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Global Jihadist Terrorism
Terrorist Groups, Zones of Armed Conflict and National Counter-Terrorism Strategies

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Contributors

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Anthony Davis is an internationally recognised security analyst and consultant for IHS-Jane's and other transnational corporations and has been based in Thailand since 1979. In a career spanning 30 years, he has gained detailed field experience of a wide range of armed conflicts and terrorist and counter-terrorist campaigns in the Asian region with particular emphasis on jihadist conflicts in the Pakistan–Afghanistan and southern Philippine theatres. He is a researcher at the Technical University (TU) Delft on the European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant (GTCMR – 670172) on Global Terrorism and Collective Moral Responsibility: Redesigning Military, Police and Intelligence Institutions in Liberal Democracies under the auspices of which the research published in this volume was undertaken.

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Seumas Miller holds research appointments at Charles Sturt University, Technical University (TU) Delft, the Netherlands and the University of Oxford, UK. Miller is the author or co-author of 20 academic books, including *Institutional Corruption* (Cambridge University Press, 2017), *Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force* (Oxford University Press, 2016) and *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and*

Liberal Democracy (Blackwell, 2009), and over 200 refereed articles, book chapters and other academic papers, including in leading international philosophy journals and cognate disciplines. He was foundation director of the Australian Research Council Special Research Centre in Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE). He has been awarded in his name over $20 million in competitive research grants from Australian, European and US funding agencies. His applied philosophical research frequently relies on input from practitioners and from cognate disciplines. He is the Principal Investigator at the TU Delft and the University of Oxford on the European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant (GTCMR – 670172) on Global Terrorism and Collective Moral Responsibility: Redesigning Military, Police and Intelligence Institutions in Liberal Democracies under the auspices of which the research published in this volume was undertaken.

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University of Victoria in British Columbia. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Connecticut in 2016.

Foreword

I greatly welcome this important, useful both practically and intellectually, addition to our knowledge base about terrorism. The editors, Dr Paul Burke, Dr Doaa' Elnakhala and Professor Seumas Miller, have collected a group of chapters by distinguished international authors. The internal logic, structure and mutually enhancing discipline achieved in this volume allows a comparative threat assessment of several jihadist terrorist groups; explores the strategies of five liberal democratic states to combat them through legal means and their institutions; and describes the zones of conflict where the precursors, threats and responses take place. The value and significance of this approach goes far beyond that claimed by the editors in their Introduction.

An element of the terrorist's intent, as explained to me by a retired terrorist of my acquaintance from one of the zones explored here, is anonymity as a function of secrecy. They seek to increase the terror by limiting our knowledge to what they want us to know. They want to control our knowledge to make the surprise and hence the terror of their violence greater. They want us to have little knowledge with which to respond to their propaganda, to make a counter-narrative to their claims difficult. In Mao Zedong's famous metaphor they are 'fish swimming with the other fish in the sea of the community'.

There is a corollary to this: the state, and particularly the lead intelligence agencies and specialist police units, do not want the terrorists to know what they know, in part because that might reveal their sources or the terrorists' weaknesses. In Churchill's famous phrase about Enigma/Ultra, these sources may need to be 'the geese that laid the golden eggs but never cackled'. This makes the task of creating an educated community to counter terrorism very difficult. The dilemma lies in what information you can share that does not benefit the terrorists. The editors here have provided a case study in how to do this.

To solve a segment of these problems, we in the Anti-Terrorism Branch modelled another component of the wartime intelligence response to the U-boat threat in the Atlantic. I helped to train and develop 'open-minded' analysts and intelligence leaders, managers and commanders by bringing academics into intelligence cells, by involving postgraduates as analysts, using open sources, and encouraging academic research with practical outcomes. The problem is how to train the root sources of that cadre early in the communities

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from which they are to be drawn. This book is a major step in that development but its impact can be wider even than on analysts alone.

The knowledge base developed here can be used, for example, to support all the strands of the UK Counter Terrorist Strategy; even the much misunderstood 'Prevent' strand with its ground-up need to generate knowledgeable community leaders; sources of protection and self-help that understand both threat and the counter-strategy; critical friends and independent advisers; to help generate sources of every kind of information; engender informed community trust, cohesion, cooperation and confidence. All these are required to help 'communities defeat terrorism'. What we need is a cadre of knowledgeable creative thinkers from communities to aid our wider society. They can unify, quell anger and pitch in and find new solutions, for example. That the breadth of contents of these chapters can help us to achieve this is the true value of the volume.

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Acknowledgement

1.   Introduction to *Global Jihadist Terrorism*

Paul Burke, Doaa' Elnakhala and Seumas Miller

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 by al-Qaeda (AQ) operatives, countering jihadist terrorism has become a primary security and political priority for many liberal democracies. The fact that global jihadist terrorism, notably in the form of AQ, Islamic State (IS) and their affiliates, has affected other liberal democratic regimes only deepens these concerns. Consequently, we have seen considerable shifts in the counter-terrorism (CT) strategies and tactics of liberal democracies, and in respect of their legal and other institutional arrangements concerned with security. Of course, jihadist terrorism has not only affected liberal democracies but more often than not it has also had greater direct impact on authoritarian states or, at least, on states other than well-ordered liberal democracies, such as Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given their global ambitions and reach, the terrorist operations conducted by AQ, IS and their affiliates still impact upon liberal democracies both directly and indirectly. Such liberal democracies are the focus of both this volume and the European Research Council Advanced Grant (GTCMR – 670172) research project of which it is a part.

  Global jihadist terrorism differs in important respects from traditional terrorism of the kind practised by the likes of the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. For one thing, the goals of global jihadism are not simply narrow, nationalistic ones but far more grandiose, notably the establishment of a Caliphate. Moreover, the harmful impact of global jihadist terrorism has been much greater. In its attempts to establish a so-called Caliphate, the terrorism perpetrated by IS has not only hit various Western cities but has also resulted in the deaths of far more people in the Middle East, predominantly among the Muslim population that it claims to represent. Further, there is an important difference in terms of tactics. Elements of the IS Caliphate project that have materialised over the past few years have relied upon a variety of brutal terrorist tactics to subdue and coerce local populations to ensure that they remain under IS control. Finally, global jihadist terrorism has taken a somewhat different organisational form, such as AQ operating

with franchise groups in a number of locations, including Nigeria, Somalia and Syria.

This volume seeks to provide a single, unified, relatively comprehensive repository of information on jihadist terrorism by offering three sets of integrated chapters organised into three parts. Firstly, four key jihadist terrorist groups (AQ, IS, Hamas and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)); secondly, four zones of armed conflict involving these terrorist groups (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Palestine–Israel); and thirdly, the counter-terrorist responses of five key, liberal democratic states (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Israel and India). Each chapter in a given set complies with a common structure in order to facilitate access to what is, in effect, a reference work on jihadist terrorism. The resulting work is one suitable for use by researchers and students in terrorism studies, by policy-makers, security personnel and others requiring, in particular, a comparative knowledge of counter-terrorism measures across a range of liberal democracies, and by journalists, members of the educated public and others desiring to possess a general understanding of jihadist terrorism and what is being done to combat it.

PART I: TERRORIST GROUPS

This part provides an in-depth analysis of the four terrorist groups, AQ, IS, Hamas and Lashkar-e-Taiba. A contextual background to each terrorist group is provided, setting the scene for an examination of each chosen organisation. This encompasses: (1) the aims of the group, not only the publicly stated ones but also any 'hidden agendas'; (2) the organisational structure of the group; (3) how the group is financed, how it conducts its training and how it recruits and retains its support base; (4) the higher-level strategies, along with the lower-level tactics of each group.

Chapter 2: 'Al-Qaeda' by Paul Burke

With a well-developed capability in recruitment, financing and training, AQ was highly successful in propagating its aims and ideology across the globe, allowing it to grow in numbers, ambition and capability. The ideological foundations of the AQ movement date back to the 13th century and progressed through the interpretations of various individuals, most latterly including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The group spawned a number of regional franchise-style affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, responsible for high-profile attacks such as that against the United States (US) warship, the USS *Cole*.

Chapter 3: 'The So-Called Islamic State' by Michael Robillard

The self-proclaimed Islamic State is a militant Sunni-Salafi-jihadist organisation, operating largely in Iraq, Syria and Libya, whose stated aim is the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate of 7th century Islam. The group is a proponent of Sharia law and claims political and theological authority over the world's Muslims. The formation of IS officially occurred in 2013 when its creation was announced by the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Its social media campaign, coupled with early military success in Raqqa and Mosul in June 2014, served to attract thousands of foreign fighters to ISIS's ranks. In the last couple of years IS's strength has waned dramatically, in terms of both troop strength and territorial control. A reduced and fractured IS might be even more dangerous in the long run, insofar as the group could decentralise and metastasise into a multiplicity of opportunist terrorist entities, leading to destructive terrorist competition.

Chapter 4: 'Hamas' by Doaa' Elnakhala

Hamas emerged in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and despite recent attempts at detaching itself from the Brotherhood, it is considered an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas identifies itself as an Islamic-nationalist liberation movement. Ever since its creation, Hamas has become increasingly influential through its military attacks against Israel, its social and unmatched welfare network at the Palestinian level, and its wide support base. Hamas identifies the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state as its main goals. Hamas has been designated a terrorist organisation by several Western countries due to its employment of terrorism against Israel. In part, the tension between Israel and Hamas lies in the latter's refusal to recognise Israel, although its document from May 2017 demonstrated some changes towards this end. In addition to addressing these issues, this chapter also goes into some detail to cover issues such as Hamas's organisational structure, training and recruitment methods, financing, and strategy and tactics.

Chapter 5: 'Lashkar-e-Taiba' by Anthony Davis

Lashkar-e-Taiba is all but synonymous with its gunmen's three-day terrorist rampage through Mumbai, India's commercial capital. The global notoriety it achieved in November 2008 with attacks that left 166 dead made it arguably South Asia's best-known terrorist organisation. In addition to a proclivity for high-profile terrorism, LeT has from its earliest beginnings been organised and trained as guerrilla force capable of a range of military operations, undertaken

most notably in Afghanistan and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir disputed between India and Pakistan. LeT has depended for much of its military capability on its umbilical relationship with the Pakistani military and more specifically the military's intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Lashkar's history is best viewed as a careful balancing of two core missions. First has been a commitment to a concept of a globalised jihad aimed at least notionally at the re-institution of the Islamic Caliphate. Second has been *dawa*, the reformist missionary drive to propagate Ahl-e-Hadith Salafism through proselytising and social welfare outreach within Pakistan and beyond.

PART II: ZONES OF ARMED CONFLICT

This part examines a number of countries or regions that have suffered from widespread and/or lasting armed conflicts in which terrorism is a major factor. Each chapter begins by outlining the historical context in which the armed conflict in question emerged, including a description of the chief protagonists. The bulk of each chapter deals with the nature of the conflict, for example to what extent it involves conventional warfare. The terrorist and CT strategies and tactics in use are described, as are the results of their use. Finally, an assessment is made of the trajectory of the armed conflict, that is, where it is heading, and what is the likely endpoint.

Chapter 6: 'Afghanistan' by Anthony Davis

The scourge of terrorism in Afghanistan has emerged from the history of the wars and insurgencies that have devastated the country since 1978. Forty years of unremitting conflict has cost between 1 and 2 million lives and has reflected a geopolitical crisis of a complexity that continues to confound the best efforts of soldiers and diplomats. Since the withdrawal of US combat forces in 2014, the conflict in Afghanistan has escalated sharply. As the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have struggled to respond, Taliban forces have extended their footprint across important areas of the country. Against this backdrop, terrorism conducted overwhelmingly in the form of suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets has evolved into a more complex and more lethal element of the broader Taliban insurgency. Since late 2014, the situation has been further exacerbated by the emergence of an IS branch or 'province' (*wilayah*), the Islamic State Khorasan Province, that has brought them into direct and often bloody conflict with both the ANDSF supported by US airpower and Special Forces, and with the far larger mainstream Taliban.

Chapter 7: 'Iraq' by Paul Burke

The Allied invasion of Iraq in 2003 prepared the ground for a vicious, deadly conflict that began as a resistance effort targeting the Allied ground forces, but morphed into a multi-faceted and complex conflict. This involved a range of protagonists and a very fluid and dynamic environment of shifting alliances and changing allegiances, dragging in Sunni and Shia tribes alike, while neighbouring states and other regional actors became increasingly involved in the proxy battleground that Iraq became. This expansive chapter begins with a brief history of Iraq, then moves on to the 1991 invasion and the 2003 invasion, before beginning a detailed description of the complexities of conflict in Iraq that ends with the loss of territory by IS.

Chapter 8: 'Syria' by Michael Robillard

Following the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, the Assad regime deployed tanks on the streets in May 2011 to suppress protests. While the early stages of the Syrian civil war were initially non-sectarian in nature, the face of the conflict would soon begin to polarise along increasingly sectarian lines as more opportunistic groups, both internally and externally, attempted to exploit the growing power vacuum. In June of 2014, IS's declaration of their self-proclaimed Caliphate brought an influx of thousands of foreign fighters into Syria to join under IS's banner. In September of 2014, the United States and five Arab countries launched air strikes against IS in Raqqa and Aleppo, while in September of 2015, Russia began conducting its first air strikes in Syria, officially stating that it was targeting IS forces. In December 2016, Assad's troops, backed by Russian air power and Iranian-sponsored militias were able to successfully re-take Aleppo and much of Syria. Assad's strategy has resulted in a costly and drawn-out conflict between regime forces and the rebels, with the remainder of the Syrian civilian populace caught in the middle.

Chapter 9: 'Palestine–Israel' by Doaa' Elnakhala

This chapter takes the reader back to the story of the conflict by spanning time from the late 19th century to potential trajectories. Initially, the chapter lays the ground by presenting both the Palestinian and the Israeli claims to the same plot of land. Additionally, it presents the complexity of the conflict by addressing the territorial, the ethnic and the religious dimensions of the conflict. It then addresses major milestones which unravelled along the history of the conflict, such as the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the 1948 and 1967 wars, and the various Israeli military operations. The chapter also provides an overview of the developments experienced by the Israeli occupation, the

two Palestinian Intifadas and the corresponding evolution of the Israeli and Palestinian strategies and tactics. The complexity of the conflict is again illustrated in the multiplicity of local, regional and international actors. Finally, the chapter sheds light on potential paths that could be followed by the conflict, including a democratic bi-national state, an undemocratic discriminatory bi-national state, and a two-state project.

PART III: NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSES

This part examines the variety of ways in which key liberal democratic states have responded to terrorism. Each chapter focuses on a single nation-state and examines: (1) what actual and potential terrorist threats are faced by the nation-state in question; (2) what legislative instruments have been introduced as mechanisms for dealing with terrorist-related offences; (3) what is the institutional architecture, including key security agencies such as police, military and intelligence agencies, for combating terrorism, and how have they evolved or been re-designed in the face of the jihadist terrorist threat; (4) what is the overarching CT strategy and key CT tactics, including de-radicalisation and social media policies.

Some of the selected countries, such as Israel, India and the United Kingdom (UK), have faced long-term terrorism problems (for example, the activities of the Irish Republican Army, IRA) that have spanned multiple decades. These have had a historic bearing on previous approaches to the criminalisation of terrorism-related offences, sentencing and the management of convicted terrorists, in prison as well as post-release. For other countries such as the United States, terrorism, and jihadist terrorism in particular, is a relatively new problem. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between CT strategies and tactics in zones of armed conflict and those in well-ordered jurisdictions, such as London, Paris and New York. It is also important to take into account the nature of local grievances that might be exploited by terrorist groups, and to frame CT strategies accordingly.

Chapter 10: 'National Counter-Terrorism Responses: United States of America' by Michael Robillard

The 9/11 attacks radically shifted US counter-terrorism strategy from a fundamentally reactive to mainly preventive posture, both at home and abroad. This resulted in significant re-structuring and re-defining of purposes for many US domestic and Department of Defense agencies, as well as a critical re-thinking of the post-9/11 threat picture and overall operational environment. This move to a preventive, warfighting and counter-terrorist strategy posture can best be

seen in the subsequent US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. As the Bush administration wound down and handed off authority to the Obama administration, US counter-terrorism strategy shifted along with the terrorism threat picture. While the Bush administration's counter-terrorism strategy will likely be most remembered for its emphasis on 'boots on the ground' and detention, the Obama administration will probably be remembered for its significant drawdown of troop presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a drawdown of detainees at Guantanamo, and its heightened emphasis on the use of targeted drone strikes and special operations raids.

Chapter 11: 'National Counter-Terrorism Responses: United Kingdom' by Paul Burke

The historical basis of the United Kingdom's approach to dealing with terrorism is derived in large part from the country's experience in dealing with the issues arising from Irish and Northern Irish movements in the 20th century. The contemporary threat of international terrorism created a shift in thinking in the UK's approach, to both the conceptual nature of terrorism and also how to legislate for countering this threat. Successive laws have countered threats such as recruitment, radicalisation, facilitation and even 'glorification', while the police, intelligence and security agencies have had to adapt their methods and their organisational structures for a more collaborative approach as part of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST.

Chapter 12: 'National Counter-Terrorism Responses: France' by Doaa' Elnakhala

Today, France is listed among the top targets of terrorism, especially that carried out by IS. The terrorist threat in France emanates from both internal and external terrorist operatives, such as those involved in the Franco-Belgian terrorist networks, foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq, and lone wolves. Radicalisation all around the French Republic has been also on a remarkable rise. Overall, France deals with terrorism within the confines of its criminal justice code. This chapter also examines the most important counter-terrorism institutions active today, including the police, the National Gendarmerie, the intelligence community and the military. Over time, the French counter-terrorism strategy has evolved from prevention to accommodation to suppression. Despite heavy reliance on suppression, the current French strategy also has preventive elements. Finally, this chapter summarises the French counter-terrorism tactics, including collecting intelligence, combating radicalisation, military deployments, fighting terrorist propaganda, the action plan against terrorism, and so on.

Chapter 13: 'National Counter-Terrorism Responses: Israel' by Doaa' Elnakhala

Since the creation of the State of Israel, it has been subjected to attacks by non-state actors, mostly orchestrated by Palestinians who were displaced due to the creation of the State of Israel. Today, Israel has developed a rather complex legal and institutional design to respond to these threats. The Israeli counter-terrorism laws and practices were either inherited from the British Mandate Palestine or later developed by the state. Today, the main source of threat faced by Israel emanates from Palestinian militant groups, but Hamas has become the most efficient and resourceful at inflicting harm on Israel. The overall Israeli counter-terrorism strategy is to deter terrorism. Over time, Israel has employed a rather long list of tactics that are meant to serve this strategy, including home-demolition, invasions, separation, checkpoints and closures, assassinations, detention, and involving Israeli civilians in counter-terrorism. In the midst of this, Israel has become a leading actor in the global area of military technology.

Chapter 14: 'National Counter-Terrorism Responses: India' by Anthony Davis

India's primary terrorist threat remains, as it has been since the turn of the century, the jihadist challenge. Over recent years this has evolved into an essentially three-pronged phenomenon: cross-border fedayeen-style attacks carried out by groups such LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM, Army of Muhammad); terror attacks, typically bombings, by disaffected Indian Muslim (IM) youth; and disaffected Muslim self-starters inspired by IS's global call for attacks on targets of opportunity. In recent decades India has struggled to devise a comprehensive legal framework for its counter-terrorist response. In a response shaped by the legacy of British colonialism, India's default frame-work has been to deal with terrorist acts as criminal offences to be handled by state police forces. The terrorist threat has often spilled into protracted insurgency situations that have overwhelmed the capacity of state police and demanded the intervention of Central Armed Police Forces and the national military. These circumstances have resulted in the enactment or repeal of several important legislative platforms drawn up specifically to meet the challenge of terrorism.

2. Al-Qaeda

Paul Burke

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND TO AL-QAEDA

> Terrorism is also a way of seeing the world, of understanding (or, in many cases, mis-understanding) the dominant political paradigm of the particular historical movement.
>
> (Miller, 2013, p. 5)

Ideological Roots

The roots of the al-Qaeda (AQ) organisation lie in the Islamic resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but the ideological roots precede this conflict. Much of the inspiration for the ideology of AQ is derived from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Egyptian author and Islamic theorist, and Ibn Taymiyah, a 13th century Islamic scholar. The path of AQ's Islamic theory can be traced backwards through a history that encompasses authors including, but not limited to, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyah.

It was Ibn Taymiyah in the 13th and 14th centuries who first wrote on several concepts subsequently adopted by AQ (and more latterly by the so-called Islamic State, or IS). He provided the taxonomic foundations for the distinctions of some theological categories that we now see in both AQ and IS ideologies. Ibn Taymiyah introduced the concept of Dar al-Islam ('the house/domain of Islam') the region in which Muslim rule was present and in which Sharia law was imposed. His second category was Dar al-Kufr ('the house/domain of unbelievers'), which comprises the areas that reject Islam. In current AQ and IS ideology, much of what is classed as the West is included in this category, with the non-Muslim inhabitants being classed as *kuffar*, or unbelievers. The third category was Dar al-Harb ('the house/domain of war'), which covered those regions in which there was an ongoing (or even a future, potential) conflict between Muslim forces (or Islam itself) and unbelievers.[1] Recent conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Mali, Yemen and Afghanistan are

Paul Burke - 9781800371309
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all usually classed as falling within this zone by AQ and IS (Streusand, 1997; Karim and Eid, 2014).

Ibn Taymiyah wrote of the concept of *takfir*, or 'apostasy', which encompasses the idea that a Muslim who does not obey Sharia law and does not live his life according to Islamic rules should be considered an apostate. Ibn Taymiyah's second major *fatwa*, concerning the invading Mongol Ilkhanids, declared the invaders to be apostate and called for their execution on the grounds of their perceived deviation from the true path of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005).[2]

His views on the inappropriateness of Muslims visiting the tombs of famous or devout Muslim scholars, leaders and prophets were extremely rigid. He considered such visits to be *bid'a* (a 'heretical innovation') and nothing more than additions which came after the time of the Salaf, or the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Wiktorowicz, 2005). In Ibn Taymiyah's view, Muslims should strive to emulate the behaviour of the Salaf, as they had the best and purest understanding of Islam. He strongly favoured a return to the strict and literal translation of the Quran, especially its rules on how Muslims should live and the continuance of his writings in the contemporary ideology of AQ (and more latterly, IS) are considerable.

Writing in the 18th century, Abd al-Wahhab was the main architect of a revival of the Islamic thinking of Ibn Taymiyah, especially Ibn Taymiyah's preference for a more literal interpretation of Islamic rules in the Quran. Abd al-Wahhab invoked strict Islamic rules and practices that would later be adopted by the Afghan Taliban, AQ and IS. These included prohibiting men from trimming their beards, banning holidays (including the Prophet's birthday), destroying tombs and other religious sites of antiquity and even, according to Wright (2011, pp. 72–73), providing his followers with permission to kill or rape anyone who refused to accept his absolute interpretation of Islam.

Unsurprisingly, Abd al-Wahhab was eventually forced out of the Najd region of what is now Saudi Arabia. After being given protection by the King Muhammed ibn Saud, the first ruler of the Saudi state, he achieved his greatest and most enduring contribution to Islamic theology. He formed a close collaboration with the Saudi King in around 1744, which led to the adoption of the policy that religion and governance of the state were indivisible, and that ibn Saud would rule in accordance with Abd al-Wahhab's interpretation of Islam. Henceforth, the Saudi state would have this Wahhabi version of Islam as a central core of its governance mechanisms (Change Institute, 2008, p. 43).

The centrality of al-Wahhab's thinking was more completely cemented into the Saudi governance model in 1931 when the Saudi King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud (usually referred to as Ibn Saud) asked permission from the Saudi religious leadership to wage war against the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan, or the Brothers, were Ibn Saud's Bedouin troops who he had

previously used to spread Wahhabi Islam across the Arabian Peninsula and to expand territory under Saudi control. The religious leaders gave Ibn Saud permission, and this has been described as the 'defining political moment of modern Saudi Arabia' because the act of making the King the only person who could legitimately declare jihad (a 'struggle')[3] was instrumental in cementing the importance of the Wahhabi clerics as the real power behind the throne (Wright, 2011, p. 72).

Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian author who contributed to the corpus of Islamic theology with works such as his 1964 book *Milestones* and was a key member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation established in Egypt in 1928, initially to encourage piety but which rapidly assumed a political nature and focused largely on ending British colonial rule in Egypt. Qutb was initially on very friendly terms with Gamal Abdul Nasser who played a central role in overthrowing the Egyptian government in the 1952 *coup d'état*. His strict beliefs soon led to a divergence of political opinion with Nasser and he was arrested and imprisoned by Nasser's government. In 1966, he was sentenced to death and was hanged (Migaux, 2007b, p. 284). Strongly predisposed to the dogma of Ibn Taymiyah, Qutb's writings are similarly relevant to the core of AQ thinking, but coming from a more contemporary era than Taymiyah they have enjoyed particular prominence (Mohamedou, 2011, p. 14). Of especial importance is one of Qutb's central points concerning the necessity for the establishing of an Islamic vanguard, which would ideally emulate the behaviour of the original associates of the Prophet Muhammad.

This thinking was picked up on by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in their founding philosophy which underpinned the creation of AQ as an organisation (Migaux, 2007a, pp. 314–315). Also of note was Qutb's theoretical writings on the notion that Muslims worldwide were in a state of *jahiliya* ('ignorance', mostly referring to the time preceding the Prophet Muhammad), because they had not lived in accordance with Sharia law (Wright, 2002). The natural progression from this thinking was Qutb's assessment that it was permissible under Sharia law to overthrow the government of his time, as he perceived both the government and the country to be in a state of such *jahiliya* (McGregor, 2003).

In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, a move that immediately sparked an armed resistance against the occupation. The Afghan nationals who resisted the Soviet occupation were joined by mainly Arab nationals who wanted to take part in the resistance, seeing it as a jihad, in defence of an attack upon Islam and/or a Muslim country. They became known as the Afghan Arabs and they formed a key group within the wider mujahideen in the Afghan conflict.[4] Thousands of young Muslim men travelled to Afghanistan, mainly via Pakistan, to undergo military training and to take part in the jihad.

The man who eventually became the leader of the Afghan Arab mujahideen was a Palestinian national, Sheikh Abdullah al Azzam. He joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the late 1960s and took part in operations against the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) after the 1967 war, which saw Israeli soldiers occupy his home village in the West Bank. Disillusioned with the secular approach of the PLO at that time, Azzam left the PLO and went on to complete a Doctorate in Islamic Jurisprudence in Cairo, where he also became a personal friend of the family of the deceased Sayyid Qutb (McGregor, 2003).

In 1980, Azzam and Bin Laden established Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Office of Services for the Arab Mujahideen) in Pakistan, which was a funnel for the recruiting, funding and training of fighters from all over the world who wanted to take part in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Burke, 2004, p. 3). Bin Laden personally funded each fighter with a flight ticket, accommodation in a guesthouse and a stipend of around $300 per month (Wright, 2011, p. 117). It has been assessed that more than 20 000 volunteers passed through the Office of Services, going on to be trained as fighters. The majority of them took part in military action against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan (Mohamedou, 2011, p. 17).[5]

While in Afghanistan, Azzam wrote of his vision for a vanguard of combat-experienced soldiers who would form '*al-qaeda al-sulbah*', variously translated as the 'solid base' (Migaux, 2007a, pp. 317–318) and the 'strong foundation' (Burke, 2004, p. 2). Once Soviet troops were expelled, this vanguard would continue the fight beyond the geographical confines of Afghanistan, in a campaign to conquer all Muslim lands. While the Afghans were primarily fighting for the freedom of their country, bin Laden had greater plans for the longer term, aimed at freeing all Arab lands from Western influence, in particular from US influence. This would be followed by the restoration of the Caliphate and finally the war with the Kuffar, or unbelievers, which would finish with the Day of Judgement (Wright, 2011, p. 126).

The Founding of al-Qaeda

Placing a date on the first known use of the organisational name al-Qaeda is open to question, but the term was already being used by Azzam in 1987, prior to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Writing in *al-Jihad* magazine, he stated that: 'every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward that is willing, while integrating into society, to undertake difficult tasks and make tremendous sacrifices … it is al qaeda al sulbuh that constitutes this vanguard for the hoped-for society' (Azzam, 1988).

According to Migaux (2007a, p. 314), the formal creation of AQ as a de facto organisation may have occurred on 11 August 1988 during a meeting between Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Dr Fadl (Sayyid Imam

al-Sharif), in the Peshawar region of Pakistan. Kohlmann (2007, p. 3) places the date of formation some months earlier, in April 1988; while Coll (2009) supports the August date suggested by Migaux. Curiously, however, the name appears conspicuously absent from the famous 11-volume opus, *The Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad* (Anonymous, 1993), written around 1993 (Burke, 2004, p. 3).

While AQ is often considered as a formal organisation when viewed through a traditional Western lens, it is interesting to note that bin Laden himself saw AQ more conceptually. In an interview in Kabul just five weeks after the 9/11 attacks against the United States of America (USA), bin Laden told the interviewer that the West's depiction of a de facto organisation with the name of al-Qaeda was not really accurate, adding that 'Brother Abu Ubaida Al-Banjshiri created a military base to train the young men to fight against the Soviet empire … So this place was called "the Base", as in a training base, and the name grew from this' (Bin Laden and Lawrence, 2005).

Fadl was the prime mover of the early, ideological platform upon which AQ would be built, and he was already the leader of a powerful Islamist group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The EIJ was behind the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. It has not carried out active operations inside Egypt since 1993, but has been implicated in a number of actual and planned attacks externally, such as the attempted assassinations of Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedky and his Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in 1993, and also the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan in 1995 (Fletcher, 2008). Al-Zawahiri would eventually assume control of EIJ and merge the organisation with al-Qaeda in June 2001 (Wright, 2002).

In November 1989, Azzam was killed by a roadside bomb placed in a culvert, which detonated as Azzam drove past the device. The potential suspects, as well as the potential motives for the assassination, were numerous: the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), alone or in partnership with their former Afghan State Intelligence Agency (KHAD), because of Azzam's involvement in the ejection of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; rival leadership elements from AQ or from the wider mujahideen, because Azzam was gaining more influence than other leaders; Israeli intelligence (specifically Mossad), because Azzam was one of the instrumental figures in the creation of Hamas (the Palestinian group established in 1987);[6] Iranian elements, either directly or indirectly controlled, as Azzam was a key Sunni figure of power and influence in the region. Even bin Laden himself was a suspect, according to Soufan and Freedman (2012, p. 135) and Baker (2009).

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan began in May 1988 and was completed in February 1989, when General Gromov walked across the Bridge of Friendship from Afghanistan into the Soviet Union, ostensibly as the last Soviet soldier to leave the country (Feifer, 2010).[7] Following the Soviet

withdrawal, AQ leaders voiced a variety of approaches about what the next steps should be. Some wanted to focus on fighting the near enemy, such as the secular Muslim regimes in the Middle East region. Others wanted to continue harrying the Soviets by pressing on to the Central Asian republics. Another suggested approach was to continue the jihad in a more widespread manner, to encourage the spread of Islam through territorial gains. The death of Azzam did ultimately benefit Osama bin Laden directly, as he was able to assume the mantle of leadership in the faction that was pushing for a more global dimension of jihad.

AIMS AND APPROACH

The aims of AQ were codified between 2001 and 2003 by Al-Zawahiri, whose writings from that time would eventually form a book *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* (Zawahiri, 2001). The book was published in serialised format by the Saudi-owned, London-based, Arabic-language newspaper, *al-Sharq al-Awsat* ('The Middle East'). Al-Zawahiri laid out a grand strategy for AQ, beginning with the 9/11 attacks of 2001, and ending with the expected completion of the plan around the year 2020 (Zawahiri, 2001).[8]

Stage 1, 'the awakening', began on 11 September 2001 with the attacks upon the US, aimed at provoking a US attack upon Muslims which Al-Zawahiri hoped would spur a worldwide jihad. Stage 2 was called 'opening the eyes' and was slated to occur between 2002 and 2006, focused on putting the West on the defensive. The third stage, 'arising and standing up', was planned for 2007–2010 and it planned assaults upon Israel and Turkey. The fourth stage, 'the downfall of apostate Muslim regimes', targeted Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the oil-rich Gulf nations and it was planned for 2010–2013. The 'declaration of the Caliphate' was the fifth stage, timetabled for 2013–2016 and aimed at mobilising Muslim forces worldwide. The penultimate stage was 'total confrontation' and this visualised a total war upon 'non-believers' between 2016 and 2020. The seventh and final stage was 'definitive victory' which would see the establishment of a global Caliphate in 2020. Like project managers everywhere, it is possible that Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden realised that their timeline was overly ambitious and that their inception was beginning to suffer from 'jihad drift'.[9] In the end, though, Al-Zawahiri did disagree with al-Baghdadi and IS, arguing that it was too soon to declare the Caliphate.

The organisational and managerial approach from the post-9/11 AQ leadership was that of 'centralization of decision and decentralization of execution', with bin Laden nominating the targets and choosing the leaders of the attack but leaving the detailed planning and execution of the attack to the cells themselves (Wright, 2011, p. 359). Writing in the same article in which he employed the term '*al-Qaeda al-sulbuh*' ('the solid base'), Abdullah Azzam

provided eight moral guidelines which he considered binding upon members of this 'solid base':

1. One must unhesitatingly face the hardest challenges and the worst difficulties.
2. Leaders must endure, along with their men, the blood and sweat of gruelling marches.
3. The vanguard must abstain from base, worldly pleasures and its distinguishing characteristics must be abstinence and frugality.
4. The vanguard must translate into reality the great dream of victory.
5. Will and determination are necessary for the march ahead, however long it may be.
6. Three things are essential to this march: meditation, patience and prayer.
7. Two rules must be followed: loyalty and devotion.
8. All anti-Islamic plots that are being hatched throughout the world must be foiled.

In writings on 'the choice of targets and the importance of martyrdom operations', AQ's advice in 2003 to global jihadists fighting under the AQ banner was to strive for maximum casualties and for the highest number of deaths in their attacks, as AQ considered this to be a language which the West would understand (Zawahiri, cited by Kepel and Milelli, 2005, p. 203). In terms of the rapid and global support which bin Laden was able to build after 9/11, Fouda believes that this was nothing more than bin Laden speaking 'the minds of so many people … He dared to ask the right questions', and not simply because he attacked the US and the West (Fouda, cited in Greenberg, 2005, p. 30). Apart from the 9/11 attacks, major targets attacked by AQ included the US warship USS *Cole* in 2000 (17 dead, 39 injured), the Ghriba synagogue in Tunisia in 2002 (14 dead, 30 wounded), the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002 (202 dead, hundreds more injured), the Madrid train bombings in 2004 (190 dead, more than 2000 injured) and the London transport bombings in 2005 (52 dead, 700 injured).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AL-QAEDA

Organisational theory is arguably as important a factor in terrorism studies as it is in the commercial world, and the theory translates neatly across to AQ's own organisational structure in the post-9/11 world. A 2010 paper by Gunaratna and Oreg (2010, p. 1055) provided a detailed organisation chart of the structural hierarchy of AQ, a structure which the authors considered an advantage, due to its inherent ability to survive attrition. It points out that AQ was still able to re-form and to function despite losing various chiefs of staff, four chiefs of the special (external) forces unit, and a number of senior regional field commanders (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010).

Over time, AQ morphed from a centrally controlled and hierarchical organisation to more of a network-centric, operational mode. Cebrowski and Garstka (1988) identified three thematic changes in (American) society that changed the nature of how business is conducted and, by extension, how the business of warfare has also changed. These three themes, each highly relevant to the morphing of AQ into a more fluid, less centralised network, are:

1. The shift in focus from the platform to the network.
2. The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a continuously adapting ecosystem.
3. The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such changing ecosystems.

Adding substance to this wider network was a loose conglomerate of global franchises which included the establishment of offshoot organisations in Iraq (2004), Algeria (2006), Yemen (2009), Somalia (2010–2012), Syria (2012) and the Indian Subcontinent (2014) (Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 2).[10] Mendelsohn (2016) argues that the AQ franchising was embarked upon from a position of weakness, not strength, and was seen internally as more of a necessity than a choice.[11] A selection of these franchise groups are discussed in the following sections.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

In January 2009, AQ groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Green, 2014, p. 526). Anwar al-Awlaki was extremely active within this group until he was killed by a US drone strike, the first US citizen to be deliberately targeted in this way. AQAP attempted two particularly creative attacks in 2009. In August of that year they targeted a senior member of the Saudi royal family, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who was responsible for counter-terrorism in the Kingdom. In particular, bin Nayef was responsible for the programme aimed at rehabilitating individuals formerly engaged in terrorism (Bergen et al., 2011, p. 72).

The bomber Abdullah Hassan Tali al-Asiri had arranged with Saudi authorities to turn himself in, but insisted he would only do it in person to bin Nayef. Despite having been searched by bin Nayef's guards, al-Asiri was still able to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed internally in his body. Al-Asiri was killed instantly, but Prince bin Nayef survived with injuries to one hand. Subsequent investigations showed that the bomber had concealed the explosive device inside his rectum (Rayment and Blomfield, 2010). The second attempt employed the novel use of a so-called underwear bomb worn by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate the device mid-air

while he was a passenger on an aircraft about to land in Detroit (Burke, 2013, p. 157). The device ignited but did not successfully detonate (Office of the Attorney General, 2015). The attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* newspaper in Paris in 2015 by Chérif and Saïd Kouachi was claimed by AQAP, and in 2017, the group was described as being 'better funded and armed than at any point in its history' (Horton, 2017). By February 2020, the group was on its third leader, Khalid bin Umar Batarfi, after the first two were killed in US drone strikes in 2015 and January 2020. Johnsen (2020) describes the group in February 2020 as being 'significantly different from the one Raymi took command of in 2015 ... weaker, more fragmented and less able to conduct international attacks than at any point in its 11-year history ... almost entirely a domestic organization'. While he considers that AQAP may finally be on the verge of defeat, it is still too early to tell whether AQAP will overcome its current setbacks or whether it will eventually wither into insignificance.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian national who formed an Islamist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ('Monotheism and Jihad') sometime in the late 1990s, with the primary aim of overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. Having been arrested and jailed in Jordan, he was eventually released, where-upon he travelled to Afghanistan and established a terrorist training camp in Herat province in 1998 (Fishman, 2006, p. 20). He fought with the Taliban against the US-led invasion in 2001, and managed to escape from Afghanistan, probably into Iran. At some point before the 2003 invasion, it is believed that Al-Zarqawi eventually arrived in Iraq.[12]

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al-Zarqawi and his group were active in conducting attacks against US-led Coalition forces, especially against US troops. In 2004, Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda franchise then re-branded his group as an al-Qaeda group which became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Pool, 2004; Fishman, 2006, p. 21). The AQI group became one of the most lethal and high-profile terrorist groups of its time, in large part due to Al-Zarqawi's tactic of kidnapping mainly Western civilians, then releasing video footage of the hostages wearing orange jumpsuits (a reference to the inmates held at Guantanamo Bay), and taunting politicians and leaders with impossible demands, before beheading the hostages on camera.

