

Delft University of Technology

### Evolutionary computation and machine learning in cryptology

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### Instructors

Stjepan Picek finished his PhD in 2015 as a double doctorate under the supervision of Lejla Batina, Elena Marchiori (Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and Domagoj Jakobovic (Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, Croatia). Currently, Stjepan is working as an assistant professor at TU Delft, The Netherlands. Before that, Stjepan worked at MIT, USA and KU Leuven, Belgium. Stjepan also has several years of experience working in industry and government. He regularly publishes papers in both evolutionary computation and cryptographic conferences and journals. Besides that, he is a member of several professional societies (ACM, IEEE, IACR).

**Domagoj Jakobovic** received his Ph.D. degree in 2005 at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, on the subject of generating scheduling heuristics with genetic programming. He is currently a full professor at the Department of Electronics, Microelectronics, Computer and Intelligent Systems at the University of Zagreb. His research interests include evolutionary algorithms, optimization methods, and parallel algorithms. Most notable contributions are in the area of a machine supported scheduling, optimization problems in cryptography, parallelization, and improvement of evolutionary algorithms. He has published more than 90 papers, lead several research projects, and serves as a reviewer for many international journals and conferences.





## Outline



- 2 Boolean Functions EC
- Substitution Boxes EC
- Pseudorandom Number Generators EC
- 5 Ciphers EC, ML
- 6 Attacks on Ciphers ML
- Quantum Protocols EC
- Physically Unclonable Functions EC, ML
- Hardware Trojans EC, ML
- 10 Side-channel Analysis ML
- 1 Fault Injection EC, ML
  - 2 Addition Chains EC

### Conclusions

- Research area within computer science that draws inspiration from the process of natural evolution.
- Evolutionary computation (EC) are population based metaheuristic optimization methods that use biology inspired mechanisms like selection, crossover or survival of the fittest.
- Genetic Algorithm (GA), Tree based Genetic Programming (GP), Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP), Evolution Strategy (ES), NSGA-II, etc.
- [47, 60, 91, 8, 34]

## Machine Learning

- Machine Learning (ML) is a subfield of computer science that evolved from the study of pattern recognition and computational learning theory in artificial intelligence.
- Deep learning (DL) is a special type of machine learning.
- Deep learning is designed to overcome problems that traditional machine learning cannot.
- Such problems are working with high-dimensional data, how to achieve generalization.
- In cryptology applications, mostly supervised learning is used.
- Supervised learning represents learning algorithms that learn to associate some input with some output, given a training set of examples of inputs and outputs.
- [9, 92, 40]

- Cryptology (from Greek words kryptos, which means hidden and logos, which means word) is the scientific study of cryptography and cryptanalysis.
- Cryptography is a science (and art) of secret writing to hide the meaning of a message.
- Cryptanalysis is a science of analyzing ciphers in order to find weaknesses in them.

Historically: cryptography has been the art of hiding the meaning of messages to protect their confidentiality.

- Origins dating back to ancient Egypt (~2000 BCE).
- Combination of the Greek words kryptos (hidden) and graphia (writing).
- Mainly relied on unsound methods till the 20th century, e.g.:
  - Monoalphabetic and polyalphabetic substitutions (*Caesar's cipher*, *Vigenère's cipher*, ...)
  - Transpositions (The Scytale, ...)
- Collectively, these methods are also known as *classical* cryptography.
- We will not be investigating AI for classical cryptography!

Modern cryptography is a science that studies the methods to allow *secure communication* in presence of *adversaries*.

- Started in the mid 20th century, with the seminal work by Shannon.
- Reliance on *precise* mathematical definitions and *rigorous* proofs to guarantee certain security levels.
- Used also for other goals other than message confidentiality:
  - Message integrity
  - Authentication
  - Non-repudiation
- Nowadays, modern cryptography is at the core of many protocols for secure digital communication (e.g., SSL/TLS, ...).

### The Basic Scenario

- Alice wants to send a message to Bob over a communication channel, so that only Bob can read it (confidentiality).
- We call the message *plaintext* (*PT*), and assume that it is a string over an alphabet Σ, that is

$$PT \in \Sigma^* = \bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} \Sigma^i, \ \Sigma^i$$
 is the set of strings of length *i*



• *Eve*, the adversary, can read *everything* transmitted over the channel.

