused on is the fundamental insight of the capability approach: the goal of societal arrangements including social policies should be “to expand the capabilities that people have to enjoy ‘valuable beings and doings’. They should have access to the positive resources they need in order to have these capabilities. And they should be able to make choices that matter to them (ibid., 2).” The term *capabilities* and “opportunity set” is often interchangeably used, and it requires careful attention not to limit the objective of this approach to produce opportunities. The capability approach’s fundamental objective is to create meaningful and fulfilled lives (ibid., 19).

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**Figure 1.** A simplified conceptual diagram of the capability approach framework.

Source: author, based on Sen’s (1999) description of the capability approach
Some Distinctive Features

The capability approach proposes **capabilities as a space for evaluating** or comparing advantages and deprivations of individuals instead of resources and utility. Its rationale is closely related to its other key features, such as the concept of conversion factors, acknowledgement of human diversity, and an agent-oriented view. **The concept of conversion factors** takes into account that individuals have different abilities to convert means (resources) into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functionings). The same amount of food provided would be converted into different levels of outcomes depending on a person’s metabolic rate, deficiency of specific nutrition or disability (personal factors), or power to take the provided food solely without the influence of, for example, gender inequality within a household (social factors). The focus on conversion factors is precisely why the capability approach proposes the capability as an evaluative space, and focuses on the ends (e.g. being able to be well nourished) instead of means (e.g. provided foods). A third core feature is that it takes into account **human diversity**. This perspective is based on a critical diagnosis of the utilitarian approach in public policy that focuses only on sum-ranking and maximizing the total amount of welfare. It does not count the heterogeneous conditions of human beings (i.e. their different ability to convert resources into welfare), and various preferences and values of human beings (i.e. different choice of a functioning from feasible options). The issue of different abilities is particularly critical for evaluating the welfare of marginalized groups who are less efficient in converting resources into achievements (functionings) such as disabled people, women, ethnic minorities and migrants. Last but not least, **the agent-oriented view** is a core concept of the capability approach. It recognizes individuals as, unlike common perceptions in welfare policies, “an active agent of change rather than passive recipient of dispensed benefits (Sen 1999, xiii).” Therefore, it places the role of the state and society in a supporting role for strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities, rather than one of ready-made delivery. It perceives individuals as being capable of shaping their own destiny and helping each other if adequate social opportunities are provided (Sen 1999).

Capabilities, Well-being and Justice

The capability approach examines the evaluative space of well-being (states of affairs) of individuals. However, its key contribution is to re-establish ethics at the centre of policy discussion and to reconnect ethics and economics (Denulin and Allister McGregor 2010; Berry 2017). It fundamentally is an approach to social justice and to answering the question: “what should we look at, when evaluating whether one state of affairs is more or less just than another?” (Robeyns and Brighouse 2010, 1). The capability approach proposes capabilities – real opportunities – as the proper metric of justice, especially by differentiating it from the metric of Rawls’ theory of justice (i.e. social primary goods; for detailed descriptions, see Rawls 2001, 58–61). In his book “The Idea of Justice”, Amartya Sen discusses the connection between the capability approach and justice more explicitly. Public policy has a corrective role in reducing injustice and unequal opportunities, and Sen argues that understanding the sources and nature of capability deprivation and inequity is central to removing existing injustice in our society (Sen 2009).
Implications for Housing Studies

The implications of the capability approach for housing studies and policy research can be examined at two levels. One is related to the extent to which we can have a better understanding of well-being (states of affairs) of individuals when the primary focus of the evaluative approach is on the capability space, and thus what a housing policy should aim to improve. The other one is related to how we can make the state of affairs more just by understanding the sources and nature of capability deprivation and inequity. The second question will allow us to draw richer implications for housing policy discussions. It is linked to structural factors in our society and indicates what housing policy needs to or should do for reducing injustice and for enlarging capabilities (real opportunities) of people for advancing justice. The discussion on the second topic will bring a missing but important dimension in the contemporary public policy discussions – i.e. ethics, as Berry (2017) highlights. While the two questions are interrelated and are under the same umbrella question on how we can advance justice better in our society, the discussion on the former one would form a foundation of the later one. This article, therefore, will primarily focus on examining the former one: the evaluative space of well-being (states of affairs) and its implications for housing studies and policy. It will critically re-examine the underpinning perspectives of housing policy discussion on well-being, through the lens of the capability approach, and draw a very initial implication. Further discussions on the second question – implications related to making states of affairs and society more just – is vital but will require another extensive discussion. This article will keep this topic brief and reserve it for future work.