The relationship between Al-Zarqawi and AQ does not appear to have been an easy one. Although Al-Zarqawi publicly acknowledged AQ as being in overall command of the campaign in Iraq, in practice he followed his own path. Both Al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden's deputy) had different visions of the most suitable way to achieve the establishing of the

Caliphate. Al-Zawahiri focused on the long game of forcing military defeat on the US and its allies, especially their allies within Muslim lands, and he was content for the Caliphate to be achieved at some point in the future, in accordance with AQ's grand strategy (Celso, 2015; Byman, 2017).

Al-Zarqawi was not content to wait, and believed that the most suitable way to achieve victory, and the re-establishment of the Caliphate, was to continue attacks upon the Shia population (Al-Zarqawi, 2004) but he also wanted to create a backlash against his own Sunni people. This backlash tactic was aimed at persuading Iraqi Sunnis that Al-Zarqawi's group was their only real defender, and their best source of protection. To speed up this process, Al-Zarqawi conducted false-flag operations, targeting Sunni areas with attacks to corral the general perception of the Sunnis that they were under sustained attack from the Shia. The viciousness of Al-Zarqawi's operations resulted in massive global media coverage of his group and their methods, but it also set him in confrontation with the senior leadership of AQ.

A letter in 2005 assessed to be from Al-Zawahiri to Al-Zarqawi revealed the wider, four-stage AQ strategy for Iraq. First, to expel US forces from Iraq; second, to create an Islamic 'emirate', ideally encompassing as much of Iraq as possible; third, to spread AQ's jihad to Iraq's secular neighbours; fourth, to confront Israel (Whittaker, 2005). The tone of the letter was more condescending than authoritative, asking Al-Zarqawi rhetorical questions about the effectiveness of his strategy of killing the Shia, and querying whether this anti-Shia effort was not a distraction to carrying out the AQ grand plan. The letter made it clear that al-Zawahiri, and also AQ by logical extension, did not agree with Al-Zarqawi's strategy and tactics (Zawahiri, 2005). Al-Zarqawi was eventually killed in June 2006 by a US air strike on a safe-house he was using near to Baqubah (Caldwell, 2006). Gerges (2009, p. 254) cites Seif al-Adl, the replacement AQ Minister of Defence, as stating that Al-Zarqawi's differences with core AQ, and in particular with bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, were 'tactical, not doctrinal' issues, and that while Al-Zarqawi on the whole was supportive of core AQ, he did not feel that they were being sufficiently fierce enough to cause the necessary level of pain and suffering to the enemy.

Although the first of the above AQ aims had not been achieved by 2006, it did not stop the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and other associated groups from announcing the formation of the 'Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI) in October of that year (Kfir, 2015, pp. 7–8). The Shia population continued to be targeted just as severely by AQI, who considered the Shia to be heretical. Al-Zarqawi was replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who assumed command of AQI. When the formation of ISI was declared, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi was appointed (reputedly by al-Masri) to run the newly formed entity. Both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were eventually killed in April

2010, when a joint force of US and Iraqi Special Forces attacked a safe-house outside Tikrit.

Al-Qaeda in Somalia (Al-Shabaab, merged with AQ in 2010–2012)

Al-Shabaab (AS) ('the Youth') emerged from the security vacuum in Somalia as the armed wing of the organisation called Islamic Courts Union, around 1996–1997. The roots of al-Shabaab came from the resistance to the leadership of Siad Barre and the military regime. Following a civil war in 1991, Barre fled across the border to Kenya, leaving a number of competing militias to fight for the reins of political power in Somalia in that same year, including the United Somali Congress (USC) who seized Mogadishu and the south, and the Somali National Movement (SNM) who seized control of the north of the country. Mohammed Farah Aidid was the Chairman of the USC. Although a leader of a rival faction, Ali Muhammed, had been declared the Somali President in 1995 and recognised as such by the international community, Aidid declared himself Somali President in 1995. Fighting continued between the factions until 1997, from which point Somalia had no President until the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000.

Sometime in 2000, the collection of independent Sharia courts around the country coalesced into the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). An important aside to this Union was that the militias belonging to these Sharia courts (11 in total) also came together under one umbrella force, which created 'the first significant non-warlord-controlled and pan-Hawiye military force' (Barnes and Hassan, 2007).[13] The TNG lasted for four years, until an agreement between the key warlords resulted in Abdiqasim Salad Hassan assuming power in 2004. By 2006, Hassan's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the ICU were engaging in armed clashes. By June 2006, the ICU had wrested control of Mogadishu from the transitional government and also seized large tracts of the south of the country. It was also around this time that al-Shabaab began their ascendancy. Beginning as a radical, Islamist splinter group from the Islamist group al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (Islamic Unity, or AIAI), al-Shabaab wanted to spread a stricter version of Islam across Somalia and they became the armed wing of the ICU, and AS was a key actor in the fighting that led to the ICU seizing Mogadishu in 2006. Viewed strategically, AS's primary aim is 'to establish an Islamic state and the rule of shari'a law in Somalia and to achieve the removal of foreign influence from Somalia, especially that of Western and/or Christian nations. Territorially, these plans would include Puntland, Somaliland and the Ogaden region' (Burke, 2019), and in 2017, AS launched a deadly attack on an army base in Puntland, killing around 70 people (Burke, 2017).

In December 2006, the United Nations authorised the use of force to expel the ICU from Mogadishu, and a joint force of Ethiopian Army troops plus militias loyal to various Somali warlords imposed a military defeat on the ICU. The ICU subsequently disbanded but al-Shabaab did not, instead transforming itself into the primary resistance movement in Somalia, conducting attacks on Ethiopian troops, Somali militias and Transitional Government figures. Al-Shabaab is assessed as having been desirous of expanding into a 'truly regional organisation with membership and horizons that transcend national borders' since at least 2010 (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2016, p. 4). AS joined with AQ in 2010, but apparently the formal announcement of the merger did not occur until two years later (Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 84).

Following a 2013 internal re-structure, two additional units were created specifically for external operations. Jaysh Ayman had the role of conducting attacks against Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, while a second unit was tasked with conducting attacks against Ethiopian targets. Al-Shabaab has carried out terrorist attacks in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda and Tanzania, and its active strength was assessed as around 6000–12 000 fighters in March 2016 (Project, 2016, p. 2).

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

In early September 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the creation of another AQ franchise: al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Mendelsohn contends that the creation of this particular group was less about an actual expansion of operational capability for AQ, and more about it being a response to the change in the socio-political environment in which AQ found itself in 2014: under pressure, in disarray and increasingly being perceived as an irrelevance. A large part of this environmental flux was down to the so-called Islamic State and their lightning-fast ascendancy in the global jihadist sphere.

Al-Zawahiri had already been forced to denounce IS in January 2014, which made public a schism that was unfavourable for AQ's image. AQ was largely absent from the populist uprisings in the Arab Spring, as the standard AQ position was that political change and the establishment of Islamic rule could only be effected by the 'Islamic vanguard' (Turner, 2015). The Arab Spring revealed the flaw in this doctrine, as citizen protests toppled regimes across the Arab world, and this contributed to the perception of AQ's irrelevance. This image was cemented further by the speed at which IS rolled across and occupied large areas of Iraq and Syria, bringing major conurbations such as Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, under their de facto control. The rapid seizure of territory led to an even more significant event that pushed AQ still further into the margins: the declaration of an Islamic State by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in

June 2014. Not only was the announcement a surprise to AQ, but it also acted as a powerful magnet for recruitment among those for whom participation in the global jihad was a personal goal.

Zawahiri made the announcement flanked by Asim Umar, the new leader of AQIS, and Osama Mahmoud, the official spokesperson of the new AQ franchise, and he made the point that the establishment of AQIS demonstrated a 'gradual consensus-building process', a direct stab at IS's more aggressive policy of forcing its belief system on others. Mendelsohn (2016, pp. 195–196) thus argues that when a terrorist organisation makes a command decision to establish a new franchise group, the decision to do so is predicated to a lesser degree by a desire to increase operational capacity, and more by a need to respond to something in the political landscape.

Since the announcement of its inception, AQIS was aggressively targeted by the US, with five of the AQIS senior leadership killed in US-led operations in less than six months. The group was not as active as other AQ franchises, but it did carry out successful attacks. In 2014, a Brigadier in the Pakistani Army was murdered by attackers on motorcycles (*Nation*, 2014), and around six other attacks were directed against bloggers or media figures who were considered to have committed blasphemy or apostasy (Reed, 2015, pp. 10–12). A more audacious but unsuccessful attack against the Karachi naval dockyard was aimed at taking control of two hijacked Pakistani naval warships and then using them to attack US naval assets (Hassan and Houreld, 2014).

AL-QAEDA RECRUITMENT

Terrorist groups such as AQ have employed a sophisticated array of recruitment tools deployed across a wide spectrum of potential environments in their efforts to draw new members into their ranks. Like any large organisation, AQ concentrated on 'recruiting, retaining, sustaining and expanding' its membership, especially foot soldiers and lower-level operational supporters (Burke, 2011a). As Bell (2005, p. 48) notes, groups such as AQ and IS are highly aware of likely targets: 'young men who stand out in mosques and schools, who are devout, intelligent and have skills to offer … the role of the recruiter is to be a talent scout'. A report based on a study of AQ recruitment methods confirms the importance of 'cultural, social, and historical context' and expands upon this research track. It also emphasises that there is no single, overarching recruitment process used for a group such as AQ. Instead, the recruiting pitches are tweaked to incorporate regional and other contextual factors. Similarly, the authors note that any recruitment strategy must also have an awareness of the potential counter-recruitment strategies which may be deployed by the authorities, to blunt the initiative of terrorist groups (Gerwehr and Daly, 2006). Sparago and Klarevas (2007, p. 12) identify six factors rele-

vant to the recruitment of an AQ foot-soldier, viz. 'religion, sex, age, marital status, economic background, and level of education', and provide a detailed breakdown under each of these categories, attempting to typify these characteristics across a range of contexts.

The technological advances of the 21st century have brought with them new opportunities for terrorist recruitment. The use of social media, either in isolation or in combination with the support of internet sites, has proved to be an effective recruitment tool in the jihadist arena. The internet provides advantages for terrorist recruitment as well as for the wider terrorist sphere of attack planning, communications, operational security, information dissemination and, of course, publicity. The internet has assumed a central role in many terrorist operational activities, especially recruitment. The debate about the relative importance of the internet as a tool of terrorist recruitment continues, but certainly for AQ it has played an important part. Carriere (2016, p. 183), writing in 2016, considered the internet to play the 'most influential role in radicalization in recent years, especially among the millennial generation'. The internet as a tool has been especially singled out for support by central AQ figures. Anwar al-Awlaki (2009) placed it at number 29 in his treatise '44 Ways of Supporting Jihad', encouraging mujahideen to contribute electronically to the global jihad, by: 'establishing discussion forums … relating to jihad; establishing e-mail lists to share information … posting or e-mailing jihad literature and news; and establishing websites to cover specific areas of jihad, such as mujahidin news, Muslim prisoners of war, and jihad literature'.

Awlaki's recommendations were expanded upon by another proponent of online support, Abu Musab al-Suri, who was the author of the jihadist theory of *nizam laa tanzim* ('a system, not an organisation'). Al-Suri promoted the concept of a highly decentralised organism and he accepted that there are many people who are unwilling to participate personally in armed actions in support of jihad, but who nevertheless support the ideals of, and the actions carried out by, jihadists around the world. It is this pool of untapped supporters whom al-Suri encouraged to join what he saw as the 'media or informational battle' (Nasar, 2004).

The relative weakness of instruments of the state can further contribute to the creation of a fertile area for terrorist recruitment. The absence of an effective police presence, and/or weakened or invisible state presence and control, can allow recruitment efforts to be carried out more overtly, when there is little or no real risk of facing arrest or detention for carrying out these activities; while radicalisation and recruitment inside prisons can be carried out more easily than in civil society. Radicalisation and recruitment efforts can be more difficult to detect in prisons, for example, often due to the closed nature of a prison community, the inability of prison staff to maintain sufficient watch on a population that considerably outnumbers them, the generally high level of

poor education among prisoners, and the fact that many young people have no direct, political allegiance or affiliation when they are imprisoned for the first time. There is also an array of social, political and economic factors which are exploited for the recruitment of new members by groups such as AQ (Rosenau, 2005, p. 2). Ineffective border controls can allow recruiters to easily access vulnerable individuals or sub-groups, and to directly contribute to the radicalisation of such persons. Widespread political and/or economic corruption can be a powerful driver, especially for younger people who may feel marginalised from day one, and may see no hope of ever gaining proper employment and being able to provide for their future family. Poverty can feed the sense of injustice, especially if neighbouring areas are seen to be more affluent, such as in Somalia–Kenya and Iraq–Kurdish Autonomous Region.

AL-QAEDA FINANCING

The Afghan mujahideen were funded by various stakeholders over the years, including the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Saudi royal family and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). One of the most influential members of the Saudi royal family, Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, is believed to have managed the funding activities of around 20 different charitable organisations, the sole aim of which were to fund the mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, and which raised an estimated $2 billion (Corbin, 2003). In the early to mid-1980s, the various disparate armed groups formed a loose coalition called the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, in an effort to present a united front, politically and militarily, against the Soviet occupation. Initially under US President Carter, then President Reagan, US funding for the mujahideen began to increase, and the amounts were swelled by a Saudi agreement, concluded by Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, to match all US contributions (Burleigh, 2009).

At Pakistan's insistence, it was agreed that all US and Saudi funding should be channelled through Pakistan's ISI (Coll, 2009). This theoretically allowed for a degree of plausible deniability by the US, regarding the direct funding of the mujahideen. In practice, however, this mechanism handed control of the spending of such funding to Pakistan, which made the decisions on how, where and on whom to spend the money, something which did not sit easily with some elements of the US intelligence community (Bergen, 2002). Even bin Laden disliked the fact that official Saudi funding was also channelled through the ISI, as he implicitly distrusted the ISI (Coll, 2009).

When the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, so too did the generous funding from the USA and Saudi Arabia. While Osama bin Laden's personal fortune, variously described as being between $250 million and $300 million, has been frequently cited as the primary funding source of AQ in its early

years, the 9/11 Commission report provides more detail on bin Laden's actual, personal contributions, and AQ's budgetary outgoings (Kean et al., 2004, sec. 5.4).

The report states that between 1970 and 1994, bin Laden received only around $1 million per year as a stipend, and in addition the Saudi government's actions against him in the early 1990s meant that his personal share of the bin Laden family business had to be put up for sale. The proceeds from that sale were immediately frozen by the Saudi government, effectively removing the bulk of bin Laden's inheritance from his personal control. Perhaps more importantly, the report also details the estimated annual running costs of AQ in the years prior to the 9/11 attacks, a figure believed to be around $30 million per year, the majority of which came from donations. The 9/11 attacks were well planned and well executed, all with a considerable degree of operational security. The total cost of the 9/11 attacks was estimated by the Commission at around $500 000 (Kean et al., 2004, pp. 169, 170, 172).

The methods core AQ employed to generate funds included both licit and illicit methods. Various charities provided money to AQ, some knowingly through the diversion of funds, and others unknowingly. In the United Kingdom (UK) the Charity Commission investigated and subsequently struck off two charities started by Adeel al-Haq, after finding that the charities had raised money for the purpose of purchasing equipment for use by AQ and the so-called Islamic State (Levitt, 2017, p. 3). Al-Haq was convicted of terrorist offences and jailed for five years (Charity Commission, 2016, p. 5). In a similar vein to charity abuse, street fundraising has also been used to finance a planned terrorist attack. A plot by an AQ cell to conduct suicide bombing attacks in UK in 2012 was funded primarily by the cell members collecting money on the streets during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, with unwitting donors being told that the money was to be used for charitable purposes. The cell netted over £13 500 in their unauthorised collections. They then attempted to increase this figure by doing their own trading on the stock market, but instead they lost £9000 of the funds through poor investment decisions (Whitehead and Marsden, 2012).

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, core AQ was still providing the bulk of primary funding for attacks. The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were centrally funded, as was the attack on a US warship docked in Yemen, the USS *Cole*. The attack against the warship had an estimated cost of $38 000, resulting in the deaths of 17 US Navy personnel (Burke, 2011b, pp. 16–20), putting the vessel out of action for three years and costing around $250 million to repair the damage (Burke, 2014).

The major 'spectaculars' carried out by AQ or its proxies after the 9/11 attacks were similarly well planned and well executed, but the centrality of funding was beginning to change and core AQ would gradually become less

involved. The Bali nightclub bombings of 2002 killed 202 people, injured a further 209 and were one of the highest-profile, post-9/11 attacks which were still funded by core AQ. Their estimated cost was £19 000 according to information provided by Ali Ghufron (also known as Mukhlas), the Head of Operations for the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (Lilley, 2003, p. 134; Freeman, 2016, p. 8).

The Madrid train bombings in 2004 killed 192 people and injured almost 2000 others (Baird, 2009). The attacks cost around $70 000 to conduct, mostly derived from the sale of narcotics (Guillen, 2004; Gómez, 2010; UNODC, 2017). The London transport bombings on 7 July 2005 killed 52 people and injured hundreds more (Hallett, 2011, p. 1), and were financed primarily by a combination of credit cards and a bank loan that was never intended to be repaid. The total cost of the attack was assessed by the UK government as being around £8000 (House of Commons, 2006), and by other sources as less than $15 000 (Perri et al., 2009; Bruno, 2010).

The traditional Islamic tax of zakat, one of Islam's five pillars, is intended to assist the poor but it has also generated funds for AQ and similar groups. This tax has traditionally been considered as 2.5 per cent, or 1/40th, of a person's net annual wealth, although there are varying interpretations of the exact calculations and responsibilities (Almatar, 2015; Hamat and Mohd, 2017). Some Imams have voluntarily diverted a portion of the zakat collected by their mosques, and made this available to groups such as AQ (Gomez, 2011).

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, there has been much written on the importance of terrorist financing to organisations such as AQ (Lormel, 2002; Basile, 2004; Kiser, 2005; Zarate, 2009; Gómez, 2010; Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010; Torok, 2011). A common theory was that the targeting of finances owned and control by such groups would be an effective method of reducing their capabilities, as finances were the life-blood of these groups. This targeting of finances seemed logical insofar as the interdiction of the flow of funding can result in a reduction in the group's operational capability, and this type of financial disruption became a key policy plank of the European Union's counter-terrorism approach (Bures, 2014, p. 207). This rationale was also an underlying premise of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that was established in 1989, originally to focus on anti-money laundering (AML). Just one month after the 9/11 attacks, an additional focus of combating terrorist financing was added to the original aim of AML work. The objectives of the FATF continued to expand, subsequently including the setting of operational standards and the promotion of more effective measures, especially legal, regulatory and operational ones aimed at AML and countering terrorist financing (FATF, 2017).

In the first few years after the 9/11 attacks, concerted global efforts were made to choke off the flow of funds to terrorist groups such as AQ, with

varying degrees of success. As the Chair of the 9/11 Commission said, 'You can't run a terror network without funding because it takes money to train operatives, transport them, and buy equipment … When you cut off those supplies, it becomes very difficult to operate' (Kean, cited by Benner, 2011). A captured AQ member put this more succinctly: 'There are two things a brother must always have for jihad – the self and money' (Roth et al., 2004, p. 17). In the first wave of targeted financial actions to hamper the flow of AQ funding, 315 separate entities were identified and designated as terrorist organisations, and a total of 1400 accounts were targeted globally, resulting in the seizure of more than $136 million (Kiser, 2005). The global grip on terrorist funding was gradually tightened until, by around 2010, AQ finances were in a lamentable state compared to a decade previously.

Such financial targeting may be appropriate for fully fledged cells wanting to carry out a sophisticated attack, but unfortunately the attack vectors have changed in recent years. More attacks are now coming from so-called 'lone wolf' attacks, or smaller, pair or group attacks which are often self-financed. This has reduced the effectiveness of targeting the financing of terrorism as an operational counter-terrorism response. A radicalised individual can now carry out a deadly terrorist attack for little more than the cost of a one-day hire for a vehicle to carry out a ramming attack, such as those witnessed in London (BBC News, 2017a, 2017b) and Berlin (Foster et al., 2016). Anwar al-Awlaki proposed to his followers that they had a religious right in Islamic law to steal from non-believers in order to fund jihad, stating that: 'Our jihad cannot depend wholly on donations made by Muslims' (Joscelyn, 2011). The tightening of the AQ financial belt has been attributed to a number of causes, including their reduced financial holdings, international targeting of terrorist financing by governments and regulatory bodies, and much more stringent border controls between countries (Jacobson and Levitt, 2009).

CONCLUSION

In 2020, the relevance and importance of AQ has faded, especially among younger jihadists, many of whom were not even born when the 9/11 attacks against the US took place. The organisation rapidly lost support as many jihadists viewed its stance on establishing the Caliphate as too long-term and too cautious. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's announcement of the Caliphate in 2014 drew much of AQ's younger base away from it, as more and more people began to view the so-called Islamic State as the group that promised hope of seeing an established Caliphate in their own lifetimes. Ironically for IS, history proved that AQ's assessment of the medium-term future was more accurate, and the IS dominance of large swathes of Iraq and Syria eventually came to an

end, with IS forced out of their strongholds and territories by crushing military defeats.

A US worldwide threat assessment in 2019 described AQ as reinforcing its command structure and continuing to urge attacks against Western targets (Coats, 2019, pp. 11–12), while a United Nations report the same year viewed AQ as a resilient organisation, stronger than IS in Yemen, Syria, Somalia and large parts of West Africa (United Nations Security Council, 2019, pp. 3, 21). In March 2020, armed jihadists affiliated with both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) continued to carry out numerous terror raids against the local population and symbols of the state in Burkina Faso, resulting in the displacement of at least 800 000 people in a 12-month period (Safi, 2020). Despite AQ's waning importance on the global stage, the organisation is not extinct and it will still pose a threat to its traditional targets for the foreseeable future.

NOTES

1. Taymiyah also included a fourth category, Dar al-Ahd (often translated as 'the house or realm of Covenant'), to denote areas in which non-Muslim leaders rule over non-Muslim subjects, and are not in conflict with Islam. It is also referred to as Dar al-Sulh (usually translated as 'the realm of peace') (Streusand, 1997). Unsurprisingly, this realm does not seem to feature much in the ideology of AQ and IS.
2. The Mongol (or Tartar) Ilkhanid dynasty ruled over what is now Iran, and parts of other countries at various times, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, as well as parts of Iraq. The majority of Mongol Ilkhanids converted to Islam as they took over Muslim lands, which raised a religious question about whether a jihad against them could be considered valid.
3. The term 'jihad' is commonly misunderstood. While it is often translated as 'holy war', the term 'jihad' means a struggle or a striving towards something, usually something noble and moral. Thus, while jihad can encompass the defence of Islam if it is perceived to be under attack by unbelievers, it can also include, for example, looking after and supporting one's parents.
4. 'The mujahideen' was the term given to the Afghan (and foreign) fighters who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in defence of Islam. It is a plural noun of the singular form *mujahid*, meaning 'one who takes part in Jihad'.
5. There are varying figures for the number of recruits processed by the Office of Services. Commins, for example, writes that the organisation processed as many as 35 000 people (Hamdan, cited by Commins, 2006, p. 135). The figure of 20 000 can be considered a conservative estimate.
6. For more information, see this book's chapters on Hamas (Chapter 4), the Israeli counter-terrorism landscape (Chapter 13) and Palestine–Israel as a zone of conflict (Chapter 9).
7. Feifer contends that the carefully rehearsed departure of the last tank and Gromov dismounting from it was previously planned, and that Gromov had already left Afghanistan, but re-entered the country on the evening before the televised walk across Friendship Bridge. He also contends that a handful of combat units with-

drew from Afghanistan in the following few weeks, also across Friendship Bridge (Feifer, 2010). Both assertions are entirely plausible.

8. For more detail on AQ's long-term strategy, see Rudner (2013, p. 959), Al-Shishani (2014), Gunaratna and Oreg (2010), Change Institute (2008) and Jenkins (2016).

9. Just as projects suffer from 'project drift' and military operations suffer from 'mission drift', I use 'jihad drift' here to highlight the similar challenges and setbacks encountered by Zawahiri and core AQ, in trying to carry out this 20-year plan.

10. Here I am envisioning Cebrowski's (2001) definition of network-centric operations, 'the process of deriving maximum military effect through the rapid and robust networking of diverse, well informed, and geographically dispersed forces', when thinking about core AQ in the first years of the immediate post-9/11 period.

11. For a detailed paper on AQ's organisational weaknesses, see Forest et al.'s paper 'Harmony and disharmony: exploiting al-Qa'ida's organizational vulnerabilities' (Forest et al., 2006).

12. There are conflicting accounts of Al-Zarqawi's approximate arrival date in Iraq. Jordanian intelligence reporting places Al-Zarqawi as not arriving until after the invasion. Other sources indicate that Saddam Hussein's government was aware that Al-Zarqawi was in Iraq, establishing a network of supporters and weapons, even before the US invasion began.

13. The Hawiye are one of the major clans in Somalia.

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3. The so-called Islamic State
Michael Robillard

OVERVIEW

Origins (2003–2006)

The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) – also referred to variously in the media as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Daesh – is a militant Wahhabi-Salafi-jihadist organisation that operates largely in the regions of Iraq, Syria, Libya and beyond, and whose stated aim is the re-establishment of Sharia law under the Islamic 'Caliphate' of 7th-century Islam.[1] Ideologically speaking, the group is a proponent of its own, extreme and severely flawed interpretation of Muslim Sharia law, and it claims political and theological authority over all of the world's Muslims (Jenkins, 2016). IS also believes in an apocalyptic 'end of times' prophecy as outlined in the Quran and sees itself as a vanguard element, duty-bound to bring about its occurrence by way of violent jihad ('struggle'). Though the Islamic State finds its origins in the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 2006, the formation of IS officially occurred in 2013 when its creation was announced by the group's leader, cleric and self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. IS gained mainstream prominence primarily in 2014 by means of an aggressive world-wide social media campaign showing the violent beheadings of four captured Western journalists. This social media campaign, coupled with exceptionally rapid territorial gains and early military successes in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq in June 2014 (signifying the official securing of territory for the establishment of the Caliphate), served to attract thousands of foreign fighters to IS's ranks.

The so-called Islamic State's de facto capital was in Raqqa, Syria, roughly from June 2014 to October 2017, and its estimated troop strength varied considerably depending on sources, as well as phases of conflict.[2] For instance, in the summer of 2016, US Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland estimated IS troop strength to be as low as 15 000 and as high as 20 000. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated IS troop strength to be around

80 000–100 000 in October 2014, and Reuters estimated troop strength to be somewhere between 40 000 to 60 000 in June 2015. The origins of IS can largely be traced back to the United States (US) military occupation of Iraq and the political destabilisation resulting from its subsequent exit. With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 and the 'de-Baathification' of the Iraqi political and governmental apparatus, the US occupation of Iraq had the side-effect of disenfranchising a considerable number of Iraqi Sunnis while creating a sizable power vacuum.[3] The establishment of US prisoner detainee camps in Iraq also had the unforeseen side-effect of creating hothouses allowing for radicalisation and bonding between prisoners who would later form the organisational backbone of IS.

With the establishment of the US-backed Maliki government, and the subsequent 'Shia-fication' of the Iraqi government, even more Iraqi Sunnis felt themselves being politically marginalised. Shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of the then jihadist group Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (the Group for Monotheism and Jihad), partnered with al-Qaeda (AQ) to form the franchise of AQI. The initial aim of AQI was to broadly target the Shia population in an attempt to draw the US into a protracted war in Iraq that would then function as a means of mobilising the remainder of the Iraqi-Sunni populace against the US military and the Maliki government. The relationship between AQ and Zarqawi soon became tenuous, however, as the groups began to differ over strategic and ideological aims. While both Osama bin Laden and Zarqawi believed in the inevitable coming of the Islamic Caliphate, Bin Laden felt that the scope of AQ's military aims should be immediately focused on the far enemy (US and Western influences) while leaving the project of establishing the Caliphate for future Muslim generations.[4] In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's deputy, castigated AQI and Zarqawi for targeting Shias, on the grounds that doing so would cause many Sunnis to ally with the Iraq government. Bin Laden's prediction was largely correct. Zarqawi was eventually killed in a US air strike in Baquba, Northern Baghdad in June 2006, when his safe-house location was uncovered through US intelligence.

Emergence and Expansion (2006–2015)

Shortly after Zarqawi's death, Egyptian-born Abu Ayyub al-Masri assumed head leadership of AQI and re-branded the organisation as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006. Shortly before this time period, however, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was arrested, and detained in a US detention facility in Iraq from February to December 2004. He was incarcerated alongside many other disgruntled Sunnis and former Baathist members who were looking for ways to re-assert their political power, and these detention facilities became unin-

tended breeding grounds for radicalisation and future terrorist coordination. Following the deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi, prior ISI leaders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed head leadership of ISI in 2010.

The US military exit from Iraq in 2011 lent itself to further political instability in the region as did the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011 which pitted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Alawite ruling class against a variety of different rebel factions. These two events allowed ISI to further capitalise on disenfranchised Sunni sentiments. In 2011, Baghdadi sent AQ affiliate group al-Nusra Front into Syria to help consolidate and mobilise Sunni power in this region. Tensions between Baghdadi and al-Nusra's leadership, however, would later cause serious political infighting within the group.[5] In 2013, Baghdadi announced the official re-branding of the ISI to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS/ISIL; but henceforth referred to as IS) and in 2014 he announced the official establishment of the Caliphate. This announcement, combined with early military successes in Mosul and Raqqa, caused a major influx of thousands of foreign fighters (from all over the world, but particularly from Europe) into the region to join IS's ranks. Within this same general time period, Zawahiri and AQ central announced their official break from IS and Baghdadi's nascent project (Jones, 2014).

Retraction (2015–2020)

In recent years, the international community has seen IS's territorial holdings and troop strength wane dramatically. Even as early as 2016, IS's troop strength was estimated to have begun dropping from somewhere between 20 000 and 30 000 troops down to 19 000–25 000 troops. Despite early territorial gains in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria, 2017 and 2018 showed IS's incapacity to maintain sufficient military control of these regions as they were pushed back by US-led coalition forces. By the autumn of 2019, the successful US special forces raid which resulted in the death of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, along with the deaths of other key leaders, dealt a decisive blow to the fledgling organisation. The intelligence yield gained from this raid on Baghdadi caused a further diminishing and retraction of the organisation and its network. Lastly, the military contributions of local US-led coalition forces in Syria as well as Western-trained Iraqi forces further helped to wither IS's power base.

The retraction of IS since 2017 is not, however, a sign of IS becoming any less dangerous (Jones and Dobbins, 2017). Indeed, several counter-terrorism experts argue that a fracturing IS might be even more dangerous in the long run, insofar as the group could decentralise and metastatise into a multiplicity

of opportunist terrorist entities, leading to what experts refer to as 'destructive terrorist competition' (Watts, 2016). Lastly, as recently as the spring of 2020, IS appears to once again be actively conducting offensive military operations in both Iraq and Syria, exploiting the momentary lack of US and international prioritisation due to Covid-19, domestic issues of racial justice, and general international disunity (Hassan, 2020). This absence of US focus upon IS in Syria and Iraq at present could prove highly dangerous for both the US and the international counter-terrorism (CT) community in the long run, insofar as it gives IS leadership the time and opportunity to regenerate more effectively, having learned valuable military and strategic lessons from their earlier attempts from 2014 to 2017 (Hassan, 2020).

IDEOLOGY AND AIMS

Salafi-Jihadism

Broadly speaking, the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of IS can be explained in terms of a Salafi interpretation of Islam. The Salafis, meaning followers of the way of Muhammad and his companions, are adherents to a particularly strict Sunni interpretation of Islam (Holland, 2016). The core tenets of Salafism involve a strict interpretation of the Quran, a belief in a duty to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate and to institute Sharia law, and a belief in the coming of the end of times. Salafi-Islamists arguably split into three further sub-groups. First are the 'passive, quietest' Salafis who believe that the establishment of the Caliphate and the coming of the end of times will occur on its own, and thus they focus on self-purification rather than violent jihad. Next are the 'politically active, non-violent' Salafis who believe that the end of times needs to be nudged along, but not through violent means. Finally, there are the 'violent vanguard' Salafis who believe that the end of times can only be brought about through the use of violence. IS arguably fits into this last sub-category.

Since Salafism preaches a strict interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith (a record of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, perceived as a major source of religious and moral law for Muslims, second only to the authority of the Quran), it views all Shia Muslims as apostates and punishable by death, in virtue of their reformist or revisionist interpretation of the Quran and their reluctance to officially pledge *bayaat* ('allegiance') to the Caliphate. Salafis therefore see Shia Muslims fundamentally as traitors, including them in the 'near enemy' category. Salafis contrast this with the 'far enemy', that is, non-Muslims, Christians, 'the forces of Rome', and so on. Salafis regard non-Muslims – and potentially non-Salafi Muslims – as *jahil* (or 'ignorant'): either being culpably ignorant, and therefore punishable, or non-culpably igno-

rant, and therefore non-punishable and thus able to attain salvation, depending upon the individual's exposure to, and reasonable chance of understanding, the Quran (Wood, 2015). Salafism arguably provides the broad ideological backdrop for both AQ and IS.

Wahhabism

More precisely, the presuppositions of not just Salafism but Wahhabism in particular provide much of the ideological motivations for IS specifically, whereas AQ is arguably more of an ideological expression of the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Osama Bin Laden's mentor and intellectual predecessor. Wahhabism is originally a Sunni, Salafi ideology which has become one of the defining characteristics of the Saudi identity, highlighted by Ibn Saud, who was a Bedouin tribe leader in the poor desert area of Nejd. Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahhab (1703–1792) is considered the founding father of Wahhabism. He was a scholar of Islamic law and theology in Mecca and Medina. He denounced many popular beliefs and practices as un-Islamic idolatry and a revival of pagan pre-Islamic Arabia, a period described as 'Jahilyya' or ignorance. He was against blind imitation or past scholarship and regarded medieval law of the religious scholars (*ulama*) as fallible and sometimes, unwarranted innovations (*bid'a*). Wahhabism was used by Ibn Saud to legitimate his jihad to subdue and unite the tribes of Arabia and to convert them to the pure version of Islam (Crooke, 2014). Similar to the earlier Salafi thinker Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abdel Wahhab believed that the period of the Prophet Muhammad's stay in Medina was the ideal Muslim society, which all Muslims should try to emulate, and this is the essence of Salafism. Ibn Taymiyyah had declared war on Shi'ism, Sufism and Greek philosophy. He also criticised visiting the grave of the Prophet and celebrating his birthday as imitating Christian worship of Jesus as God. Lastly, Ibn Taymiyyah introduced the conceptual distinction between Dar al-Islam ('the house of Islam') and Dar al-Kufr ('the house of unbelievers'), whereby Sharia law was imposed on the former. Ibn Abdel Wahhab assimilated all of these earlier teachings, stating that 'any doubt or hesitation' on the part of a believer in respect to their acknowledging this particular interpretation of Islam should 'deprive a man of immunity of his property and his life' (Crooke, 2014).[6]

The Caliphate

The intermediary phase in the Salafi grand narrative, between now and the end of times, is the establishment of the Caliphate. The succession of the Caliphate, however, is riven with disagreements and conflicting viewpoints which in their own way are mirrored in the Sunni–Shia schism that was cemented after the

Battle of Karbala in AD 680 which resulted in the death of Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib (a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad), and Hussein's family. Even the Ottoman caliphs were not universally accepted or recognised as caliphs in some parts of the Muslim world during their tenure, as they were not direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or his tribe, the Quraysh. The Ottoman Caliphate was finally abolished by Kemal Attaturk in 1924, but even at that stage there were those who considered the real Caliphate to have ended following the fall of the Abbasid-controlled city of Baghdad to Mongol invaders in AD 1258.

For the Caliphate to be officially established requires two things, at least according to IS: (1) territorial control of the lands prophesied in the Quran; and (2) leadership under the legitimate caliph. Once these two criteria are met, the ideologies of both AQ and IS believe that all Muslims then become duty-bound to travel to the Caliphate and to live under Sharia law. According to the Salafi interpretation of the Quran, it is considered sinful for vigilantes to begin enacting Sharia law only partially (such as the severing of the hands of thieves) prior to the legitimate establishment of the Caliphate (Wood, 2015). Consequently, the practicing of certain violent elements of Sharia law only makes sense, according to Salafis, when understood as a total package of social practices coordinated under the Caliphate (that is, when also coupled with free medical care, for instance). This is why many Salafis have openly criticised Saudi Arabia for its seemingly partial implementation of only certain elements of Sharia law in the absence of the legitimate Caliphate. By definition, the concept of the Caliphate precludes the acknowledgement of any existing state borders or boundaries within its scope. Similarly, seeking official recognition from the United Nations for legitimacy would, according to Salafi doctrine, be considered sinful, as it would count as an instance of polytheism (Wood, 2015).

In addition to territorial control of the lands prophesied in the Quran, Salafism stipulates that the Caliphate cannot officially begin unless the leader over this territory satisfies the necessary requirements for being caliph. Salafism also stipulates that in order for one to become caliph, one must demonstrate physical and mental integrity, leadership authority, sufficient knowledge of Islamic learning, and be a descendant from the tribe of the Prophet, the Quraysh. Once caliph, one is duty-bound to continually wage war on behalf of the spreading of Islam, and under no circumstances may the caliph lose the territory of the Caliphate (Wood, 2015).

The Apocalypse

While Muslims believe in the prophesies of Muhammad, to include the prophesy of the end of times, members of the Islamic State specifically see

themselves as active participants in this prophecy, duty-bound to bring about its occurrence in their own lifetime. This notion of the impending imminence of the apocalypse therefore considerably distinguishes IS from AQ insofar as the latter sees the end of times as preordained but in the distant rather than near future. The prophetic, end of times narrative tells of the Mahdi, the messianic leader of the Muslims who will appear to lead them in battle against the 'forces of Rome', led by the anti-Christ, Dajjal. The prophesy states that this epic, final battle between Good and Evil will occur on the fields of Dabiq near Aleppo, Syria and that the forces of Islam will diminish to only 5000 in number until they are cornered by Dajjal in Jerusalem. Just as the army of Good is about to be defeated, the prophesy foretells that Jesus will return to earth and kill Dajjal and lead the Muslims to victory (Wood, 2015).