To prevent Eve from reading *PT*, Alice and Bob adopt the following protocol:

Alice uses an Encryption function, Enc, which depends on an encryption key K<sub>E</sub>, and transforms PT into a ciphertext CT:

 $CT = Enc_{K_E}(PT)$ 

- Alice sends CT over the channel, and Eve observes CT.
- Bob uses a Decryption function, Dec, that depends on a decryption key K<sub>D</sub>, to transform CT back into PT:

 $PT = Dec_{K_D}(CT)$ 

### Cryptosystem – Block scheme



- PT: plaintext
- Enc: encryption function
- K<sub>E</sub>: encryption key

- CT: ciphertext
- Dec: decryption function
- K<sub>D</sub>: decryption key

- Unique decodability: given K<sub>E</sub> and K<sub>D</sub>, for all plaintext PT it must be the case that Dec<sub>K<sub>D</sub></sub>(Enc<sub>K<sub>E</sub></sub>(PT)) = PT.
- For all *PT*, it must be *easy* for Alice to compute the ciphertext  $CT = Enc_{K_E}(PT)$  by knowing  $K_E$  and Enc.
- For all *CT*, it must be *easy* for Bob to recover the plaintext  $PT = Dec_{K_D}(CT)$  by knowing  $K_D$  and Dec.
- Given *CT*, it must be *extremely difficult* for Eve to recover *PT* without knowing the decryption key *K*<sub>D</sub>.
- It is always assumed that the encryption and decryption functions are known to Eve (*Kerchoff's principle*).



## Symmetric and Public Key Cryptosystems

Symmetric key cryptosystems:

- The key used for encryption and decryption is the same.
- Alice and Bob must agree on this key before the communication takes place.
- Can be further classified in:
  - *Stream ciphers*: Encryption and decryption process single symbols of the plaintext and the ciphertext.
  - *Block ciphers*: Encryption and decryption work over *blocks* of fixed length of symbols.

Public key (or asymmetric key) cryptosystems:

- The keys used for encryption and decryption differ.
- Alice uses Bob's public key K<sub>E</sub> to encrypt, while Bob uses his own private key K<sub>D</sub> to decrypt.
- [56, 58, 84, 152]

- A study of methods for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information, without access to the secret information that is typically required to do so.
- Commonly, it involves knowing how the system works and finding a secret key.
- The major categories of cryptanalysis are ciphertext only, known plaintext, chosen plaintext, and chosen ciphertext.
- Common examples are linear and differential cryptanalysis.

### Implementation Attacks

- Implementation attacks do not aim at the weaknesses of the algorithm itself, but on the actual implementations on cryptographic devices.
- Power, sound, light, electromagnetic radiation.
- Implementation attacks are among the most powerful known attacks against cryptographic devices.
- Common types of implementation attacks are side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks.
- Side-channel attacks are passive and non-invasive attacks [75].
- Fault injection attacks are active attacks since they enforce the target to work outside the nominal operating range.

- We will notice that such artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are used more often in **attacks** than in **constructions**.
- More precisely, they are used more often in attacks by the crypto community.
- There are two main reasons for this:
  - It is easier to validate that the attack works. Indeed, we require only a successful attack as proof. For constructions, it is difficult to capture all the notions of security when using data or fitness functions.
  - Attacks are made after the constructions are done. So, there is the effect of timeliness. For constructions, one needs to use AI while designing the system, which is often not possible. Later, even if AI produces improved constructions, it is hard to change the already made design.
- [110, 19, 108, 109].

- For machine learning, a common tool is scikit-learn.
- For deep learning, Keras.
- For EC, different approaches use different tools.
- ECF is a C++ framework intended for application of any type of evolutionary computation: http://gp.zemris.fer.hr/
- Details about projects concerning evolutionary computation and cryptology: http://evocrypt.zemris.fer.hr/



Figure: Evolutionary Computation Framework.

- How to solve hard problems in cryptology?
- Problems need to be hard (to be worthwhile), but not too difficult (to be impossible to solve).
- Plenitude of problems and possible methods to solve them.

- The easiest problem to start.
- A natural mapping between the truth table representation of Boolean functions and representation of solutions in EC.
- Boolean functions are important cryptographic primitive and often used in stream ciphers as the source of nonlinearity.
- Boolean functions are commonly used in combiner or filter generators.