The core argument of the capability approach is that the appropriate evaluative space of well-being is freedoms (or capabilities), and is neither “utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor […] primary goods (as demanded by Rawls) (Sen 1999, 74).” In other words, the primary objective of public policy for well-being should be neither the increase of individuals’ satisfaction and desire-fulfilment nor the increased resources such as opulence sources, commodities and primary goods. For clarification, the concept of “well-being” here is defined in terms of a person’s achievement (i.e. how “well” is his or her “being”?), and “advantage” as the real opportunities that a person has (Sen 1985, 3). The concept of well-being in the capability approach is a state of having access to particular valued functionings. It is close to the concept of quality of life, or “well-living” as a more active term (Gasper 2004), or “states of affairs” as Sabina Alkire usually uses in her literature. This paper uses this concept of well-being. It is different from the hedonic-oriented or desire-fulfilment-oriented conception amongst the well-being theory types defined by Parfit (1984, 493), and from subjective well-being of which the conception is in the hedonic stream (Gasper 2004), which have satisfaction-oriented conceptions, and are common in various disciplines of economics, psychology, social epidemiology and public policy studies (Clapham, Foye, and Christian 2017). The proposal of Sen is based on diagnosis on the flaws in the informational bases of well-being (states of affairs) evaluations that are used by conventional economics, Rawlsian justice, libertarianism, and utilitarianism – opulence, primary goods, liberty, and utility respectively. His diagnosis on the flaws of the other evaluative approaches and his reasoning for proposing the capability approach raise various questions for the notions in housing policies.
The traditional evaluative spaces of housing policy or project outcome have largely been material resources, monetary resources and satisfaction. The main informational bases include the number of dwellings supplied, the ratio of public rental housing stocks, housing quality (e.g. physical conditions of dwellings such as floor areas, utilities, and structural durability), government expenditure on the housing sector for a cost-benefit analysis, and housing expenditure-to-income ratios (see, e.g. indicators used in Haffner, Lennartz, and Dol 2012, comparing public performance in the housing sector in 28 countries). These material and monetary conditions are often used as key indicators for assessing the effect of housing on well-being (see, e.g. indicators used in Haффner, Lennartz, and Dol 2012, comparing public performance in the housing sector in 28 countries). Another core evaluative space is “satisfaction”. One of the key housing research areas has been housing satisfaction and preferences. Recently, there has been increasing research attempting to analyse the effect of housing on subjective well-being by examining the relationship between a person’s life satisfaction and housing physical characteristics, or housing tenure types (Clapham, Foye, and Christian 2017). The assumption on the correlation of the possessions of goods, individuals’ life satisfaction or preferences, and well-being has also served as a rationale for promoting homeownership-oriented housing policies in many Western countries. According to some scholars, people have an instinctive “desire to own”, this desire fulfilment should be a leading factor, and thus the government should promote homeownership (Saunders 1990). Housing affordability is another key space of evaluation. It may have a certain linkage to a person’s capabilities, in a sense that it allows her or him to have more freedom to utilize the rest of income and savings for other functionings or capability enhancement. However, the validity of this monetary dimension to understanding the housing problems of the poor and vulnerable groups is in debate depending on its measurement methods.

The diagnosis of Sen on the flaws of other evaluative spaces does not imply that they are not important elements for human development and well-being. Sen clearly notes that income is an important element in providing people with more opportunities, but he points out that a problem arises when we place it as an end goal of policy. He also notes that subjective well-being (happiness) is obviously an important element of human life as a functioning, but refuses to place it as the final end goal to pursue. The purpose of Sen’s diagnosis is to argue why the central concern needs to move from resources or utility to capabilities. Similarly, the material and monetary conditions of housing can still be important elements as a means of enabling people to expand other opportunities. Housing satisfaction (or preferences) can still be meaningful information for understanding people’s happiness and for analysing policy implications from the gaps between what intervention has aimed at and what people actually perceive on its outcome. According to the capability approach, however, the problem comes when we place them as a primary goal of housing policy.