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Governmental Bodies

The leadership and organisational structure of IS can be explained as follows. Prior to his death in October of 2019 at the hands of US Special Forces, IS was led by their commander-in-chief/caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi was an Iraqi national from the Al-Bu Badri tribe and claimed descendancy from the Prophet Muhammad, one of the necessary conditions for being caliph (McCants, 2016). Baghdadi received his PhD in Islamic Studies shortly before founding the Jamaat Jaish Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamaa in order to fight US forces in 2003. He was detained by US forces at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca for most of 2004, and assumed leadership of ISI before its expansion and re-branding to IS/ISIL in 2013. He was the self-appointed and self-declared 'caliph' until he killed himself and two of his children by detonating an explosive vest when cornered by US Special Forces in a US-led raid in October 2019 (Lister, 2014). Baghdadi has since been replaced by Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (aka Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi) as IS's new figurehead (Chulov, 2020).

Directly beneath the caliph within the IS organisational hierarchy are several deputies, cabinets and councils. One senior deputy to the caliph is Abu Muslim Al-Turkmani, former Lieutenant Colonel in the Iraqi Army and officer in the Iraqi Special Forces. A second deputy was Abu Ali Anbari, former Governor in charge of the IS-controlled areas of Syria. He was, however, killed on 25 March 2016, and his replacement is currently unknown. Assisting in an advisory capacity to the caliph are both the official IS Cabinet and the Shura Council. The IS Cabinet is made up **of** Abu Abdul Kadr**,** Abu Louy, Abu Salah**,** Abu Hajar al-Assafi**,** Abu Kassem**,** Abu Abdul Rahman and Al-Bilawi, Abu Bakr's self-appointed team of advisors (Taylor, 2014). The Shura Council is

headed by Abu Arkan al-Ameri. This Council is supposed to include 9–11 members and all members are personally selected by the caliph. Theoretically, this Council can depose the caliph, but only in exceptional circumstances. The main task of the Council is the supervising of affairs of the state.

The caliph is also supported by the Military Council/War Office consisting of Abu Shema, Abu Suja and Abu Kifa. The main task of these three members is to plan and supervise the military commanders and the actual military operations of IS in the field. The members of the military council are all appointed personally by the caliph. The caliph is also supported by the Judicial Authority, headed by Abu Mohammad al-Ani. The Judicial Authority deals with all judicial issues as well as spreading the message of IS by means of recruitment and preaching. Lastly, the caliph is further supported by the Defense, Security and Intelligence Council as well as the Islamic State Institution for Public Information. The Defense, Security and Intelligence Council is responsible for the personal security and safety of the caliph, and serves to implement orders, campaigns, judicial decisions and collect and disseminate intelligence. The Islamic State Institution for Public Information, headed by Abu al-Athir Omru al-Abbassi, concerns internal information dissemination for the Caliphate (Taylor, 2014).

Evidence suggests that even if key leadership of IS are killed, the system has created a succession procedure designed to allow it to survive, just like AQ was able to survive even after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 (Stanford University, 2019). IS's massive loss of territory and fighting strength since 2017, however, suggests that even succession planning could not halt its eventual decline.

Military

IS troop strength estimates have varied significantly, with estimates ranging from 15 000 to as high as 100 000, with average estimates usually being somewhere around 20 000–40 000 troops, around 12 000 of whom were assessed to be foreign fighters. Analysis of IS's military demographics suggest that the average IS soldier is male, 26, single, reasonably well educated but not an expert on the Quran. Regional fighters from Syria and Iraq round out the remainder of IS's ranks, with many of these fighters coming from Iraq's disbanded Saddam-era guerrilla group the Fedayeen Saddam, possessing over a decade's worth of insurgency fighting skills in Iraq, and with a few older veterans even having served in the mujahideen against the Russians in Afghanistan.[7]

Domestic and Political

The territorial areas which IS annexed and controlled in order to nullify national boundaries are known individually as *wilayah* (that is, a province). *Wilayat* temporarily established by IS in both Syria and Iraq reportedly had governing authorities that included legal, judicial, educational and propagandistic structures (Al-Tamimi, 2018). These areas also had relatively functioning municipal agencies such as police, firefighters, water and sanitation agencies, as well as 57 media production units and propaganda offices, including the IS Amaq News Agency (Winter and Clarke, 2017).

At its height in 2014–2015, IS was able to establish quasi-state functionality not unlike functionality comparable to Hezbollah. Within Raqqa, in particular, reports of day-to-day life within the Caliphate suggested a combination of social cohesion, domestic governance and extreme brutality for its approximately 300 000 inhabitants. Despite its detractors and critics, IS was able to establish and implement a domestic governance structure capable of such things as raising taxes, conscripting soldiers and regulating rents (Cockburn, 2015). Furthermore, a Sharia Board of Authority was created to resolve local problems and disputes, and a consumer protection office was established in order to regulate the health and safety of local restaurants and food distributors. Despite these efficiencies, many people within Raqqa still reported frequent lack of water, electricity and fuel as well as limited access to mobile and satellite communications within the Caliphate.

Domestically speaking, reports from within the Caliphate suggested that public displays of religiosity increased considerably, with men growing out their beards and shops and marketplaces shutting down during the day for daily prayer. Furthermore, local school and university curriculums within the Caliphate were also drastically overhauled, removing all literature, philosophy, social and law studies incompatible with IS's strict teachings. Lastly, the behaviours of everyday men and women within the city were highly regulated in strict accordance with Sharia law. The Hisbih Brigade, for men, and the Khansa Brigade, for women, provided round-the-clock enforcement of strict Sharia law within the city. Women in particular were expected to cover themselves from head to toe, and to not leave the house without a male escort. Many women dropped out of school or university entirely (Smith and Balkiz, 2014).

Such social coherence and governance within Raqqa was made possible largely in part due to the strict and brutal implementation of 7th century Sharia practices found within the Caliphate. Failure to abide by Sharia rules resulted in a minimum of 40 lashes for most offences. More severe punishments such as beheadings, crucifixions and amputations were also commonplace. Lastly, persons deemed to be pagans, such as the Yazidis, were brought into the city and sold as chattel slaves. Obedience within the Caliphate was made further

possible, according to some experts, by many citizens' poor understanding of Islamic law and legislation. According to one undercover informant; 'the support [for ISIS] came from people whose knowledge of Islamic legislation is weak … Those people think that what they see – what ISIS is doing – is implementation of Shariah' (Smith and Balkiz, 2014).

Affiliates and Adherents

IS has claimed affiliate groups in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tunisia and North Caucasus. External organisations such as AQ and Boko Haram have similarly pledged varying degrees of support and affiliation to IS at different times, depending upon key leadership. IS is estimated, by some reports, to have up to 42 million sympathisers in the Muslim world (Anderson, 2016).

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Recruitment Demographics

As reporter Heather Long notes, George Washington University and Brookings put together a metadata analysis report on IS recruits (Long, 2015). Their top findings suggest that the average IS recruit is predominantly in their twenties, predominantly male, and is middle or upper class. Brookings findings also suggest that IS recruits are often second- or third-generation Muslim immigrants. In terms of their internet and social media behavior, Brookings found that most recruits do not like taking selfie pictures, are more likely to use Android phones, and are more active on Twitter than average. Lastly, Brookings report found that many IS recruits were motivated by a passion to travel abroad (Long, 2015).

Recruitment Methods

An article in the October 2015 edition of West Point's *Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel* (Berger, 2015) breaks down the following five-stage template for online recruiting, which IS implements in different ways depending on the target's disposition and circumstances. The first stage of this recruitment template is the 'discovery' phase where a member of IS discovers a potential recruit, or a potential recruit discovers IS. The second stage of the recruitment process is the creation of a 'micro-community' where IS supporters flock around potential recruits to surround them with social input. The third stage is the 'isolation' phase where potential recruits are encouraged to cut ties with mainstream influences, such as their families, friends and local religious

communities. The fourth stage is a 'shift to private communications' stage where IS supporters encourage targets to take their conversations about IS into private or encrypted messaging platforms. And the last stage is the 'identify and encourage action' stage where IS supporters probe to figure out what the target is most likely to do (usually travel to join IS, or carry out terrorist attacks at home) and then encourage the target to take concrete action (Berger, 2015).

IS's recruitment success, both locally and worldwide, can largely be traced to its keen ability to combine social media dissemination with various Salafi and Wahhabi grand narratives. These include heroic self-sacrifice and righteous struggle as a way to capture the imaginations of mainly disenfranchised young men (for example, Sunnis at home, second-generation Muslims in the West) and to leverage this general sentiment towards the realisation of its violent, ideological ends. Furthermore, IS's use of spectacular atrocities, such as the beheading of Western journalists on film and disseminated on social media, function as the first 'click bait'-style entry point into the IS advertising funnel and overall IS informational ecosystem. From there, more robust articulations of IS ideology (and Salafi and Wahhabi ideology more generally) can be found in online chatrooms, over Twitter and YouTube, and in IS's online magazines, *Inspire* and *Dabiq*. Given the Salafi grand narrative and the supposed duty for all Muslims to travel to the Caliphate once it is restored, and to live under the rule of the caliph, IS's greatest recruitment tool (and accordingly, its greatest Achilles heel) came down to the social media broadcasting of its increased territorial and positional success. The influx of thousands of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq in 2014 after early IS positional successes in Raqqa and Mosul added weight and testament to this claim.

Training

While the specifics of IS training are not fully clarified, some general trends can nonetheless be gleaned from various US intelligence reports. According to one report, new recruit training ranged from anywhere between two weeks and one year. Training content involved a mix of military tactics and methods as well as political indoctrination and Sharia law instruction. During this time period, recruits could be dispatched to military checkpoints but not to front-line combat. Upon graduation, recruits remained under supervision and could be expelled or punished in cases of non-compliance. Recruits struggling to accept the group's message and methods could be sent back to receive remedial training to 'strengthen' their faith and skills competence. Some reports indicated that IS went to great lengths to indoctrinate and mobilise child soldiers, either as suicide martyrs or for social media propaganda purposes. For example, the rate of young people dying in suicide operations rose from six in January 2015 to 11 in January 2016. The rate of operations involving one or more children or

youth likewise increased. The CTC reports that there were three times as many suicide operations involving children in January 2016 as in January 2015.

FINANCING

Sources of Funding

Technically speaking, IS at its height was the richest terrorist organisation in history, with its financial assets estimated to be somewhere around $2 billion. IS's financial base came from a variety of self-generative sources, mainly through the trade of vital oil and gas resources (with an estimated £1.8 million a day revenue), taxation of its local populace (an estimated £900 million per year), illegal drug-trafficking (with revenue estimates as a high as $1 billion per year) and through looting of captured territories. In the 2014 capture of Mosul, for instance, IS acquired an estimated £240 million worth of currency from Iraqi banks. In addition to these two main sources of income, IS gained additional financial resources from a variety of other tertiary sources, namely from extortion of local businesses and local agriculture, taxation of Christian communities, human trafficking, drug trafficking particularly from Afghanistan, ransom from hostages, the black market sale of cultural artifacts, and from charitable fronts and fundraising (Bahney, 2015).

Funds derived from the extortion of local businesses and agriculture were estimated to be around £5 million per month, while ransoms from hostage-taking were assessed at around £3 million per hostage, with an estimated £40 million gained in hostage-taking in 2014 alone. Human trafficking revenue was believed to generate around £10 000–£15 000 per person, with about 7000 women and children (mainly Turkish Yazidis) kidnapped and sold as of late December 2015. The black market sale of cultural artifacts further raised around £200 million per year.

In addition to these self-generative means of revenue generation, IS has also relied on external funders and donors. Specifically, IS has used fraudulent charitable fronts as well as so-called 'combat charities' to serve as a source of external revenue (FATF, 2015). Furthermore, especially in their early stages, IS relied upon donor contributions from wealthy Gulf State angel investors to further fund its operation (Windrem, 2014).

MOVEMENT AND USE OF FUNDS AND ASSETS

Financial Institutions

While IS secured access to many financial institutions in both Iraq and Syria, the Iraqi government and the US Department of Treasury took aggressive steps

to block IS's access to the international financial system at large. According to one industry report, as of 2015, approximately 90 Iraqi bank branches were located in territories held or contested by IS. In an attempt to prohibit IS from exploiting Iraq bank access, the bank headquarters of the Mosul Development Bank moved its centre of operations to Baghdad. With respect to financial institutions in Syria, more than 20 Syrian financial institutions operated in locations under Iraqi control. These included the Central Bank of Syria, the Commercial Bank of Syria and the Syria International Islamic Bank. The US Treasury and the European Union has designated these banks as being connected with IS, thereby causing most major international financial institutions to officially sever ties with them (FATF, 2015).

ALTERNATIVE MONEY/VALUE TRANSFER SERVICES (MVTS)

In addition to formal financial banking channels, IS also uses a variety of alternative money/value transfer services. These financial services, which are far less regulated and institutionally surveilled than standard means and methods, rely on trusted brokers who do not use wire-transfers as banks do, but who send messages via email, phone, text, fax, and so on to local or foreign affiliates to receive or send money for a given counterpart. The money/value transfers then settle payments at a later date. This system, known as hawala, originates from 8th century Islamic trade, and involves coordination between four key parties: a money/value sender, a pair of trusted hawaladors (hawala brokers who act as the middlemen)*,* and a money/value receiver. The customer gives a hawalador in one city a sum of money (or a valuable commodity) along with instructions for receipt (usually a password). The hawala broker then sends the money to his hawala counterpart in another city, while the customer calls or emails the receiver in the receiving city with the instructions or password. The receiver then approaches the hawalador on the receiving end and gives him the password along with a small commission, and the hawalador pays the receiver the agreed-upon transferred amount. In addition to MVTs, IS has also been known to use cruder methods of value transfer such as physical smuggling of cash and gold across national borders such as Turkey (FATF, 2015).

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, EXPENDITURE AND 'BURN RATE'

While IS's monetary gains are quite significant, its rapid expansion, in terms of both troop strength and territorial control, necessarily entailed a marked increase in spending on such things as food, water and electricity for the local population. According to one report, IS paid its troops an average of

$350–$500 per month. With an estimated 20 000–30 000 fighters, IS would spend roughly $10 million per month on this expense. IS also marshalled its financial resources to make significant infrastructural overhauls, such as dam repairs, the restoration of stalled generators and the upgrading of power plants and oil refineries in an attempt to increase the quality of life for its population and to bolster popular opinion. Since much of IS's funding was contingent upon its ability to refine and transport oil, military defeats and setbacks or stalled efforts to expand necessarily entailed further spending to recoup losses. Such territorial and positional losses have therefore prompted IS to reconsolidate its stronghold areas in Libya in recent years (Snow, 2019), particularly in Sirte, nicknamed by jihadists as 'Raqqa by the Sea'.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Conceptual Frameworks

In order to properly understand IS's specific military and strategic actions, it is helpful to understand the broader military distinction between strategic, operational and tactical levels of combat. The strategic level of combat concerns the macro-level coordination of persons, resources and information over time and space for the purpose of achieving the group's ultimate political and ideological end. The operational level involves the translation of strategic ends into real-world tactical actions. And the tactical level concerns the bringing about of specific causal actions or events in the world, in service of strategic ends. As Jeff McCausland, former Dean of the Army War College, keenly points out, terrorism – that is, the use of violence against innocents for the purposes of achieving some ideological and/or political end – is fundamentally a tactic and not a strategy. Hence, the entire notion of a counter-terrorism 'strategy' is something of a misnomer.

Strategy

Given the distinction between strategy, operations and tactics, the overall strategy that IS employed can arguably be described as a combination of Maoist protracted warfare doctrine and Guevaran 'focalism' doctrine, and it is useful at this point to briefly describe these doctrines to understand how they are relevant to the approach that IS has taken. Maoist protracted warfare doctrine conceives of revolutionary warfare as having three distinction phases: phase 1 is insurgency fighting, phase 2 is positional and phase 3 is the conventional offensive. The goal of a successful revolutionary effort, according to Mao Tse Tung, should be to move from non-conventional, small-unit insurgency fighting, to the securing of physical, geographic positional gains, to the

marshalling of a conventional force towards offensive fighting and ultimate military success. Depending on circumstances, a successful revolutionary effort constantly shifts back and forth between these three successive phases. If the revolutionary effort faces defeat at the conventional offensive phase, then it will fall back to secure its positional assets. If the military force loses at the positional phase, then it will shift back to decentralised insurgency tactics until a more favourable opportunity presents itself whereby it may regain those positional assets and, from there, move to conventional offensive fighting once again. Maoist protracted warfare doctrine is therefore a long-game strategy, one aimed not so much on winning as on not losing until the opponent's will is broken through mere attrition.

Expanding on Mao's protracted warfare notion, the South American revolutionary Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's 'focalist' doctrine can be seen as uniquely innovative in that it reconceives the Clausewitzian 'centre of gravity' as not being fundamentally located in the physical destruction of the enemy's army or its state capital's infrastructure, but in social symbols of power.[8] Put another way, Guevara arguably was the first theorist to really latch on to the idea of violence as fundamentally communicative (Guevara, 1963).

These two doctrines clearly permeate IS's military thinking, as demonstrated by its deliberate strategic advances and retreats in Mosul, by its battles against Kurdish forces and by its spectacular atrocities, cleverly broadcasted and distributed throughout social media. Unlike other opponents whose strategic ends may be somewhat of a mystery, given the fatalistic grand narrative that IS sees itself as duty-bound to bring to fruition, IS's strategic ends are arguably fairly clear: to advance along the three Maoist phases until their conventional forces are strong enough to defeat the 'near enemy', to use these local victories against the near enemy as well as its social media presence to recruit Muslims to the Caliphate, and to bait the 'far enemy' (aka the 'forces of Rome') into a protracted, 'boots on the ground' conflict in their Muslim homeland as prophesied by the Quran that IS sees itself as divinely preordained to ultimately win (Whiteside, 2016).

Tactics

All this being said, we can now better understand how specific military tactics were meant to feed into IS's higher strategic aims and ideological ends. Consequently, some of these tactics will include so-called terror tactics, but not all. For instance, when fighting against Kurdish forces, IS employed more insurgency-based tactics than terror tactics, such as the use of surveillance drones, improvised explosive devices, snipers and booby-trapped buildings utilised against combatants rather than civilians. Furthermore, in moments of battle in Mosul and Aleppo, IS demonstrated more conventional tactics

through the deployment of tanks, armored personnel carriers, fixed artillery and mortars.

With respect to IS insurgency tactics from August 2014 onward, the overall 'active defence' style that IS has employed is more reminiscent of Nazi Germany circa 1944–1945. Indeed, even in retreat, IS was extremely aggressive and highly dangerous, tactically speaking, through the use of snipers, mobile shooter teams, improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and mobile platoons making good use of the night and early morning to achieve area denial versus last-stand defence. Several counter-terrorism experts have argued, however, that IS's aggressive active-defensive posture at the tactical level has been deleterious, insofar as it has strained and stretched operational coordination and the logistical re-supply of troops and equipment, and also resulted in the continual strategic loss of physical territory. Arguably though, when utilised correctly, such a tactic hedges on a conscious bid to trade positional losses for spectacular and highly visible and violent tactical successes, as a demonstration of strength and ostensibly for future recruitment replenishment (Ingram, 2016).

With respect to terror tactics specifically, IS has inextricably linked these to its exploitation of the recent advent of social media. The group's use of video-based social media, such as YouTube, arguably serves two main purposes. By its use of highly orchestrated, slickly filmed atrocities (such as the beheading of high-profile Western journalists, the burning of a Jordanian pilot in a cage, the tossing of an alleged homosexual man off of a building, or the mass execution of dozens of innocents), IS's social media campaign serves as both terror propaganda as well as an effective recruitment tool for adherents and sympathisers. The specific atrocity acts that IS carried out served an additional signalling and communicative purpose to potential recruits, insofar as they are consistent with a strict Salafi interpretation of both the Quran and of Sharia-based punishments.

In addition to its exploitation of video-based social media, IS has made effective use of Twitter as a means of propaganda, information dissemination and recruitment around the world as well. This reliance of IS upon such cutting-edge social media technology is at least somewhat noteworthy since a strict Salafist-Wahhabist interpretation of the Quran would arguably denote such technologies as *bidaa* ('innovation') and therefore technically mark them as forbidden. Hence, members of IS, by their own ideological commitments, are arguably doing something sinful, hypocritical and self-defeating by promoting a Salafist-Wahhabist message by means of a forbidden technological medium.[9]

Lastly, terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki's promotion of the conception of 'open source jihad' via the vehicles of the *Inspire* online magazine and *Inspire* videos (which provide do-it-yourself instructions for bomb-making and other terror

tactics, plus encouragement for Western sympathisers to conduct jihad on their own) further harnesses anti-Western sympathies around the world and converts them into a powerful symbolic gesture of violence furthering IS's overall cause. These do-it-yourself terror tactics in recent years have specifically taken the form of homemade IEDs, mass shootings, stabbings, vehicular attacks on pedestrians and suicide bombings, all intentionally directed primarily at 'soft targets' such as social spaces and institutions.

FUTURE FORECASTING

While IS, in recent years, has lacked the military successes, international prestige and institutional momentum that it demonstrated in its heyday of 2014–2015, the terrorist organisation and its network is far from finished. Indeed, IS in its future form will likely continue to provide a serious threat to the US and the greater international community for years to come. While precise predictions about the organisation's future are impossible to make, theoreticians and practitioners can at least look to several salient points for general future forecasting. These salient points include: (1) re-branding efforts; (2) relationship to AQ; (3) territorial control (of Iraq and Syria, and to a lesser degree Libya and Africa); and (4) new leadership. These issues are now investigated in turn.

Re-Branding

Firstly, counter-terrorism practitioners can reasonably expect IS in the coming years to re-brand and change up its overall messaging and recruitment tactics, having learned key lessons since 2014. Despite its early branding and recruitment successes in 2014, largely motivated by the hypothetical idea of the establishment of the Caliphate, one of IS's biggest branding hurdles for the future will be the many disparaging reports and stories of the reality of what the Caliphate actually looked like in practice. Indeed, far from the idyllic and romantic vision of the Caliphate promised to many foreign fighters and Muslim families, many foreign recruits into the Caliphate came to discover its non-idyllic reality: harsh living conditions, abuse of women, and so on (Dandois, 2019). Accordingly, future IS re-branding efforts will no longer be able to as easily leverage such hopeful and romantic idealisations of the Caliphate when contrasted against the narratives and reports of its suboptimal application and governance in practice.

Relationship to AQ

Closely related to IS's future re-branding efforts is its ongoing relationship to AQ. Indeed, as IS's closest ideological competitor, AQ and IS are essentially fighting for dominance and control over the future vision of Salafi jihadism not only in the Middle East but in the world at large for years to come. The degree to which AQ and IS leadership are willing to cooperate versus compete with one another will have a direct bearing on IS's future ideological messaging, its ability to attract future recruits, its ability to retain and motivate existing members, its ability to garner future funding and donor support, and its military and strategic prioritisation. IS's ability to successfully cooperate or compete with AQ will also likely determine whether IS's organisational integrity will remain intact or whether the organisation will fracture and metastasise into a new set of sub-organisations (Byman and Williams, 2015).

Territorial Control

As per its stated mission and purpose commensurate with Quranic prophecy, IS's clear military objective is a territorial one: the re-capturing and re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the areas of Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, the US and international CT community can likely anticipate IS focusing its efforts on this territorial priority (as opposed to focusing its efforts on prioritising attacks on the 'far enemy' of the West). This, however, is not to rule out the idea that IS could not utilise attacks against the West on Western soil in service of this territorial objective. What is more, such a territorial end-state does not preclude IS attempting to consolidate a power base outside of just Syria and Iraq. Indeed, as noted briefly before, recent reports suggest that IS has begun to re-consolidate much of the remnants of its fractured network in Libya as well as in regions of Western Africa.

Leadership

A final consideration relevant to the future of IS will be its future leadership, particularly the leadership decision-making and ability of al-Baghdadi's replacement, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Indeed, somewhat of al-Baghdadi's leadership appeal was that he was the original founder and implementer of IS. Hence, somewhat of a cult of personality had built up around him. His death at the hands of US Special Forces in 2019 has arguably made him somewhat of a martyr now within IS's ranks, hence leaving al-Qurashi with big institutional shoes to fill. Given the highly centralised and hierarchical command structure of IS, much of IS's future recruitment and branding efforts, relationship to AQ,

retention and organisational integrity, and future strategic prioritisation will likely turn on al-Qurashi's leadership decision-making.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the phenomenon of IS represents the latest instantiation in recent years of a more pernicious, enduring and underlying meme of Salafi-Wahhabi-jihadism more generally. While the positional, material, leadership, and troop strength of IS has waned dramatically in recent years, especially after the killing of its former leader, al-Baghdadi, and its huge territorial losses in Syria and Iraq, recent consolidation efforts in Libya as well as recent military attacks in both Iraq and Syria during this time of general international disunity suggest that IS is far from permanently defeated. Such recent offensive military activity in Iraq and Syria further suggests that IS will likely regenerate in some new and strengthened form having learned, adjusted and adapted from its earlier military and strategic losses. Accordingly, it is important for members of the US and international CT community to remember and keep in mind that the 'battle-space' of the war on terror is fundamentally to be located in the hearts and minds of individuals, and that the nature of the war itself is primarily an ideological rather than a physical one. Accordingly, the US and international CT community must not only be on guard against the metastasising of the remnants of IS into some other form, or the absorption of such remnants back into AQ, but it must also make a more active effort in propping up more peaceful and moderate versions of Islam and showcasing the liberal democratic values that the CT communities are ostensibly fighting for.

NOTES

1. Recent reports, however, have also shown increased IS activity within Africa. For instance, a recent United Nations report suggests that IS has begun operating in the areas of West Africa as of late. For details on this development, see: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-west-africa-province-iswap-0.
2. As of 2020, the so-called capital of IS has relocated to Sirte in Libya, as detailed in this chapter.
3. For a more comprehensive exploration of the de-Baathification process and the resulting power vacuum, see this book's Chapter 7 on Iraq as a zone of conflict.
4. In 2001, Bin Laden and Zawahiri planned to establish the Caliphate in around 2013–2016 as part of their 20-year plan. This is covered in more detail in this book's Chapter 2 on al-Qaeda.
5. Al-Nusra's official connections to AQ and IS are somewhat hazy. While it appeared to announce its official separation from AQ and IS in 2016, several US, United Kingdom and Australian sources still regard it as closely institutionally linked. For a more lengthy explanation of this connection, see: https://www

.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Jabhat-Fatah-al-Sham
.aspx.
6.   For more detail on the theological history of Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab, see
     Chapter 2 on al-Qaeda in this volume.
7.   For more information on the Fedayeen Saddam, see this book's Chapter 7 on Iraq
     as a zone of conflict.
8.   Clausewitz's concept of centre of gravity focuses on the idea that there are certain
     metaphysically salient loci of strength that can be targeted in order to defeat an
     enemy, a political community and its military. Clausewitz located the centre of
     gravity of an enemy's force in its physical army and in the will of its people and
     leadership. For a thorough explanation of centre of gravity, see Strange and Iron
     (1943, pp. 1–17).
9.   For a more thorough treatment of this ideological tension involving IS's use of
     modern social media technology, see Klausen (2014).

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4.   Hamas

Doaa' Elnakhala

BACKGROUND

Unlike several other Palestinian militant groups, Hamas appeared as a player in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict relatively recently, as it was founded only in the late 1980s. The conflict started unravelling in the late 19th century when historic Palestine became the heart of the project of the Jewish state and thus attracted waves of Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases in Ottoman and British Mandated Palestine (1922–1948) (Sinanoglou, 2010, pp. 119–120).[1] Towards the end of the British Mandate, Palestinian Arabs were fighting with increasingly powerful Jewish gangs established by Jews who had emigrated to Palestine. The 1948 war resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel and the displacement of some 700 000 Palestinians, who ended up in various refugee camps[2] and locations in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, neighbouring countries and beyond (Nakhala, 2012, p. 5). As early as the 1950s these refugees, aided by Arabs, started to organise and launch attacks against Israel. The first group that appeared was the fedayeen, or the guerrillas, who launched attacks against Israel, and mostly infiltrated the borders from the Gaza Strip,[3] Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Sayigh, 1999, p. 62; Byman, 2011, pp. 1–2).[4] To the fedayeen, the armed struggle was the sole means for liberating Palestine (Giacaman, 2013).

Meanwhile young Palestinian activists in the diaspora coalesced into a number of political parties with varying ideologies. Several of those participated in the fedayeen attacks. This also gave birth to the renowned Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. Less than a decade into the establishment of the PLO,[5] the fedayeen took over the PLO. The goal of the PLO was to 'liberate Palestine', including the land on which Israel was established in 1948, and the eventual return of Palestinian refugees. Until 1967, this land extended from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, which corresponds to the map of Mandate Palestine. In 1974, the Arab League and the United Nations recognised the PLO under the leadership of the fedayeen factions as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people' (Giacaman, 2013). Devastated by the loss of more land to Israel in the 1967 war,[6] the goals of the

PLO retreated to what was perceived to be an intermediate goal: the liberation of the land occupied by Israel in 1967, that is, the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem (Hroub, 2009). Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), two secular Palestinian factions integrated under the PLO umbrella, immediately became two of the most active groups that attacked Israel in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Emergence of Hamas

With Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967, more Palestinian political parties with armed wings emerged, this time both among the diaspora and inside the Palestinian Territories. Organisations later emerged with Islamist ideologies and no PLO membership, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, established in 1981) and Hamas (founded in 1987) (Elnakhala, 2014) and they started to launch attacks against Israel. Hamas was founded in the Gaza Strip as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and since its establishment as a religious-nationalist liberation movement it has become increasingly influential on the ground, not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank. Hamas's rise coincided with political concessions by the Fatah-led PLO.

Around the mid-1980s, the PLO officially relinquished its long-term goal of the liberation of Palestine 'from the River to the Sea' by recognising Israel and its right to exist, and dropped the armed struggle as its primary strategy. At that time, the PLO hoped to regain the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through a settlement, and it argued for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on any piece of Palestinian land. This shift resulted in the Oslo Accords of 1993 that founded the Palestinian Authority (PA). By contrast, Hamas persisted in employing the armed struggle as its primary strategy in fighting Israel (Hroub, 2009; Milton-Edwards and Farrel, 2010).

Hamas thus appeared as an alternative to Fatah, as it preached a path in the completely opposite direction, one that resembled the earlier path of the PLO in the 1960s. Hamas opposed the agreement with Israel, emphasising the idea that the Oslo Accords served Israeli interests and compromised Palestinian rights. While the Palestinian and Israeli representatives were negotiating in the early 1990s, Hamas and the PIJ launched a series of suicide bombings, a tactic that had not previously been used by any Palestinian faction. These attacks shocked Israel's city centres and raised questions about the ability of the newly established Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to rule the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Within the first decade after the Oslo Accords, most Palestinians felt frustrated with the outcomes of peace. Palestinian daily life had become increasingly difficult and the construction of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land continued to expand, resulting in the deterioration of the political and

security situation, leading to the Second Palestinian Intifada of 2000. These conditions provided Hamas and its 'resistance project' with yet more power and influence (Hroub, 2009).

Various governments have differing views on Hamas. The United States and Israel designate it a terrorist group, while the United Kingdom and Australia designate only its armed wing, the Izz al-Dine al-Qassam Brigades, as terrorist. Numerous other countries do not designate Hamas or any other Palestinian group at all. Hamas was designated as a terrorist group by the European Union (EU) until 2014, when the European Court removed Hamas from the proscribed list. Following an appeal by the EU Commission, this European Court decision was suspended in 2017 and Hamas was once again listed as terrorist. Many Palestinians, including those who disagree with Hamas's ideology and politics, do not see Hamas as a terrorist group. In fact, various Palestinians and Arabs perceive the group as a resistance organisation battling the Israeli occupation of Palestine. This does not, however, eliminate the fact that Hamas does use terrorism as a tactic, which is also used by several other actors, including states.

HAMAS AND ITS AIMS

Liberation of Palestine

Hamas has always marketed itself among the Palestinians, and sometimes the Arabs, as an Islamist movement engaged in a liberation struggle against a foreign occupier, focusing its goals and activities within the borders of historic Palestine. This feature distinguishes Hamas from other Islamist movements, which emphasise other issues such as corrupt regimes or global jihad. Hamas, by contrast, restricts itself to fighting the Israeli occupation and protecting Palestinian rights to freedom and self-determination (Hamas, n.d.; Hroub, 2009). Hamas's political leader, Yahya Sinwar, has vowed that Hamas will continue to fight the Israeli occupation 'until the liberation of all of Palestine' (Fares, 2017). Hamas's April 2017 document, which is considered an addition to, rather than a modification of, its 1988 Charter, reiterates the 'liberation of Palestine and fighting the Zionist project'[7] (that is, the State of Israel) as the central goal of the organisation (Orabi, 2017).

Palestinians differ on where the borders of their aspired state should be. Some leaders of Hamas's rival faction, Fatah, believe that the Palestinian state should be built on the pre-1967 borders, that is, the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Many Palestinians, however, still have yearnings for, and hopes to establish their future state, on all of historic Palestine: that is, on the land occupied by Israel in 1967, as well as today's Israel. This implies that the fulfilment of these aspirations would somehow require the disap-

pearance of present-day Israel. Hamas's documents and official statements have repeatedly stressed that Palestine extends from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, yet its April 2017 document states a willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 borders, a hitherto unprecedented statement by Hamas. In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas's original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible (Akil, 2017).

Welfare

Since its early days, the organisation has established social welfare programmes that provided much-needed services to Palestinian society.[8] What made these services more valuable is the fact that they were not offered by any institution in the Palestinian society until the Palestinian Authority set foot in the Palestinian Territories in 1995. Until then, Hamas was the sole provider of social, educational, charitable and religious services. Over the long term, such services helped the organisation to win the hearts and minds of many Palestinians (Hroub, 2009; Roy, 2011).

A closer look at the role of such services reveals that this goal carries within it the elements of a strategy for yet another goal, viz. the ruling of Palestinian society and potentially establishing an Islamic Palestinian state (a concept that is discussed later in this chapter). Hamas's social, educational and other services were instrumental in garnering broad legitimacy and support which paved the way for later victories. Additionally, Hamas's institutions have helped the movement to instil its Islamic ideology, which facilitated acceptance of its Islamic project (Malka, 2007, p. 101).

Governing the Palestinians

As of 2005, Hamas displayed a clear interest in governing, through its participation in the Palestinian political process for the very first time. Consequently, the organisation has become part of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a body which it previously criticised and boycotted. In the 1990s, Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO, and it even tried to thwart the peace process by launching attacks inside Israel. Hamas also boycotted the PA and the elections of 1996; around a decade later it shifted its strategy by actually taking part in running the PA. Hamas first participated in local municipal elections in 2005, and after achieving a wide victory on that level it participated in the parliamentary elections in 2006, achieving a stunning victory ('Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement', 2014).

Hamas already had a solid support base due to its social and military activities, but several factors explain this victory. Many agree that Hamas's

political victory was less due to its religious and warlike agenda, and largely due to a clever campaign in which it took advantage of the collapse of the Oslo Agreement, the failure of the PA in establishing an independent state, and Fatah's corruption and bad governance. Generally, Hamas justifies the use of violence as a form of self-defence against a threat, and thus it sees 'the ability to commit violence against Israel [as] ... an important source of legitimacy'. For Palestinian voters in 2005, the time was ripe to try other alternatives, particularly due to the widespread corruption in the Fatah-led PA between 1995 and 2005 (Long, 2010). Hamas's determination is evident in its later relations with its rival faction, Fatah. Hamas turned its weapons against Fatah in 2007, and after direct clashes, finally took over the rule of the Gaza Strip ('Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement', 2014).

Hamas's rule in Gaza Strip enforced an authoritarian and Islamic regime that arrested and tortured political opponents. Sharia courts were established, demonstrations were banned and violently repressed, and the media was censored (Schanzer, 2009). This practice was not unique to Hamas. Fatah's PA had previously used similar methods and restrictions in the West Bank, as did many Arab countries, such as Egypt (Long, 2010). Overall, Hamas's entrance into politics was also associated with a change in its discourse, by adopting a softer and more political position, and this has transformed Hamas into an actor that cannot be ignored in the political arena. Meanwhile, Hamas emphasised that its participation in politics was just one aspect of its broader strategic goal of resistance to Israel, and was consistent with its commitment to the liberation of Palestine and its rejection of the Oslo Agreements, as expressed in the preamble of its national platform (Hroub, 2006, p. 6).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura)

Hamas's central consultative body, the Shura[9] Council, serves as the equivalent of a state legislature. One of the key roles of the Council is defining Hamas's overarching strategy and political aims. Council members consult amongst themselves on important decisions, as well as Hamas's general strategy and goals. They also consult with the Political Bureau on the means of fulfilling these goals and strategy. Moreover, the Shura Council oversees Hamas's activities, elects the group's Political Bureau, and has the power to disband it if the Political Bureau exceeds its mandated authority. The Council also provides normative backing and moral justification for Hamas's political conduct and major decisions. The Council has representatives from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons and Hamas's leadership abroad. The Council is rather secretive and includes respected religious

figures. Under the Council, smaller Shura committees are employed to oversee various activities, including military operations and media relations. Local sub-committees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip report back to the Shura Council and implement its decisions on the ground (Malka, 2007). Hamas members elect the Shura Council. In fact, Hamas's 2017 internal elections resulted in the election of 80 members of the Council's branch in the Gaza Strip ('Haniya takes the lean …', 2017).

The Political Bureau

The Political Bureau is Hamas's principal decision-making body and derives its power from the backing of the Shura Council (Davis, 2016, pp. 282–283). While being overseen and guided by the Shura Council, the Political Bureau functions as the main source of political authority in Hamas. Its main responsibility is the implementation of Hamas's overall strategy, which is set up by the Shura Council. The main members of the Bureau are elected by the Shura Council every four years. Since May 2017, the former head of Hamas's government in Gaza, Esmael Haniya, has headed the Political Bureau, the organisation's executive authority. He succeeded Khaled Mashaal,[10] who headed the Bureau, from 2004 until 2017. It has 15 members in the Gaza Strip alone and has several departments including finance, propaganda, foreign affairs and social welfare. It has four sections, located in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, in Israeli prisons and abroad. The Bureau is composed of representatives from the four sections, totalling 18 members, elected by the movement's Shura Council or one of its branches. The head of the Bureau is also elected every four years (Gleis and Berti, 2012; 'Haniya takes the lean …', 2017).