### **Boolean Functions**



- Filter and combiner generators, as depicted in previous slides are not commonly used in crypto anymore.
- Evolving Boolean functions is more interesting from the perspective of a difficult optimization problem, and not designing cryptographic primitive that will be used in ciphers.

| Trut  | h table input         | Truth table output |  |  |  |
|-------|-----------------------|--------------------|--|--|--|
| $x_1$ | <i>x</i> <sub>0</sub> | у                  |  |  |  |
| 0     | 0                     | $\bigcirc$         |  |  |  |
| 0     | 1                     |                    |  |  |  |
| 1     | 0                     | 1                  |  |  |  |
| 1     | 1                     | 0                  |  |  |  |

Figure: Boolean function representation with truth table (two variables).

### **Boolean Functions**

- Three main directions in evolution of Boolean functions:
  - Evolution of Boolean functions fulfilling a number of cryptographic properties (that can be used in combiner or filter generators). Additionally, with some special properties that are useful for masking countermeasures against side-channel attacks.
  - Evolution of bent Boolean functions. Bent Boolean functions are maximally nonlinear but not balanced, and as such, not directly usable in crypto. Still, this represents an interesting benchmark problem.
  - Evolution of algebraic constructions that are used to design Boolean functions.

### **Boolean Functions**

- Depending on the setting, we are interested in a number of properties (balancedness, nonlinearity, algebraic degree, correlation immunity, algebraic immunity), where some of those properties are conflicting.
- Search space size is  $2^{2^n}$ .
- Representing solutions in the truth table form requires a string of bits of length 2<sup>n</sup>.
- For smaller sizes, bitstring, integer, and floating-point also give good results.
- Currently, the best results, in general, are achieved with GP/CGP.
- Such results are comparable with those from algebraic constructions.

- The problem is scaling as algebraic constructions work for many dimensions, while EC has problems when considering Boolean functions with more than, e.g., 16 variables.
- Interesting research directions: *i*) finding Boolean functions with specific properties that were not found with algebraic constructions, *ii*) extending EC to work with larger Boolean functions, and *iii*) evolving constructions of Boolean functions.
- General information about Boolean functions in cryptography [14, 26, 15].
- [90, 86, 127, 113, 87, 2, 88, 89, 22, 23, 20, 50, 132, 129, 116, 136, 77, 76, 80, 121, 79, 78, 107, 140, 115, 125, 128, 10, 81].

#### Bitstring representation

correlation immunity: 0; nonlinearity: 116; algebraic degree: 6

- Boolean function of eight variables represented with a binary array of size 256 (ECF).
- Optimization of nonlinearity while maintaining balancedness.

### Floating point representation

| <individual <="" size="1" th=""><th>&gt;</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></individual>                                  | >   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|----------|--|-------------|----------|--|--|--|--|--|
| <fitnessmax< td=""><td colspan="10"><fitnessmax value="114.938"></fitnessmax></td></fitnessmax<>                                | <fitnessmax value="114.938"></fitnessmax> |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| <floatingpoi< td=""><td>nt size="32"&gt;</td><td>0.26875</td><td>0.669872</td><td>0.762153</td><td>0.246787</td></floatingpoi<> | nt size="32">                             | 0.26875  | 0.669872                                   | 0.762153    | 0.246787 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.443393  | 0.498733                                  | 0.664411 | 0.00021305                                 | 0.278248    | 0.622918 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.889779  | 0.321942                                  | 0.982994 | 0.554419                                   | 0.0779042   | 0.663329 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.125795  | 0.595173                                  | 0.540512 | 0.132081                                   | 0.112745    | 0.59266  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.847716  | 0.888488                                  | 0.592867 | 0.655954                                   | 0.770198    | 0.198452 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.348636  | 0.620424                                  | 0.767249 | 0.673829 <td>atingPoint&gt;</td> <td></td> | atingPoint> |          |  |  |  |  |  |
|   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
|   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| Truth table:  |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| 010001001010101111000011001111110111000101  |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0011111111000110100101111101110001101000100111010   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00101000100001000111001001011111011001111   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1001001011001110110001001001010100  |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
| correlation immunity: 0; nonlinearity: 114; algebraic degree: 7   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |
|   |   |          |  |             |          |  |  |  |  |  |

- Boolean function of eight variables represented with a floating point array (ECF).
- In this example, each floating point value maps to eight bits in the truth table (either binary or Gray encoding, concatenated or distributed bits).

#### GP representation

- Boolean function of eight variables represented with a GP tree (ECF).
- Optimizing for maximally nonlinear functions (bent functions).