**Problems of the Resource-focused Evaluative Approach**

The capability approach argues that resources such as income, wealth, commodities and basic goods have been misplaced as the ends of economic and social policies, while they are only a means of human flourishing and well-being. By re-orienting the attention to human-beings, the capability approach places the enhancement of a person’s freedoms
(or capabilities) or valued functionings as end goals. Housing has been discussed as a core and self-evident capability that allows a person to expand other capabilities such as education and health. Some examples include the Housing First approach for the homeless (Tsemberis 1999, 2010; Gulcur et al. 2003), placing housing as a cornerstone of the welfare state (Malpass 2008), and supporting the growth of homeownership as part of an asset-based welfare strategy (ibid.; Sherraden 1991, 2003; Regan and Paxton 2001). As they argued, adequate housing can contribute to individuals’ economic opportunities in life, physical and mental well-being, personal safety, a sense of worth and economic status. In these approaches, the role of housing appears to rather be a resource that a person may or can utilize for expanding her other capabilities, depending on her circumstances and other kinds of available resources. For instance, Nicholls (2010) conducted a qualitative longitudinal study of 28 people who were recently homeless and examined the role of housing in enhancing Nussbaum’s central human capabilities. The study concluded that many people were still lacking the central capabilities while there were clear improvements in their material circumstance. The study does not provide in-depth analysis of the reasons for such disconnection, but indicates a somewhat possible limitation of a resource-focused approach.

From the capability approach perspective, “well-having” should be distinguished from “well-living”, if Gasper’s terms (2004) are borrowed. Again, the focus should be placed on the capabilities that are generated with resources, and the resources should not be an exclusive focus on assessing how well people are doing and being. This is because individuals have different levels of abilities to convert resources into their capability expansions or valued functionings. Relevant personal and social circumstances influence the conversion of primary goods to the real enjoyment of the primary goods. The important concern should be “what the person succeeds in doing with the commodities and [their] characteristics at her or his command” in assessing the well-being of a person (Sen 1985, 6). The capability approach emphasizes that human flourishing, instead of economic growth, should be the final ends of development. However, it does not claim that economic growth, material resources, and monetary issues are not important and should be neglected. Rather, it critically questions the final ends at which the social policy and welfare discussion conventionally aim. It reveals some misleading informational bases in evaluating well-being, and suggests what should be the ends of economic and social policy.

The informational bases of housing policy have had a focus on the housing itself (a resource) rather than on what it generates, or what capabilities (opportunities) are necessary for individuals to achieve a housing-relevant-functioning (e.g. residing in a way that a person has reason to value). Much recent research has in fact examined how housing generates social outcomes in relation to health, education and environment. However, these valuable findings and implications have relatively little been integrated into housing policy practices. In addition, there has been an assumption of a direct correlation between housing possession or housing quality (characteristics of housing) and a person’s well-being, with little consideration of different abilities to convert resources into capabilities (real opportunities) and functionings (chosen achievements). This can mislead our understandings of housing policy outcomes and of the extent that policies meet the people’s need. This analysis naturally raises the question if the end goal of housing policies has been appropriate for expanding human flourishing and real human development.
Problems of the Utility-focused Evaluative Approach

Adding to the resource-focused judgements of housing outcome evaluation, surveys on housing preferences and housing satisfaction have been a major evaluative approach of housing policy outcomes. The capability approach points out that the utility-focused judgements on well-being (states of affairs) pay no direct attention to non-utility concerns such as meaningful and fulfilled lives, and violation of rights and duties (Sen 1999, 59). In the utility-oriented judgements, for instance, happy slaves will be categorized as those in well-being (ibid.). The meaning of well-being has been reduced to “well-feeling” counting pleasure. Its focus has further been reduced to utility, as a scalar of unitary pleasure, and by economists, it has been reduced even further to being well-off financially or materially, or “well-having” (Gasper 2004). The assessment of well-being based on individual’s feeling and responses to questionnaires has limitations in distinguishing adaptive attitude and mental conditioning. For instance, homeowners are commonly perceived to have a high level of life satisfaction and good mental well-being. However, in a review of different empirical research results on the effect of homeownership on subjective well-being (e.g. effects on mental well-being), Clapham, Foye, and Christian (2017) conclude that the effect is dependent on the owners’ circumstances such as financial security. The issue of adaptive attitude is more significant when it comes to the well-being of deprived people. The people who are persistently deprived can be unfairly assessed as being in well-being. They tend to limit or adjust their desires and expectations to what is seemingly feasible for them, focus on the sheer necessity of their survival, and thus “the mental metric of pleasure or desire is just too malleable to be a firm guide to deprivation and disadvantage” (Sen 1999, 63).