Gaza Government

In February 2017, Yahya Sinwar, a founding member of the group's armed wing, won Hamas's internal elections for the role of political leader of the organisation in Gaza, replacing Esmael Haniya, Hamas's former Prime Minister. So far, the Prime Minister of Hamas's Gaza-based government has been responsible for the daily rule of the Gaza Strip since Hamas expelled the Fatah leaders from the Strip in mid-2007. In April 2014, Haniya stepped down and assumed the role of deputy leader of Hamas as part of a failed reconciliation agreement with the PLO (Rudoren and Kershner, 2014; Beaumont, 2017a). Since 2006, Hamas's Gaza government has been shunned by the international community, while it has struggled to pay the salaries of 40 000 municipal workers in the Strip (Issacharoff, 2016).

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Named after a Syrian fighter killed by the British in 1935, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (hereafter referred to as the Qassam Brigades) function as Hamas's military wing and were officially established in 1992. Soon after their creation, the Brigades attempted to derail the negotiations that were ongoing in 1992 between Israel and the PLO. According to the Brigades' website, however, there were efforts to establish an armed wing even before the establishment of Hamas itself. The main goals of the Brigades were 'to liberate all of Palestine from the Zionist occupation' in 1948, the fulfilment of the rights of the Palestinian people, the mobilisation of all of its resources, forces and capabilities, and the mobilisation of the Arab and Islamic nations to 'launch Jihad for the liberation of Palestine' ('Who we are', n.d.).

The Qassam Brigades are generally committed to a high level of secrecy regarding their structure, leadership and membership ('Izz Addin al-Qassam Brigades', 2014), and they are officially headed by Mohammad Deif, although Israeli intelligence considers Marwan Issa to be the de facto head. The Brigades enjoy a considerable degree of independence and according to a senior Hamas official are a separate entity 'which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from us and do not tell us of their plans in advance' (Kass and O'Neill, 1997, p. 267). Most likely, however, this is only the case at the operational level, and other Hamas senior leaders, including for example the late founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, indicated that the armed wing is not detached from the organisation's political body (Levitt, 2004). The 'About Us' section of the Brigades' official website explains the relationship as 'complementary at the organisational level and independent in the field', adding that the Brigades are an integral part of the structure of the Hamas Movement ('Who we are', n.d.).

In 2014 Hamas was estimated to have around 20 000 fighters plus another 20 000 police and security forces personnel (Saleh, 2014). The Hamas-controlled Ministry of Finance in Gaza revealed in May 2014 that some 25 000 Hamas employees in Gaza worked in the security services, the majority of these being members of the Qassam Brigades (Abu Amer, 2014). Despite the lack of clarity over the exact number of fighters, these figures were previously confirmed in December 2012 by Abu Obayda, the Brigades' official spokesperson, adding that the Brigades can actually rely on an even larger number of fighters.

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the Brigades' arsenal and fighting tactics have significantly expanded and evolved. Early attacks by the Qassam Brigades in the late 1980s were limited to stone-throwing, stabbings, and using home-made bombs as well as Molotov cocktails. Later, the Qassam Brigades also introduced ambushes that included the planting of bombs and the use of assault rifles. In most cases, the Qassam Brigades targeted the Israeli military

forces present in the occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In 1992, Israel deported 418 Palestinians who Israel identified as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activists to south Lebanon, where the Lebanese Hezbollah was – and still is – very active. Many scholars trace the beginnings of linkages between Hamas and Hezbollah to that time (Horowitz, 2010). One year after the deportation, the Qassam Brigades, as well as the PIJ, launched their first suicide-bombing attack, a well-known tactic of Hezbollah, inside Israeli city centres.

Suicide bombings became the Qassam Brigades' main tactic of attacks until at least 2005. Some months after the Second Palestinian Intifada started in late 2000, various armed Palestinian groups, including Hamas's Qassam Brigades, increased the number of their attacks against Israel. The Qassam Brigades, however, introduced new attack tactics such as rocket and tunnel attacks, both borrowed from Hezbollah. The Qassam Brigades' first rocket attack was launched in 2001, with the necessary weapon parts being transported via the underground tunnels along the borders with Egypt. Early Qassam Brigades rockets caused barely any damage or harm, but the range and precision of these rockets evolved over time and the Qassam Brigades developed great expertise in this field (Elnakhala, 2014). In the last wide-scale military confrontation between Hamas and Israel in the summer of 2014, Hamas's rockets demonstrated a strategic threat when they hit key Israeli city centres, such as Tel Aviv, Ashdod and the outskirts of Jerusalem. While the Qassam Brigades still imports advanced rockets from abroad, most likely from Libya or Iran, it now has the necessary expertise to build its own capable and effective rockets.

In turn, the first tunnel attack by the Qassam Brigades was launched in 2001. These attacks used underground tunnels to cross the borders with Israel and conduct attacks inside Israel. They have generally been very well coordinated, requiring complex operation planning as they also involved various tactics employed simultaneously, including the launching of rockets, armed attacks, and so on. These attacks targeted Israeli military bases just outside of the Gaza Strip, and sometimes involved the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, such as the snatching of an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in June 2006 (Elnakhala, 2014).

RECRUITMENT

The political context is a key determinant in Hamas's ability to attract new recruits, and any breakthroughs in negotiations[11] with Israel were always followed by a decline in Hamas's popularity and commensurately its ability to recruit new members. Alternatively, any failures in the negotiations preceded a significant rise in Hamas's support base and recruitment. This is partly due to the fact that Hamas proposes an alternative strategy – that is, the armed

struggle – to that of the PLO. Hamas's support base extends to include all sections of Palestinian society, including university professors, students, doctors, lawyers, farmers, young and old, men and women (Gleis and Berti, 2012).

During recruitment, Hamas has always emphasised the political circumstances that drive it to use force against the occupying power, Israel, meaning that a significant change in circumstances could potentially result in it relinquishing the armed struggle without affecting its own identity as an Islamist-nationalist organisation (Jefferis, 2016, p. 85). Inside the Palestinian Territories, Hamas has a large base of passive supporters who are neither fighters nor members of Hamas's political structure, but who would nevertheless vote for and support the organisation. Hamas has active members inside the Territories who are affiliated with its military or political wings, and it also has a large number of overseas supporters, both in the Palestinian diaspora and among non-Palestinians. Although the latter group is not composed of members of the organisation, it has an important role in providing legitimacy and funding (Gleis and Berti, 2012).

For Hamas, the media is a key instrument for mobilising the people, and it invests considerably in the 'resistant media', the objectives of which are sometimes perceived as the same as those of the resistance itself: that is, mobilising the masses. The ability of Hamas to sell its ideas about the resistance helps to increase the recruitment of new members and to widen its popular support. From an early stage, the movement relied on simple tools such as leaflets and graffiti murals to mobilise the masses and encourage more recruits, while mosques and educational institutions acted as centres for the dissemination of Hamas's media materials. Today, in addition to these methods, Hamas has its own information centre which keeps the organisation's website and news up to date (Abdelal, 2016, p. 174).

Those recruited usually follow a training programme, and some of them are then transferred to the military wing (Balousha, 2015). Those who show leadership promise are identified at an early age and their indoctrination is developed through peers and mentors. Alternatively, those who are capable of meeting physical and mental challenges are guided towards the appropriate parts of the organisation.

Recruitment Centres

Recruitment for Hamas is usually carried out through its web of social activities, and Hamas uses its charities, mosque classes, *dawa* centres, student unions, sporting clubs, summer camps and other Hamas-run organisations to recruit new members through its preaching department. This applies to recruitment for religious, military or even inactive roles, and Hamas's suicide bombing volunteers have been recruited through similar networks (Gleis

and Berti, 2012; Balousha, 2015). The presence of the Hamas organisation, through its welfare and religious organisations, has provided it with much credibility and this in turn has facilitated its recruitment efforts (Hroub, 2009).

That said, the process of recruitment may take place informally through familial relations or friendships that develop in the context of the above-mentioned institutions. Several Hamas attackers from Hebron in 2003 were actually members of a Hamas-affiliated football team (Regular, 2013). On university campuses, recruitment usually happens through Hamas's affiliate student group, al-Kutla al-Islamiya, or the Islamic Bloc (Bajes, 2012). The recruitment usually includes a period of indoctrination, covering historic education about Palestine and the occupation (Milton-Edwards and Farrel, 2010).

After the crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank by both the Fatah-led PA and Israel, Hamas's military infrastructure in the area was considerably weakened. In March 2017, Israel uncovered information about Hamas's attempts at contacting West Bank Palestinians who had left Palestine to study in Egypt. Mohammad Nazzal, a Palestinian student who was active in this kind of endeavour, admitted to Israeli intelligence that he had also coordinated the visits of new recruits to the Gaza Strip for training purposes, before they returned to the West Bank to conduct attacks against Israel. The goal of this cell was to rebuild Hamas's militant infrastructure in the West Bank (Lappin, 2016; Ahronheim, 2018).

TRAINING

Hamas's training activities take place both inside the besieged Gaza Strip and abroad, and according to some sources Hamas's armed wing offers annual martial arts training programmes to its recruits, held outside of Hamas's military training camps until 2014. This changed after an extended Israeli military campaign, Operation Protective Edge, targeted the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, which led to 50 days of intense fighting between Hamas and Israel.[12] The candidates are usually trained to use weapons, kidnap soldiers and infiltrate into Israel via underground tunnels, through repeated simulation drills and exercises. By graduation, they can climb ropes, conduct close-order drills, fire the Kalashnikov assault rifle, throw a grenade and provide first aid. The young graduates then pledge to defend the Gaza Strip and be ready to fight the next war against the enemy (Booth, 2015; Pileggi, 2015).

Hamas's military training camps were previously run by its political wing, but as of 2015, the Qassam Brigades have been organising camps for boys and young men in January and August, dubbed the 'Vanguards of the Liberation Camps' (Balousha, 2015). The summer session also includes sports, religious instruction and leisure time at the beach. Winter camps are more serious affairs and more martial by nature, with the trainers being actual Qassam commanders

who wear military uniforms. Hamas views these camps as instruments to boost the Palestinian resistance and to absorb the frustrations of Gaza's unemployed youth. Although Qassam officers deny that the camps are organised to supply recruits for the militia, candidates for the armed wing are chosen from the ranks of attendees. Some view these attempts as a necessary process for Hamas to maintain its fighting strength, while Israeli intelligence believes that the military wing of Hamas should not have any trouble in recruiting more troops (Booth, 2015).

Hamas operatives also receive training abroad, mostly provided by Hezbollah and Iran, although this is reserved for high-level operatives. Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have all provided significant military resources, logistical support and training to Hamas in the past few decades. Even during the imposition of a tight siege on the Gaza Strip, Hamas members still received military training abroad, by crossing the borders with Egypt through underground tunnels. Other training was achieved by bringing Hezbollah and Iranian experts into Gaza, also through the tunnels (Rabinovich, 2007; Elnakhala, 2014). There is little information about the detailed nature of this external training for Hamas operatives, but such training usually involves senior Qassam Brigades' fighters and it provides skills and knowledge about operational planning and the manufacturing of rockets and other weapons. For instance, between 2008 and 2014, hundreds of young Palestinians, mostly Hamas operatives, left the Gaza Strip and received training in Lebanon, Syria and Iran to learn how to improve their respective groups' arsenals ('Here's How Hamas …', 2014).[13] In Gaza, Hamas learned how to make rockets and even imported advanced rockets into Gaza, from Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, again via the tunnels (Elnakhala, 2014), and some argue that the imposition of the Gaza siege in 2007 positioned Hamas even closer to Iran and its allies (Roy, 2011).

Many scholars trace the beginnings of linkages between Hezbollah and the Palestinian armed groups, particularly Hamas, to the early 1990s when Israel deported 418 Hamas and PIJ activists to southern Lebanon (Horowitz, 2010, p. 37). An unintended consequence of these deportations was the fact that Hamas was more easily able to establish direct links with Hezbollah and to obtain training in attack tactics, especially the use of suicide bombings, tunnel operations and the launching of rockets (Elnakhala, 2014). Iran is known to be another source for Hamas's foreign training, and according to Egyptian intelligence, Iran trained as many as 3000 Hamas militants between 1991 and 1993, which was followed by a series of Hamas suicide bombings (Schanzer, 2008, p. 41).

FINANCING

Hamas relies on a variety of sources to cover its administrative and military costs. First, Hamas receives financial and other support from counties such as Iran. Second, it receives donations from individuals and organisations in various countries outside of Palestine or Israel, in the form of charity or donations. Third, it organises fundraising activities abroad ('Terrorist organizations', 2008). Fourth, Hamas has also developed its own income-generating schemes, such as the tax collected from the underground tunnels along the Rafah border (Reed, 2013). Finally, Hamas collects taxes from the residents of the Gaza Strip (Abu Amer, 2016). Hamas government's 2014 budget was $894 million and covered four types of expenses: salaries and wages, $509 million; operating expenses, $114 million; transferable expenses, $111 million; and capital expenses, $160 million. The security and public order sector was allocated $261 million (34 per cent) of the 2014 budget.[14] Under this budget line, the Hamas government included the traditional sectors of security, police, national security, the Ministry of Local Government, the Land Authority and the religious judiciary (Shaban, 2014). Today, Hamas's financial structure and procurement strategy are based on state sponsorship and third-party donations, in addition to self-funding (Gleis and Berti, 2012).

Charities

With its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas collects zakat, or Islamic charity, to carry out its missions and goals. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and as a result, private and public funding of religious charitable organisation has been always strong in Muslim societies. In this respect, Hamas has developed an effective, local and global network of charitable organisations that finance its extensive welfare programmes. Hamas-affiliated charities do not officially fund the group's armed wing, however, as this is mostly done either by Iran or through the Political Bureau. Hamas claims to separate its armed wing from its social welfare activities, in an attempt to facilitate fundraising for its social activities, but the line between the two is blurred, especially given that several of its social networks are used for recruitment (Gleis and Berti, 2012).

Several Hamas charities are particularly active in countries where Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation. Some of these charities have been designated as 'terrorist entities' after being exposed by the local authorities, such as the Canadian charity International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy in Ottawa, and the Holy Land Foundation in the United States of America (USA) (Hroub, 2009; Baynes, 2011; Ward, 2014).

Donations

During the Second Palestinian Intifada, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and other countries collected and funnelled millions of dollars to Hamas and other Palestinian militant organisations for what are known as 'martyr payments' in the early 2000s ('Saudi Committee …', n.d.). In the past few years, Hamas has been accused of diverting international humanitarian aid that was destined for the Gaza Strip, to fund the group's military programme. For example, in May 2015, it was revealed that the Khan Younis-based Mahdiya Developmental Society was involved in selling donated medications with a value of $3 million. In another incident from June of the same year, the head of World Vision in Gaza, Mohammad El-Halabi, was detained by the Israeli authorities due to allegations that he had steered donations to Hamas[15] (Beaumont, 2016).

Gaza Tunnels

The network of tunnels under the Rafah border, linking Egypt with the Gaza Strip, was first built to connect separated families in the early 1980s. Almost immediately, involved clans started to use their tunnels to transport illegal commodities. When the Second Palestinian Intifada broke out in late 2000, Hamas began to cooperate with tunnel gangs to import military equipment and knowledge. With the further development of tunnels in the 2000s, Hamas imposed taxes on smuggled goods (Elnakhala, 2014), and as this was a lucrative business in itself, Hamas started to fund its own tunnel construction programme and to raise funds. The number of tunnels reportedly grew from a few dozen in 2005, with an annual revenue of $30 million per year, to at least 500 by December 2008, with a revenue of around $400 million per year (Pelham, 2012, p. 10). While there have been several attempts by Egypt and Israel to shut down the tunnels (Laub and Brazak, 2014), there is no indication that they ever completely close.

Friendly Governments

Iran has supplied Hamas with hundreds of millions of dollars, and Iranian support for the group continued through the 2000s in the form of military assistance. After Hamas's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Iran provided Hamas an estimated €15–17 million a month for governing costs. This aid shrank after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, however, as Iran sided with the Assad regime while Hamas backed Syrian rebels. Ghazi Hamad, Hamas's Deputy Foreign Minister, remarked: 'I cannot deny that since 2006 Iran supported Hamas with money and many [other] things. But the situation is not like the past. I cannot say that everything is normal' (Tait,

2013). After several years of disengagement, relations between the two parties seem to be revived. In addition to increased isolation, regional developments in the past few years have made it very difficult for Hamas to sustain a steady flow of funds (Abu Amer, 2018). In 2019, Iran backed Hamas by providing aid to 1700 Palestinian families who had stopped receiving salaries from the PA. Iran also has recently built homes for Palestinians, and distributed Iftar meals during Ramadan (Abu Amer, 2019a; Sadeghi, 2019).

Qatar has also invested heavily in the Gazan economy, launching a $254 million plan to modernise Gaza in October 2012, after an Israeli military operation in Gaza, and subsequently increasing its investment to $400 million ('Qatar funds major project …', 2012; 'Qatar ups Gaza investment …', 2012). When Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement in April 2014, the Fatah-led PA refused to pay the salaries of Hamas civil servants in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Qatar stepped in and attempted to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas through the Arab Bank to pay the salaries of 44 000 employees, but the United States reportedly blocked the transfer (Miller, 2014). In his first visit to Qatar as head of Hamas's political bureau, Haniya was received by the Emir of Qatar who emphasised his country's support for the Palestinian steadfastness and legitimate rights ('Qatar's emir meets Hamas leader …', 2019).

Hamas also receives support from other countries[16] such as Turkey, which reportedly planned to donate $300 million to Gaza's Hamas government in 2011, while other reports indicate that this amount became an annual donation to Hamas (Bannoura, 2011; Bar'el, 2012). More recently Hamas has been trying to improve its ties with Russia, and Hamas representatives met with Russian officials a number of times in 2019, both in Moscow and elsewhere. Some observers explain this recent rapprochement as Hamas's wish to break free from the isolation imposed upon it by the USA and Israel. These attempts coincided with the USA's so-called 'deal of the century' which was not welcomed by Hamas or the Russians or the Palestinians. While Russia has a veto power at the United Nations, it also has ties with Israel, the PA and Egypt, three central actors in relation to Hamas. Consequently, Russia could play a key role for Hamas, partly by opposing President Trump's 'deal of the century', and also by resolving issues between the PA and Egypt (Abu Amer, 2019b).

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Social Welfare

From the outset, Hamas had a social welfare programme which it built using a network of social, educational, health, charitable and religious institutions, that helped the Palestinian poor. The organisation's social work is known to be

the core of its strategic strength, and the role of Hamas in such a network was directly experienced personally by a great number of Palestinians. As late as 2009, Hroub (2009) concluded that Hamas had managed to maintain what he considered a sound level of honesty and transparency in its welfare activities, something that stood in contrast to the visible corruption of other factions at that time, and it is unsurprising that this quickly widened Hamas's support base inside and outside Palestine, and paved the way for its political victories in 2005 and 2006.

The Armed Struggle

Hamas adopted a strategy that it calls the armed resistance to the Israeli occupation, and the persistence of its central goal, the liberation of Palestine and fighting Israel as an occupying power, means that Hamas always has a motivation to attack Israel. Hamas makes deliberate choices about what tactics to use for its attacks, designed to ensure that in the long run they will help it to achieve this overarching goal (Dutter and Seliktar, 2007, p. 431; Kydd and Walter, 2002). The Qassam Brigades lead this armed fight against Israel, and a number of factors, including available resources and specialist skills, are central to determining the organisation's selected tactics. Those tactics have evolved over time, with Hamas viewing the evolution of them as a natural development, due to the organisation being in a state of conflict with Israel. Hamas contends that after Israel's tightening of its grip on the Gaza Strip, particularly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in late 2000, Palestinian militants lost access to many of their military raw materials and thus they resorted to alternative methods. The late Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi said in this context, 'we are in a struggle against a superior enemy, with its advanced military technology. Consequently, we try to develop our weapons to be able to encounter this enemy as much as we could' ('The qualitative development …', 2003).

   In the First Intifada, Hamas operatives participated in stone-throwing, as well as ambushing Israeli forces. After establishing direct links with the Lebanese Hezbollah in early 1990s, Hamas employed suicide bombing in Israeli city centres. Following the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada, Hamas introduced rocket attacks. From 2005 onwards, rocket attacks had become Hamas's main attack tactic, in conjunction with a lesser number of tunnel attacks. These rockets initially targeted Israeli settlements inside the Gaza Strip, then Israeli towns outside of the Strip. They had very limited range and accuracy. The rockets then witnessed significant technical improvement. In 2014, Hamas rockets landed in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Ashkelon. In addition to the rockets, Hamas introduced tunnel operations in the mid-2000s, which tended to be well planned and highly coordinated and were frequently

employed to attack Israeli military bases outside of the Gaza Strip ('The qualitative development …', 2003; Najjar, 2014).

The number and nature of Hamas's attacks have varied, depending on the political situation as well as the group's military capabilities. Usually periods of tensions, such as the Intifadas and the Israeli incursions inside the Palestinian Territories, are associated with a higher number of Palestinian attacks against Israel in general, and Hamas attacks in particular. For example, between the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and March 2002, 317 attacks were launched against Israel from the West Bank alone, about 19.6 per cent (62) of which were suicide bombings, 4.7 per cent (15) were rocket attacks, and 75.7 per cent (240) were settlement and roadside attacks (Elnakhala, 2014).

The list of Hamas's military operations is extremely long, but the following examples provide a flavour of some of Hamas's most devastating attacks. On 27 March 2002, Abdel Basit Odeh from Tulkarm, a refugee from a village called Kharbash and a member of Hamas, arrived at the city of Natanya. Soon after, he changed into women's clothes and donned a wig before heading to the Park Hotel. His 10 kg belt-bomb was filled with nails, screws and ball bearings to inflict maximum damage in a confined space. As he mingled with the crowd of about 200 people in the hotel who were celebrating the Jewish Seder feast, he threw several grenades before detonating his belt-bomb, killing 30 and wounding 172 civilian Israelis (Elnakhala, 2014). Two days after this attack, Israel announced a wide ground military operation inside Palestinian city centres in the West Bank.

On 25 June 2006, in an operation reminiscent of Hezbollah's sophisticated kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers in 2000, eight Gaza gunmen dressed in Israeli army uniforms emerged at dawn from a tunnel underneath the Gaza–Israel borders and entered an Israeli military base near Kerem Shalom border crossing outside of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, rockets fired from Gaza showered the border area, to distract the Israeli border guards located in different areas. As the eight militants entered the base, they split into three assault groups. They simultaneously opened fire in different areas of the base, using hand grenades, automatic assault rifles and a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The armed attackers made their way back into the Gaza Strip after they blew an opening in the fence, and disappeared through the tunnels. Two Israeli soldiers were killed, four were injured and one was kidnapped, subsequently identified as Corporal Gilad Shalit. The tunnel used by the attackers was around 1 km long and took approximately two months for the attackers to dig. The Qassam Brigades collaborated with other military groups, including the Palestinian Resistance Committee and the Army of Islam (Elnakhala, 2014).

Generally speaking, rocket attacks are less lethal than suicide bombings, although the lethality (as well as the range and precision) of Hamas's rockets

increased over time. None of Hamas's rockets fired between 2001 and 2003 caused any deaths or injuries. Between 2005 and 2013, Palestinian rockets fired outside of major escalations[17] caused 600 Israeli causalities (that is, deaths and injuries). According to official reports, five Israelis were killed and 232 wounded by rocket-fire (by Hamas and other groups) in 2012 alone. The same year, there were 3921 insurance claims for rocket damage totalling $14.81 million (Armstrong, 2018, pp. 116–117). Hamas's rockets have become a strategic threat to Israel, mainly due to their increased range and precision rather than their lethality. To give a specific example, on 25 March 2019, a Hamas rocket landed in an Israeli house in the village of Mishmeret, about 25 km north of Tel Aviv. The attack wounded seven Israelis, including an elderly woman and three children. According to Israeli official sources, the rocket had a range of about 120 km and was locally manufactured in the Gaza Strip (Liebermann et al., 2019). On 6 May 2019, another Hamas rocket hit a car in Ashdod, killing a 21-year-old man and wounding seven others ('Hamas rocket hits car …', 2019).

Hamas has also introduced other tactics, such as the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, viewed by the Qassam Brigades as one of the most successful tactics because it has helped Hamas to garner several victories. As an example, Hamas exchanged one captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, for the release of around 1000 Palestinian prisoners in 2011, in a swap mediated by the Egyptians and the Germans. Today, four Israeli soldiers are believed to remain in captivity under the Qassam Brigades. More recently, Hamas has developed its own drones, although these have so far only been used for intelligence collection missions, not for conducting offensive attacks against Israel ('Izz Addin al-Qassam …', 2014; Najjar, 2014; Habeeb, 2016).

The Hamas website posits that every time Israel tightens its grip by intensifying its punishment policies and policing strategies, Hamas fighters will consistently look for alternatives to continue attacking. Rocket attacks, Hamas freely admits, were an innovation that was caused by the Israeli high-tech fence around the Strip. Additionally, with the Israeli fence and the tight closure which it imposed on the Gaza Strip, Hamas and other militant groups resorted to smuggling weapons and military materials through the tunnels underneath the border with Egypt ('The qualitative development …', 2003; Burgess and Yourish, 2014; Najjar, 2014).

Although Hamas and other Palestinian factions have adopted militancy or the armed struggle as their main tactic in dealing with Israel, several non-violent strategies have also been employed by these groups. During the recent Great March of Return, for example, non-violent popular protests along the borders with Israel were organised by Palestinians demanding the return of the refugees displaced by the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Hamas participated in the Coordination Committee of the Great Return March along

with other Palestinian factions. The March itself started on 30 March 2018, a date which marks Palestinian Land Day (Blend, 2019), and the protests continued until the outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020. According to several sources, Hamas was also a key player in scaling back those Marches towards the end of 2019, with claims that this scaling-back was done to fulfil a promise to Israel, as part of a truce between the two sides. As of January 2020, these Marches are to be held once a month instead of every Friday. These developments are, in fact, outcomes of Egyptian, Qatari and American mediation between Hamas and Israel ('Organisers say Gaza protests to be scaled back', 2019).

Governing

Despite its objection to the Oslo Accords that gave birth to the Palestinian Authority, Hamas has developed another strategy, one that required participation in the Palestinian political process and resulted in it gaining control of institutions built by the Accords. Within around 20 years of its establishment, Hamas had achieved major victories at local elections, for example, student unions, municipality elections, and others. Hamas decided to participate in the broader political spectrum in 2006, when it took part in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. Since winning the majority of seats, Hamas has become increasingly politicised, at the expense of its famed militarism. The organisation has continued to sell itself as an Islamist movement, however, engaged in a liberation struggle against a foreign occupier, focusing its goals and activities within the borders of historic Palestine (Hroub, 2009).

CONCLUSION

Hamas is certainly different from international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (IS). Hamas perceives Israel as a foreign occupier, to be resisted by all means, including military force, but Hamas clearly limits its political and military goals within the borders of historic Palestine. The group's strategy and tactics target three types of audience: Palestinian society, Israel, and the Arab and international communities. Hamas governs the Gaza Strip and the wider Palestinian society is a recipient of its social welfare services. The Arab and international communities are important for Hamas for a number of reasons. Hamas is desirous of being recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, or at the very least, not being considered as a terrorist organisation. The Arab and international communities have also traditionally been potential sources of funds, from donations, international aid or charity work.

In Hamas, Palestinians found an alternative to the rather corrupt Fatah. The services provided by Hamas were completely lacking in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and similar services were not provided by the Fatah-controlled PA, which entered the Palestinian Territories in mid-1990s. Fatah institutions were much more corrupt than those of Hamas, yet some claim that Hamas's services are merely a veil that covers the funding of its military operations (Pham, 2014). Regardless of the reasons behind the establishing of such a network, these services have definitely contributed to Hamas gaining legitimacy and popular support amongst the Palestinians (Roy, 2011).

The 2006 parliamentary elections presented Hamas as a potential legitimate, democratically elected government (Davidson, 2006). Many external factors intervened, due to the group being listed as a terrorist organisation by several international actors, resulting in the boycotting of Hamas and the imposing of a siege on the Gaza Strip, particularly after the Hamas takeover in 2007. It is impossible to guess how Hamas might have performed after winning the elections had the group been recognised internationally. Hamas's rule over the Gaza Strip is now more than a decade old and various sources posit that this rule has become increasingly corrupt and oppressive. This makes the situation verge on the catastrophic when one considers other factors, for example, lack of power supplies, pollution, high unemployment rates and completely absent freedom of movement ('Hamas marks ten years …', 2017), and as a result, Hamas's popularity has waned.

With the deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip, Hamas announced its willingness to cooperate with, and concede some authority to, the internationally recognised Fatah-led PA. A national consensus government was formed in 2014 in an attempt to achieve reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. In October 2017, a national reconciliation agreement was signed between the two sides that would achieve power-sharing, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The road to achieving real reconciliation has proved bumpy, to say the least, with various tensions arising on many key issues such as budgeting, salary payments, control over the borders funnelling foreign funds to the Gaza Strip, relations with Israel, and so on. While the reconciliation agreement is still alive at the time of writing (2020), it is largely fragile (Abu Amer, 2017; Friedman, 2019). In an attempt to ease the Gaza siege, Hamas handed control of the Gaza crossings to the Fatah-controlled PA in fulfilment of its commitments under a reconciliation agreement brokered by Egypt in October 2017 (Beaumont, 2017b).

This raises the question, then, of whether Hamas in the Gaza Strip operates as a state or as a political organisation. Although Hamas has maintained the same relations and structure as an organisation that it had before entering the Palestinian political process in 2006, the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip has the structure of a state. When Hamas took over control of the Gaza Strip, it

also took over the PA ministries that were set up to administer daily life and to provide a variety of services, such as health and education. In the end, Hamas has achieved its ruling over a specific plot of land and over a population, which constitute some of the basic features of a state. As described above, however, this quasi-state lacks international recognition, particularly by the US and other important actors, but perhaps most importantly, it has failed to fulfil its duties towards the population it governs.

NOTES

1. Following the end of World War I, the League of Nations granted the Mandate for Palestine to the United Kingdom in 1920 after the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. The British Mandate for Palestine (and Transjordan) expired in 1948, on the day the State of Israel was created.
2. These camps, established about seven decades ago, still exist today, populated by the original refugees and their descendents (Nakhala, 2012, p. 5).
3. The Gaza Strip was under Egyptian rule from 1948 to 1967. The West Bank, on the other hand, was governed by Jordan.
4. Other Palestinian local groups were formed before, but they were less organised and coordinated than the fedayeen and similar groups. For instance, in the context of the Palestinian-Arab revolt of the 1930s, launched against the British and their support for the Jewish immigration to Palestine and Jewish land purchases, local armed groups proliferated and attacked Jewish settlements and interests. These groups were primarily men who owned rifles but had no military training (Pappé, 2006).
5. An umbrella organisation which centralised the Palestinian resistance groups. The PLO was established in 1964 but was recognised internationally as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO was engaged in a protracted guerrilla war against Israel until signing a peace agreement with Israel in the early 1990s.
6. The 1967 war – also known as the Six-Day War – was the second military confrontation between the Arab States and Israel after the 1948 war which also witnessed the establishment of the State of Israel. In 1967, the Arabs lost the war and Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
7. While Hamas's 1988 Charter clearly indicates that the organisation's fight is against the Jews, the new document specifies that the struggle is directed against Israel and the Zionist movement behind it.
8. Some trace Hamas's educational and charity organisations to the 1960s, despite the fact that the organisation was not in existence at the time (Dalloul, 2019).
9. Shura here means 'advisory'.
10. Mashaal was a target of a failed assassination attempt in 1997 by Mossad, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency.
11. Fatah, Hamas's rival, has represented the Palestinian side in the negotiations with Israel.
12. This violence started after three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and killed by Hamas members (Crowcroft, 2014), after the killing of two Palestinian teens by the Israeli military in May 2014 (Hasan, 2018). Ostensibly aimed at locating and rescuing the teenagers, Israel launched Operation Brother's Keeper (Bellal, 2014,

pp. 46–47) and Hamas retaliated by firing rockets, after which the violence greatly increased.

13. It is noteworthy that Hamas's relations with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah waned after taking a position against the Assad regime in Syria in 2011 and siding with the rebels. As indicated elsewhere in this chapter, relations between Hamas and Iran have started to warm up again in the past few years.

14. Since 2014, Hamas's government budget in the Gaza Strip has become less independent as it was integrated with that of the West Bank-based PA, headed by Fatah. In fact, the budget was repeatedly a subject of debate between Hamas and Fatah since general government budget is decided in the West Bank. For instance, in 2018, the Palestinian cabinet in the West Bank approved a budget of $5 billion that would increase to $5.8 billion if unification with the Gaza Strip worked as planned ('Cabinet approves …', 2018). Until today, fulfilment of unification is riddled with conflicts between the two sides on various issues, including the budget.

15. El-Halabi is still in Israeli custody, although the court proceedings are ongoing. The Australian government, the main contributor to the concerned funds, investigated the case and so did World Vision, concluding that the Israeli allegations had no concrete evidence (Holmes, 2019).

16. Previously, Hamas received support from the Saudis, yet the latter significantly changed their position over time regarding Hamas and the Palestinian cause at large. At the time of writing, 68 Palestinians in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were being tried at the Saudi terrorism court, simply for having ties to Hamas ('Saudi Arabia tries Palestinians …', 2020).

17. In other words, these numbers do not include rockets fired between 27 December 2018 and 18 January 2019, 14 and 21 November 2012, and 8 July and 26 August 2014.

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5. Lashkar-e-Taiba

Anthony Davis

INTRODUCTION

Much as al-Qaeda is instantly associated in the public mind with the falling towers of the World Trade Center and the 9/11 attacks on the United States (US), so Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is all but synonymous with Mumbai and the three-day terrorist rampage by its gunmen through India's commercial capital. The global notoriety that Lashkar or LeT achieved in November 2008 with attacks that left 166 dead and nearly twice that number wounded made it arguably South Asia's best-known terrorist organisation. Among transnational jihadist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba or Army of the Pure[1] is a complex entity. Many of its operations, not least the Mumbai outrage, define it as a group in unambiguous pursuit of a terrorist agenda targeted against Hindus, Jews and Americans with an eye to a worldwide audience. Not for nothing do Indians refer to the Mumbai massacre as 26/11, their nation's equivalent of al-Qaeda's made-for-global-TV 9/11 attacks on the US.

At the same time, any dispassionate assessment of Lashkar needs to recognise that mass casualty terrorism is only one face of a Janus-like identity. Other equally important facets – military, political, social and ideological – coalesce to form a complex entity that defies the simple, if satisfying, categorisation of the group as a terrorist organisation. In addition to a proclivity for high-profile terrorism, Lashkar has from its earliest beginnings organised and trained as a military force. Its fighters have conducted operations mainly in Afghanistan and the state of Jammu and Kashmir disputed between India and Pakistan, but have also ranged as far as Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. But while the battlefield reputation of its military wing has owed much to its own process of recruitment and training, Lashkar has also depended for much of its capability on its umbilical relationship with the Pakistan Army and more specifically the military's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).[2]

In this context Lashkar has been willing to subordinate itself to the interests of the Pakistani state and to serve as a proxy force in the military's pursuit of the nation's perceived security objectives. For much of its existence Lashkar has fought as the tip of the Pakistani spear in the 30-year-long insurgency in

Kashmir, benefiting from equipment and training provided by the ISI and willing to adapt its operational tempo to ISI calibration. In return it has benefited in Pakistan from the diplomatic and political 'top cover' extended by the military. At the same time, Lashkar has come to serve as a military reserve force able to call on a cadre of trained combatants that can almost certainly be numbered in the thousands. In 1999, skilled Lashkar fighters played a major role in protracted conventional engagements between Pakistan and India in the mountainous Kargil sector of the Line of Control.

Given Lashkar's salience as a military and terrorist force, it is easy to overlook the proselytising role of its politico-religious wing, the Markaz-e-Dawa w'al Irshad (MDI), later re-branded the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). An avowedly Salafist organisation that promotes the teachings of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Sunni Islam,[3] MDI/JuD has developed an extensive national network of offices, mosques, madrassahs and schools that has actively prosecuted the group's missionary and proselytising work. On a jihadist field dominated by groups of the revivalist Deobandi school,[4] Lashkar, far more than any other Pakistani militant group, has focused significant resources on *dawa* or preaching through outreach activities inside Pakistan. The scope and impact of a social welfare network that embraces education, health and humanitarian assistance has made of MDI/JuD a virtual state within a state – albeit one that functions at the pleasure of the military. Finally, Lashkar – or more specifically MDI/JuD – has attempted to parlay social and religious influence into party politics with the establishment in 2017 of the Milli Muslim League (MML). The party has not fared well at the ballot box, but the foray into electoral politics has served to underscore an attempt to adapt to a shifting and clearly less favourable environment than that of the 1990s and 2000s.

More broadly, though, Lashkar's history is best viewed as a careful balancing of two core missions. First has been a commitment to a concept of a globalised jihad aimed at least notionally at the reinstitution of the Islamic Caliphate. In practical terms, that objective is seen as best advanced from the sanctuary of Pakistan through the Indian Subcontinent. To this extent, Lashkar's mission has overlapped comfortably with the strategic imperatives of the Pakistani military which demand the de-stabilisation of India and an overturning of the status quo in Kashmir. Lashkar's second mission has been *dawa*, the reformist missionary drive to propagate Ahl-e-Hadith Salafism through proselytising and social welfare outreach within Pakistan and beyond. Lashkar's foundational view of the symbiotic relationship between jihad and *dawa* was perhaps best articulated by its founder and ideological leader Hafiz Mohammad Sa'eed writing in one of the group's publications, *Takbeer*, in 1999:

> Islam propounds both 'dawa' and jihad. Both are equally important and inseparable. Since our life revolves around Islam therefore both 'dawa' and jihad are essential,

> we cannot prefer one over the other ... the need is to fuse the two together. This is the only way to bring about change among individuals, society and the world. (Tankel, 2011, p. 38)

As a non-state actor with a multifaceted identity that has sought to blend social welfare and terrorism, missionary outreach and guerrilla warfare, religion and politics, Lashkar is unusual but not entirely unique. Notwithstanding the obvious sectarian difference across the Sunni–Shia divide, the Pakistani movement bears significant similarities with Lebanese Hezbollah. Both groups are typically categorised by many states as terrorist organisations, and both have a history replete with undeniably terrorist attacks on civilian targets across the regions in which they operate: Lashkar in Kashmir and India more widely, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Argentina, Bulgaria and well beyond. At the same time, both groups have grown to develop significant military forces deploying both guerrilla and unconventional capabilities.

Both groups have also acted as a proxy forces enjoying substantial state backing in wider regional conflicts and benefiting from access to funding, training and equipment that has been fundamental to their emergence and growth. And finally, both have sought to establish a parliamentary political role in their home countries, even if Lashkar's inglorious foray into Pakistan's electoral arena can hardly compare with Hezbollah's striking success as a representative of Lebanon's once downtrodden Shia community. For both organisations, however, balancing the aspirations of revolutionary jihadism and the constraints imposed by the role of both state proxy and domestic socio-political actor has been a perennial source of tension.