### S-boxes

- Natural extension from the Boolean function case.
- S-boxes (Substitution Boxes) are also called vectorial Boolean functions.
- Often used in block ciphers as a source of nonlinearity.
- However, this problem is much more difficult!
- S-box of dimension n × m has m output Boolean functions, but for several cryptographic properties we need to check all linear combinations of those functions (there are 2<sup>n</sup> – 1 linear combinations to consider).

| Truth table input |       | Line    | Linear combinations |                 |  | Walsh-Hadamard spectrum |       |                 |
|-------------------|-------|---------|---------------------|-----------------|--|-------------------------|-------|-----------------|
| $x_1$             | $x_0$ | $ y_1 $ | $y_0$               | $y_1\oplus y_0$ |  | $y_1$                   | $y_0$ | $y_1\oplus y_0$ |
| 0                 | 0     | 0       | 1                   | 1               |  | 0                       | 0     | 0               |
| 0                 | 1     | 1       | 0                   | 1               |  | 0                       | -4    | 0               |
| 1                 | 0     | 1       | 1                   | 0               |  | 0                       | 0     | -4              |
| 1                 | 1     | 0       | 0                   | 0               |  | 4                       | 0     | 0               |

Figure: S-box with two inputs *x* and outputs *y*.

- For an S-box of size  $n \times m$ , the search space size equals  $2^{m2^n}$ .
- Commonly (with EC), we explore cases where n = m, which means that for n = m = 8, the search space size equals  $2^{2048}$ .
- Common sizes to evolve with EC are from  $3 \times 3$  to  $8 \times 8$ .
- Common solution representations are the same as for Boolean functions, plus permutation (which enforces bijectivity).
- Note, if using the tree representation, one actually evolves *n* trees.
- For smaller sizes, (up to 4 × 4) all solution representations work well.

- Similar to the Boolean function case, there are three main approaches to construct S-boxes: *i*) algebraic constructions, *i*) random search, and *iii*) heuristics.
- EC is commonly used to:
  - Find bijective S-boxes with high nonlinearity (and low differential uniformity). Note that for such S-boxes, we know several algebraic constructions.
  - To find S-boxes with additional properties. These commonly go into the direction of resilience against side-channel attacks.
  - To find more efficient implementations of S-boxes (efficient in terms of area, power).



Figure: When considering S-box implementation properties, it is important to be able to communicate between the EC system and the system that checks the implementation perspective.

- The best results are obtained with tree representation and cellular automata approach.
- In fact, this representation was the first to obtain bijective S-boxes with optimal cryptographic properties for sizes up to 7 × 7 (not including 6 × 6 as there, no EC technique found the bijective S-box with the best possible differential uniformity).
- Already for size 8 × 8, EC results are far from those obtained with algebraic constructions (except if the initial population is seeded with good S-boxes).
Table: Best known values for bijective S-boxes. For  $8 \times 8$ , we give the best known results while for smaller sizes, we give the optimal values. For bijective S-boxes (and in  $\mathbb{F}_2$ ), both nonlinearity and differential uniformity ( $\delta$ ) can be even values only. The worst possible values are 0 for nonlinearity (i.e., the S-box is linear), and  $2^n$  for differential uniformity.

| Property              | 3×3 | $4 \times 4$ | $5 \times 5$ | 6×6 | $7 \times 7$ | 8×8 |
|-----------------------|-----|--------------|--------------|-----|--------------|-----|
| nonlinearity $\delta$ | 2   | 4            | 12           | 24  | 56           | 112 |
|                       | 2   | 4            | 2            | 2   | 2            | 4   |

#### S-boxes

- S-boxes are becoming less popular due to the rise of permutation-based cryptography, but they are still widely used.
- Naturally, most EC solutions are obtained much after the cipher design, so it is impractical to change the whole cipher simply to accommodate a new S-box.
- Interesting challenges for EC are *i*) obtain S-box of size 8 × 8 with the same properties as with algebraic constructions, and *ii*) evolve algebraic constructions of S-boxes (either primary or secondary).
- General information about S-boxes [13].

- Tool that evaluates cryptographic properties of Boolean functions and S-boxes [114].
- Discussion on benchmarking EC with cryptographic problems [130].
- [21, 33, 35, 51, 52, 85, 120, 103, 135, 137, 138, 83, 134, 133, 82, 11, 155, 5, 141, 143, 119, 105, 16, 106, 71, 37, 54, 126].

```
<Tndividual size="1">
    <FitnessMax value="84.0938"/>
    <Tree size="13">XOR v1 IF v3 IF v0 v5 v3 XOR NOR v5 v0 v2 </Tree>
</Individual>
infix: (v1 XOR IF(v3, IF(v0, v5, v3), ((v5 NOR v0) XOR v2)))
Shox.
101110110111011101000100011101110100010001000100010011101110001000
Permutation.
63 12 24 57 48 11 51 26 33 18 22 55 39 28 52 29 3 50 36 7 44 21 47 4 15 62 56 27
41 16 58 17 6 6037 13 9 59 14 46 25 35 42 2 31 45 8 40 30 38 61 23 49 1 54 20 19
43 32 10 53 5 34 0
```

- S-box CA representation (cellular automata rule for a single column repeated six times).
- End result is a bijective S-box with six inputs and outputs (ECF).