An Example of Gaps in Resource and Utility-focused Evaluation

Let’s assume that there is a housing policy that successfully produced its target number of housing units. The newly built houses have good physical conditions in terms of floor areas, windows, housing utilities, gardens and balconies. They are also green areas nearby. The purchase and rent prices are affordable. A high percentage of residents are reporting that they are satisfied with their house. This project will be counted as a good housing policy outcome that contributes to the residents’ well-being. However, if a wife in a household cannot have a joint tenure title over a house even if she also invested in the house together with husband, she can be in an insecure position against her husband. It will be difficult to say she is in a good state of affairs even if she finds herself in well-being. She may be unaware of that she may have to be dependent on her husband for her pension, or have to be obedient to her husband in order to secure a place to stay even if she does not want one day. She has a lower level of freedoms to pursue the life she values. Or, if the newly built houses are too far from the places of income generation opportunities, and thus if a youth has to commute 3–4 hours every day, he may have much fewer chances than others for investing his free time for skill development, resulting in lower opportunities of getting a better or secure job. In this case, the housing policy actually reduces his capabilities to achieve well-being. If a household is renting a housing unit but there is no proper system for securing tenants’ right, the household may be in an insecure position against the landlord. That person may be forced to accept any unfair conditions from the landlord, and endure violations on his dignity. The total number of households
that have benefited from this project is high, but the majority of benefactors might be those who can easily mobilize funds for a house, either through formal mortgages or informal borrowing. If there is such inequality in the access to the newly built housing units, it is difficult to say it was a successful project simply by referring to the total number of units and benefited households.

The capability approach still recognizes the role of resources and mental satisfaction in improving a human’s well-being. But focusing merely on them can easily mislead, as shown above. Conversion factors, non-material and non-utility aspects, heterogeneous-ness of human-beings, and distribution issues need to be at the foundations of housing policy and its evaluative approach.

**Applying the Capability Approach to Housing Studies: Functionings and Capabilities Relevant to Housing**

This section holds a conceptual discussion on how the concept of *functionings* and *capabilities* can be applied in housing studies. It leads to the fundamental question on how housing should be perceived in policy discussions and its position in the capability approach framework – i.e. whether housing should be perceived as a functioning, capability, or resource. The position of *housing* may be shifting between them, depending on the context and specific purpose of the application of the capability approach. While the article keeps this issue open, this section suggests reviewing how housing is generally perceived in practice, and a need for explicitly stating housing-relevant-functionings for re-orienting the main focus of housing policy. The section also discusses a more narrative description of housing-relevant-capabilities by breaking down necessary abilities and opportunities for individuals to achieve a housing-relevant-functioning.

**Functionings Relevant to Housing**

*Functionings* in the capability approach refers to the states of “being or doing” of a person. *Housing* can have various meanings and can also present various states of being or doing. In academic discussions in different disciplines, the implied meaning of *housing* ranges from a socio-economic mechanism to a socio-cultural process of social construction, an experience of individuals, and personal expression and reflection of the self (Hatuka and Bar 2017). However, in housing policy practices, of which relevant disciplines include housing studies, economics, laws and planning, *housing* is generally discussed as a type of commodity or basic good to be supplied. The literal meaning of *housing* in the English language has two different meanings whether used as a noun or a verb: it is a material object, and also the sum of activities to provide housing (a material object) by people themselves or others (Ruonavaara 2017). Even if the aspect of housing as a verb is taken into account, however, the end goal of the housing activities still tends to remain at providing a material object of housing. This tendency exists in policy practices, and King (2009) captures this aspect as: “housing policy […] is the concern for the production, consumption, management and maintenance of a stock of dwellings.” Naturally, the final end goals of housing policies have largely been concerned with the supply of (adequate and affordable) housing (as a commodity or basic good), rather than expanding a person’s *capabilities* or “valued being or doing” (*functionings*) that a person can achieve by utilizing the resource *housing* (the article marks it as *housing*\(_R\)).
Although the primary focus of the capability approach is to expand the “capabilities” of people, conceptualizing housing-relevant-functionings that a person can achieve is still important. First, it allows re-orienting the primary attention from housing\(\text{(R)}\) to the real housing outcome of “valued being or doing”. Second, understanding what housing-relevant-functionings a person has reason to value provides a basis for discussing what capabilities she or he needs to achieve those functionings. The third reason is the practical reason. The achieved functionings of a person is not the most ideal evaluative space, as discussed in the next section, but it is often inescapable to measure the achieved functionings in practice, largely because of limited data availability and measurability. The achieved functionings can still provide relatively more valuable information to understand people’s well-being compared to the resource- and utility-focused one, and thus many empirical studies applying the capability approach have used the achieved functioning data.