AFGHAN GENESIS

Like most jihadist groups in Pakistan and the Asian region more widely, Lashkar emerged from the conflict that overtook Afghanistan following the communist coup of 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979. The decade-long Afghan war and the jihadist fervour that it inspired exerted a profound influence on the handful of men who were to build Lashkar from a small group of Salafist fighters and ideologues into an organisation with global reach and notoriety. One of them was Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, who as a religiously committed 22-year-old student from Okara district in Punjab province travelled in 1982 to the southeastern Afghan border province of Pakhtia to join anti-communist Afghan resistance fighters or mujahideen. Despite his own affiliation with the Salafist Ahl-e-Hadith sect, Lakhvi joined and fought with a group from the far larger Deobandi school dominant along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, until in 1984 he broke away to set up his own Ahl-e-Hadith faction.

Independently of Lakhvi's jihadist activities, in 1985 two teachers of Islamic Studies at the Lahore University of Engineering and Technology, Hafez Mohammad Sa'eed and Zafar Iqbal, founded their own Ahl-e-Hadith group, the Jama'at-ud-Dawa (Association for Preaching). Sa'eed was born in 1950 in the Sargodha district of Pakistani Punjab three years after his family had migrated from India in the partition of the Subcontinent. In the savage communal violence that accompanied the movement of millions across the new border, 36 of his relatives were killed, a trauma that undoubtedly influenced his childhood development (*Times of India*, 2012). As a young man, Sa'eed was first associated with the Pakistan's main Islamist party, the Jama'at-e-Islami, and joined its student wing. In the early 1980s he furthered his studies at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, where he was influenced by Salafist thought and forged links with Saudi clerics already involved in the Afghan jihad who inspired him to support the struggle (*Times of India*, 2012).

The following year the two groups – one focused primarily on the military jihad, the other on the need for preaching or *dawa* – joined forces to establish the Markaz ud Dawa w'al Irshad or Center for Preaching and Guidance (MDI). Leadership fell to Sa'eed, whose credentials as an Islamic scholar carried greater weight than those of either Lakhvi or Iqbal. The group's headquarters in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar, the organisational hub for the Afghan jihad, provided it with a wide range of contacts with Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Islamists also based there. Not least among them was Abdullah Azzam, the Saudi-trained Palestinian intellectual and writer who more than any other figure was to popularise the ideology of jihad across the Arab world and beyond. An associate of Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam was one of 17 founding members of MDI (Tankel, 2011, p. 21).

In 1987, MDI shifted its focus of military operations and training from Paktia to the eastern Afghan province of Kunar where it set up bases and a training camp under the auspices of an Afghan Salafist commander, Jamil-ur-Rahman. Having earlier owed allegiance to one of the leading Afghan Islamist factions, the Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jamil-ur-Rahman later broke away to establish his own Salafist group, the Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran w'al Sunna, ruling an enclave in the mountains of Kunar. He was backed by Saudi Wahhabi clerics, private Saudi funding and, before long, an influx of Saudi fighters. Supported by Jamil-ur-Rahman, MDI fitted well into this milieu of doctrinaire, Arab-influenced Salafist purism from which bin Laden's al-Qaeda was to emerge in 1988.

Soviet forces finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, but the jihad against the communist government of President Najibullah, still ensconced in Kabul, continued apace. In 1990, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Army of the Pure, was formally founded as the military wing of MDI. The same year also saw

a rising wave of unrest in Kashmir, disputed since 1947 between India and Pakistan, spill over into full-scale insurgency. And it was in Kashmir rather than Afghanistan where Lashkar was soon to forge a reputation as a leading jihadist force.

IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXION

From the time of its founding, both MDI's Ahl-e-Hadith beliefs and its chosen area of operations among the Salafis of the remote mountains of eastern Kunar set the organisation apart from the Sunni jihadist mainstream on both sides of the Afghan–Pakistan border. Meaning 'People of the Traditions of the Prophet', the Ahl-e-Hadith school originated as a distinct movement in 1870s in British-ruled India but traced its roots back to the revivalist teachings of the Delhi-based Islamic scholar Shah Waliullah (1703–1762). A South Asian variant of Salafi revivalism that upholds the Quran and Hadith as the only legitimate legal sources in Islam, the Ahl-e-Hadith sect rejects the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence – Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i and Maliki – as tantamount to a worship of their various founders and to be eschewed.

Within the context of 19th century India, the Ahl-e-Hadith existed as a small exclusivist sub-set of Sunni Islam, with its own distinctive prayer rituals and set apart from the far larger Deobandi school of Islamic reformism that emerged in 1867 from the madrassah in Deoband, north of Delhi. While the group developed links with the Wahhabi *ulama* in Arabia, they remained loyal to the British Raj and were viewed by the colonial authorities as essentially apolitical and quietist (Tankel, 2011, p. 27). In the context of the new state of Pakistan, the Ahl-e-Hadith remained a tiny minority. The overwhelming majority of Pakistani Sunnis – as many as 80 per cent – adhere to the Barelvi school of syncretic Islam that has blended the Muslim faith with various pre-Islamic traditions; and which in party political terms has mainly been represented by the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan (JUP). Meanwhile a large minority of Sunnis are Deobandi, concentrated mainly in the North-West Frontier Province (since 2010, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan, and represented politically by the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) party.

Even within the small Ahl-e-Hadith minority, the Lashkar and MDI/JuD movement stands as a minority itself. Most followers of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect in Pakistan are members of the Markaz-e-Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, which holds that jihad is collective responsibility. In significant contrast, MDI/JuD and its leaders have propagated the idea that the pursuit of jihad is an individual responsibility incumbent on every Muslim. Notionally at least, the obligation to jihad is viewed by the movement as a global mission on behalf of a united Muslim *ummah*, and to that extent Lashkar has been strongly influenced by the teachings of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. As Sa'eed wrote in 2000,

'The jihadic caravan that emerged from Afghanistan has spread throughout the globe. Mujahideen have no nationality: they are recognized and identified through Islam.'[5]

More immediately, however, Lashkar's jihad has been founded on the notion of Pakistan as a sanctuary, a primary focus for *dawa* and a springboard for military jihad. In sharp distinction to Deobandi jihadist factions which in 2007 finally coalesced under the umbrella of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement) and turned against the Pakistani state in a campaign of sweeping violence, Lashkar has remained throughout a loyal servant of the state and the military. From the group's ideological perspective, the rulers of Pakistan at least professed belief in Islam, whatever their perceived religious shortcomings. Again, as Sa'eed himself put it: 'We do not believe in revolutionary change in Pakistan; rather we want a gradual reform through "dawa"' (Tankel, 2011, p. 43).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

For most of its existence, Lashkar's civilian wing, MDI/JuD has been head-quartered at the village of Muridke some 20 kilometres outside Lahore.[6] Seed money for the Muridke complex is generally understood to have come from its Saudi benefactors. One was Abdur Rahman Surayhi, an associate of Osama bin Laden, who became the father-in-law of Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, and assisted Lakhvi in setting up training camps in Afghanistan. Another important benefactor was Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq (aka Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz), who was to become a central figure in the financial affairs of the expanding MDI/JuD–Lashkar organisation. Muridke was designed and built to create a truly Islamic society in microcosm. It comprises offices, schools, shops, a madrassah, a hospital, residential quarters and farmland. The complex also hosts an annual convention or *ijtema* of Lashkar faithful and sympathisers from across Pakistan and indeed the world. By the turn of the century the *ijtema* at Muridke was drawing a congregation which over a week numbered several hundred thousand people.

By this period the movement had extended its reach and recruitment across Pakistan with a network of close to 2500 offices and recruitment points (John, 2011, p. 5). This organisational structure rests on a system of departments which answer to a central leadership council or *shura*, headed by emir Hafez Mohammad Sa'eed. These include importantly departments for political affairs, *dawa*, education, finance, and media and propagation. There is also a large social welfare department, the Idarah-e-Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK); a publishing wing, the Dar al-Andalus; and an external affairs department which deals with the movement's relations with jihadi groups and LeT assets beyond Pakistan. MDI/JuD also runs wings focusing on targeted outreach to

specific social groups. The most important of these are arguably the women's wing (Shoba-e-Khawateen), viewed by Sa'eed as crucial to instilling a culture of jihadist sacrifice in growing children, and the student wing (Tulaba Jama'at-ud-Dawa). But the movement also runs wings for teachers, doctors, farmers and workers.

At the centre of this far-reaching network, the core leadership of MDI/JuD remains a decidedly family affair. Sa'eed's deputy emir has long been his brother-in-law and cousin Abdur Rahman Makki, while his son Talha Sa'eed, son-in-law Hafiz Khalid Waleed and nephew Javaid Naved all occupy senior positions with direct access to the emir. This concentration of power around Sa'eed and his relatives has predictably caused dissension, and in particular tensions between Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi and Sa'eed which at one point risked splitting the entire movement. Tellingly, however, they appear to have been papered over by the intervention of ISI officers (Tankel, 2011, p. 138).

OPERATIONS

Kashmir

As the Afghan war wound down after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Lashkar fighters scattered to various arenas of jihadist endeavour. These included notably Tajikistan, where a civil war raged from 1990 to 1992; and Bosnia, on the doorstep of Europe, where MDI luminary Bahaziq headed an ISI-backed jihadist following (Kiessling, 2016, pp. 125–126).[7] However, it was the insurgency in Kashmir that attracted growing numbers of Lashkar fighters and came to both shape and define the movement as it expanded through the 1990s. While at one level Lashkar espoused a vision of jihad influenced by Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden that was global, more practically its instincts and horizons lay closer to home. A visceral anti-Hindu animus that had much to do with a recruitment base in Punjab and Azad (Free) Kashmir, the Pakistani-administered eastern third of the disputed state, drove a military agenda that was always centred on Kashmir. Rooted in widespread allegations of rigging in the state elections in 1987, unrest in Kashmir escalated in 1988 and 1989 with bombings, strikes and mass protests. By the spring of 1990, turmoil had morphed into fully fledged insurgency led by a local Kashmiri faction, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

A religiously moderate movement with deep roots in the Vale of Kashmir, the JKLF championed independence for the state rather than its accession to Pakistan. And given its popularity, the ISI was prepared to throw its initial support behind it. By 1991, however, the Pakistan military turned to a candidate better suited to Islamabad's own objectives: this was the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), an overtly Islamist group linked to the Kashmiri branch

of Jama'at-i-Islami and committed to accession to Pakistan. With the benefit of ISI backing, HM expanded rapidly even as it shouldered the JKLF violently aside (Davis, 1991). Against this shifting backdrop, the first Lashkar volunteers joined the fight as early as 1990, two years before the fall of the Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul. But it was not until 1993 that Lashkar publicly announced its first operation in Kashmir (Tankel, 2011, p. 58). By that stage in the conflict, local Kashmiri factions including HM were flagging in the face of massive deployments of Indian security forces and aggressive counter-insurgency operations. In order to maintain battlefield pressure ISI began to throw its weight behind tougher, more experienced Pakistan-based jihadist groups including Lashkar and the Deobandi Harakat ul Mujahideen (HuM) whose fighters became known in the Valley as 'guest mujahideen'.

An early assessment of Lashkar by a former Director-General of ISI (DGISI), General Javed Ashraf Qazi, was of a 'very motivated group' (Tankel, 2011, p. 40); and indeed, by 1995 Lashkar had asserted itself as the most effective of the Pakistan-based groups and benefited from a correspondingly high level of ISI support. The years of jihad in Kashmir that followed served to forge a relationship between the jihadis and the ISI in which Lashkar became the Pakistani military's favoured weapon in the covert war with India; or, in the words of one American commentator, 'Pakistan's premier proxy terrorist organization' (Roggio, 2019). It was not only LeT's military skills that recommended the group to ISI: its home base in Pakistan, coupled with its status as a small and politically weak religious entity, suggested that it would be easier to control and calibrate than either a Kashmir-based faction or a Deobandi faction with independent political influence in Pakistan. Courtesy of training and equipment provided by ISI, Lashkar fighters honed a range of military capabilities in Kashmir. Most obviously, small-unit guerrilla tactics against larger, less mobile Indian Army and paramilitary forces became an area in which its fighters excelled. Lashkar also developed a noted expertise in the manufacture and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These skills were used not only in Kashmir but also in the Afghan theatre, to which Lashkar operatives filtered back in the mid-2000s as the tempo of hostilities in Kashmir declined even as the Taliban insurgency against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan escalated (John, 2011, p. xxix).

LeT units also proved their mettle in the Kargil hostilities of May–July 1999 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2018). This conflict unfolded as a largely conventional, if geographically limited, war in which Indian forces made extensive use of artillery and air power as they sought to re-take mountains heights overlooking the road between Kashmir and Ladakh which had been occupied in early spring by the Pakistanis. Lashkar fighters also gave some

cover to Islamabad's official narrative that the heights had been seized not by regular forces but by Kashmiri mujahideen. If there was one tactic that Lashkar can be said to have pioneered in Kashmir, however, it was the use of fedayeen or *fidayi* attacks. These operations involved small groups of trained and highly committed fighters mounting aggressive frontal assaults on Indian military compounds or barracks using automatic rifles and grenades. The assault team, typically consisting of only two or three combatants, would then seize control of all or part of a building and resist attempts to dislodge them for hours at a time.

These 'sacrificial' operations usually ended in the death of the attackers, but that outcome was not necessarily required, and there was no disgrace in escaping to fight another day. Importantly from a theological point of view, the fedayeen attack stood in sharp contrast to the tactic of suicide bombing transported from Iraq and adopted in the early 2000s by Deobandi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Kashmir, and both the Afghan and the Pakistani wings of the Taliban movement. Fedayeen operations were suicidal but not suicide: the perpetrator was never the agent of his own death. The nature of the fedayeen attack was well articulated by deputy emir Abdul Rahman Makki, a leading MDI/JuD ideologue, who defined a *fidayi* attack as:

> attacking the enemy risking one's life, without taking necessary precautions, pouncing upon the enemy in the face of sure death completing one's mission at every cost. If one embraces martyrdom in this course one feels it is a divine mission and if one returns alive successfully one is jubilant over Allah's bounty. (Tankel, 2011, p. 64)

As a military tactic in Kashmir, *fidayi* operations reached their zenith around the turn of the century even as the intensity of the conflict waned. Between 1999 and 2002 there were as many as 55 fedayeen assaults against Indian security force camps and government installations, most of them carried out by Lashkar (Tankel, 2011, p. 55). But, granted trained and motivated combatants and a willingness to die, it was a tactic that travelled all too easily from Kashmir to the streets of Mumbai. It was only a matter of time before the suicide bombers dispatched by Deobandi groups and Islamic State (IS) were trained to adopt fedayeen assault tactics and protracted resistance before detonating their suicide vests. The lethal fusion of the two tactics was to produce horrific results on the streets of Islamabad, Lahore, Kabul and Paris.

Operations Beyond Kashmir

Lashkar's operations beyond Kashmir in 'India proper' can be viewed as falling into two broad categories. The more visible manifestation involved attacks carried out directly by its own cadres on both civilian and military

targets. In this space it was joined by JeM, another terrorist organisation favoured by the ISI. Headed by the Deobandi cleric Massoud Azhar, JeM split from Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in 2000 following Azhar's release from jail in India as the result of the successful hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814. At the same time, Lashkar has also devoted considerable resources to assisting in recruiting, training and providing operational support to indigenous Indian terrorists grouped loosely in the Indian Mujahideen (IM) network. In the early 1990s the recruitment drive in India was led mainly by Mohamad Azam Cheema, a colleague of Hafez Sa'eed at the University of Engineering and Technology who arrived in the country shortly before the destruction of the Babri Mosque by Hindu fanatics in December 1992. The demolition of the mosque and widespread anti-Muslim pogroms that followed marked a crucial watershed in the emergence of home-grown terrorism, driving Indian Islamist activists to join LeT and later in 2008 to establish the IM network. Lashkar provided the ISI with an essential cut-out in efforts to support the wave of terrorist bombings that followed.

In terms of direct action, the confidence and capabilities honed by Lashkar in Kashmir were first demonstrated in 'India proper' in 2000. On 22 December that year, two LeT operatives launched a fedayeen-style assault on the Red Fort in Delhi. Before successfully escaping they killed two soldiers and one civilian guard, but the low casualty toll belied the political significance of the operation, an attack rich in symbolism which struck not only the Indian capital but also a fortress, built by the Moghul Emperor Shah Jahan and viewed as a locus of national power and pride. Lashkar's second major attack beyond Kashmir followed in 2002, after the December 2001 assault by JeM terrorists on the Indian Parliament, which pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out war. Unfolding on 24 and 25 September 2002 and apparently in retaliation for the Gujarat riots earlier in the year in which large numbers of Muslims had been killed, the Lashkar operation struck an unambiguously civilian target, the Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Two LeT operatives armed with assault rifles and grenades executed a massacre that took the lives of 30 worshippers and wounded at least 80 others. The gunmen who had travelled south from Kashmir were finally killed by National Security Guard commandos early on 25 September, 14 hours after the attack began.

In the years that followed, further operations unfolded. On 28 December 2005 an attack on a conference at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore killed one academic and wounded four others before the lone gunman, armed with an assault rifle and dressed in military-style fatigues, escaped with an accomplice. The targeting of a well-known institution in a southern city synonymous with India's prowess as a growing information technology (IT) power appeared aimed at economic de-stabilisation. An assault in the early hours of 1 January 2008 on a paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) recruit-

ment centre in Rampur, in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, marked a return to fedayeen tactics against military targets. The attack involved four gunmen dressed in CRPF uniforms and armed with assault rifles and grenades storming the facility and killing seven CRPF personnel and one civilian and wounding five others, before escaping.

An unprecedented fusion of a complex special forces operation and a mass-casualty terrorist outrage, the notorious November 2008 assault on the commercial capital of Mumbai provoked a surge of global condemnation. Carried out by ten Lashkar gunmen who targeted five-star hotels, a restaurant, the main railway station and a Jewish centre, the operation spanned three days (26–28 November) ensuring maximum global news coverage. The slaughter left 166 people dead in addition to nine gunmen who were finally killed by security forces. Over 300 people were wounded. Given the capture and testimony of the tenth gunman, 21-year-old Ajmal Kasab from Faridkot, Pakistan, along with communications intercepts by US intelligence, the Mumbai attack also served to focus a penetrating spotlight on the close operational relationship between Lashkar and its ISI handlers. The following month the United Nations declared JuD a front for the already proscribed LeT and listed JuD emir Hafiz Sa'eed a terrorist under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. Interpol later issued arrest warrants for two serving senior Pakistan Army officers and one retired major.

Given the weight of international condemnation over Lashkar's Mumbai foray it was scarcely possibly for the Pakistani state not to react. On 11 December, Hafez Sa'eed was detained under the Maintenance of Public Order Act. In June 2009, however, the Lahore High Court ordered his release for lack of evidence of any participation in military activities. Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi was one of 12 arrested in a police raid on a Lashkar training camp in Pakistani-administered Kashmir on 7 December, four days after being named by India as a leading suspect. In November 2009, almost exactly one year after the Mumbai attacks, he was one of seven formally charged by an anti-terrorism court for planning and facilitating the operation. However, he was finally released on bail in April 2015 after a detention in a Rawalpindi jail that provided access to several rooms, television, mobile phones, internet access and 'dozens of visitors a day' (BBC, 2015).

Predictably, the visibility of Lashkar in terror attacks beyond Kashmir declined sharply in the decade that followed. But operations were not terminated. The group's operatives were implicated in a fedayeen-style attack on Rajbagh police station in Kathua district of Jammu on 20 March 2015, and in a similar attack on the police station at Gurdaspur in the Indian state of Punjab on 27 July the same year. LeT was also very much involved in an attack on a CRPF convoy on the Srinagar–Jammu highway in Pampore which left eight CRPF dead and 20 injured along with two attackers killed. While Lashkar

has clearly retained a lethal presence in Kashmir, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has moved to the fore in high-profile fedayeen operations. Among the most notable was the 20 January 2016 assault on the Pathankot Airbase, close to the international border in Punjab, which was claimed by the umbrella jihadist group the United Jihad Council (UJC) but is understood to have involved JeM operatives. The assault left seven security personnel dead in addition to four attackers, in a battle that lasted some 17 hours. JeM was also undoubtedly responsible for the 18 September assault on the Indian Army brigade head-quarters at Uri near the LoC which left 19 soldiers dead and over 20 wounded, and triggered surgical strikes by Indian forces across the Line of Control.

More recently, a 14 February 2019 suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) bombing of a paramilitary convoy at Pulwama in Kashmir left at least 40 CRPF personnel dead, and was claimed by JeM. On this occasion India's response, in the shape of air strikes against what were advertised as JeM training facilities, struck the Balakot region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in 'Pakistan proper' rather than Pakistani-administered Kashmir. As detailed below, the Pulwama attack was also to have major repercussions for Lashkar's front organisations.

MILITARY RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Lashkar's recruitment base has long tended to mirror that of the Pakistan Army, with a clear focus on Punjab – and even specific districts of the province – and North-West Frontier Province or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as it has been known since 2010. And as with the army, recruitment has generally attracted youths from the lower-middle class more than other social strata (Fair, 2014, pp. 61–62). The Lashkar–Army symbiosis has even in some instances seen sons from the same family joining both streams of military service. At the other end of the age spectrum, there have been numerous cases of retired army personnel, including officers purged from the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, joining Lashkar; a striking reflection of the respect and prestige the jihadists have accumulated in the ranks of the regular service (Tankel, 2011, p. 61). Between the two poles of early and late recruitment into Lashkar direct, there have also been cases of army and ISI personnel, possibly includ-ing special forces operatives of the Special Services Group (SSG), taking 'unpaid leave' to join Lashkar units operating in Indian-held Kashmir (Tankel, 2011, p. 62).

The mainstream channel of induction into Lashkar, however, involves progression through a layered series of courses mostly conducted in camps in Azad Kashmir which traditionally has served as the hub of the group's military organisation. The most basic comprises the Daura-e-Aam or General Course required of all recruits. Gaining access to the course requires a letter

of authorisation from a local MDI/JuD branch office but, significantly, does not require the applicant to be a practicing member of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect: youths from any Sunni Muslim background may apply on the presumption that Lashkar training will soon convert them to the group's practices and beliefs. Essentially 'training-lite', the Daura-e-Aam typically lasts for three weeks with an emphasis on prayer, physical fitness and basic weapons instruction. However, not all those graduating from the course automatically move on to more focused military training.

Advanced military training is centred on the Daura-e-Khas or Special Course. Entry into this level of specialised instruction is selective and requires personal recommendations from senior Lashkar–MDI/JuD officials usually following a period of supervised *khidmat* or social service. *Khidmat* requires recruits to join a team engaged in active proselytising of Ahl-e-Hadith beliefs, and appeals to participate in jihad in markets, bus stations or other public venues. From 1998 onwards this form of socio-religious training in the organisation's missionary outreach was formalised in a 21-day Daura-e-Suffa or religious instruction course. Not all of those completing missionary training go on to advanced military training, however. Many inductees may move into other branches of the MDI/JuD's Pakistan-wide socio-religious network. But those joining the Daura-e-Khas embark on a taxing three-month course involving intense physical training; instruction in small-unit tactics and handling a range of small-arms including assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars; and map-reading and radio communications. Instructors are drawn both from the ranks of seasoned Lashkar operatives as well as from the regular military.

Lashkar has also instituted a more narrowly specialised Daura-e-Ribat (literally, 'Watchman Course') which is reserved for operatives undertaking covert operations in enemy territory, that is, typically inside India. The course provides a more intelligence-based focus with instruction in surveillance and counter-surveillance, agent recruitment and covert communications skills. Significantly, military recruitment and training is set well apart from the civilian face of MDI/JuD and has been organised mainly from Muzaffarabad, capital of Azad Kashmir. At least until the fallout caused by the Mumbai operation of 2008, the Bait-ul-Mujahideen camp not far from Muzaffarabad has been the largest training facility.

PUBLIC OUTREACH

As evidenced by the Department of Media and Propagation and by the Dar al-Andalus publishing wing, Lashkar–MDI/JuD, more than any other jihadist group in the Subcontinent, has consistently stressed missionary outreach and humanitarian assistance both within Pakistan and beyond. Within Pakistan

these efforts have capitalised strongly on the manifest failings of the state while projecting an essentially non-sectarian message. As noted by one former Lashkar member, despite 'belonging to the Salafi sect, Lashkar has [the] sympathies of people from all sects because of its social work and because it has focused on jihad against India and does not kill innocent people in Pakistan' (Tankel, 2011, p. 132). Over the years the movement's media output has been prolific and wide-ranging. It has involved a range of print publications and periodicals in Urdu, Sindhi and English, several of which have been financially profitable. By the late 1990s the group's flagship monthly magazine *al-Dawa* was claiming a circulation of over 100 000 (Tankel, 2011, p. 80). Lashkar in its various incarnations has also maintained a robust online presence including a web-based radio station, Radio al Jihad, which has broadcast in Urdu, Sindhi, Arabic and English.

The annual *ijtema* or congregation held at Muridke over a week also attracts hundreds of thousands of MDI/JuD faithful from across Pakistan, as well as potential new members and military recruits. The huge gathering also provides an opportunity for networking with foreign Islamist and jihadist groups. This writer attended the *ijtema* in 1999 and was struck both by the level of organisation required to accommodate and feed the influx of attendees, and by the unremitting ideological stress on jihad, most immediately against Hindu India but also including the United States and Zionist Israel. Projected onto one giant screen were maps and graphics detailing districts across Pakistan which had contributed *shaheed* or martyrs – each marked as a small light – in the conflict in Kashmir. The spread of lights was nationwide but revealed telling clusters in a relatively small number of districts in Punjab.[8] On one evening a radio greeting from a Lashkar unit said to be operating in Indian Kashmir was broadcast over the public address system.

In addition to public outreach, MDI has also established its own educational network. This system is based both on Ahl-e-Hadith madrassahs, separate and distinct from those madrassahs run by the Jamiat-e-Ahl e-Hadith party, as well as al-Dawa schools which provide a heavily subsidised secondary education for both boys and girls. While the learning environment is predictably infused with the tenets and rituals of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and the purported virtues of violent jihad, the curriculum is a modernist one that includes, mathematics, science, information technology and English. MDI/JuD's modernism contrasts strikingly with the obscurantist, Quran-centric teachings in the madrassah of the main Deobandi parties, notably JUI. And in a country where the shortcomings of the state-education system are well-known, MDI/JuD's al-Dawa schools have a clear appeal to lower-middle or working-class families keen to equip their children for the modern economy but unable to afford the private education sector.

Such has been the success of MDI/JuD's al-Dawa schools – which by 2001 numbered 127 nationwide – that the movement has also established its own teacher training college. Capitalising again on the manifest shortcomings of the Pakistani state, missionary-driven social outreach has also moved decisively into the field of health and disaster relief. MDI/JuD-run health facilities have expanded markedly from the hospital at Muridke which constituted their early beginnings. By 2010 the organisation was running six hospitals nationwide, along with 140 dispensaries, mobile clinics and the second-largest ambulance service in the country with a fleet of over 200 vehicles (John, 2011, p. 120). Higher-level training also includes a medical faculty attached to the hospital at Muridke that trains MDI/JuD's own doctors.

The capacity of MDI/JuD in the provision of humanitarian relief was notably underscored at the time of the Kashmir earthquake of October 2005, which in Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir alone killed 73 000 people, while leaving 69 000 injured and a further 2.8 million homeless. It was perhaps unsurprising that given Lashkar's presence in the region, which served as a training base and launch pad for infiltration across the LoC, the response was immediate. But beyond the swiftness of the reaction, it was capability in terms of well-organised manpower, field hospitals and ambulances that drew national and international admiration. Teams from JuD's Idarah-e-Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) or Humanitarian Relief Department worked for weeks side by side with both Pakistan Army response units and United Nations agencies. The organisation's Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) has also been active in humanitarian outreach both in Pakistan and well beyond. Following the massive displacement of civilians caused by the Pakistan Army's Zarb-e-Azb campaign into North Waziristan in June 2014, FIF was active in the distribution of relief goods, with as many as 500 volunteers (Inter Press Service, 2014). FIF was also involved in aid distribution to Rohingya refugees driven out of Myanmar by the Myanmar Army in late 2017.

FUNDING

Hardly surprisingly, given the sheer breadth of its operations – military, missionary, social and economic – Lashkar/MDI–JuD has relied on multiple streams of funding. The relative importance of these has shifted over the years, but by the late 1990s underpinned an annual budget that ran to millions of dollars. In its earliest incarnation during the period of the late 1980s, when Lashkar was establishing itself in eastern Afghanistan, the group appears to have owed its growth primarily to funds emanating from Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia, keen to carve out an ideologically sympathetic foothold in the Afghan jihad and more generally to extend Salafist influence in South Asia. The very fact that Arab luminaries such as Abdullah Azzam and Abdur

Rahman Surayhi were founding member of Lashkar is itself telling. From 1993 onwards, as Lashkar's military role in Kashmir grew, backing from Pakistan's ISI undoubtedly came to form a second and probably more important income stream. How far this state funding was dedicated solely to military pursuits targeted on Kashmir, and how far it contributed to MDI/JuD's ability to extend its other activities within Pakistan, is less clear.

As Lashkar's star rose above the Kashmiri battlefield it was also able to build up a network of fundraising operations focused on private donations. Inside Pakistan, contributions could be made either at boxes in MDI offices, mosques or even local shops; or alternatively paid into MDI bank accounts whose details were freely available on the group's website. The sale of animal hides donated by the pious after the cattle had been butchered for the Eidh-ul-Adha celebrations proved to be one early and successful money generator. MDI also collected the Islamic *ushr* tax in kind through its Farmer and Workers' Wing, a levy normally raised by an Islamic ruler but legitimised by MDI in the absence of a recognised caliph. Fundraising from a well-heeled Pakistani diaspora was equally important, particularly in the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom where the expatriate community from Mirpur district in Pakistani-administered Kashmir was known to be sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause as projected by Lashkar (John, 2011, p. 122).

Directed largely by Mahmoud Mohamad Ahmed Bahaziq and Haji Mohamad Ashraf, MDI's Department of Finance was also able to develop several activities into businesses, from which the profits could be ploughed back into wider portfolios in real estate and agriculture. Fees from the network of al-Dawa secondary schools was one such source of funding. Another was profits from the Dar al-Andalus publishing house. In short, despite the technical ban imposed on MDI in 2002, by the first decade of the century Lashkar–MDI/JuD had developed an impressive nationwide presence in the educational, medical and humanitarian spheres. The quality of service provided was typically well beyond anything that Pakistan's crumbling state agencies could offer.

ADAPTING TO PRESSURE

The end of 2001 presented Lashkar with a major dilemma, as it did the Pakistan Army under Musharraf. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan that followed shattered the tacit alliance between the Pakistan Army and the jihadist movement. Musharraf was presented by Washington with a blunt choice of 'with us or against us' that in reality was no choice at all. As Musharraf argued, Pakistan had three overarching strategic priorities: opposing Indian hegemony and supporting the 'freedom struggle' in Kashmir; protecting and developing a nuclear programme that underpinned the nation's survival; and establishing a friendly regime in Kabul to ensure politico-military strategic depth on

Pakistan's western flank. Not without dissent among his corps commanders, he concluded that in order to advance the first two objectives he would need to sacrifice the third, and lend support to the US's impending war against the very regime that Pakistan had installed in 1996: Osama bin Laden's hosts, the Afghan Taliban.

The decision to make common cause with the Americans and betray the Taliban was anathema to many of the jihadist groups in Pakistan. Lashkar's own response to the 9/11 attacks was initially confused, eliciting different responses from different leaders. Before long, however, the movement fell behind Musharraf's position, and for two overlapping reasons. Firstly, Lashkar's primary military and ideological focus was Kashmir, not Afghanistan. Secondly, unlike Pakistan's Deobandi parties and jihadist factions such as JUI, JeM, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Ahl-e-Hadith Lashkar shared little religious fellow-feeling with the Deobandi Afghan Taliban or for the war they had been waging against the Afghan Northern Alliance. Following the earthquake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, a second major crisis in the region was caused by the brazen terrorist attack mounted by JeM on the Indian Parliament building on 13 December. The incident, which left five dead including the Pakistan-based attackers, prompted a full-scale mobilisation of Indian forces along the border; angry demands from New Delhi for a crackdown on Pakistan-supported jihadist terrorism; and heavy diplomatic pressure from an administration in Washington alarmed by the prospect of war between the two nuclear-armed rivals.

Coming in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks on the US, the assault on the Parliament building was – as it clearly intended to be – a huge embarrassment for Musharraf. On 20 December Washington announced a freeze of any assets held by Lashkar; a move that the government of Pakistan was then obliged to follow. And on 26 December, Washington formally listed both JeM and Lashkar as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). On 12 January 2002, in a nationally televised address, Musharraf proscribed both Lashkar and JeM. The organisational sleight of hand that ensued was a foretaste of the response of the group and its ISI interlocutors to international condemnation and sanctions over the years to come. As the formal military wing of the organisation, Lashkar shifted its headquarters to Azad Kashmir, which technically has never been incorporated into Pakistan. MDI, the organisation's civilian wing, dissolved itself only to re-emerge under the name of the group founded by Hafez Sa'eed in 1985: Jamaa't ud Dawa (JuD). Bank accounts that were frozen had been emptied well in advance of the government move. Meanwhile along the Line of Control, infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir by Pakistan-based groups including Lashkar slowed to accommodate US pressure on Islamabad; but never entirely stopped.

FOREIGN RECRUITMENT AND GLOBAL REACH

More than any other Pakistan-based jihadist organisation, Lashkar has established a significant international footprint and has recruited and trained jihadist volunteers from a wide range of countries. For would-be Western jihadists the attraction of LeT is not difficult to understand: at the ideological and military level, while its focus has been an India-centric one targeted primarily on Kashmir, its sectarian moorings and long-standing contacts with al-Qaeda underpin its sympathy and support for global jihadist activity on the global stage.

More practically, MDI/JuD's Pakistan-wide network of offices, madrassahs and mosques means that the group is uniquely easy to contact. And at the same time, its training camps offer a range of relatively sophisticated instruction in secure environments. There is no doubt that significant numbers of foreigners have passed through Lashkar training facilities. Countries whose citizens have benefited from military instruction include the United Kingdom, the USA, France, Australia, Russia, Uzbekistan, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia and, of course, India (John, 2011, p. xxvi). That said, it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which LeT has reached beyond its primary operational focus on India and the Subcontinent to establish the sort of global network associated with Lebanese Hezbollah. The number of foreigners known to have graduated from military training to become more or less integrated into Lashkar's operational network is actually quite small. It is also worth pointing out that the involvement of foreigners with Lashkar at any level is far less common today than during the first, pre-Islamic State, heyday of jihadist endeavour in the 1990s and 2000s.

Arguably, the best known of Lashkar's Western operatives is David Coleman Headley aka Da'ood Gilani. A US national born to a Pakistani diplomat father and an American mother, Coleman drifted into narcotics trafficking. Following a short spell in a US jail he returned to Pakistan and established a close association with Lashkar and Hafez Sa'eed himself, while at the same time working as an informant for the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In 2002 he underwent the LeT's Daura-e-Aam basic training course, followed later in the year by a more advanced course. By 2005 he had been taken under the wing of Sajid Mir, the Lashkar official in the External Affairs Department headed by Abdul Rehman Makki and responsible for handling foreign operatives. He had also changed his name from Gilani to Coleman, his mother's maiden name. Having been put in contact with a 'Major Iqbal' – assumed to be an ISI operative – Headley went on to conduct surveillance operations for the Mumbai attacks of 2008, a foray allegedly financed by 'Major Iqbal'. He also undertook target surveillance in Copenhagen for a pro-

jected attack on a Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, which had published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Headley was finally arrested at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport in October 2009, and in January 2013 was sentenced by a federal court to 35 years in jail for his part in the Mumbai attack.

Other foreigners who became notable Lashkar assets were the Australian Faheem Khalid Lodhi, and Willie Brigitte, a French convert to Islam born in the French West Indian territory of Guadeloupe. Like Headley, both men were run by LeT handler Sajid Mir. Brigitte underwent training in an LeT camp between late 2001 and early 2002 following the 9/11 attacks, where Sajid Mir marked him out as worthy of attention. Following Brigitte's return to France in 2002, Sajid Mir later financed his travel to Australia in May 2003 to assist Lodhi. An Australian of Pakistani descent who had migrated to Australia in 1998, Lodhi had also been through LeT military training. Under Sajid Mir's direction, he returned to Sydney in 2002 to plan terror attacks. Brigitte was deported from Australia in September 2003 and arrested by French authorities. He was finally sentenced in 2007 to nine years in jail. Lodhi and his associates were arrested by Australian police in October 2003 in raids which revealed the extent of the surveillance already undertaken on a range of targets in the Sydney area, including defence installations and the national power grid. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison on terrorism charges. In terms of a transnational cadre network, however, Lashkar appears to remain an organisation with a footprint centred essentially in the Subcontinent. Predictably, given the group's close and presumably ongoing cooperation with the ISI, that has resulted in a particular focus on countries offering easy access to India: Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Gulf States – offering recruitment prospects from a large pool of expatriate Indian Muslim workers – and, not least, Bangladesh.

POLITICS AND TIGHTENING SANCTIONS

As an organisation, Lashkar-JuD has undertaken a distinct shift in recent years towards expanding its footprint inside Pakistan through missionary, humanitarian and overtly political initiatives. The growth of the role of the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) has been one important part of this process. More surprising was the foundation in August 2017 of the Milli Muslim League (MML) party, to contest the 2018 elections. Headed by Saifullah Khalid, a close aide of Hafez Sa'eed and a ranking leader of JuD, the MML was committed to turning Pakistan into a 'real Islamic and welfare state', and represented a striking retreat from Sa'eed's long-standing condemnation of electoral democracy as an un-Islamic Western implant.

In the context of a nation where religious parties have traditionally performed poorly in electoral politics, never winning more than 10–15 per cent of the total vote, the MML's prospects for success were always improbable.