- In the same way one builds Boolean functions and S-boxes as cryptographic primitives, it is possible to extend the approach and build pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs).
- In cryptography, random number generators (RNGs) play an important role.
- Most of the time, we need true random number generators (TRNGs), but still, there are applications for pseudorandom number generators.
- TRNG is a device for which the output values depend on some unpredictable source that produces entropy.
- PRNGs represent mechanisms that produce random numbers by performing a deterministic algorithm on a randomly selected seed.

- Commonly, we want to find extremely fast and small PRNGs that pass all NIST tests [4].
- We can use GP and CGP to evolve PRNGs.
- CGP has an advantage that it can have multiple outputs, which means it can output more bits.
- Fitness function needs to be simple, yet powerful.
- We can use approximate entropy test from the NIST statistical test suite as a fitness function.

```
void CGP(uint x0, uint x1, uint x2, uint x3,
uint z_0, uint z_1, uint z_2, uint z_3 {
    uint y4 = x0 \& x1;
    uint y5 = x2 x3;
    uint y_6 = (y_5 >> 1) | (y_5 << 31);
    uint v7 = p1(v6);
    uint v8 = x3 v7:
    uint y9 = p1(y8);
    uint y10 = y6 \hat{y}9;
    uint v11 = (v9 \ll 1) | (v9 \gg 31);
    uint v12 = const:
    uint y13 = p1(y10);
    uint y14 = y12 ^ y11;
    uint y15 = y12 ^{y13};
    uint v16 = (v15 >> 1) | (v15 << 31):
    uint y17 = y10^{\circ} y16;
    uint y_{18} = p_1(y_{17});
    uint y19 = y18 >> 1;
    uint v20 = v18 v4:
    uint y_{21} = p_1(y_{20});
    uint y22 = y18 ^ y21;
    uint y_{23} = p_1(y_{18});
    uint y24 = y19^{\circ} y18;
    uint y_{25} = y_{23} + y_{19};
    uint y_{26} = y_{22} \circ v_{14}:
    *z0 = v18;
    *z1 = v25;
    *z2 = v26:
    *z3 = y24;
```

Figure: Example of a PRNG evolved with CGP.

- The same technique can be used to produce PRNGs on-the-fly.
- Then, we can use evolvable hardware [153] that constantly updates the PRNG part.



🖾 not on FPGA 🔳 core in silicon 🖾 default IP 🔳 custom IP

Figure: Example of a system that uses CGP and evolves PRNGs on-the-fly.

- Common challenges are to find fast, reliable, and small PRNGs with EC.
- Usually, the problem is to have an efficient fitness function.
- [67, 101, 59, 42, 145, 159, 144, 142]

- Instead of evolving only parts of ciphers as we discussed up to now, we can consider whether AI could build the whole cipher.
- There are commonalities with the previous topic as one can consider PRNG as the whole system, and not only a part of it.
- The first effort in this direction uses adversarial neural networks.
- There are three networks representing Alice, Bob, and Eve and they compete to find a cipher that is usable and secure [1].

- It is also possible to evolve ciphers with evolutionary algorithms [131].
- One can use competitive coevolutionary algorithms to train a cipher (Alice) and attacker (Eve).
- Still, these works can be regarded as proofs of concept only.
- There are multiple possible research directions: *i*) making the ciphers more efficient and secure as now, they work with very small inputs and are trivial to break, *ii*) making the attacker strategies smarter, *iii*) explore different levels of information provided to Alice and Eve do they design all from scratch, or do they have background info? *iv*) extending to other concepts and not only block ciphers (and in block ciphers, consider whether evolving the round function or the whole cipher), and *v*) Al "reinventing" of crypto techniques that are well-known and commonly used.



Figure: Coevolutionary system for the evolution of ciphers.