When conceptualizing the housing-relevant-functioning, it might be possible to place housing as a functioning by exclusively emphasizing its meaning as a verb – being housed or being housing oneself, and its implied meanings. However, in many countries, the term housing often connotes a stock of houses, housing units, or dwellings. To let a policy focus more on outcome – a state of being or doing – rather than means, and to explicitly differentiate what housing-relevant-functionings people have reason to value, as a first step, we may need to consider other expressions, like King (1996), King (2009) suggests the term of dwelling (as a verb) for example. The conceptualization of housing-related-functionings can be expressed as, – only as an example for a discussion in this paper – residing in the form of being or doing, which a person can achieve with various capabilities and resources including housing\(\text{(R)}\). To add values to the functionings, well-, adequate-, or dignified- can be added, for instance. The additional question of conceptualizing housing-relevant-functionings is how the values, such as well- or adequate-, can be defined. This question may require substantive discussion in various disciplines. This paper leaves further discussion to the future, and temporarily uses the expression residing in the following discussion in order to distinguish the concept of housing-relevant-functioning from housing\(\text{(R)}\).

**Capabilities Relevant to Housing**

The capability approach claims that the primary evaluative space should be freedoms or capabilities as proxies of freedoms. The capability space has counterfactual nature and concerns process, which is different from the actually achieved functionings. For instance, a person staying home with his own will has different capability than the one staying home forcefully, while the achieved functioning appears exactly the same in both cases (i.e. staying home). Sen highlights the need for distinguishing between “doing something” (achieved functioning) and “being free to do that thing” (capability), and notes that a focus on the later one is important for a policy and justice related discussion (Sen 2009). It can especially include the concerns on rights, possible obstacles and unjust conditions in the process of achieving a functioning. Housing-relevant-capabilities are thus what policy needs to primarily aim at instead of a sole focus on housing\(\text{(R)}\).

However, defining or rather selecting a set of capabilities relevant to housing is a complicated task. The approach is overly vague and open when it comes to defining a capability set. One of the central debates in the capability approach literature is which
capabilities are relevant. This topic is also the most critical difference between Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the two leading scholars of the capability approach. Sen argues that a list of capabilities should be purpose and context specific, and needs to be developed by involving democratic process and public reasoning. Nussbaum argues, on the contrary, that a well-defined universal list of capabilities can be developed, and proposes ten central human capabilities: (i) life; (ii) bodily health; (iii) bodily integrity; (iv) senses, imagination and thought; (v) emotions; (vi) practical reason; (vii) affiliation; (viii) other species; (ix) play; and (x) control over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2011, 33–34).

There are debates not only at a theoretical level, but also on the issue of empirical applications of the theories. They include various concerns on methods of the capability selection in practice, the feasibility of implementation, and data availability (Robeyns 2006). On the other hand, Alkire (2007) notes that it is a complex problem but the methods for capability domain selection are unexpectedly straightforward. As an example, she lists five methods that are used by most researchers, either alone or in combination. They are: to draw from existing data, selecting capability dimensions from data that is available; to assume implicitly or explicitly what people do value or should value based on the informed guesses of the researcher; to use public consensus such as universal human rights at international level or values agreed at national or local levels; to conduct a deliberative participatory process; and to use empirical evidence regarding people’s values. However, this does not mean that there are a confined boundary of application methods and the existence of the most appropriate method among them. Different methods are used for different purposes of research, and all of them have both weaknesses and strengths. Alkire (ibid.) provides a typology of the commonly used methods, but emphasizes that methods will be plural: there is no universal method or a distinctive methodology for generating a universally-relevant set of capability domains that can be used for all evaluative exercises.

The general complexity and challenges of capability selection are applied also to the question of which capabilities are relevant to housing-related-functionings (e.g. residing in a way that individuals have reason to value). In addition, housing has a much more complicated nature. For achieving a housing-relevant functioning, a person or household needs multiple capabilities that are relevant, for instance, financial resources, tenure security, citizenship, standard employment, gender equality, access to basic infrastructure, and decent travelling times to income generation places.

The capabilities relevant to a functioning of well-residing can be various depending on the purpose of the application and the context applied. For clarification, this plurality does not imply that capabilities are subject to individuals’ values and choices. The plurality of individual values and choices is actually more related to which functioning a person chooses out of the functionings feasible to achieve (e.g. eating, fasting, and sharing foods). The capability is about whether individuals can have such alternative combinations of functionings and can freely choose her valued functioning. The fundamental question of housing-relevant-capabilities would be what conditions, abilities, opportunities or capacities a person needs for expanding her freedoms to choose a housing-relevant-functioning that she has reason to value (e.g. residing in a way that she values). Some examples are illustrated in Table 1. The term ability may interchangeably be used with opportunity. Obviously, different groups, such as slum dwellers without tenure title, low-income migrants, or informal labourers need a different range of capabilities. Or,
depending on the purpose of utilizing housing\(^{(R)}\), such as securing pension of elders, the required capability set can be different. The threshold line of capabilities – a similar concept to the poverty line – can also be different depending on the groups and purposes.