Whether the launch of the party was driven by fundraising objectives, or by an-ISI backed ploy to weaken the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif (ML-N) at a time when Sharif was under heavy pressure, is unclear. It is fair to assume, however, that Sa'eed could not have established the party without the explicit approval of the army and the ISI. Even so, the MML's initial showing in the 2018 elections was dismal: the party failed to secure a single seat in either national or provincial parliaments, dominated by mainstream parties such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of the Bhutto clan, the ML-N of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif (now jailed on corruption charges), and the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) of current Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The foray into party politics did, though, reflect Lashkar's ongoing efforts to adapt to new conditions. Shaped partly by the storm of international opprobrium excited by the Mumbai attacks, and the salvo of sanctions that followed, the environment in which Lashkar and its army handlers operate has become far less accommodating than was the case in earlier decades. In late January 2017, Hafez Sa'eed had been placed under house arrest with other senior JuD leaders, but no specific charges were laid and by November he had been quietly released. Days after his arrest, however, he floated a new front, the Tehreek-e-Azaadi Jammu-Kashmir (TAJK) to provide cover for fundraising and other activities by JuD and FIF. On 8 June, TAJK was put on a list of proscribed organisations by Pakistan's National Counter Terrorism Authority.

Then on 3 April 2018 the US Department of State (DoS) added the MML to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, with TAJK thrown in for good measure. As the DoS's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Nathan Sales noted: 'Today's amendments aim to take aim at Lashkar-e-Taiba's efforts to circumvent sanctions and deceive the public about its true character. Make no mistake: whatever LeT chooses to call itself, it remains a violent terrorist group.' The fallout from the JeM suicide bombing of the Indian paramilitary convoy on 14 February 2019, which killed at least 40 troops, was to further impact upon Lashkar. Amidst a surge of international alarm and condemnation, Islamabad was compelled to take further steps, and on 21 February Pakistan's Interior Ministry designated both JuD and FIF 'proscribed organisations'.

Additional measures followed. On 12 May, local media reports quoted Interior Ministry sources as noting that Hafez Sa'eed's brother-in-law Abdul Rahman Makki, the head of JuD's political wing, had been arrested by Punjab police under the maintenance of Public Order Act for 'hate speech'. Around the same time, the government banned 11 organisations for having links with the proscribed JuD, FIF and JeM. Given the history of 'smoke and mirrors' surrounding the relationship between Lashkar and its various front organisations on the one hand, and the Pakistani 'deep state' on the other, it would be premature to conclude that there has been any fundamental shift in army and ISI policy intended finally to close down the sprawling JuD–LeT complex. As

one perceptive Indian commentator has noted, the military has managed 'to refine the role of a "minimal satisfier" to the level of art, making tiny and marginal concessions when the pressure is unbearable, but at no stage abandoning their basic purpose and strategy' (Sahni, 2017).

Nevertheless, the stakes for both Pakistan and Lashkar are perhaps higher than they have ever been. There can be no doubt that the government of Imran Khan was severely discomfited by the February 2019 decision of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Paris-based international terrorism financing watchdog, to maintain Pakistan's 'grey' listing for its failure to crack down on funding for local groups proscribed both locally and internationally. As the FATF listing impacts directly on Pakistan's prospects for raising desperately needed international bail-outs to sustain a crumbling economy, the possibility of a blacklisting has clearly concentrated minds in Islamabad as never before.

NOTES

1. The name also translates as the Army of Medina, the second-holiest city of Islam after Mecca. In this chapter the abbreviation LeT and the name Lashkar are used interchangeably.
2. The relationship with Pakistan's military and the ISI is discussed below.
3. Salafism, from the Arabic *salaf* or 'ancestors', is a reformist movement dating from the late 19th century positing a purist return to the original and unadulterated sources of Islam: the Quran, the *sunnah* or ways of the Prophet Muhammad, and the traditions surrounding the companions of the Prophet. Salafist thinking rejects the later accretions of Islam's four schools of jurisprudence: Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i and Maliki. As detailed below, the Ahl-e-Hadith or People of the Traditions (of the Prophet) constitute one sect in the broader salafist movement.
4. A school of reformist teaching in the Hanafi tradition of Islamic jurisprudence which originated in the late 19th century in the Dar ul Uloom seminary in the north Indian town of Deoband.
5. *Taiba Bulletin* ('official publication of Mujahideen Laskkar-E-Taiba'), 17 October 2000.
6. A second headquarters complex was later established at the Jamia al-Qadsia mosque in Lahore city.
7. Kiessling provides interesting detail on ISI support for Pakistani jihadist groups operating in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya.
8. Over the years, Punjab has provided by far the largest proportion of the hundreds of Lashkar fighters killed in Kashmir, with the NWFP following in second place.

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6.   Afghanistan

Anthony Davis

ROOTS OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS

Introduction

Beset by war, poverty, corruption and narcotics trafficking, Afghanistan has also emerged in recent years as among the planet's most tragic victims of terrorism. In 2019, for the second year running it ranked top of the bleak listing of the Global Terrorism Index, not far behind Iraq. The scourge of terrorism in Afghanistan has emerged from and remains inextricably intertwined with the history of the wars and insurgencies that have devastated the country since 1978. Forty years of unremitting conflict that have cost between 1 and 2 million lives have reflected in turn a geopolitical crisis of a complexity that continues to confound the best efforts of both soldiers and diplomats. Any understanding of contemporary terrorism in Afghanistan and its potential for regional and global export requires a fundamental appreciation of the social and political roots of that crisis.

Ethnicity, topography, tribalism and the relative weakness of central government are all often identified as key elements underlying Afghanistan's apparently endless conflict. And each has certainly contributed to aggravating the crisis. But equally, none is unique to Afghanistan and none is of itself sufficient to account for the intractability of the security crisis. This chapter suggests that the impasse in which Afghanistan is today trapped stems rather from more modern ideological and geostrategic roots.

Competing Ideologies

The ideological genesis of conflict dates back essentially to the 1960s and 1970s. At its heart were two profoundly discordant prescriptions for the political and social modernisation of a tradition-bound and deeply conservative Muslim society. One was Islamist; the other, secular. Elite debates in the 1960s over paths to modernisation slowly escalated into confrontational politics played out within a relatively small, but fast-growing and impatient class of

newly educated youth. Many of them were students freshly transplanted from the provinces into the urban setting of Kabul (Bradsher, 1983, pp. 45–46).

Broadly, these impassioned and occasionally violent disputes centred on the campuses of Kabul University and Kabul Polytechnic, and divided a generation of intellectuals and students into two camps. The confrontation of newly imported ideologies pitted the champions of the Soviet and Chinese-influenced Marxist Left against followers of the Muslim Brotherhood influenced by the leading ideologues of the Islamic state, the Egyptians Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani Abul Ala Maududi. The former gradually coalesced around the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 (Arnold, 1983, p. 25), and the latter around the Jamiat-i-Islami Party which was brought together in 1972 by professors of theology who had returned from studies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.[1]

A 1973 palace coup by strongman Sardar Mohammad Daoud, cousin of King Zahir Shah, overthrew the monarchy and saw a sudden lurch towards the Soviet secularist prescriptions for modernisation backed by the PDPA. But in 1978, as he sought to counter growing communist influence with overtures to Iran and the West, Daoud himself was killed in a bloody putsch by pro-Soviet military officers. The April coup, referred to by the communists as the Saur Revolution after the month of the Afghan calendar, brought to power the communist ideologues of the PDPA and their avowedly revolutionary Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) (Hyman, 1982, p. 25). An aggressive government campaign to institute a programme of force-fed socialist reforms set the fires of rural reaction. The leadership of that conservative revolt was soon seized by the Islamists, many of whom had earlier fled to neighbouring Pakistan.[2]

Afghan–Pakistani Geopolitics

A second underlying factor fuelling the crisis has been, and remains to the present, geostrategic: Afghanistan's perennially toxic relationship with neighbouring Pakistan, rooted in the legacy of Western imperialism. The 2400 km border between Afghanistan the British Raj was first delineated in 1893 by India's foreign secretary Sir Mortimer Durand and Afghanistan's 'Iron Emir' Abdul Rahman Khan. The 'Durand Line' cut through some of the world's most daunting terrain, precluding the possibility of either power effectively policing the border. It also bifurcated the lands inhabited by fiercely independent Afghan or Pushtun tribes who in an 18th century confederacy led by Ahmadshah Durrani had imposed a unity on the territories between the Oxus and Indus Rivers and named them Afghanistan (Dupree, 1980, pp. 334–341) .

Given the manifest inability of the British Raj to conquer all Afghanistan, and the utility of that country as a buffer against the southward expansion of

czarist Russia towards India, the Durand Line and the bifurcation of Pushtun tribal power made strategic sense in New Delhi. But imperial logic also held the seeds of bitter geopolitical rivalries in the post-colonial era. British retreat from the Subcontinent in 1947 left behind a truncated India and new-born Pakistan, an ethnically diverse state bound together only by the tenuous bonds of shared religion. To its east, Pakistan was immediately embroiled in war with India over disputed Kashmir. On its western border it faced the hostility of Afghanistan, where from 1947 onwards a succession of governments refused to recognise the imperially imposed Durand Line. Fears of Pashtun irredentism and support in Kabul for a putative 'Pushtunistan' have haunted Pakistan's rulers and fuelled their insecurities ever since (Dupree, 1980, pp. 485-494).

The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces aimed at propping up the embattled communist regime of the PDPA threw together these two central facets of the Afghan crisis, socio-political and geostrategic, in a catastrophic collision the echoes of which reverberate to the present. From 1979 onwards, cross-border tensions between governments in Islamabad and Kabul have escalated into a proxy war that has ebbed and flowed over the decades. The result has been a chain reaction of events that for both countries – but far more painfully for Afghanistan – has ushered in an era of conflict and terrorism seemingly without end.

Anti-Soviet War and Pakistani Objectives

Viewed from Islamabad as an existential threat, the Soviet invasion marked a watershed in the geostrategic thinking of Pakistan's dominant military and the adoption of what in imperial days had been termed 'Forward Policy' aimed at installing a pliant government in Kabul. Put simply, in the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, the question of who ruled in Afghanistan had become far too important to be left to the Afghans. Throughout the decade between 1979 and 1989 Soviet and allied DRA forces faced nation-wide guerrilla resistance by Afghan mujahideen factions. Financially and logistically the revolt was supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and China. Under the watch of Pakistani dictator General Zia ul-Haq, however, the military's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) maintained tight control over the flow of munitions to the various Afghan resistance parties it permitted to operate from the border city of Peshawar (Yousaf and Adkin, 1992, pp. 25–30).

And for good reason: Pakistan Army policy was driven broadly by three key strategic objectives requiring the ISI's careful calibration of support of the mujahideen factions. The first was to use the mujahideen in a 'war of a thousand cuts' to expel from Pakistan's borders the threat posed by a superpower friendly to India and increasingly inclined to exploit Pakistan's own ethnic

and political divisions (Yousaf and Adkin, 1992, p. 69). The second was to topple the communist government in Kabul that by the mid-1980s was actively retaliating against Islamabad's support for the mujahideen with a campaign of destabilisation in the Pushtun tribal belt on the Pakistani side of the border (Davis, 1986). Beyond that, a critical third objective in Pakistan's grand plan was to install in Kabul a pliant regime, both Islamist and Pushtun, that would be sympathetic to Islamabad's concerns over Pushtunistan and Kashmir and remain hostile to India. Its chosen vehicle in this endeavour was the tightly centralised and predominantly Pushtun mujahideen party that had received the lion's share of material support channelled through the ISI: the Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Party of Afghanistan or HIA). Islamist in its ideology and almost Leninist in its organisation, the HIA was led by former Kabul University campus rabble-rouser and long-time ISI asset, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 18–19).

Mujahideen Warfare and Terrorism

Between 1979 and 1989, what might best be described as the first of the Afghanistan's contemporary wars unfolded as a classic guerrilla insurgency, a hit-and-run war of attrition waged by mujahideen fighters enjoying broad popular support from a deeply religious rural population. The targets of their unremitting attacks were Soviet and DRA forces based in provincial and district centres who enjoyed the often devastating benefits of air power, but who struggled to hold open the highways linking major cities and who had lost the rugged hinterlands early in the conflict. It was the striking military and political disunity of the Afghan resistance that differentiated it from other modern 'liberation' struggles in China, Algeria and Vietnam, however. In the early months of the conflict a plethora of mujahideen fronts sprang up across the country, mirroring the fragmented nature of local society. Their commanders, from conservative rural or religious backgrounds, learned tactics fast but had no conception of strategy at the national level. And like the Peshawar-based political parties with which they were required to affiliate themselves as a precondition for acquiring munitions, they were divided across key fault lines.

Not least of these was ethnicity, in a country forged by and named after its largest group the Afghans or Pushtun, but which also embraced Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkoman, Hazara and Pasha'i (Dupree, 1980, pp. 57–65).[3] Dominant across the south and east, the Pushtuns were themselves divided by tribe. And country-wide, Afghanistan's rugged topography of towering mountains and valleys imposed further divisions. Against this backdrop, mujahideen resistance struggled to translate strategic strengths – popular support, terrain favourable to guerrilla warfare and growing logistical backing – into significant military gains.[4] The traditionalism of the mujahideen served as a powerful

bulwark against terrorism, however. A decade of anti-communist war saw hard-hitting sabotage of infrastructure, ambushes of road convoys, and countless attacks on regime and Soviet bases. But throughout the conflict the mujahideen refrained from carrying out bombings or other mass-casualty attacks targeted on civilians in regime-controlled towns and cities.

While it did not escalate into terrorism, a decidedly un-Afghan element of extremism was introduced in the later years of the conflict, however. As foreign volunteers, predominantly Arab, flooded to Peshawar and across the border to join the guerrilla fronts of southeastern Paktia, Nangahar and Kunar provinces, a new fanaticism impacted upon the war. Patronised mainly by the Ittehad-i-Islami (Islamic Union) faction of mujahideen leader Abdul rab Rassul Sayyaf, the Arab brigade brought with it a Wahhabi and Salafi-influenced religious radicalism that spilled over into the execution of prisoners, mutilation of corpses and other battlefield excesses.[5] It was a hint of things to come.

Civil War and the Taliban

In February 1989, pursuant to the Geneva Accords of 1987, an exhausted Soviet military completed its withdrawal and conceded to Pakistan success in the first of its strategic objectives. The realisation of the second came three years later with the final implosion of the DRA regime of President Mohammad Najibullah and the entry of mujahideen forces into Kabul in April 1992. It was to take a further four and half years, however, before Pakistan was able to achieve its final and most important goal of installing in Kabul a regime sympathetic to its interests. Even as the Najibullah regime collapsed, an immediate lunge for power by Pakistan's leading proxy Hekmatyar's HIA was foiled by other mujahideen factions in the streets of Kabul, the opening shots of a bitter civil war between the victors that had been gestating for years.

In a country traditionally ruled by a Pushtun monarchy and social elite, anti-Soviet war had served both to politicise and arm ethnic minorities who were no longer willing to countenance a return to a Pashtun-dominated *status quo ante*. The civil war that followed was a brutal multi-sided affair involving Pashtun, Tajik and Hazara mujahideen and ex-communist Uzbek militia in a kaleidoscope of shifting alliances. But the primary contenders for power were Pakistan's candidate, Hekmatyar's HIA, and the more moderate mainly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan) dominant in the northeast of the country. Its foremost field commander was Ahmadshah Massoud, a rival of Hekmatyar's since the late 1970s when both were involved in Islamist exile politics in Pakistan, and a man who throughout the anti-Soviet war had been deeply suspicious of the machinations of the Pakistani military and the ISI.[6]

The bitterest of the fighting took place in Kabul, which Massoud's forces struggled to hold against a shifting coalition of the HIA, the Uzbek militia of Abdul Rashid Dostam and Shia Hazara forces backed by Iran. Much of the city was reduced to rubble and thousands were killed. And by the time Massoud was able to push his enemies back from the southern and western approaches to the capital in early 1995, he found himself facing a new enemy also backed by Pakistan who were to prove far more capable of uniting the Pashtuns than Hekmatyar had ever been. The Taliban movement of religious students burst into the southern Pashtun heartlands in late 1994, on a platform of ending the anarchy of the civil war and bringing just Islamic governance to the country, with initial support from Pakistani transport interests keen to see roads to Iran secured for trade. Then, in short order, they seized Kandahar city from the ISI in November. Their rapid military advances rested on an alliance of three elements, all Pashtun: a core of former mujahideen commanders around the movement's emir Mullah Omar; young Afghan refugees studying in Islamic seminaries or madrassah in Pakistan; and former communist officers needed for military technical roles activated to support the new movement by the ISI (Davis, 1998, p. 55). In the opening months of 1995 the Taliban advanced into Helmand, Zabol and Ghazni provinces. In March they ejected the ISI's erstwhile protégé Hematyar from his base south of Kabul, but were then checked by Massoud's forces. It was not until September 1996 that they finally seized the city, advancing not from the south but from the east in a well-planned, mobile campaign that first seized Jalalabad. Then, without pausing, Taliban forces swept on through the town of Sarobi and into Kabul's eastern outskirts, forcing Massoud to abandon the city. This was a campaign which had clearly not been planned by the village mullahs ostensibly leading the movement (Davis, 1998, pp. 67–70).

The Taliban–al-Qaeda Compact

The capture of Kabul by the Taliban movement and the ascent of their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – recognised by Islamabad in May 1997 – appeared finally to secure the third of Pakistan's strategic objectives in Afghanistan: the installation of a client Pushtun regime in Afghanistan that would not only lay to rest the spectre of 'Pushtunistan', but also secure strategic depth for Pakistan in its perennial struggle with India while offering economic connectivity with the emerging republics of post-Soviet Central Asia. There was thus a sharp irony in the events that were to turn Islamabad's strategic victory to dust. Even as the ISI continued to throw support behind a series of Taliban campaigns to seize control of northern Afghanistan from the Northern Alliance forged by Massoud, Pakistan's own protégé was itself unwittingly to frustrate those goals. Between 1996 and 2001 the Taliban opened the floodgates to a wave of

terrorism that first swept Afghanistan and then surged across the border into Pakistan.

Forged following the capture of Kabul in 1996, a fateful compact between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and exiled Saudi jihadist Osama bin Laden provided the latter's al-Qaeda organisation with a base from which to plot an escalating wave of terrorist attacks on American targets. Centred initially in the Middle East and Africa, these were to culminate on 11 September 2001 with al-Qaeda's assault on the United States. Bin Laden's involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan long pre-dated his alliance with the Taliban. Son of a wealthy construction magnet of Yemeni extraction close to the Saudi royal family, he had first arrived in Pakistan in 1980. In the years that followed he was to gain status as facilitator for the flow of Arab volunteers to the anti-communist jihad. Along with Egyptian exile Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, bin Laden established in Peshawar the Maktab al-Khedmat (Bureau of Services), a clearing-house for international volunteers seeking to join the war across the border. In 1988 he was himself involved in fighting with Soviet forces close to the Jaji region of southeast Paktia province on the Pakistan border; a limited foray into the war zone that was to assume mythic proportions in the mythology of al-Qaeda as it was later crafted (Wright, 2006, pp. 127–138).

In the final two years of the anti-Soviet war, the numbers of foreign jihadists in Afghanistan rose rapidly. Predominantly Arabs and North Africans but also including Sudanese, Central and Southeast Asians, most became associated with the hard-line Pushtun Islamist parties of Hizb-i-Islami and Ittehad-i- Islami. By the time of the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 and the abortive mujahideen assaults on the eastern cities of Jalalabad and Khost, entire foreign units were operating on the front lines, many of them better funded and equipped than their Afghan hosts.[7] Following the 1992 collapse of the communist regime, most of the foreigners returned home. Bin Laden himself left for Saudi Arabia in 1989, following the reverses around Jalalabad and less than a year after he and his colleagues had founded al-Qaeda al-Askaria, the 'Military Base'. Set up in Peshawar in August 1988, al-Qaeda (AQ) was an organisation intended to maintain contacts between international mujahideen and facilitate their training for further jihadist struggles (Wright, 2006, pp. 150–153).

Bin Laden was before long embroiled in efforts to raise an army of mujahideen to defend Saudi Arabia from the threat posed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. His disputes with the Saudi royal establishment over the role of American troops on Saudi soil was finally to lead to an outright rupture, the cancellation of his passport and his move to Sudan, ruled by the Islamist regime of Hasan al-Turabi. When in 1996 his welcome in Sudan finally ran out, it was perhaps predictable that the itinerant apostle of jihad, now fired by

a potent anti-Americanism, would return to Afghanistan, by then torn between the rising power of the Taliban and a regime in Kabul defended by the northern forces of Massoud (Wright, 2006, pp. 254–256). Bin Laden first came into contact with the Taliban around the time of their capture of Jalalabad in September 1996. He was later to move to the movement's spiritual capital of Kandahar, where he met Mullah Omar and became in a more official sense an honoured guest.

Al-Qaeda was later to re-establish training camps close to the Pakistani border for its international recruits, and establish its offices in Kabul. For four years between 1997 and late 2001 the Afghan capital was to become both a sanctuary for the organisation's key leaders and a hub for its planning activities aimed at striking back at its main enemies. In this context, while an essentially conventional war in the north of the country ground on, supported in large numbers by AQ and other jihadist groups, Afghanistan also became a launch-pad for terrorism grounded in the tactic of suicide bombings (Davis, 2002). The simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es-Salaam in Tanzania on 8 August 1998 marked AQ's first major foray into transnational terrorism and saw the use of tactics that would later become standard operating procedure: coordinated and broadly synchronised attacks deploying suicide bombers against several geographically dispersed targets.

While not ordered by AQ's central leadership in Afghanistan, a 'Millennium' attack intended to target Los Angeles International Airport at the turn of the century was foiled when, on 14 December 1999, its would-be perpetrator, Ahmed Ressam, was halted by an alert customs official as he was trying to cross into the United States (US) from Canada. An Algerian, Ressam had trained in AQ camp in Afghanistan (Wright, 2006, pp. 336–338).

Another abortive attack – which at the time went undetected – targeted an American warship, the destroyer USS *Sullivans* docked at the Yemeni port of Aden, on 3 January 2000. In October that year AQ terrorists returned to the same location and a similar target, with a successful suicide attack against the USS *Cole*, which killed 17 US personnel (Wright, 2006, pp. 360–361). AQ's Afghanistan-based campaign of international terrorist strikes culminated in the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. A terrorist coup for which the planning had begun in Afghanistan in 1999, the 9/11 attacks were to plunge Afghanistan into a new chapter of war. They were preceded two days earlier by a gift from bin Laden to his host and benefactor Mullah Omar, in the shape of the assassination by a suicide bomber of Northern Alliance commander Ahmadshah Massoud.

Taliban Defeat and Western Democracy

The war that followed between early October and late December 2001 brought together a potent mix of Northern Alliance ground forces and US special forces backed by intense – and devastatingly accurate – US air support that swept the Taliban regime from power.[8] The northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif fell on 9 November, while the pre-existing front lines across the Shomali plains north of Kabul were broken on 12 November, with Kabul city falling on 13 November. The Taliban's northern stronghold of Kunduz collapsed on 26 November with over 5700 Taliban and allied jihadists surrendering. Finally, Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban, was abandoned on 7 December as Mullah Omar fled across the border into Pakistan (Davis, 2002).

The collapse of Islamist rule in Kabul as the result of US military intervention paved the way for the installation of a new species of Western governance. Fronted by the government of Hamid Karzai, this experiment with European- and American-style parliamentary democracy promised much more in the post-Cold War era than the 'people's democracy' of bankrupt Soviet Marxism. But implicit in the advent of Western democracy backed by American and European military might was a rekindling of the secular–Islamist ideological schism that had fired the conflict of the 1970s.

The fall of Kabul and Kandahar also prompted the flight of the defeated Islamists into Pakistan. As the Taliban army disintegrated, Mullah Omar and his cohorts fled south into Baluchistan, while AQ's leaders and thousands of allied foreign jihadists – Pakistanis, Arabs, Northern Africans and Central Asians – streamed south from Kabul into Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). There they enjoyed the protection of local Pashtun jihadists such as Jalaludin Haqqani – a former Taliban minister for tribal affairs – Nek Mohammad and Baitullah Mehsud (Gall, 2015, pp. 35–38).

A post-colonial acknowledgment that Pushtun tribal writ and custom underpinned stability on the border, the FATA comprise seven traditionally autonomous agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan. From Waziristan the border cuts west through arid ranges and deserts that separate the ethnic Pashtun north of Pakistani Baluchistan from the sparsely populated flatlands of southernmost Afghanistan. It was largely from this zone, and particularly from the western end of the FATA in Waziristan, that modern terrorism was to emerge and engulf Afghanistan.

Notably absent in over 20 years of conflict that had already wracked the country, terrorism in Afghanistan emerged as a product of two broad developments that converged in the 2002–2005 period and have since assumed a lethal momentum of their own. The first was the survival of the Taliban movement in Pakistan. Sustained by the Pakistani military's irrepressible ambitions to shape Afghanistan's political future, survival was followed by a slow but steady

resurgence. The second development was the impact of the war in Iraq on Taliban tactics in Afghanistan, in which al-Qaeda, operating in both theatres, served as the critical vector.

Taliban Resurgence

In the wake of the crushing defeat of the Taliban regime in the closing months of 2001, there was nothing inevitable about the resurgence of the movement. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the administration in Washington had presented Pakistan's military ruler President Pervez Musharraf with a stark ultimatum: abandon support for the Taliban or be considered an enemy of the United States. It left no room for manoeuvre – or so, at least, it seemed. On 19 September, Musharraf addressed his nation in a televised broadcast and announced that Pakistan would be extending full cooperation to the US if the Taliban regime declined to hand over Osama bin Laden and war came. Hostilities opened on 9 October.

Given years of close support and advice, disentangling Pakistan's jihadist assets – ISI advisors, army special forces elements, and madrassah-based cannon fodder – from among the defeated Taliban was never going to be a simple process. This was particularly true in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz, surrounded by Northern Alliance forces and far from the Pakistan border, where special flights to evacuate Pakistani military operatives and some of the hundreds of Pakistani jihadists were quietly negotiated with the Americans. Hundreds of other Pakistanis, along with their Afghan Taliban and foreign jihadist comrades, became prisoners of war left to the brutal mercies of Northern Alliance commanders, most notably Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum.

The break, however, was never complete. Many Taliban foot soldiers simply filtered back into villages across the Pushtun south of Afghanistan; many others, including senior leaders, fled across the border into Pakistan to lie low in the refugee camps and madrassahs of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North-West Frontier Province) and the provincial capitals of Quetta and Peshawar. Notable in the aftermath of defeat was that only one senior Taliban leader, the Islamic Emirate's former ambassador to Islamabad, Abdul Salaam Zaif, was arrested by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the Americans. The rest simply disappeared, but – like their mujahideen counterparts before them – remained under the watchful eye of the ISI (Yousafzai, 2009).

Against the backdrop of new-found optimism and a promise of peace under the Karzai presidency, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan sank to its lowest ebb in 2002. Towards the end of the year, however, a crucial shift in Pakistani politics worked to its benefit. Fuelled by popular anger in the northwestern

Pashtun Belt over the ouster of the Taliban regime from Kabul, October elections saw an alliance of religious parties with tacit military backing sweep to power in both border provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, while gaining an unprecedented 68 seats in the National Assembly. With local government along the border in the hands of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Council or MMA) – dubbed by local wags the Mullah–Military Alliance – Taliban exiles in Pakistan found the organisational oxygen they desperately needed (Hussain, 2007, pp. 172–177).

As the Taliban slowly emerged from hibernation, events accelerated during 2003. In February, Mullah Omar broke a long silence and released a letter calling on all Afghans to wage jihad against the American military; Afghans collaborating with the foreigners were threatened with death. Cassette tapes bearing the same message followed, amid rumours of a spring offensive. Scattered attacks by small Taliban groups across the south did indeed follow, militarily inconsequential but clearly ominous. On 27 March, gunmen in Uruzgan province held up traffic on the road to Kandahar and, while sparing Afghan travellers, singled out and executed a lone foreigner travelling with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Salvadorean aid worker Ricardo Mungia. The murder, ordered over a satellite phone connection by Taliban commander Dadullah, shocked the country and seized international attention (Gall, 2015, p. 70).

In June, another ominous development followed with the announcement by Mullah Omar of a new ten-man leadership council, which before long was to become known as the Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council) or Quetta Shura, based as it was in or near the Pakistani city of Quetta. In July a high-level meeting brought together senior Taliban leaders, AQ representatives and HIA chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to lay down strategy for the anti-American campaign. Given its long-standing relations with all three groups, there can be no doubt that the ISI was fully aware of the meeting. Indeed, by mid-2003, ISI officials were allegedly encouraging and cajoling unemployed Taliban commanders to return to Afghanistan, and where necessary supplying satellite phones and motorbikes to support the movement (Gall, 2015, pp. 72–74). With covert support from the ISI, the Taliban jihad was back in business.

Iraq and the Advent of the Suicide Bomber

It was a very different jihad to that of the 1990s, however. During the 1994–2001 period the Taliban waged semi-conventional military campaigns supported by a wide range of weaponry including armor and artillery, and often characterised by rapid movement. By contrast, the war of the so-called 'neo-Taliban' in the post-2002 period was an insurgency relying initially on intimidation, assassination and destabilisation along with hit-and-run attacks.

To that extent it mirrored the opening phase of many modern 'people's war' insurgencies; with one critical difference: the advent of the suicide bomber.

Suicide bombing was not an easy fit in traditional Afghan culture. As noted above, through the war of the 1980s, the civil war of the early 1990s and the Taliban campaigns of 1994–2001, the suicide bomber was entirely absent from the battlefield. Suicide was viewed as a sin in the light of Islamic scripture, and had no roots in Afghanistan's decidedly pragmatic military culture where tactics were grounded in the art of survival rather than the glorification of death. This was true on both an individual and a collective basis: the suicidal bravery or 'fanaticism' that during the 1980s saw Iran's *baseej* militia, clad in the white shrouds of martyrdom and dying in massed charges against Iraqi positions, were wholly alien to Afghan culture and the Afghan way of war (Winchester, 1989).[9]

Afghan pragmatism stood in sharp contrast to al-Qaeda's assiduous exploitation of elements of Arab culture to transform suicide into the ultimate sacrifice in the name of God. Even before AQ gained organisational traction, there are reports of Arab volunteers in Afghanistan in the late 1980s proposing the use of suicide bombers against communist forces but being turned down by Afghan commanders concerned over the possible backlash from local society.[10] Not by coincidence, the first recorded use of a suicide bomber in Afghanistan involved not an Afghan but a Tunisian, an AQ operative posing as a journalist who detonated a bomb concealed in a video camera to assassinate Ahmadshah Massoud on 9 September 2001. The 'cameraman' died in the blast while his accomplice was shot dead.

In the aftermath of al-Qaeda's retreat into the FATA and its reorganisation there, AQ formally endorsed the tactic with tape released by bin Laden in February 2003 calling for martyrdom operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Following two failed suicide attacks in Kabul in 2002 – both believed to have been carried out by foreigners – Afghanistan's first suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) attack occurred in June 2003 striking a bus carrying German troops. The professionalism of the attack led investigators to conclude it was the handiwork of Arabs. Two more suicide incidents followed in late December that year, one involving the death of five policemen in Kabul as they tried to arrest two foreigners described as either Arabs or Pakistanis. The second incident involved the successful arrest of two Pakistanis and an Afghan before they were able to execute an attack (Williams, 2008).

Three more attacks followed in 2004 all targeted at ISAF vehicles or foot patrols in Kabul. The first on 27 January involved the first apparently confirmed case of an Afghan bomber, described by the Taliban as one Hafez Abdullah from Khost on the Pakistan border. The second attack of 2004, the following day, was carried out by a Palestinian. The identity of the third bomber who killed himself in October is not clear (Williams, 2008).

It was 2005, however, which marked the real beginning of a concerted campaign of suicide bombing in Afghanistan. Events in Iraq where al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had adopted suicide bombing as a central tactic in attacks on US-led Western forces served as a powerful impetus. As one official of Kabul's intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), was quoted as saying; 'Had the Americans not invaded Iraq and created a jihadi training ground there, we would never have had these bombers here. This all comes to us as a result of America's war against (Saddam) Hussein' (Williams, 2008).

Opinions among Taliban leaders over the acceptability of the tactic were initially mixed, with many including Mullah Omar himself opposed to the 'sinful' tactic. Others, notably Mullah Dadullah and Jalaluddin Haqqani, were keen to adopt it. According to a report by Pakistani investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, in March 2005 a delegation sent by Zarqawi met with Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mullah Omar, which brought with it propaganda material justifying suicide bombings (Shahzad, 2006). It remains questionable whether such a convening of top-level figures could have happened without the ISI being at some level aware of it. As Pakistani clerics of the Deobandi school recognised by the Taliban began to endorse the tactic, the religious argument began to swing against the traditionalists. Beyond theology, however, the military utility of martyrdom operations after the shattering defeat of 2001 must also have carried weight, particularly for leaders with field responsibilities such as Dadullah and Haqqani: in an asymmetric struggle against a technologically superior enemy, the suicide bomber was both a battlefield leveller at the tactical level and a potent weapon of psychological warfare strategically.

At the same time, AQ's eager embrace of modern communications technology was pushing onto the back foot Taliban conservatives who in the 1990s had outlawed television, and as recently as August 2001 banned use of the internet. By 2004, Zarqawi's media blitz and internet propaganda campaign was being reflected in the Pakistan–Afghanistan theatre as video cassettes of jihadist attacks in Iraq, dubbed into Pashto, were widely distributed in the FATA. And there, as in cities across Afghanistan, new internet cafés were also opening. The first Afghan production involving the beheading of a victim followed in September 2004.

The Suicide Campaign

In 2005, 22 suicide attacks were recorded in Afghanistan; a notable increase on the three of 2004. But it was not until 2006 that the campaign gathered serious traction, with 139 attacks. The year 2007 saw a further dramatic jump, to 160 suicide attacks (Williams, 2008). Nevertheless, culture and tradition weighed

against the tactic among a large majority of young Afghan males. Arrests and interrogations indicated that the recruitment pool was overwhelmingly from the mosques and madrassahs of the Pakistani borderlands, where activists of Pakistani jihadist groups and religious parties served as recruiters and middlemen. In the early years of the campaign, many of those willing to sacrifice themselves were often physically disabled individuals attracted by promises of financial rewards for their families; or, in some cases, they were mentally retarded. And the rate of incidents in which suicide bombers managed to kill only themselves was notably high (Williams, 2008).

Noteworthy too was that during the first year of the campaigns, targets were typically military – patrols and bases of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – albeit with frequent civilian collateral damage. By 2008, however, the dynamic was shifting towards full-blown terrorism targeting unambiguously civilian targets. In November 2007, a suicide bomber or an improvised explosive device (IED) targeted the opening of a new factory in the central city of Baghlan, killing at least 75 people, 59 of them young school children brought to the ceremony by their teachers. In February 2008, another horrific attack in Kandahar city targeted civilians at a traditional dog fight, killing at least 80 and wounding nearly 100 others. Both attacks appeared to rely on a lethal new mixture of plastic explosives and ball-bearings.

By the turn of the decade there was no doubt that the Taliban had embraced the full gamut of AQ-style 'martyrdom operations' in which the slaughter of innocent civilians finds justification in the argument either that civilian casualties are unavoidable collateral damage in the righteous defence of a Muslim land against infidel invaders and their local apostate agents; or that deliberately targeted civilians are objectively speaking allies of the invader.[11]

Since then, terrorism in the shape suicide bombing has become a central weapon in the arsenal of a now sophisticated and geographically widespread Taliban insurgency aimed at driving Western military forces out of the country and toppling the US-backed government. In recent years there has been no reliable research profiling the socio-economic background of the typical Taliban suicide bomber. However, Taliban propaganda and evidence in the field suggest strongly that reliance on recruitment from among Afghan refugee communities in the Pakistani borderlands has shifted towards a far more streamlined and lethal system centred on military training camps inside Afghanistan, with bombers emerging from Taliban special forces units.

TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY

Overview

Since 2010, and particularly since the withdrawal of US combat forces in 2014, the conflict in Afghanistan has escalated sharply. As the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have struggled to respond, Taliban forces have extended their footprint across important areas of western, north-western, northern and northeastern parts of the country. Loosely estimated to number at least 60 000 combatants country-wide (Roggio, 2019), in early 2018 they were assessed as contesting or controlling 46 per cent of the country's 407 districts (45 controlled outright; 117 contested, usually implying that only the district centre remains in government hands) (Roggio and Gutowski, 2020).

From this hinterland, the insurgents have come close to overrunning several major cities, notably Kunduz in the north, Lashkargah in the south and Baghlan in central Afghanistan. The manifold shortcomings of the ANDSF, chronic political dysfunction in Kabul following contested election results in 2014 and 2019, and pervasive corruption in all areas of public life including the military, have only served to aggravate the imminence of the insurgent threat. Against this troubling backdrop, terrorism conducted overwhelmingly in the form of suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets has evolved into a more complex and more lethal instrument of the broader Taliban insurgency.

Since late 2014, the overall situation has been further exacerbated by the emergence in Afghanistan of a branch or 'province' (*wilayah*) of the Islamic State (IS) group, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), called after the historical name for contemporary Afghanistan, northern Pakistan and eastern Iran. With strongholds in eastern Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, the ISKP has drawn importantly on elements of the Pakistani Taliban Movement (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TPP) driven across the border by Pakistan Army operations against them in the FATA; and on disgruntled commanders from Afghanistan's mainstream Taliban. Their rise has brought them into direct and often bloody conflict with both the ANDSF supported by US airpower and special forces, and the far larger mainstream Taliban.

For their part, the ANDSF now confront a twin-pronged terrorist threat relying on different networks and directing their murderous efforts against somewhat different but often overlapping target sets. It is worth noting, however, that despite a commonality of terror tactics prioritising suicide bombers, one threat – that of the ISKP – has been defined by the US government as emanating from a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). At the same time, and for starkly political reasons – hopes that eventually it may be

possible to negotiate a political solution to the conflict – the Taliban has not been thus proscribed.

Taliban Terrorism

As noted, terrorist tactics employed by the mainstream Taliban are firmly rooted in the group's broader military and political objectives. While targeted assassinations of uncooperative political and religious leaders using small-arms or roadside IEDs continue, the sharp edge of Taliban terrorism invariably involves suicide bombings. In addition to attacks by individual suicide bombers, who in most cases require relatively little training, tactics have broadened to include increasingly sophisticated operations in which a suicide bomber, often using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), forms the point element in a complex *feday'i* (self-sacrificing) assault; or in which multiple suicide bombers carry out an *inghimasi* (immersion) attack. In such operations, well-trained combatants seek to 'immerse' themselves in the defences of a target, inflicting maximum casualties through the use of small-arms before either being killed or killing themselves by detonating suicide vests. Such attacks typically lead to protracted engagements, often lasting hours, gaining media coverage which conveys a more powerful political message.

Attacks involving suicide bombers acting alone or in broader *feday'i* or *inghimasi* operations have occurred across the country. However, there has been notable and growing focus on Kabul, where the political impact of military operations is strikingly amplified both nationally and internationally. An ongoing string of assaults has for extended periods turned central Kabul into the country's most active war zone.