## Attacks on Ciphers

- Up to now, EC has been successfully applied to break classical cryptography, see, e.g., [98] or simplified ciphers [32].
- Additionally, EC was also used as a helper tool in SAT-based attacks [100].
- To the best of our knowledge, these results are still far from being able to say that EC was used to conduct cryptanalysis of a modern cipher.
- On the other hand, neural networks proved to be a more suitable option here.
- A common direction is to use neural networks to exploit the properties of ciphers.

- For example, train neural networks to distinguish the output of a cipher with a given input difference from random data.
- These approaches represent very interesting research direction as with neural networks, one can reach/surpass state-of-the-art cryptanalysis results.
- [39, 68, 66, 28, 27, 18].

- Instead of operating on primitive or cipher level, EC can be used to evolve protocols also.
- As an example, it is possible to use EC to evolve novel quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols designed to counter attacks against the system in order to optimize the speed of secure communication.
- In essence, the goal is to evolve protocols as quantum circuits [154].
- Then, it is possible to define whether EC must work on the specific, user-defined template of a protocol or without explicit rules on how to access quantum communication channel.



Figure: QKD protocol depicted as two circuits  $G_A$  and  $G_B$ . First, run circuit  $G_A$ , and then, the wire is measured yielding a classical bit. Then, Eve is allowed to attack the transit line. Finally,  $G_B$  circuit is run, acting on the transit wire, and additional wires private to party *B*. Then, *B*'s wire is measured.

- This research direction looks very interesting as the current results are very good and there are not many other approaches to solve this.
- [61, 62, 63].

## **Quantum Protocols**

| <individual size="5"></individual>         |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
|--|-----|-----------|-------|------|--------------------|----------|--|--|--|--|
| <fitnessmax value="0.152422"></fitnessmax> |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| <intgenotype size="5"></intgenotype>       | 2   | 0         | 3     | 0    | 0 <td>ype&gt;</td> | ype>     |  |  |  |  |
| <intgenotype size="5"></intgenotype>       | 2   | 0         | 2     | 1    | 3                  |          |  |  |  |  |
| <bitstring size="5">01011</bitstring>      |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| <intgenotype size="5"></intgenotype>       | 2   | 2         | 2 0   |      | 1                  |          |  |  |  |  |
| <floatingpoint size="15"></floatingpoint>  | 0.  | 0.471412  |       | 8858 | 0.560975           | 0.554435 |  |  |  |  |
| 0.397848 0.448713                          | 0.3 | 28381     | 0.582 | 966  | 0.310332           | 0.273257 |  |  |  |  |
| 0.623984 0.782299                          | 0.0 | 0.0205793 |       | 9614 | 0.0182854          |          |  |  |  |  |
|  |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| Gates A:                                   |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| type 2 target 2 mode 0 control: 2          |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| type 0 target 0 mode 1 control: 2          |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| type 3 target 2 mode 0 control: 2          |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| Gates B:                                   |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| type 0 target 3 mode 1 control: 2          |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
| type 0 target 2 mode 1 control: 3          |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |
|  |     |           |       |      |                    |          |  |  |  |  |

- QKD circuit representation (ECF).
- Optimization of a one-way QKD protocol, five gates total.
- The fitness function reflects the maximum obtainable key-rate.

- Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are embedded or standalone devices used as a means to generate either a source of randomness or to obtain an instance-specific uniqueness for secure identification.
- This is achieved by relying on inherent uncontrollable manufacturing process variations, which results in each chip having a unique response.
- No two PUFs will give the same response when supplied with the same challenge.
- There exists no ideal PUF.
- Ideal PUF is unpredictable and without noise.
- Practical realizations depend on noise, aging, environmental variables, and process variations.

- Two types of PUFs: strong and weak.
- The difference with respect to the number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) attacker is allowed to obtain.
- The number of unique challenges *c* scales polynomially with the circuit area of a weak PUF.
- The number of unique challenges *c* scales exponentially with the circuit area of a strong PUF.

- Weak PUF has a limited number (typically, one or few) of responses to challenges.
- Strong PUFs have a large number of responses (with respect to different challenges).
- Strong PUFs have a virtually unlimited number of challenges *c*, but their CRPs are highly correlated.
- Given enough (often small amount) of CRPs, it is possible to build a predictive model of a strong PUF (in a way, we build a mathematical clone since it is not feasible to make analog physical clone).
- There exists no validated design of a strong PUF that is fully resilient against modeling attacks.



Figure: An example of a strong PUF - Arbiter PUF with *n* stages.