Selecting the capabilities relevant to housing will require another discussion space – however, it is not necessarily for defining a universal set – and may open up substantial debates and research. This paper limits itself to providing an entry with some examples. The important aspect to emphasize here is that non-resource and non-utility concerns should be taken into account in the evaluative space of housing policy. In addition, multi-dimensional capabilities that a person needs to achieve a housing-relevant-functioning need to be considered. The current informational bases, such as the physical quality of housing, housing satisfaction, and housing affordability can still be valid informational bases but not sufficient enough to indicate whether a policy has produced a good housing outcome that positively effects human flourishing. The primary focus of housing policy performance needs to be placed at the enhancement of the housing-relevant-capabilities.

**Some Possible Areas of the Capability Application in Housing Research**

The practicality and feasibility of operationalizing the capability approach are often criticized (Sugden 1993; Roemer 1996, 191–93). It is yet relatively at the beginning phase of its operationalization, but already a lot of empirical research in other domains has applied the approach with various methods. In this section, some possible areas of application in housing studies are explored as an example, based on a review of research in other disciplines and social policy domains.

**Identifying Target Groups of Housing Policy**

A possible area of application is to include non-monetary deprivations in defining target groups of housing policy interventions. Income or consumption measurement has been the main dimension to define the social policy target groups, and housing policy is no exception to this. The capability approach critically questions the placement of opulence as a key evaluative space, and argues for taking into account non-monetary poverty, or in other words, deprivations in capabilities. The most active application can be found in multi-dimensional poverty

### Table 1. Some examples of housing-relevant-capabilities.

- Ability to secure a safe place to live
- Ability to secure a stable place to live
- Ability to live in a healthy living environment
- Ability to live in an adequate distance to income generation opportunities
- Ability of proactively being part of the community
- Ability to enjoy gender equality in achieving a joint tenure title;
- Ability to enjoy adequate and associated rights of tenants
- Ability to have an adequate amount of income after housing cost is deducted
- Ability to make an informed decision in one’s housing process
- Ability to utilize the information on housing options and policies
- Ability to be part of the decision-making process in housing (re)development

*This is only a list of examples and not a comprehensive list
research. It has mainly focused on assessing general well-being (state of affairs) of a community, society or country, in comparison to uni-dimensional poverty assessment with an income or consumption indicator. Non-monetary poverty dimensions may include, for instance, undernourishment, underweight, under education, gender inequality in school enrolment, and mortality.

Several research results have shown that there is a low correlation between monetary poverty and non-monetary poverty. There is a significant lack of overlap between the poor people identified according to income and according to functioning-deprivations. Some example studies include: Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998), Chiappero-Martinetti (2000), Klasen (2000), Perry (2002), Qizilbash (2002), Ruggeri Laderchi (1999), the mid-term report on the progress of the Millennium Development Goals (Bourguignon et al. 2008). These applications still tend to measure functioning-deprivations, and to focus on overall well-being. There is limited attention on multiple capability deprivations within social welfare domains, such as education, employment, health and housing. However, these findings have provided important implications for social development programmes, given that most governments allocate their budgets based on the estimates of poor household headcounts according to income.

A similar approach can be taken in housing research. A possible application would be an analysis of multi-dimensional capability deprivations or obstacles that individuals face in achieving a housing-relevant-functioning (e.g. residing in a way that individuals have reason to value). A person may have income above a poverty line or an income threshold for target beneficiaries of a housing policy intervention, but this person can still be deprived in multiple capabilities relevant to housing at the same time. However, she will not be categorized as a target group for housing policy interventions. Such multi-dimensional capability deprivations involve, for example, lack of access to formal housing finance, no ability of mobilizing informal financial sources, little tenure security, lack of access to reliable housing market and housing policy information, limited capacity of utilizing that information, gender inequality, lack of entitlements for various housing programmes due to non-standard employment conditions, or long distance to income opportunities from affordable housing. This approach may allow us to better diagnose housing problems, particularly of marginalized groups in society, and thus to define a housing policy target groups and problem solving measures.