The Haqqani Network
Many of the complex terror attacks in Kabul have been attributed to the so-called Haqqani Network. A wing of the Taliban which operates across the southeast of the country (Paktia, Paktika, Khost provinces, and parts of Logar and Ghazni) the Haqqani network is based on both sides of the border but has deep roots in North Waziristan around the town Miramshah where clan patriarch Jalaluddin Haqqani was based during the anti-Soviet war. Today the Haqqani network is commanded by his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, who ranks as deputy amir or No. 2 in the Taliban leadership along with Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar who died in 2013. The movement as a whole is headed by Mullah Habaitullah Akhund, who operates from the Quetta region. Since the anti-Soviet war the Haqqani Network has maintained close operational relations with the ISI. In a deposition to the US Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2011, then-Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike

Mullen, baldly described the group as 'acting as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency' (Bumiller and Perlez, 2011).

The impact of terror

Taliban terrorism has undoubtedly been effective at several distinct levels. Firstly, and most immediately, it has sapped the morale of the ANDSF, hardly robust at the best of times. This has been particularly the case with the police, who are less well trained and operationally more exposed than the army. As in Iraq, police stations and recruitment assemblies have been perennial targets for suicide bombers. Secondly, by means of relentless high-profile attacks against hotels, guest houses and embassies, Taliban terrorism has decimated the foreign presence in Afghanistan, and in Kabul in particular. Foreign commercial representation and many aid agencies have fled, while the mobility and access of those remaining has been crippled. Heavily defended diplomatic missions have also been severely constrained in what they can usefully achieve in terms of interacting with Afghan society. Behind a mantra of 'force protection' even North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military personnel have today largely abandoned movement on the roads of the capital in favour of helicopter transport.

The dramatic deterioration of the situation was succinctly, if cynically, summed up in a July 2017 comment by an American security contractor, based at Kabul's international airport but working at different locations across the city: 'It doesn't seem to have occurred to anybody that when enemy action forces you to commute to work by helicopter in a city serving as the capital of the puppet regime you installed, you've already lost the war.'[12] Predictably, the cumulative impact of the expulsion and constriction of the international presence in Kabul has been to increase the psychological isolation of the Afghan government. Finally, and not least, Taliban terrorism and the failure of the ANDSF to safeguard security even in the heart of the capital have severely eroded the credibility of an already largely dysfunctional government. The chronic inability to prevent massive attacks in the city centre has also increased the politically corrosive speculation around insider involvement by ANDSF personnel. The flurry of high-casualty attacks in 2018, and the increase in the operational tempo of ISKP in the capital, have only accentuated a trend that was discernible throughout 2019. It is difficult to gauge whether or how this might reach any type of tipping point.

ISKP Terrorism

Overview

The Khorasan Province branch of the Islamic State (ISKP) first emerged in Afghanistan in late 2014 and has since been centred in eastern Nangarhar prov-

ince. At its core, ISKP initially consisted of a group of disaffected commanders of the Pakistan Taliban Movement (TTP) who had fled across the border from the FATA to escape Pakistan Army offensives and settled in southern border districts of Nangarhar. They first declared their allegiance to Islamic State (IS) emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2014. Uzbek fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who had also been pushed out of bases in the FATA, and some of whom had returned from fighting in Syria, also comprised an important element of the group. In January 2015, IS spokesman and external operations official Mohammad al-Adnani formally endorsed the group as a province or *wilayah* of IS. Its first commander was Hafez Sa'eed Khan, who had earlier served as the TTP commander in the FATA's Orakzai Agency.

Given the weakness in Nangarhar of both the Kabul government and, more particularly, the Taliban, the ISKP grew to become a major force in the province, establishing a significant degree of territorial control. By the middle of 2015, the group was dominant in eight of the province's 22 districts. Following months of rising tension, major clashes with the Taliban – which ISKP scornfully dismissed as the 'ISI Emirate', in reference to the Pakistani military's support for the Taliban – broke out in May.

Characterised by beheadings and public executions, ISKP rule soon alienated swathes of the population. And in June and July, local Taliban – supported by well-trained elements from Paktia and Paktika provinces – launched a sweeping offensive. By year's end this campaign had reduced ISKP control to four key border districts: Achin, Deh Bala, Kot and Nazian (Osman, 2016). In other parts of the country, notably western Farah, southern Helmand and Zabol, and northern Balkh provinces, disgruntled Taliban commanders who had declared allegiance to the new movement were unable to establish territorial control and were gradually though not completely eliminated by the Taliban. In January 2016, one year after its formal endorsement by IS Central, the ISKP was declared an FTO by the US government; and in June its first emir, Sa'eed Khan, was killed in a US drone strike. In territorial terms the group largely held its own in 2016, while expanding its influence into eastern Kunar province to the north of Nangarhar, and attracting recruits from different areas of the country. It also began what has since expanded into a campaign of brutal terrorist strikes against civilian targets in Kabul and other cities (Osman, 2017) (see below).

Spring 2017 brought a full-scale offensive by the ANDSF code-named 'Operation Hamza', which was closely supported by US air strikes and special forces. The drive was focused on the Mamand and Pecha valleys in Achin district. On 13 March, the ISKP achieved a measure of global fame when for the first time the US dropped a GU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb on a complex of caves held by the insurgents blocking access to the Mamand valley. By an Afghan government count, the bomb killed 92

militants including a number of foreigners. Two weeks later on 27 March, the group's second emir, Abdul Hasib, was killed in a clash with joint Afghan–US forces (Osman, 2017). His successor, Abu Sayed, was killed in a US air strike in Kunar less than four months later on 11 July, a reflection of unremitting American determination to prevent the ISKP from gaining wider traction in eastern Afghanistan (Jocelyn, 2017). The severest setbacks faced by the group have been more recent. In November 2019, the ISKP was largely routed by the Taliban, first in its main Nangahar base and then in Kunar. In April 2020, Afghan state intelligence units in southern Kandahar province captured the group's emir Aslam Farooqi. Then in May its second-in-command, Omar Khorasani, was arrested north of Kabul. Against a backdrop of military defeat, leadership fragmentation and shrinking financial support from IS Central, the number of ISKP combatants country-wide was estimated to have plummeted by April 2020 to around 4000, or less than half of the total one year earlier (Giustozzi, 2020).

Facets of ISKP terrorism

ISKP terrorism has been characterised by three important facets. The first has been the group's viciously sectarian focus on Afghanistan's ethnic Hazara Shia community. Constituting some 13 per cent of a national population of approximately 34 million, the Hazaras are concentrated mainly in the Hazarajat region of Afghanistan's central highlands but have traditionally maintained a large community in Kabul. The ferocity of ISKP's sectarian bias – which sets it apart from the Taliban – has been largely an extension of the sectarianism of IS in Iraq and Syria, and the group's broad strategy of inciting sectarian conflict across the Islamic world. In the Afghan context, the ISKP has attempted to justify its anti-Shia animus by reference to the recruitment of Afghan Shia by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to serve as a militia – the so-called Fatemiyoun Brigade – alongside government forces in Syria.

Secondly, ISKP terrorism has also been characterised by the surprising strength of its networks and capabilities in Kabul. Attacks in the capital escalated sharply in 2017 and continued, albeit with a notable dip in 2019, into 2020. While it is difficult to gauge the internal dynamics of the movement with any real confidence, the wave of urban terror attacks appeared to mirror the pressure being brought to bear on ISKP provincial footholds. Coming in tandem with Taliban bombings, ISKP terrorism has underscored the dramatic collapse of security in a capital city where, since 2001, the population has ballooned from 1 million to around 5 million. The repercussions on the stability of a government already riven by chronic factionalism are potentially disastrous. Thirdly, ISKP terror attacks have to date have been carried out mostly by small cells of one or two attackers. This stands in contrast to Taliban urban terrorism, which has typically tended towards military-style *inghimasi* assaults often

involving larger numbers of tactically well-trained commandos. The differing attack profiles almost certainly reflect the very different military footprints of the two groups, with the Taliban militarily well entrenched in Wardak and Logar provinces on the doorstep of the capital, while ISKP's operational centre of gravity is further removed and under far greater pressure in Nangahar. Moreover, the Taliban's Haqqani Network has had well over a decade to establish a support network in the city, while the ISKP remains a relative newcomer.

FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Overview

In addition to the Afghan Taliban and the ISKP which are conducting terrorist campaigns inside Afghanistan, it is important to note that the chaotic conditions in the country have provided space to a significant number of transnational terrorist groups which use Afghan territory as a sanctuary and/or a base for training, organisation and wider operations in the region and beyond. Numbers and definitions remain fluid, although both US forces commander General John Nicholson and the Afghan government have settled on a figure of either 20 or 21 terrorist groups in the country. Most operate in loose alliances with the Taliban; one operates closely with the ISKP.

It should be noted that the figure of 20 or 21 would appear to be the highest possible total, arrived at by including groups with negligible operational presence and by defining organisational wings of a single group as two distinct entities: for example, counting al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) as two groups; or by separating the Haqqani Network from the Afghan Taliban (when in fact it has operated as an integral part of the Taliban). What can be safely said is that since the early 2000s Afghanistan has again emerged as a sanctuary and training base for a range of jihadist factions with regional and potentially global reach. At the same time, the fluid nature of the conflict in Afghanistan today is such as to preclude the establishment of well-organised terrorist infrastructure of the type seen in the late 1997–2001 period when the Taliban held Kabul.

Terrorist Organisations

Foreign terrorist groups represented in Afghanistan can be broadly divided into the following categories.

Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Established in September 2014 against the backdrop of rising IS prestige, AQIS was led by Asim Umar, an Indian-born but Pakistani-trained jihadist militant. Appointed by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, he was killed in September 2019 in a joint Afghan–US operation in the Taliban stronghold of Musa Qala, Helmand province; a loss which dealt a heavy blow to AQIS. More broadly, however, AQ evidently retains a significant presence in Afghanistan and remains closely embedded with the Taliban. Al-Zawahiri has sworn allegiance to a string of Taliban emirs from Mullah Omar onwards, and AQ is understood to operate several training camps. Given its dependence on Taliban hospitality, the potential for AQ to use its foothold in Afghanistan to prosecute future international operations remains unclear.

Pakistani terrorist organisations
Pakistani foreign fighters operating in and out of Afghanistan are loosely estimated by the United Nations to number 6000–6500, divided between several groups.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
Since being pushed onto the defensive by sustained Pakistan Army operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2014 and 2015, the Pakistani Taliban Movement or TTP retreated across the border into Afghanistan, where some of its commanders announced allegiance to ISKP while others remained loyal to the parent organisation. Led currently by Nur Wali Mehsud, the TTP is assessed to be the largest Pakistani faction camped inside Afghanistan.

Jamaat ul-Ahrar
The JuA or 'Association of the Free' broke away from the larger TTP in 2014 to conduct a string of independent high-profile terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Like the TTP it sought sanctuary from Pakistan Army operations inside Afghanistan, although it too was targeted there by US drone strikes. In August 2020 the TTP announced that the JuA was rejoining the parent group with a view to consolidating an evidently flagging terrorist campaign inside Pakistan.

Lashkar-e-Islam
A small group originally based in the Khyber area west of Peshawar, Lashkar migrated to Nazian district of Afghanistan's Nangarhar province and is closely allied with the ISKP. The extent to which it has survived intense operations against the ISKP in Nangarhar in late 2019 and spring 2020 is unclear.

Lashkar-e-Taiba
The military wing of what was once Markaz al-Dawat w'al-Ershad but has now been re-branded Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), LeT is understood to have maintained links both with the Afghan Taliban and AQ/AQIS. It has also benefited from a close and long-standing relationship with the ISI.

Jaish-e-Mohammad
Another Pakistan-based group with known ties to the ISI, JeM is also able to operate inside Afghanistan, but is unlikely to maintain a presence in the country on the scale of LeT.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi-e-Alaami
This small but virulently anti-Shia faction splintered from the larger Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which was proscribed in Pakistan in 2001 after a series of sectarian massacres and bombings. Based in the southern border province of Zabol, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi-e-Alaami's anti-Shia agenda has seen it making common cause with the ISKP, reportedly in attacks on both sides of the border.

Harakat ul-Mujahideen
Since defections to Massood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad after the establishment of the latter in 2000, HuM has been significantly weakened. Its main focus of operations remains Kashmir, but the group has access to training camps in Afghanistan which is probably ongoing.

Central Asian terrorist organisations

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Despite a long history of fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, and in 2001 retreating with those groups into the Pakistani tribal areas, much of the IMU declared allegiance to the ISKP in 2015. However, some parts of the organisation retained the group's original name and remain active with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan as both combatants and instructors.

The Islamic Jihad Union
Founded in 2002 as a splinter from the IMU, the IJU is mainly composed of ethnic Turks from Turkey and Western Europe, but includes Uzbekistanis and other Central Asians and some Western converts to Islam. Far smaller than the IMU, it operates with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in northern Afghanistan.

The Imam Bukhari Jamaat
Also known as the Katibaat Imam al-Bukhari, after a 9th century Islamic scholar from Bukhara in today's Uzbekistan, the group is composed mainly of

Uzbekistanis and has been primarily active in northwest Syria. Having sworn allegiance to the Afghan Taliban it also maintains a small presence in northern Afghanistan.

The Turkistan Islamic Party/East Turkestan Islamic Movement
Composed mainly of ethnic Uighurs from western China, the TIP operates both in northwestern Syria where it has established a significant presence as well as in northeastern Afghanistan. Probably numbering only a few hundred fighters, it operates closely under the Taliban umbrella**.**

Iranian terrorist organisations

Jundullah
A Sunni faction based in Iranian Baluchistan, reportedly represented in north-western and northern Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Despite some progress in negotiations between the United States and the Taliban in 2020, the process remains precariously balanced with the chances of its stalling or collapsing altogether all too real. Indeed, to imagine that there is any prospect of a stable peace in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future would be naive. Sadly, the mass-casualty terrorism that has escalated over the past decade, to become a default tactic employed by both main Islamist groups challenging the US-backed government in Kabul, is likely to remain an unchanging staple of the conflict.

In the Taliban camp, notwithstanding early doubts by a different generation of leaders over the acceptability of suicide bombing in Islam, the tactic is one that has served the movement well in its persistent efforts to militarily weaken and politically destabilise the government. As it continues to push for the complete withdrawal of American forces from the country, this reality will not change.

The efficacy of mass-casualty terrorism as a tool of destabilisation is even more true for the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) group, which has far fewer claims to popular support than the Taliban. Indeed, in the case of the ISKP with its viciously anti-Shia agenda, the use of suicide bombings as a catalyst to ignite wider sectarian conflict will remain central to its campaign. And despite recent setbacks, it would undoubtedly be a mistake to underestimate the resilience of the group and its capacity for further terrorist atrocities in Kabul.

Finally, the wider challenge raised by the presence in Afghanistan of a range of foreign terrorist groups, most of which have found sanctuary under the

Taliban banner, is one that has seldom received sufficient attention in media commentary. Ideologically and militarily firmly embedded with its Taliban hosts, and still at the centre of an extensive radical network, al-Qaeda poses the primary threat to stability at the global level. But it would be premature to dismiss the potential of the ISKP to provide its parent grouping with a base for reorganisation following its defeat in Syria and Iraq. This would be particularly true were the Taliban to reach a peace deal with the United States that triggered significant defections to its more militant rival.

Closer to Afghanistan's own borders, the presence of Pakistani terrorist groups linked to the Pakistan military's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) also poses real risks to the precarious stability of Indian-administered Kashmir. Should the ISI seek to increase pressure on India in the disputed state, both Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) offer a cadre of experienced Afghan-based operatives ready to re-ignite anti-Indian militancy.

It remains a sobering and remarkable reality that in 2020, after two decades of US-led military intervention and a 'Global War on Terror', Afghanistan remains perhaps to an even greater degree what it was in 2001: the world's most threatening epicentre of Islamist terrorist endeavour.

NOTES

1. Author's interviews with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Peshawar, 1983 and 1984.
2. Author's interviews with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Peshawar 1983 and 1984; and Ahmadshah Massoud, northern Afghanistan, 1989–1991.
3. Dupree's unrivalled overview of the land, people and pre-war history of Afghanistan provides a good summation of its ethnic complexity.
4. In a decade of war between 1979 and 1989 the mujahideen were never able to capture a provincial capital. Arguably the only mujahideen commander who thought in national-strategic terms was Ahmadshah Massoud, who between 1983 and 1989 built a mainly Tajik coalition of mujahideen fronts across much of the northeast.
5. Author's own encounters with Arab fighters and interviews at the siege of Jalalabad, March–April 1989.
6. Author's multiple interviews with Ahmadshah Massoud in northern Afghanistan between 1981 and 2001. Massoud's deep-rooted suspicions of the machinations of the Pakistani military and the ISI constituted a leitmotif of his political worldview.
7. Author's observations at the siege of Khost, April 1990. See also Winchester (1991).
8. Author's observations on the front line north of Kabul where US operatives equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) target designators directed air strikes from high-altitude B-52 bombers onto Taliban positions less than 500 metres away. Taliban defences collapsed on the afternoon of 12 November, and Northern Alliance forces entered the city the following morning.
9. This article offers a graphic description of mujahideen fighters confronting conventional warfare for the first time.

10. Author's interviews with mujahideen commanders in Nangahar province, May 1988.
11. Al-Qaeda, and by extension the Taliban, have been broadly guided by Osama bin Laden's so-called *fatwa* or ruling of 1998 in which he urged Muslims to 'kill the Americans and their allies, civilian and military'. Bin Laden's lack of clerical credentials that might have underpinned the weight of such a ruling has been less important than his legendary standing in the jihadist community writ large. At the same time, qualified Islamic clerics, most notably the Qatari Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have sought to draw a distinction between terrorism and 'martyrdom operations' which constitute a legitimate act of self-defence and are thus a legitimate form of resistance.
12. Email to the author from a colleague with nearly 20 years' experience working in Afghanistan.

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7.   Iraq

Paul Burke

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Iraq is one of the oldest civilisations in the world, if not the oldest (Gibson, 2003). By the 16th century, most of Iraq had been brought under control of the Ottoman empire, and by 1831 the Ottomans had seized complete control of Iraq, retaining it until the dissolution of the empire after World War I (Tripp, 2000, pp. 13–19). Iraq then passed to British control under the British Mandate of Mesopotamia, until 1932 when Iraq became independent (Tripp, 2000, pp. 31, 52–58). In July 1958, Abd al Karim Qasim seized power in a coup and announced a new Republic of Iraq, officially ending the monarchy. In 1963, Qasim was himself the victim of a coup launched by the Ba'ath Party, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif. In 1968 another coup followed, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr who seized power on behalf of the secular Ba'ath Party. Al-Bakr appointed himself President of Iraq, and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

In July 1979, Saddam Hussein instigated a coup of his own and seized power, forcing al-Bakr to resign. Saddam took over the roles of President of Iraq and Chairman of the RCC, and one year later in 1980 he led Iraq into an eight-year war with neighbouring Iran (Subrahmanyam, 1980). The Iran–Iraq war resulted in huge numbers of dead and injured, and infrastructural devastation on both sides, but it ended with almost no territorial advantage gained by either side (Mofid, 1990, p. 133; PBS Frontline, 2002; Potter and Sick, 2004, p. 2; Hiro, 2006, p. 234). Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, seizing control of the country and claiming it as Iraq's 19th province. In response, a build-up of troops and military materiel followed, to support a United States (US)-led coalition of countries opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 678, the coalition launched a ground offensive in January 1991, codenamed Operation Desert Storm, that routed Iraq's Armed Forces and destroyed a significant amount of Iraq's military capability (UNSC, 1990).[1]

Following the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, various control measures were put in place to institute a containment policy against Saddam

Hussein's regime. These measures included the use of United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection teams (known as UNSCOM, later UNMOVIC) working on the disarmament of Iraq (United Nations, 2017). This inspection regime was conducted under the authority of another UN resolution, UNSCR 687, aimed at ensuring that Iraq had no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that Iraq could not develop such weapons (UNSC, 1991).

Other measures were implemented, such as the no-fly zones which prohibited Iraq from using its aircraft in the north and south of the country, initially to protect the Kurdish and Shia minorities, respectively (Childs, 1998). Some years after the 1991 invasion, the US policy aim of removing Saddam from power, and replacing him with a more democratically elected successor, was formally enshrined in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (US Congress, 1998). This also provided the US President with the ability to fund Iraqi opposition groups which might be suitable successors to Saddam (US Congress, 1998, sec. 3). The year 1998 also saw the launch of Operation Desert Fox, which involved a four-day bombing campaign against a raft of Iraqi targets, in response to Iraq's refusal to permit previously agreed UN inspections of the Ba'ath Party Headquarters to take place (Youngs and Oakes, 1999).

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US increased the focus and pace of its investigations into Iraq's WMD capabilities. In October 2002, the US government passed legislation authorising the use of force against Iraq (US Congress, 2002), following which the UN weapons inspection teams (UNMOVIC) returned to Iraq to continue their inspection and verification work. In the US administration there was a strong push for military action against Iraq, with the primary justification being the probable existence of Iraqi WMD capabilities. Much of the material concerning Iraq's involvement in WMD came from a HUMINT source codenamed Curveball.[2] The source was handled exclusively by the German Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), with the derived information and intelligence being passed on to the CIA as a third party. Curveball's reporting was deeply flawed and was subsequently proved to be false (Drogin, 2007).

After assembling a coalition of partner nations, the US-led invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003. On 1 May 2003, US President George W. Bush formally declared an end to combat operations in Iraq (Murphy, 2003). Despite the optimism, there was no clear end to combat operations, just as there was no clear beginning to the violent insurgency in Iraq.

PROTAGONISTS

Iraq has a complex cast of protagonists, most of which are armed, some of which are political, but all are nevertheless important within the wider, geopolitical context of Iraq as a zone of conflict.

Fedayeen Saddam and the Ba'athists

A paramilitary organisation established in Iraq some years after the first Gulf War of 1991 (Otterman, 2003), the organisation was broadly similar in composition and aims to the Iranian Basij paramilitary group, and it is possible that the inspiration for the Fedayeen Saddam came from Iraq's long-term enemy, Iran. The group's primary role was the protection of the President and his family, and unlike other branches of the Armed Forces their loyalty was sworn to Saddam Hussein, not to Iraq. This force was originally controlled by Saddam's son Uday; it was later transferred to Saddam's other son Qusay, then eventually back to Uday (Cordesman, 2003, p. 14). Trained in guerrilla warfare, and numbering around 40 000 members (Otterman, 2003; Windle, 2003), they were to delay any foreign invasion force, to provide sufficient time for negotiations to take place which would ensure the survival of Saddam Hussein as President of Iraq. Former members of Iraq's secular Ba'ath Party also joined in the armed resistance to the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003. Disillusioned with the speed at which the Iraqi Armed Forces collapsed in the warfighting phase, many Ba'athists carried out attacks in collaboration with the Fedayeen Saddam (Tucker, 2013, p. 268).

The Sunnis

The initial, non-military resistance to the US-led invasion came primarily from Sunni quarters, as the main resistance was from those elements of the Saddam regime who were fighting to repel the invaders, to maintain the status quo of Saddam's government, and to delay the coalition's military progress for long enough to provide for the expected negotiations to take place, which would eventually see Saddam and his government returned to power.

Less than three months after the declaration of the end of combat operations by Bush, the US Secretary of State for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, described the insurgents as 'dead-enders' and implied that the insurgency itself was on its last legs (DefenseLink, 2007). The complexity of the Sunni insurgency, however, was more than just a sub-stratum of pro-Saddam, pro-Ba'athist loyalists who refused to accept that the old order was over.

Eisenstadt and White capture this complexity with their analysis of the wider Sunni insurgency, describing the eclectic range of actors as including 'former regime members and Iraqi Islamists, foreign jihadists, angry or aggrieved Iraqis, tribal groups, and criminals, who draw considerable strength from political and religious ideologies, tribal notions of honor and revenge, and shared solidarities deeply ingrained in Iraq's Sunni Triangle', and this only covers the Sunni insurgency (Eisenstadt and White, 2005, p. xi). The ascendancy of figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and his Tawheed

wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) group, were a clear example that the Sunni insurgency was nowhere close to being in a terminal phase from 2003 to 2005.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi/AQI/ISI/ISIS

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, formed an Islamist group called Tawheed wal-Jihad sometime in the late 1990s, with a primary aim of over-throwing the Jordanian monarchy (Zelin, 2014, p. 1). Having been arrested and jailed in Jordan, he was eventually released, whereupon he travelled to Afghanistan and established a terrorist training camp in Herat province in 1998. He fought with the Taliban against the US-led invasion in 2001, and managed to escape from Afghanistan, probably into Iran. At some point before the 2003 invasion, it is believed that Zarqawi eventually arrived in Iraq.[3]

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi and his group were active in conducting attacks against coalition forces, especially against US troops. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda franchise then re-branded his group as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The AQI group became one of the most lethal and high-profile terrorist groups of its time, in large part due to Zarqawi's tactic of kidnapping civilians, releasing video footage of the hostages wearing orange jumpsuits (a reference to the inmates held at Guantanamo Bay), and taunting politicians and leaders with impossible demands, before beheading the hostages on camera.

The relationship between Zarqawi and AQ does not appear to have been an easy one, and although Zarqawi publicly acknowledged AQ as being in overall command of the campaign in Iraq, in practice he followed his own path. Both Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden's deputy) had different visions of the most suitable way to achieve the Caliphate. Zawahiri focused on the long game of forcing military defeat on the US and its allies, especially within Muslim lands, and was content for the Caliphate to be achieved at some point in the future, in accordance with AQ's grand strategy.

Zarqawi was not content to wait, and believed that the most suitable way to achieve victory, and the re-establishment of the Caliphate, was to target the Shia population, thus creating a backlash against his own Sunni people. This tactic was aimed at persuading Iraqi Sunnis that Zarqawi's group was their only real defender, and thus their best source of protection. To speed up this process, Zarqawi conducted false-flag operations, targeting Sunni areas with attacks to corral the general perception of the Sunnis that they were under sustained attack from the Shia. The viciousness with which Zarqawi operated resulted in massive global media coverage of his group and their methods, but it also put him in confrontation with the senior leadership of AQ.

A letter in 2005 assessed to be from Zawahiri to Zarqawi revealed the wider, four-stage AQ strategy for Iraq: first, to expel US forces from Iraq; second, to create an Islamic emirate, ideally encompassing as much of Iraq as possible;

third, to spread AQ's jihad to Iraq's secular neighbours; fourth, to confront Israel (Whittaker, 2005). The tone of the letter was more condescending than authoritative, asking Zarqawi rhetorical questions about the effectiveness of his strategy of killing the Shia, and querying whether this anti-Shia effort was not a distraction to carrying out the AQ grand plan. The letter made it clear that Zawahiri, and also AQ by logical extension, did not agree with Zarqawi's strategy and tactics. Zarqawi was eventually killed by a US air strike on a safe-house he was using near to Baqubah, in June 2006 (Caldwell, 2006).

Although the first of the above AQ aims had not been achieved by 2006, it did not stop the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and other associated groups from announcing the formation of the 'Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI) in October of that year (Kfir, 2015, pp. 7–8). The Shia population continued to be targeted just as severely by AQI, who considered the Shia to be heretical. Zarqawi was replaced by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadist who assumed command of AQI. When the formation of ISI was declared, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi was appointed (reputedly by al-Masri) to run the newly formed entity. Both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed in the same counter-terrorism operation in April 2010, when a joint force of US and Iraqi Special Forces attacked a safe-house outside Tikrit.

The Sunni 'Awakening'

By 2005, the Sunni tribes in Anbar province in particular were looking inwards for their own protection. Many males from the province, especially former Iraqi military ones, had taken an active part in the resistance against the US-led invasion. There are various theories concerning the genesis of the Awakening movement. The worsening violence in Anbar, the loss of control over traditional smuggling routes, the extreme actions of groups such as AQI, and disillusionment with what the post-Saddam Iraq was metamorphosing into, were all plausible factors in the Awakening movement's *raison d'être*.

For certain, the tension between the Albu Mahal and al-Salmani tribes was a prominent factor in the origins of the movement, containing as it did, elements of all four of the above factors. The Albu Mahals were being forced out of the smuggling business in their traditional areas, by the Al Salmanis. Having controlled the illicit flow of goods and people (including jihadist foreign fighters, funds for the various groups and an array of military materiel) across the Syria–Iraq border in the vicinity of Al Qaim, the Albu Mahal were commercially threatened by the takeover of their enterprise by the Al Salmanis.

As the Al Salmanis were aligned with AQ, the conflict rapidly became violent, with a number of prominent tribal figures from the Albu Mahals being kidnapped and/or killed. The increasing local violence, together with the lack of any meaningful government intervention, led the Albu Mahals to begin negotiations with US commanders in their area. A decision was taken

to provide light weapons and funding for the Albu Mahal and a number of other tribes, to assist the US troops in countering the presence of AQ in Anbar (Montgomery, 2009; Najim and Stirling, 2010; Mansour, 2016). As the Albu Mahal and other tribes were almost exclusively Sunni, it was a remarkable step change in co-opting localised, Sunni support in the fight against AQ.

This resulted in a loose federation of Sunni tribes engaging in a more coordinated, armed resistance to the Islamist groups who were using Anbar as both a staging post on the 'Jihadi highway' from Syria into Iraq, as well as for the establishment of a large swathe of relatively safe operating space away from coalition presence. The tribes had risen against AQ on a number of previous occasions, but these had generally been unsuccessful.[4] Assessed to number between 65 000 and 80 000 active fighters at the height of the Awakening (Rubin and Cave, 2007), the Awakening movement encompassed more than 40 tribes from the entire province of Anbar, thus representing the vast majority of them (Pittman, 2007).

The Shia

The foundations for the Shia insurgency were laid decades ago, with a key milestone being the formation of the Dawa Party (also referred to as the Islamic Call Party). Dawa is an Islamic party formed in the 1950s, and based on the preachings and ideologies of Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, who pressed for a return to Islamic values in society and for the imposition of an Islamic government in Iraq. The Sadrist ideology was strongly Iraqi nationalist and equally strongly anti-Iranian in the 1980s and 1990s. Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr was the cousin of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, and was the father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr (the current leader of the Sadrist movement). His preachings and theories appealed widely to the Iraqi Shia, especially to the poor and the working class. After repeatedly falling foul of Saddam Hussein's government, he was finally executed in 1980 following a marked increase in Shia agitation which started the previous year (Norton, 2009, p. 30).

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr Corps (or Organisation or Brigades)

In 1982, various Dawa rejectionists, together with a number of other smaller Shia groups, founded the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) under the leadership of Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, who was a co-founder of Dawa, and who worked closely with Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr. SCIRI was formed while Hakim was living in exile in Iran. The creation of a military wing followed, variously referred to at different points in time as the Badr Organisation, the Badr Corps and the Badr Brigades. Based in Iran until the fall of the Saddam regime, the organisation was also funded,

trained and equipped by Iran. Many officers in the organisation were Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) officers, and they have been described as being 'organizationally indistinguishable from the IRGC' (Abedin, 2003). After the 2003 invasion, they joined in the fighting against Saddam loyalists, especially in the province of Diyala.

Following the end of the Allied military campaign (Operation Desert Storm) in 1991, the Shia minority living in the south of the country took the opportunity to demonstrate their displeasure with the Saddam regime, while the Iraqi military was severely weakened by the warfighting.[5] The demonstrations mushroomed into an uprising that quickly spread across the south, where the government lost control of more than ten cities. SCIRI sent a large number of armed members from Iran into Iraq, to support the uprising. Saddam deployed Republican Guard units to the south to quell the insurrection, as these units were the only ones remaining that were relatively combat-effective. By early April, the Shia uprising had been put down (Nakash, 2003, p. 227). After the 2003 invasion, SCIRI became extremely active politically within Iraq, joining the Shia coalition of the National Iraqi Alliance, which also included the Dawa Party, Iraqi Hezbollah and a raft of other, smaller parties.

Jaysh al-Mehdi (JAM)/Muqtada al-Sadr

The Mehdi Army (usually referred to as Jaysh al-Mehdi, or JAM) was formed by Muqtada al-Sadr shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Muqtada al-Sadr is the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Sadr who founded the Sadrist movement, and although Muqtada did not formally inherit the Sadrist movement on the death of his father he nevertheless managed to take control of it, through a combination of patronage, luck and force of personality. At the same time as the battle for Baghdad was raging between coalition and Iraqi forces, Muqtada al-Sadr received a key token of support which coincided with events in a very fluid, fast-moving, political environment.

On 7 April 2003, Sadr's primary Iranian mentor and supporter, Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha'eri, made a formal announcement nominating Sadr as his deputy in Iraq. This was significant because Sadr did not have the necessary theological qualifications, experience and respect necessary (for the Shia tradition) to allow him to assume the leadership mantle from his father. As the other key leadership figures from the inner circle of Sadr's father all looked to the same religious mentor, the decision established Sadr as the *de facto* successor to his father, and the *de jure* leader of the Sadrist movement. The following day, on 8 April, al-Ha'eri pronounced a *fatwa* instructing the Shia of Iraq to seize power in the country. Muqtada established the JAM in August 2004, while he was still under the shadow of an Iraqi government arrest warrant for his involvement in the murder of the exiled cleric Abdel Majid al-Khoei, who had recently returned to Iraq from London. Al-Khoei was notable in that he was

the grandson of the Shia religious figure who was instrumental in an earlier uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991, after the end of Operation Desert Storm (Garamone, 2004).

As a direct result of his involvement in the murder of al-Khoei, and the outstanding arrest warrant against him, Sadr and his political machinery were excluded from the interim power-sharing executive, the Iraqi Governing Council. Following this exclusion, Sadr began a drive to expand and train his own militia. The template for Sadr's JAM appears to closely mirror that of the Lebanese Hezbollah in that it was a populist, nationalist movement concentrated at grass-roots level, with a strong advocacy of the provision of social services, social welfare, urban and rural enhancement projects, and a strong drive to integrate the movement's political ideology into the social and welfare fabric of the local infrastructure.

Muqtada established the JAM ostensibly for three reasons: to protect the Shia in Iraq, to help remove the coalition forces from Iraq, and ultimately to establish a Shia state in Iraq. Young Shia men quickly responded to the call to join, and at its height in 2006 the JAM was believed to number around 40 000 active members, with even more sympathisers (BBC, 2006). Sadr then embarked upon an Iraq-wide expansion programme to open offices across all the major cities, for the organisation called the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS). Tensions with the coalition forces quickly increased and a major clash occurred in April 2004, close to Najaf, leaving more than 20 dead. Sadr then called on his followers to 'terrorise your enemy, God will reward you well for what pleases him' (McCarthy, 2004).

From 2004 to 2008, the JAM formed the primary arm of the Shia insurgency, especially in southern Iraq where their traditional heartland lay. Sadr took the war to the coalition and in the British sector of operations, in Basra (and as far North as al-Amarah in Maysan province) a sustained campaign of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes was waged against British forces. US forces were equally targeted in other provinces. Sadr promoted the JAM as the most effective provider of personal and communal security to the Shia. As the JAM expanded to a point where it became integral to Shia society in Iraq, a more unsavoury aspect of the JAM also expanded commensurately, viz. the ascendance of the so-called 'death squads'. The sharp increase in killings of Sunnis, especially from areas traditionally associated with officials of the former Saddam regime (for example, the Mansour area of Baghdad), resulted in unwelcome global awareness of the issue. A former Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Office in Baghdad stated that the majority of the more than 7000 bodies received by Baghdad mortuary, in just a few months, bore 'signs of summary execution – many with their hands tied behind their back. Some showed evidence of torture, with arms and leg joints broken by electric drills' (John Pace, cited in Steele, 2006).

The Iraqi Armed Forces

Before the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi Armed Forces had an assessed strength of around 389 000 full-time troops (Cordesman, 2003, p. 2; Windle, 2003). Following large losses during the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi Armed Forces were disbanded by the order of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under CPA order number 2 (Bremer, 2003). A new Iraqi Armed Forces was built up, almost from scratch, which resulted in a massive programme of recruiting, equipping, training and mentoring of the new troops. The bulk of this effort was led by the US military, apart from in Basra in Southern Iraq, where the United Kingdom (UK) took the lead in the training and mentoring (Iron, 2013, pp. 55–58). By the summer of 2014, the recruitment and training programme had resulted in a troop strength of around 193 000 Iraqis, at an estimated cost of $25 billion (*Telegraph*, 2014b).

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Units (post-2003)

The priority to create an indigenous Iraqi counter-terrorism unit was identified as early as the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom II (O'Brien, 2012, para. 4), which aimed at rotating out the combat troops who had fought in the warfighting phase of the 2003 invasion (Keane, 2003). The task fell to the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which was filtered down to specialist SOCOM units such as the United States Army Special Operations Forces, or ARSOF, which assumed the lead role in the training mission (O'Brien, 2012, para. 5).

The first Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) were formed in 2003, and the first graduates of a newly designed Operator Training Course finished training in April 2004. By 2006, a formal hierarchy had been created, with a Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) sitting at the top level, underneath which was the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC) that had operational control of the ISOF battalions (JFSOCC-I, 2010, pp. 4–5). A steady increase in recruitment and training continued the expansion of ISOF and many of the Iraqi operators were participants in the major battles to clear Basra of the JAM and other militias, in Operation Charge of the Knights (Iron, 2013; Witty, 2016, p. 7). By 2016, the expansion in manpower had led to CTS having an established strength of 649 staff, and CTC having an established strength of 1824 staff (JFSOCC-I, 2010, p. 10).

Foreign Fighters (FFs)

One report assesses that by 2015, as many as 31 000 foreigners had travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight for the jihadist groups, but this is likely to err on the

low side, given the difficulties of collecting accurate statistics in such an environment (Soufan Group, 2015, p. 4). More than 5000 of these FFs came from European Union countries, but there is an internal density within the figures which shows that 3700 of these European FFs came from just four countries: in order of magnitude, these were France, the UK, Germany and Belgium (Soufan Group, 2015, p. 12). Such fighters not only swell the numbers of the combat troops available to the terrorist groups, but they also create a potential 'fifth column' upon their return to their countries of origin, which is of major concern to the intelligence and security agencies of countries which have been traditional suppliers of FFs. In 2019, official US estimates of foreign fighters in Iraq were around 2000 (*Armed Conflict Survey*, 2020, p. 23)

The Kurds

The Kurds are estimated to constitute between 15 and 20 per cent of Iraq's total population. They are an integral component of the concept of Iraq as a zone of conflict, as their various armed groups have fought against the Armed Forces of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria, as well as more latterly against the so-called Islamic State. In addition to these state-level conflicts, the Kurdish groups have also fought against each other. Their traditional territory encompasses parts of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Armenia (BBC News, 2016).