- Several techniques are commonly used to break strong PUFs.
- From ML domain, logistic regression, and from EC, evolution strategy.
- This domain is very interesting as AI provided results that were not possible to obtain with any other technique.
- What is more, even simple AI techniques can easily break strong PUFs.
- This also means there is not much development in the domain as attacks are easy to do, so no clear benefit of using more complex techniques, e.g., deep learning.
- [7, 158, 149, 148, 147, 6, 156, 29].

- Hardware Trojans (HTHs) are malicious hardware components that intend to leak secret information or cause malfunctioning at run-time in the chip in which they are integrated.
- Over the last decade, HTHs have gained increasing attention.
- There are no HTHs in ICs reported in real-world applications yet, there are many examples of academic research results, both on injecting and detecting/preventing HTHs.
- HTHs can be inserted by untrusted foundries and actors at different stages in the design and development of FPGAs and ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits).

# Hardware Trojans

- Conventional HTHs typically modify the functionality of target circuits at the register transfer level, net-list level, layout level, or dopant level to obtain secret information directly, to induce a fault for differential fault analysis, or to disable/degrade an embedded (pseudo) random number generator.
- HTH consists of two parts: a trigger and a payload.
- The trigger usually corresponds to a rare data input (sequence), while the payload is the activity that causes the data leakage or the malfunctioning when the HTH is triggered.
- HTHs are usually inserted in special places in the design that have low testability or high slack time.
- Testability is measured through two parameters: controllability and observability.

- Compared to research concerned with the design of Hardware Trojans, considerably more results exist related to different Hardware Trojan detection mechanisms and countermeasures.
- Most research focuses on detecting Hardware Trojans inserted during manufacturing.
- In many cases, a golden model is used that is supposed to be Trojan free to serve as a reference.
- One important question is how to get to a Trojan-free golden model.

- Common research directions include EC for detection and prevention of HTH, ML for detection, but also EC to insert HTH.
- [41, 53, 64, 55, 150, 36, 65].

- SCAs represent one of the most powerful categories of attacks on crypto devices.
- Profiled attacks have a prominent place as the most powerful among side-channel attacks.
- Some machine learning techniques can also serve as profiled attacks.
- There is a natural mapping between the profiled attacks and supervised learning.
- Recently, deep learning started to gain attention in the SCA community.

#### Side-channel Analysis



Figure: A depiction of profiled SCA.

- ML in SCA is an active domain for almost 20 years.
- Even the first profiled attacks template attack and stochastic attacks are well-known techniques, quadratic discriminant analysis, and linear regression, respectively.
- Machine learning techniques were successfully applied in the attack phase, but also for pre-processing and feature engineering.
- Deep learning thrives from advantages that it does not require feature selection and that it can break implementations protected with countermeasures.
- Interesting additional ML applications are noise removal and data augmentation.

- This is very active research domain with new papers appearing all the time.
- This makes this domain attractive for new researchers but also difficult due to large competition.
- There are some extra problems like lack of publicly available datasets, inconsistency between ML metrics and SCA metrics.
- Common techniques are random forest, support vector machines, multilayer perceptron, convolutional neural networks.
- While common attack target is AES (block cipher), recently, more people are interested in attacking public-key cryptosystems also.
- [122, 45, 124, 44, 12, 72, 38, 146, 139, 57, 3, 48, 43, 123, 70, 46, 49, 111, 157, 104].

# Fault Injection

- A fault injection (FI) attack is successful if, after exposing the device to a specially crafted external interference, it shows an unexpected behavior exploitable by the attacker.
- Insertion of signals has to be precisely tuned for the fault injection to succeed.
- Finding the correct parameters for a successful FI can be considered as a search problem where one aims to find, within a minimum time, the parameter configurations which result in a successful fault injection.
- The source of fault can be, e.g., voltage glitching, laser, electromagnetic radiation.
- Depending on the source of the fault, the search space of possible parameters changes significantly.
- In general, the search space is too big to conduct an exhaustive search.

- Commonly, one defines several possible classes for classifying a single measurement:
  - NORMAL: smart card behaves as expected, and the glitch is ignored
  - RESET: smart card resets as a result of the glitch
  - MUTE: smart card stops all communication as a result of the glitch
  - CHANGING: the response is changing when repeating measurements.
  - SUCCESS: smart card response is a specific, predetermined value that does not happen under normal operation



Figure: A depiction of search space for voltage glitching and two parameters.