**Evaluation of Housing Policy Performance**

The capability approach can also be used for an analytical reasoning on, or critical analysis of, existing social practices or already existing empirical findings (Robeyns 2006). For instance, housing satisfaction and preference studies have been one of the mainstream evaluative spaces in housing research. However, as illustrated earlier, the capability approach addresses the limitations of utility focused evaluation. The comparison of housing satisfaction, subjective well-being and the state of non-utility affairs (e.g. observations on ethical issues), for example, can be an area of research to evaluate a housing policy or programme performance.

A more proactive application of the capability approach entails an evaluation of the extent to which a housing policy or programme has enhanced or adversely affected capabilities. Robeyns remarks that a policy should aim at “removing obstacles in their lives so that they
have more freedom to live the kind of life which, upon reflection, they find valuable (2003, 6).” Outcomes and (in)efficiencies of institutions or policies can be examined in terms of certain capability expansions. It can be framed at two levels. The first is to examine the influence of housing policy on other capability dimensions and thus on the general well-being of individuals. The outcome of a housing programme can be assessed by measuring not only positive impacts but also unintended side effects on a person’s capabilities in other domains such as less income generation opportunities and/or loss of community and social networks. The second is to place a housing-relevant-functioning as an ends and examining what capabilities are necessary to achieve that functioning. This can be framed as to what extent a housing policy and institutional framework have removed the obstacles that a person faces in achieving her housing-related-functionings. For instance, development aid projects in the housing sector, such as post-disaster housing reconstruction, can be evaluated in their effectiveness and efficiency in terms of the enhancement of housing-related-capabilities, instead of the number of units provided or beneficiaries that are sheltered. The second topic is closely connected to the question on the sources and nature of housing-relevant-capability deprivation and inequity, and eventually on how existing injustices can be reduced.

**Housing Policy and Programme Design**

The applications in the above two areas naturally lead us to rethink how we should design a housing policy or programme, and set its final end goal. Aiming at the enhancement of multi-dimensional capabilities relevant to housing, or elimination of housing-related capability deprivations is certainly different than aiming at the provision of a certain number of housing units, an increase in subjective housing satisfaction, an improvement of housing quality, or an efficiency improvement of a public housing programme defined by cost-benefit analysis. The capability approach has a direct focus on human beings as an end goal of policy, and emphasizes the inequality in capabilities of individuals rather than resource inequality. A representative case of its partial application is the human development paradigm initiated by the United Nations Development Programme as briefly described in the introduction. In the housing policy design, and its agenda development, the capability approach can be applied as a basic framework for establishing social and ethical goals by re-orienting the focus of housing policy from economic concerns to human flourishing and more just society.

**Participatory Housing Development**

At the project practice level, participatory methods in a housing development can be a tool for reflecting on the notions of the capability approach. During a participatory discussion process, the different levels of abilities and heterogeneous deprivations among the participants can be reflected in housing development. It can also open a space where marginalized groups can raise voices to local government, which may enhance their ability to be an important stakeholder in the government’s decision making in the longer term. It acknowledges people as an active agent and provides a space where they can take decisions over their housing and settlements. The process generally carries non-material, non-monetary and non-utility concerns.
It requires a careful interpretation, however. Due to the phrase of “freedoms to achieve the lives that a person has reason to value”, and the tendency of housing practitioners – such as architectural or urban planning practitioners – to focus on physical design of a housing unit or neighbourhood, the application of the capability approach can easily be limited to the participatory housing planning or participatory surveys on design preferences for instance. A careful interpretation will be needed in order not to form such a confined boundary. Secondly, not all participatory housing projects would bring capability enhancement. It highly depends on the methods of facilitation and societal arrangement around the projects. It should not be translated simply as the expansion of individuals’ freedom to achieve the housing or settlement that they prefer or desire. The focus of participatory housing development should be to expand the capabilities of a person – for instance, empowerment and expansion of space for “deliberative democracy (Crocker 2008)” where marginalized groups can raise their voice – by placing people as an active leading agent. It also needs to aim to reflect the diversity of human beings in its planning result, such as different financial capacities, life paths and phases, gender, and age.