- Research domain with not many results from AI.
- Commonly used techniques are random search and grid search, so EC makes a strong alternative.
- The main issue is very expensive equipment to run fault injection campaigns.
- Mostly, EC is used, but recently, also deep learning found its place.
- Deep learning can be used to predict what a target would respond to a specific parameter combination.

- Interesting research directions include *i*) working with more relevant parameters, *ii*) attacking targets with countermeasures, and *iii*) making the search algorithm more powerful, especially by considering the differences between faults and exploitable faults (those that would result in target break).
- [17, 102, 112, 160, 74, 73, 151].
## **Addition Chains**

- Up to now, we considered EC and ML applications that directly contributed to the security of ciphers, or, on the other hand, were used to break ciphers.
- Still, it is possible to use AI techniques as a helper tool to improve the systems, either from attack or defense perspective.
- In a way, one could consider the evolution of S-boxes with good implementation properties to also belong to the setting that helps improve the system, but not necessarily its security.
- Another example of a problem like that is the finding of short addition chains.
- A sequence of positive integers where each value is a sum of two values appearing previously in the chain.
- Addition chains are used in public-key cryptosystems (e.g., for modular exponentiation).

 Binary method: write 60 in binary: 111100; replace "1" with "DA" and "0" with "D"; cross out the first "DA" on the left; "DADADADD", calculate:

$$1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 6 \rightarrow 7 \rightarrow 14 \rightarrow 15 \rightarrow 30 \rightarrow 60$$

Addition chain (7 operations):

$$A^{1}$$
;  $A^{2} = A^{1} * A^{1}$ ;  $A^{4} = A^{2} * A^{2}$ ;  $A^{6} = A^{4} * A^{2}$ ;  $A^{12} = A^{6} * A^{6}$ ;

$$A^{24} = A^{12} * A^{12}; A^{30} = A^{24} * A^{6}; A^{60} = A^{30} * A^{30}$$

## **Addition Chains**

- The problem of finding the shortest addition chain for a given exponent is relevant in cryptography.
- The problem is believed to be NP-hard.
- There is no single algorithm that can be used for any exponent.
- The best solutions are obtained by pen and paper method.
- Huge numbers so exhaustive search is impossible.
- Heuristics should be able to help.
- The values in the ascending addition chain have the property that they are the sum of two values appearing previously in the chain.

- Common solution representations are binary encoding where value 1 means that the entry number is in the chain, and 0 means the opposite, and integer encoding where every value represents an element of the chain.
- Extra care needs to be taken with crossover and mutation operators: as one changes elements, it is required to ensure that the chain remains valid!

- Interesting research directions are *i*) improve the speed of the algorithm, *ii*) look for optimal chains for even larger numbers, *iii*) support special structures of numbers, and *iv*) explore different types of addition chains.
- [93, 94, 96, 25, 24, 99, 69, 118, 117, 95, 97, 30, 31].

## Custom chain genotype

- Chain optimization with target exponent value 375 494 703 (ECF).
- The construction steps are reproduced below the chain.

- Up to now, EC proved to be successful in cryptology:
  - When there exist no other, specialized approaches.
  - To rapidly check whether some concept (e.g., formula) is correct.
  - To assess the quality of some other method.
  - To produce "good-enough" solutions.
  - To produce novel and human-competitive solutions (solutions produced by EC that can rival the best solutions created by humans).

- Machine learning is a data-driven approach, and as such limited to scenarios where we can obtain data.
- Still, in domains like attacks on strong PUFs and profiled SCA, machine learning achieved excellent results.
- Deep learning is mostly explored in profiled SCA, and more recently, in attacks on ciphers.
- As machine learning is used as an attack mechanism, it is "easy" to show if it works or not, which makes a huge advantage over EC and constructive approaches.

- We presented here only a handful of applications, there are more options.
- Even for each of the applications, there is a plethora of options still to try:
  - New algorithms.
  - 2 Combinations of parameters.
  - Representations.
  - Fitness functions.
- The results obtained up to now are good, but there is still much room for improvement.

## Conclusions

- For the AI community, cryptology problems are just something to be solved, but without consideration of the constraints and the quality of the obtained solutions.
- For the cryptographic community, AI techniques are just a tool that is used without understanding.
- Without a good understanding of the problem and the tool to be used, it is hard to expect strong results.
- As already said, there is a difference between attack and constructive perspectives, which makes it easier for AI techniques to be used as attack mechanisms (at least for now).
- As a general research direction, it would be interesting to consider new applications (while some of the current ones are still very active, it would not be necessarily easy for new researchers to join the game).

Questions?

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