**Others**

In this article, some possible areas of capability approach application are discussed particularly for empirical research and housing policy practices. However, the application should not be constrained to them. The capability approach is an open-ended framework, and therefore named as “an approach” instead of “a theory”. It is a general, open and underspecified idea, which can be specified and theorized depending on the aim of using the approach (Alkire 2005). It can be used for a theory development (e.g. a theory of justice), an assessment framework of a specific issue (e.g. gender inequality), a normative base for political critics (Robeyns 2017, 29). Some examples are Nussbaum’s theory of justice (2006), Wolff and De-Shalit’s theory of disadvantage (2007), and Crocker’s development ethics (2008). It can also be a framework for comparing welfare states (see, e.g. “[economic] incentive giving state” versus “capability state” in the domain of work-welfare policy, by Dean et al. 2005).

The examples of possible applications in this article have largely focused on understanding individual deprivations. This does not imply that the capability approach is detached from society and broader issues. The capability approach is often addressed as an excessively individualistic approach, of which concentration remains only on capabilities of individual persons. It is labelled as an example of methodological individualism (Stewart and Deneulin 2002), and criticized for paying little attention to group capabilities (Stewart 2005) and to collective capabilities (Evans 2002). Gore (1997) and Robeyns (2017), however, note that the approach is actually normative individualism. The central argument of the individualistic focus is a reaction to the limitation of utilitarianism and to acknowledge individuality for evaluation. Sen clarifies that the label of individualistic approach is a mistaken understanding of what he intends. He highlights how the capability approach actually is closely connected to society and notes “its concern with people’s ability to live the kind of lives they have reason to value brings in social influences both in terms of what they value [...] and what influences operate on their values [...] (Sen 2009, 244). For instance, women in sexist societies accepting their inferior position are not independent of social conditions, and enhancing their capabilities is
linked to advancing wider society matters (ibid.). Environmental sustainability is connected to “the substantive freedoms and capabilities of people today ‘without compromising the capability of future generations’ to have similar – or more – freedom. (ibid., 251)” The concerns on housing-relevant-capabilities can be more than just individuals’ well-being as well. They can also be linked to broader issues such as the well-being of the wider society, economic stability and environmental sustainability.

Conclusion: Challenges and the Way Forward

Through the lens of the capability approach, this article re-examined the underpinning notions of housing policy discussions. It revealed an added value of the capability approach to housing studies, and a need for taking into account non-resource and non-utility concerns by placing the focus on multiple capabilities relevant to housing, instead of limiting its concerns to quantity of housing units, physical quality of housing, housing satisfaction, and housing affordability. The article suggested some potential areas of the capability applications in housing studies. This topic requires further inputs from empirical, theoretical as well as philosophical research. The application of the capability approach to housing studies and its operationalization can be challenging. However, an increasing number of applications in other disciplines with various methods and methodologies provide a great promise.

In this article, I have left many important questions for future research. Amongst them, the vital question that should be noted is about the role of housing policy and institutions in reducing injustice and in enlarging capabilities (real opportunities) of people for advancing justice. It is related to re-establishing ethics at the centre of housing policy discussion. As a foundation of the further discussion on this question, this article primarily focused on examining the evaluative space of well-being from the capability approach perspective, and its implications for housing policy, which is fundamentally connected to the question on the proper metric of justice. The role of housing policy with regard to justice and the implications of the capability approach for it need to be further discussed.

The capability approach is a well-grounded framework for diagnosing problems and for evaluating social arrangements. It is highly valuable to explore the approach and its application in housing research, especially for discussing housing policy directions in the future by re-orienting the focus from economic concerns to contributions to human flourishing and social justice as an end goal. Its application in housing research allows having a critical review in what perspective housing policies used to diagnose problems and causes, in which way they have responded to the causes and thus to what extent they have contributed to reducing capability deprivations and inequity.

An additional advantage of the capability approach is that it is an extremely interdisciplinary approach. Within the housing domain, the capability approach application requires interdisciplinary concerns around housing, such as planning, economics, law, social science and humanities. It crosses the other domains of welfare – education, health, pension and employment. Housing studies have often been criticized for being too fragmented and specialized, and the need for an integrated approach is often addressed. A frame of capability-oriented-housing policy may bring cross-cutting issues together in a coherent framework, and thus may provide a common platform where diverse disciplines can collaborate for better housing policy.
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References


### Appendix A. Ten central human capabilities by Nussbaum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily Health</td>
<td>Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily Integrity</td>
<td>Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senses, Imagination, and Thought</td>
<td>Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td>Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical reason</td>
<td>Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Affiliation                    | (1) Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and show concern for other humans, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
(2) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species. |
| Other species                  | Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.                                                                                                               |
| Play                           | Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.                                                                                                                                             |
| Control over one’s environment | (1) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.  
(2) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. |

Source: excerpted from Nussbaum (2011,33–34)