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is probably the largest Kurdish group within Iraq's borders. The party is led by Masoud Barzani, who has been President of the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan since 2005. The Iraqi Constitution adopted after the revolution in 1958 did provide for recognition of Kurdish as a nationality, but it was eventually dropped. This resulted in the KDP engaging in armed rebellion with the Iraqi government. Various cease-fires came and went with no lasting effect.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was formed in 1975 by Jalal Talabani, following his split with the KDP. It is considered the second-largest of the Kurdish groups in Iraq. The political differences between Barzani and Talabani manifested themselves in various bouts of internecine conflict, such as the Fratricide Wars from 1994 to 1998. More than one major, political volte-face happened during this conflict. Talabani was elected President of Iraq in 2005.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a Kurdish group formed in the early 1970s that has fought a long-term, armed conflict with Turkey. Although its main focus is on the creation of a separate Kurdish state within Turkey, it is an actor in the Iraq zone of conflict due to its use of Iraqi territory as a safe haven, a tactic which has resulted in repeated armed incursions by Turkey into Iraqi territory. The PKK is a predominantly Marxist group.

Iran and Iranian Surrogates

Iran has played a very important, but at times very subtle, role in the post-invasion environment of Iraq. Skilled in the use of proxies to further its political aims, Iran has directed the activities of a range of actors in support of its external agenda. Sadr's JAM was a direct beneficiary of funding, support and guidance from senior clerical figures such as Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha'eri. The Badr Brigades/Corps/Organisation was so closely integrated into the Iranian Armed Forces that it could have passed as an indigenous unit. Hezbollah (Lebanese, as well as other derivatives), enjoyed direct funding, receipt of sophisticated military equipment, and direct support from IRGC when necessary.

Iranian operatives from special forces units, such as the Quds Force, have been compromised and arrested in Iraq, including senior leaders such as Mahmoud Farhaid who was identified as being involved in the clandestine trafficking of weapons from Iran to insurgent groups (Bauer, 2007). Iranian mentoring and support to anti-coalition groups was evidenced in a rapid increase in the accuracy of the frequent mortar attacks launched against Sunni neighbourhoods, marketplaces used by all religious faiths, coalition bases and the Green Zone in Baghdad. Also noteworthy was the transfer of lethal technological capabilities in the manufacturing and deployment of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) (Wilson, 2007).[6]

US Forces and Coalition Forces

The US provided the largest contingent of troops in the 'Coalition of the Willing' which conducted the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US contribution was around 150 000 troops for the invasion phase, followed by the UK which contributed around 45 000 troops, then Australia with around 2000 troops, and Poland with 194 troops. In all, 49 nations provided troops,[7] although only four of these provided troops for the actual ground invasion (the USA, the UK, Australia and Poland), with the remainder providing troops after the completion of the invasion in support roles. By the final withdrawal of US combat troops in August 2010, the US had lost 4487 personnel, the UK had lost 179 personnel, Poland had lost 23 personnel, and Australia had lost two personnel. The numbers of US forces largely remained somewhere between 100 000 to 150 000 throughout the main US deployment in Iraq, although this was bolstered by the additional 30 000 troops that constituted 'the Surge'.

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

Since 2003, the nature of the conflict in Iraq has traversed a wide scale of methods, justifications and complexity, beginning with battlefield combat between uniformed protagonists which generally conformed to the laws of international armed conflict; through to a variety of insurgent and terrorist campaigns which targeted innocent individuals in an effort to coerce support from the population; to the wholesale targeting of ethno-religious groupings of all those who were deemed to constitute the opposition or the enemy. The ground invasion of Iraq was carried out between 19 March and 30 April 2003. The military operation itself was a swift affair and, with some exceptions, the Iraqi ground forces collapsed relatively quickly in the face of the Allied operation. At this point the conflict in Iraq was one between state-level Armed Forces, generally well disciplined and uniformed. Since the end of the first Gulf War of 1990–1991, Saddam and his inner circle had long planned on countering any ground invasion through a series of delaying strategies and tactics, all designed to buy time at the negotiating table which would hopefully allow for the continued existence of their regime (Borger, 2003). One of these tactics was the use of harassing forces such as the Fedayeen Saddam.

As the coalition advanced further into Iraq, and as Iraqi ground forces were defeated, the supply and communication lines necessary to support the advancing units became longer and more thinly stretched. The tactic of attacking these stretched supply lines was a classic one of harrying the opponent, requiring more resources to be deployed in a force protection capacity, and generally contributing to the debilitation of the overall advance. The fedayeen employed a range of tactics, including IEDs, armed ambushes, rocket and mortar attacks, and sniping engagements to attrit the coalition forces on their advance to Baghdad. They were also supported by disgruntled elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces who still wanted to fight the occupying coalition forces. In December 2003, US convoys were ambushed twice as they transited through Samarra. The ambushes turned into pitched battles, resulting in 46 of the attackers killed and six US members injured. Unusually, the ambushers were mainly wearing the uniform of the fedayeen, possibly to broadcast a clear message to the local population that there was still an armed and organised Iraqi resistance, loyal to the old regime (Campbell, 2003; Recknagel, 2003).

The insurgent nature of the coalition's opposition increased as quickly as the uniformed Iraqi Armed Forces were being overrun. Fedayeen and Ba'athist attacks increased as the coalition supply lines became stretched, due to the unexpected pace of the advance. Only months after the fall of the Saddam regime, Zarqawi's group was highly active in a campaign of IEDs, car bombs, kidnappings and murders that targeted coalition troops, Sunni residential

neighbourhoods and Shia activists. With insufficient troop numbers to maintain internal security, coalition troops were unable to prevent the country from sliding into a state of chaotic insecurity.

De-Ba'athification

Any opportunity to blunt the ferocity of the armed opposition by former Ba'athists, by assimilating moderate, former Ba'ath Party members into post-Saddam Iraqi civic society, evaporated on 1 May 2003. In what would be one of the worst mistakes of the post-invasion period, Paul Bremer's CPA announced the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society as one of its main policy pillars, through the passing of Order Number 1 (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003). Under this edict, former members of the Ba'ath Party were prohibited from working in the civil service, the Armed Forces or almost all public sector jobs.

The move only served to reinforce the disenfranchisement of former Ba'ath Party members, many of whom had only joined because it was strongly expected of all public servants under Saddam's rule. Alongside the de-Ba'athification order, the Iraqi Army was effectively disbanded, putting almost 500 000 armed men into immediate unemployment, many of whom took their personal weapons with them. These two factors, combined with the post-invasion ineffectiveness of the Iraqi police, plus the unfeasibly low number of Allied troops on the ground in Iraq, can be argued to constitute the drivers of the insurgency that rapidly unfolded after the US-led invasion.[8]

From the toppling of the Saddam regime in 2003 to sometime in 2006, the former Ba'athists and the fedayeen were responsible for many insurgent attacks against coalition forces in Iraq. The CPA policy was formally revoked on 28 June 2004, under the auspices of the transference of sovereign power to the Iraqi government, which took place on 30 June 2004. The ban on the employment of former Ba'athists continued to be imposed in practice, however, despite it no longer being a formal policy. A law was passed in January 2008 which rescinded the previous law banning former Ba'athists from working in government posts or the civil service (Usher, 2008). Although the legal impediment was removed, it took time for the ban to be lifted in practice.

Shia Attacks and a Six-Pronged Insurgency

The formation of the JAM in 2004, and its first major clash with coalition forces, added a Shia insurgency to the long list of problems faced by the coalition. It did not take long before Sadr's JAM was described by the Pentagon as 'the most dangerous accelerant' in the Iraq conflict (Bridge, 2007).

In Basra, the JAM carried out a campaign of attacks upon the British forces in charge of this area of operations (AOR), which steadily became more lethal as their levels of training were boosted, primarily by the Iranian Quds Force, but also by training from Lebanese Hezbollah. The flow of weapons and explosives from Iran into southern Iraq increased, as did the flow into Iranian training facilities of militia members from the JAM and other groups. Iranian planning for these operations had begun as early as 2003, as the US-led coalition built up its forces in preparation for the invasion, and the attacks by the militias began less than a year later (Kagan, 2006, pp. 1–3).

The complexity of the insurgency facing the coalition just one year after the end of the warfighting phase is difficult to portray, but Kilcullen's assessment is probably the most accurate. He notes that in 2004, there were no less than six distinct insurgencies under way in Iraq, which he classifies as follows:

1.   Communitarian militias (Shia).
2.   Iranian proxies (Shia).
3.   Sadrists and the JAM (Shia).
4.   Zarqawi and similar jihadists (Sunni).
5.   Secular nationalists rejecting the Iranian/Shia influence (Sunni).
6.   Former regime elements (FREs, almost exclusively Sunni).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) Attacks

Zarqawi continued to plan operations which his AQI group carried out, until he was finally killed in an air strike in 2006. His favoured tactic of kidnapping foreigners and beheading them on camera was just one instance of his clear understanding of the importance of terrorising a civilian population, and of making many foreign companies and media outlets reluctant to send staff to work in Iraq. His group continued to operate after his death, under the leadership of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who made a concerted effort to realign the group with the traditional Sunni insurgency. Zarqawi's brutality and notoriety had led to AQI being alienated and rejected among many of the Sunni tribal groups. It was thus important to al-Masri that AQI remained relevant and in touch with the Sunni core.

The Sunni Awakening in Anbar had resulted in AQI being targeted on two fronts: by the coalition forces, and by the group of tribes now supported by US forces, such as the Albu Mahal, the al Rashawi and others. AQI's answer to this two-pronged assault was to form a fortified alliance with other Sunni insurgent groups. Their umbrella organisation, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), was already in existence in early 2006, before Zarqawi's death. In October 2006, the MSC announced the 'establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI) for the first time (Negus, 2006). Despite al-Masri's efforts to appeal

to a wider Sunni baseline of support, the new organisation still continued its policy of ethnically cleansing the non-Sunnis from its areas of operations and control (Celso, 2015, p. 256).

'The Surge' and Insurgent Responses to It

In an attempt to deny the insurgents the necessary degree of operating space, a US plan was put in place to bolster the existing coalition forces with an additional bulk of combat troops, to allow for the saturation of Baghdad and other areas, especially Anbar province. The plan also coincided with some significant changes in the senior leadership relevant to the new plan. Donald Rumsfeld had become increasingly unpopular with the military leadership, and in December 2006 Bush accepted Rumsfeld's resignation and replaced him with Robert Gates. This freed Bush at the grand strategic level to get the new plan under way. At the strategic level, General Petraeus replaced General Casey, which provided the impetus for the new COIN strategy that the plan would be built upon.

This plan was officially referred to by the US administration as 'the New Way Forward', but it was also referred to as 'the Surge' by members of the administration and by the media. Announcing the plan in the President's Address to the Nation, Bush explained that an additional 20 000 troops (five combat brigades) would be deployed to Baghdad and Anbar, to help the Iraqi Security Forces to better contain and fight the insurgents; an additional 4000 US Marines would also be deployed as part of the plan (Bush, 2007b). The wider plan had six main policy pillars (Bush, 2007a):

1. Let the Iraqis lead.
2. Help Iraqis protect the population.
3. Isolate extremists.
4. Create space for political progress.
5. Diversify political and economic efforts.
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

Kilcullen, who was a principal architect of the US counter-insurgency strategy, notes that the premise of the Surge was aimed at protecting the local population, unlike the previous years where the main focus had been on defeating the insurgents through physical attrition (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 129–130). Writing several years later, Kilcullen (2016, pp. 35–36) expanded on what he saw as the overall aims of the Surge: 'to protect the population; break AQI's hold of fear over the Sunni community; stop the cycle of sectarian violence; force the Iraqi government to be more inclusive and less sectarian; reduce civilian casualties'. On 10–11 September 2007, General Petraeus briefed the US Congress on the

progress of the Surge, stating that since December 2006, civilian deaths across Iraq had declined by more than 45 per cent, while the decline in Baghdad itself was around 70 per cent (Petraeus, 2007, p. 3). The slide Petraeus used as the overall snapshot was famously nicknamed 'the waterfall slide' by his team (Petraeus, 2007, Slide 2, p. 12), due to the sharp drop-off which the graphs demonstrated (Kilcullen, 2016, p. 41).

Much has been written on whether the Surge was successful or not (cf. McCain and Lieberman, 2008; Crider, 2009; Dyson, 2010; Feaver, 2011; Polsky, 2012). Opinion was, and still is, divided on how successful the Surge actually was in reducing the death toll and the attacks, and a number of writers have reached different conclusions (cf. Anderson, 2007; Biddle et al., 2009; Crider, 2009; Kagan, 2009). Whether it can be attributed as the architectural pillar of the swift reduction in violence, or whether it was just one of several symbiotic causes, the stark drop in casualty figures certainly point to it being successful in at least reducing the level of violence in Baghdad and, eventually, in other Iraqi cities. Biddle et al. conducted an analysis of the various competing hypotheses and concluded that the Surge was, in fact, successful, but noted that that its success was symbiotically linked to the 'Sunni Awakening' (Biddle et al., 2009, p. 10).

The Sunni Awakening and the JAM Ceasefire of 2007

As the Surge was beginning to take shape on the ground by the summer of 2007, several new dynamics were affecting the conflict zone of Iraq. One of these was the 'Sunni Awakening', centred in Anbar province (Sky, 2008). When the Sunni tribes in Anbar launched their fifth attempt to negate the effects and influence of AQI in their traditional tribal areas, they were supported this time by US funding, weapons, training and combat support. AQI was now fighting a much more powerful, confident and capable opponent, as well as having to contend with the ongoing disruptions of its operations by coalition forces (McCary, 2009).

The Shia insurgency was also continuing at this point, but one large-scale tragedy led to a key political milestone in the progress of the cycle of violence. Clashes in August 2007 in the city of Karbala, between Sadrists in the JAM and rival supporters in the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC, formerly known as SCIRI), resulted in Iraqi police firing into the crowd to break up the clashes, with more than 50 people killed (Cochrane, 2009). Muqtada al-Sadr announced a six-month ceasefire the following day, stating that the JAM would attack neither Sunni groups nor the coalition forces (MacAskill, 2007). Through a combination of the above factors, allied with the improved relations being built between the coalition and the Iraqi population in many areas, plus

a more visible political will by the US administration to try to reduce the levels of violence, the death toll and the number of attacks began to decrease.

A Decrease in Attacks and Casualties, 2007

Between the start of the Surge in 2006 and the end of 2008, AQI was in disarray, and captured internal documents showed the extent of the problems it was facing in some areas. One AQI commander described how his previous force of 600 men had melted away to just 20, with the majority joining the opposing Awakening movement, and with some having fled with the group's funds and equipment (Fletcher, 2008). ISI had also been reduced to a hardcore of members, primarily former members of the Saddam regime, and many of whom had considerable experience in intelligence work and in planning and conducting covert operations.

Much of 2006 and 2007 was used to train and mentor Iraqi Army units, in a massive capacity-building programme to increase the capabilities of the Iraqis to eventually take over the responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. The Shia militias were also undergoing their own internal feuds, and Cochrane (2009, p. 7) assesses that there were five distinct sub-divisions within the JAM alone:

> the 'Golden JAM' that sought to purge criminal elements and Iranian influence; the 'Noble JAM' that exposed the criminal gangs and favored Coalition assistance; the Kadhimiyah wing which advanced the interests of Hazem al-Araji and his brother Bahaa al- Araj; Asaib Ahl al-Haq/Special Groups led by Qais Khazali; and the criminal gangs that depended upon the money generated from extortion.

Allied Drawdown and Iraqi Politics

In 2009, the UK and Australia ended their combat operations and formally withdrew from Iraq, with the UK leaving at the end of April and Australia leaving at the end of July. Two key terrorist leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri (leader of the rump AQI) and Abu Omar al Baghdadi (leader of ISI) were finally geolocated close to Tikrit. Both men were killed in April 2010 in the same joint operation by US and Iraqi troops. Two months after their leaders were killed, ISI was assessed as having lost 80 per cent of its leaders, either by capture or through fatality (Lesperance, 2016, p. 20). Al-Masri was replaced by Nasser Abu Suleiman as the leader of AQI (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010), while Abu Omar al Baghdadi was replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who later declared himself the caliph of the so-called Islamic State (Stansfield, 2014, p. 1332).

The winding-down of US troop numbers in Iraq began in 2010. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al Maliki, ignited further tensions with the Sunni bloc by revoking more than 500 applications from Sunnis to stand as candidates in the forthcoming elections (Sullivan, 2013, p. 31). He also shut down funding for the Anbar Awakening groups, such as the Sons of Iraq, and the Iraqi government made widespread arrests of Sunni figures from the Awakening movement (Kilcullen, 2016, p. 50). By mid-August 2010, the majority of combat troops had left Iraq (BBC News, 2010), although the Advise and Assist Brigades remained, which were a key facet of the US withdrawal plan in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Snyder, 2011, p. 9). As the new leader of ISI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi kept up the pressure of attacks on Iraqi government organs throughout 2010 and 2011, delivering a wave of car bomb and suicide bomb attacks in the last stage of the US withdrawal. Sixty people were killed in just one attack, on people queueing up to join the Iraqi Army (Jones, 2010).

The Death of bin Laden and the Birth of the So-Called Islamic State

In May 2011, Osama bin Laden was finally located living in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. An operation by US Navy Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEALs) led to bin Laden being killed and his body being removed and buried at sea by the US Navy (Stevenson, 2011). Baghdadi promised retribution for the killing, and although no 'spectacular' attack was identified as being carried out by ISI as a revenge attack, instead a string of smaller but deadly attacks were carried out in various locations across Iraq, including Mosul and Baghdad. In addition to targeting Iraqi Police and members of the Armed Forces, Baghdadi's attacks also targeted the JAM and the Shia militias, a tactic which he would continue to follow in the years after the attacks (Al Jazeera America, 2011).

Bin Laden's death generated a power vacuum in al-Qaeda that was eventually filled by his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri. Unlike bin Laden, however, Zawahiri lacked the leadership, charisma and popularity to fill the shoes of his predecessor, and the period from bin Laden's death to the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) resulted in a lack of direction and drive from the al-Qaeda leadership. Baghdadi used 2011 and 2012 to expand the presence of ISI and to increase his control over the group's sources of financing. In the summer of 2012, Baghdadi commenced Operation Breaking the Walls, a strategic plan to conduct multiple jailbreaks to free Sunni jihadist prisoners (Lister, 2014, p. 92).

In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the creation of ISIS (Holbrook, 2015, p. 94). The new group that was ISIS effectively co-opted a Syrian rebel group, Jabhat al-Nusra, that was fighting against the forces of President Bashar al-Assad. Baghdadi declared the al-Nusra group to now be the Syrian arm of

what had been ISI. This announcement apparently came as a surprise to the leaders of the al-Nusra group, who rejected the merger the following day, saying they were unaware of it. This caused a split in the al-Nusra group between the rejectionists who refused to join Baghdadi's group, and the supporters who agreed with the integration of al-Nusra into the newly formed ISIS (Mohamedou, 2014, p. 3).

Zawahiri stepped in to mediate in the disagreement and pronounced Baghdadi to have been wrong in announcing the formation of ISIS. Zawahiri ordered Baghdadi and his group to revert to being ISI, crucially adding that Baghdadi had not asked for permission to create ISIS. Clearly, Baghdadi did not see any need to have his decision sanctioned by al-Qaeda's centre as he continued with his plan, effectively making public Zawahiri's perceived lack of ability to lead AQ.

The culmination of Operation Breaking the Walls happened after the announcement of the formation of ISIS, and this was the successful breaching of Abu Ghraib jail on 21 July 2013, which led to more than 500 prisoners being freed, many of whom had been incarcerated for terrorist activities (Lewis, 2013, p. 7). This operation was quickly followed by another, this time under the ISIS banner: Operation Soldiers' Harvest had the twofold aims of reducing the effectiveness and morale of the Iraqi security forces, and of increasing and playing upon the existing sectarian fault lines, and it was carried out with yet more attacks, kidnappings and killings (Lister, 2014, pp. 93–94).

Heavy-handed treatment of Sunnis by the Iraqi security forces during a search operation at a protest camp in Hawija in 2013 led to more than 20 people killed and dozens more injured. One result of this was a rapid influx of Sunni insurgent groups, to protect the Sunnis. Another result was a sharp increase in sympathy for the Sunni insurgent groups, from a sub-section of the population who had previously been generally sympathetic to the Anbar Awakening movement which fought against AQI (Lewis, 2013, p. 19). This did not go unnoticed by the Kurds, who were sufficiently concerned about their oilfields to deploy their own militia as a buffer force.

Zawahiri continued to present the argument to the world that ISIS was indeed a sub-branch of AQ, emphasising at the start of 2014 that the leaders and foot-soldier of ISIS 'pledge their loyalty to al-Qaeda … and their leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, may God rest his soul in peace' (Holbrook, 2015). One month later, Zawahiri announced the expulsion of ISIS from AQ, and the rift grew in the years following the expulsion, with Zawahiri accusing ISIS of being a *takfiri* organisation (Spencer, 2014; Dearden, 2017).[9]

Foreign Fighters, the International Dimension and Iraq as a Proxy Battleground

One of the main routes for fighters entering Iraq, whether they were foreign or otherwise, was to cross from Syria via one of the 'jihadi highways' such as the one which ran close to al-Qa'im in the Western Desert. The need to have a secure, effective network on both sides of the border, to facilitate a flow of fighters, meant that AQI was well positioned in logistical terms. When the new organisation of ISIS was announced, it largely inherited this network and built upon it.

Although it constitutes a distinctly separate zone of conflict on its own, the Syrian angle is important in the more recent history of Iraq's own conflict, due to the rapid rise and spread of ISIS throughout both Iraq and Syria. The Syrian conflict had been ongoing since early 2011, and by the time ISIS formed in 2013, the conflict had quickly become bogged down, resulting in a collection of clusters and swathes of territory held by various elements and factions.

The Syrian war became a proxy battleground as Iran and Russia both provided military (and other) support. Iran provided weapons, ammunition and logistical support through an airbridge it maintained with Damascus, via Baghdad (Bucaa and Hawrey, 2016). Iran also provided Hezbollah fighters, along with senior commanders and specialists from the IRGC, in particular the Quds Force. In 2015, Iran suffered the death of its most senior adviser in the conflict when General Hossein Hamedan, the Deputy Chief Commander of the IRGC, was killed in a clash with ISIS fighters in Aleppo (*Daily Telegraph*, 2015; Press TV, 2015). Russia has provided crucial close air support (CAS), as well as advisers and other technical support, to bolster the Syrian Armed Forces, either in carrying out attacks or to assist them when under threat on the ground (N.S., 2015).

The Advance of IS in Iraq

One hypothesis is that Baghdadi originally sent ISIS fighters into Syria due to the negative situation which the group was facing in Iraq, being pressured on all sides by the Iraqi government, the Sunni Awakening and the Shia militias such as the JAM. In relative terms, the early days of the Syrian conflict thus constituted a bizarre kind of safety zone for ISIS, in which it could pause for breath, re-group, re-arm and consolidate its combat capability before re-entering Iraq to seize territory (Kilcullen, 2016, p. 78). Looking backwards, this certainly seems plausible, given the speed with which the so-called Islamic State was able to spread its operational control over large areas of Iraq and Syria. By January 2014, both Fallujah and Ramadi had been seized by ISIS, but perhaps more importantly from a military perspective, it was able to hold

the territory. In early June 2014, ISIS embarked on a series of attacks against major cities in Iraq, including Mosul, Samarra, Tikrit and Kirkuk (Dodge, 2014, pp. 11–12).

Against this backdrop, Dodge comes to a harsh but ultimately fair conclusion about the fall of Mosul to ISIS, and the abysmal performance put in by the majority of the Iraqi Army units in its failed defence, viz. that the ISIS capture of Mosul and its subsequent, rapid advance across Northern Iraq was 'not caused by a century-old legacy of Anglo-French colonialism. It was the direct result of the contemporary flaws within the political system set up after the regime change of 2003' (Dodge, 2014, p. 16). Media channels provided ISIS with a major public relations coup, as pictures were broadcast of long columns of Humvees and other government vehicles, captured from the fleeing Iraqi soldiers, and being driven in a parade by ISIS members (*Telegraph*, 2014a). One year later, the full extent of the rout became clear when Iraq's Prime Minister Haider al Abadi confirmed that ISIS had captured 2300 vehicles (*Guardian*, 2015). In Kirkuk, however, ISIS met with more determined resistance after seizing the western and southwestern suburbs of Hawija, Abbasi, Zab and Riyadh (Stansfield, 2014, p. 1334), probably due to the fact that the strategic installation of the Bayji oil refinery was under threat.

The Announcement of the Caliphate, 2014

The official announcement of the creation of the so-called Islamic State came on 29 June 2014. In a sermon on 5 July, Baghdadi also declared that he was the 'Commander of the Faithful' of the self-declared Caliphate, thus seizing for himself the politico-religious authority to rule. Less than four months later, a collection of more than 100 of the world's most esteemed Islamic scholars published an open letter to Baghdadi in which they refuted every single religious edict of his so-called state, taking him to task for such transgressions as killing journalists ('Islam forbids killing of the innocent, emissaries, ambassadors, and diplomats; hence it is forbidden to kill journalists and aid workers'), Yazidis ('it is obligatory to consider Yazidis as People of the Book') and Christians ('it is forbidden in Islam to harm or mistreat – in any way – Christians or any "People of the Scripture"') (Various Authors, 2014). Despite publicly challenging the interpretation of Islam employed by Baghdadi and his senior leadership, they still managed to entice a generation of young Muslims and/or their supporters to join their self-declared 'Caliphate'.[10]

The Consolidation of Territorial Control by Islamic State (IS)

As ISIS seized control of more and more territory inside Iraq, the nature of the conflict changed again, from one of a wider insurgency carried out by multiple

factions, to a more organised and systematic seizure of the civilian population, the levers of civic control and the instruments of justice and public safety. As territory was captured, IS engaged in brutal measures to consolidate its control over the territories that constituted its fragmentary and non-contiguous so-called state. When IS first overran Mosul, one of the institutions which fell under their control was Badoush prison, which held around 1000 convicted prisoners. In June 2014, IS militants loaded all of the prisoners onto trucks and transported them into the desert. Using a similar methodology to the Nazi regime, they screened each inmate about their background and confessional status. The Sunni prisoners were subsequently released, while around 670 non-Sunni males were summarily executed (Sherlock, 2014).

Non-Muslim sects such as Christians and Yazidis were targeted by massacres of males and forcible enslavement of females. In Kocho, close to the strategic town of Sinjar, more than 700 Yazidi males were executed by IS fighters. The UN assessed the number of Yazidis executed by IS to be in the thousands (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2014, paras 18–19). Christians were subjected to similar treatment. More than 200 000 of them fled IS attacks on Mosul and the Christian areas in Nineweh province (BBC, 2014).

Mastracci (2015) claims that, during their phase of territorial acquisition in Iraq, IS dominated the battlefield in the sphere of intelligence. The policies and doctrine of IS are based upon a perceived legitimacy of Islamic concepts such as *al shawkat* (power, intensity) and *al taghloub* (overcoming), components of a philosophy that a group which has power thus also has the legitimacy to rule (Al-Shishani, 2014). The IS doctrine prohibited any possibility of mosques and shrines becoming places of worshipping a historical figure, such as a prophet, and the group sought to impose this view across its territorial holdings. Muslim shrines such as the 14th century Jirjis mosque in Mosul were destroyed, following IS claims that such shrines have become centres of what it considers to be apostasy (*Guardian*, 2014). The contents of the Mosul Museum were ransacked and the majority destroyed, while some artefacts have been sold by IS to dealers, to fund the group's activities. By February 2015, the extent of the problem had become so severe that the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared it as 'cultural cleansing' (UNESCO, 2015).

Despite the initial efforts of the Iraqi Army to re-take Mosul, the archaeological vandalism did not stop. On 21 June 2017, with Iraqi Army troops just 50 metres away from the historic mosque of al Nuri, IS fighters triggered explosives which demolished the 800-year-old building (BBC News, 2017). The mosque had a special significance for IS, as it was from this mosque that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the so-called Islamic State in 2014. IS claimed that the mosque was destroyed by an air strike, and it is possible that sacrificing the mosque was considered as a worthwhile loss if

there was a chance that IS could use the loss as a publicity tool, by blaming its opponents for its destruction.

In order to negate the impact of coalition air strikes on its positions, convoys, key infrastructure or movements, IS frequently used the tactic of embedding human shields around areas, vehicles or key figures which it wished to protect from air strikes (Farmer, 2015; Hawramy and Graham-Harrison, 2016; Radio Free Europe, 2016; Kouhnavard, 2017).

The Expansion and Contraction of IS Territory

There were severe fluctuations in the territorial holdings of IS, since the declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. Initially, IS made rapid gains of Mosul, Tikrit and Ramadi in June 2014, when the so-called Islamic State was declared (*Telegraph*, 2014c). The patchwork of cities that fell under its control did not resemble a state at all, and this created problems in maintaining supply lines using the major lines of communication. The thin strips of territory such as the Ruthba–Ramadi highway provided little security from being cut in two, potentially resulting in isolation and encirclement. By September that year, IS had expanded its influence over a larger area of Iraq, but the Iraqi areas under *de facto* control of IS were looking thinner. Al-Baghdadi's influence had spread across areas of North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), West Africa (Nigeria), Egypt (Sinai), the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Yemen), Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2015, and it had even spread as far as establishing a *wilayah* in the Caucasus (Youngman, 2016).

All this expansion provided IS with a bridgehead from which to expand influence, territory and income generation. By the middle of 2015, Baghdadi's self-declared Caliphate was classed as the richest terrorist group on Earth, with annual earnings of between $1.5 billion (Bolton and Krol, 2016) and $2 billion (Giovanni et al., 2016). The trajectory of IS ascendance was not a straight line, however, as coalition air strikes combined with sustained attacks from Kurdish Peshmerga fighters reduced its territorial holdings over the course of the calendar year. By the end of 2015, IS territory had been reduced by 14 per cent (IHS Conflict Monitor, cited by BBC, 2017).

Iraq's security forces launched a major ground offensive in October 2016, to re-take Mosul from IS control. The fighting was intense, as IS elements had enjoyed the luxury of time to prepare well-constructed defensive positions. By December 2016, the group had lost another 25 per cent of its territory (IHS Conflict Monitor, cited by BBC, 2017); and by May of 2017, Iraqi government forces had regained control of East Mosul. The city of Mosul was finally liberated in July 2017. The re-taking of Mosul by Iraqi forces was a strategic, tactical and spiritual loss for IS, and reduction of IS territory in Iraq came at the commensurate cost of IS territorial expansion in Syria (BBC, 2017).

The IS group had managed to successfully draw many of AQ's core supporters to it since 2014, and it built a larger brand awareness than AQ, while AQ struggled and failed to re-assert itself as the voice that speaks for the global jihad. As early as June 2016, preparations were already being made by IS for a near future in which it would control little or no territory, and the strategy began to be trickle-fed through the IS propaganda machinery, probably in an effort to prepare IS followers for a potential loss of key areas such as Raqqa, Mosul and Sirte. An editorial piece in the IS weekly magazine *al Naba*, entitled 'The Crusaders' Illusions in the Age of the Caliphate' (*Al Naba* Editor, 2016), delivered an ambitiously optimistic prognosis of the group's territorial control, asking: 'Were we defeated when we lost the cities in Iraq and were in the desert without any city or land? And would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take Mosul, Sirte or Raqqa, or even take all the cities? Certainly not!' (Warrick and Mekhennet, 2016).

In 2014, when the Caliphate was announced, a map proliferated online amongst IS supporters, showing the countries which IS planned to have under its control by the end of 2020 (Hall, 2014). The map included several European countries, including Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and even Austria, and while the map was clearly nothing more than a piece of propaganda, it was well received within the target audience. When the 2014 announcement of the Caliphate was made, the land controlled by IS in Iraq and Syria amounted to an area almost equivalent in size to that of Great Britain. Since announcing the Caliphate, IS suffered major losses in its territorial portfolio, and its 2020 vision appeared more like a fantasy than a strategic goal.

Next door, in neighbouring Syria, AQ's affiliate group Jabhat al-Nusra seized the city of Idlib as a 'capital' in 2015, to use as a base for its operations and to re-group and consolidate its position as its territory in Iraq shrank (Spencer, 2015). IS has now been reduced to a 'virtual Caliphate', but as organisations both AQ and IS are not spent forces and it would be premature to write them off just yet. Both organisations will continue to pose a credible threat to Iraq's security for at least the near future.

TRAJECTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Following the defeat of IS in Iraq (and also in Syria), Iraq was able to transition to the next phase in its future, one which no longer included 40 per cent of its territory being controlled by the extreme Islamist group and its followers. The chance to make meaningful change was once again missed, however, and by late 2019, mass protests across the country were calling for an end to corruption and for the creation of more jobs for young people. These protests, which led to more than 500 protestors being shot dead by Iraqi police and security forces, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Abdel Mahdi in October

2019, who was replaced by Mustafa al-Kadhimi; but little has changed for the average Iraqi (BBC, 2020a).

The rampant corruption which has become commonplace in post-Saddam Iraq, coupled with high unemployment, especially among the youth, has created a nationwide dissatisfaction with the political establishment which will be difficult to resolve peacefully, quickly and effectively. Iraq's consociational political system, a confessional one broadly similar to the Lebanese model, results in the religious, tribal and sectarian divides being strengthened and allows for the dissemination of patronage, whereby financial benefits, contracts, bribes and payments are all used to buy and ensure loyalty among the different groups. The recent protests across the country have widely criticised this model.

The malevolent influence of Iranian covert (and not so covert) activity on Iraqi politics shows no signs of abating and is only likely to intensify, given the stakes involved. Recent revelations from leaked Iranian intelligence reports detail how the previous head of Iraqi Military Intelligence offered to provide his Iranian handler with any intelligence requested by Iran, how eight Iraqi cabinet ministers were considered sufficiently loyal to Iran to cause no worry, and how the former Speaker of Iraq's House of Representatives worked as an intelligence source for Iran during his time in office (Arango et al., 2019; *New York Times*, 2019). While many in Iraq were angry about the US targeted killing of Iranian Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020, there were just as many other Iraqis angered by the continued Iranian subversion of Iraqi domestic and foreign policies, who also protested on the streets. Iran's attempts to completely subsume Iraq's political decision-making will continue to create tension and divisions among Iraqis, while continuing to destabilise the country and the region.

The risk of Iraq splintering apart into three separate states has been an often-voiced worry, especially in the first few years after the 2003 invasion, and that risk remains. The potential disintegration of Iraq into a Sunni state in the central north and the west, an oil-rich Kurdish state in the north, and a Shia state in the south and southwest, has posed a long-term threat to regional stability since the fall of the Saddam regime. While the Iraqi Kurds have long pushed for greater autonomy or even full independence, the 'Sunni region project' adds an additional sectarian voice to this issue. This project calls for an autonomous Sunni region similar to the Kurdish model, ostensibly to combat the increasing influence of Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs, although the idea does not have broad support across the Sunni community in Iraq (*Arab Weekly*, 2020).

Having captured then subsequently lost swathes of territory in Iraq as well as Syria, IS still constitutes a problem for Iraq: namely, how to deal with the remnants of the organisation and its pernicious ideology. Huge amounts of money

and resources have been spent on bolstering Iraq's own indigenous ability to counter the insurgent and terrorist threat, and this capacity-building programme has had very mixed results. The top-tier, specialised counter-terrorist units were intensely mentored and trained, and have developed into an effective force capable of disrupting active cells and plots. The broader standard, however, across the breadth of the Iraqi security forces has been diluted by the sheer scale of the task, by corruption, and by deliberate interference from the executive (Eisenstadt and White, 2005; Sullivan, 2013). This leaves Iraq with a weak ability to militarily secure and defend its own borders, to act as an independent state, and to present a strong and capable front to the rest of the region, a factor which is ruthlessly exploited by Iran. In a BBC documentary on Iraq broadcast in August 2020 (BBC, 2020b), *New York Times* journalist Dexter Filkins was asked when all of this would end in Iraq. He replied: 'No time in the foreseeable future, it's the Middle East, there is no solution, but it will engage us forever.'

NOTES

1. Iraq was estimated to have the fourth-largest army in the world, before the 1991 Gulf War. Traditional estimates of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the start of the 2003 Gulf War are usually assessed as being around 400 000–440 000 troops.
2. Curveball was later identified as an Iraqi émigré, Rafid al-Janabi. For a full account of the Curveball involvement, see Drogin (2007).
3. There are conflicting accounts of the approximate date of Zarqawi's arrival in Iraq. Jordanian intelligence reporting places Zarqawi as not arriving until after the invasion. Other sources indicate that Saddam Hussein's government was aware that Zarqawi was in Iraq, establishing a network of supporters and weapons, even before the US invasion began.
4. Kilcullen, for example, states that there had been four previous uprisings by the Sunni tribes in Anbar, against AQ (Kilcullen, 2016, p. 41). He contends that the fifth was successful in 2007 as it was enhanced by the positive effects deriving from 'the Surge'.
5. A similar uprising occurred in the north of Iraq, led by the Kurdish minority, although the reasons for this were not identical to those of the Shia uprising in the south.
6. A report for US Congress describes an EFP as follows: 'An EFP is made from a pipe filled with explosives and capped by a specially shaped metal disk. When the explosives detonate, they transform the disk into a jet of molten metal capable of penetrating armor. EFPs reportedly strike with enough power to cause pieces of a targeted vehicle's heavy armor to turn into shrapnel, making them much more deadly than traditional IED weapons' (Wilson, 2007, p. 3).
7. Costa Rica subsequently requested to be removed from the list, reducing the total to 48 (Associated Press, 2004).
8. Initial planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for the warfighting phase assessed the requirement for coalition troop numbers at 400 000. Rumsfeld was dismissive of this figure, considering that Saddam's regime could be toppled with no more

than 70 000 troops. The final figure of 200 000 was a compromise on both sides. As Kilcullen points out, this number was high enough to remove the regime, but not high enough to 'contain the chaos of his fall' (Kilcullen, 2016, p. 17).

9.   The term *takfiri* is used to describe a Muslim who considers other Muslims as apostates (*Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, 2016).

10. See, for example, the case of three missing schoolgirls who eloped to join the so-called Islamic State (*BBC News*, 2015). One of the three was later confirmed killed in an air strike on Raqqa. She had been trying to leave the so-called Islamic State but had abandoned her efforts after seeing a young Austrian girl beaten to death (Dearden, 2016).

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8. Syria

Michael Robillard

CONTEXT

The present war in Syria can perhaps best be understood as a combination of political and religious tensions internal to Syria itself as well as an expression of a greater regional struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran as bolstered by various international actors such as Israel, Turkey, the United States and Russia. To better understand the present state of affairs in Syria, it is therefore necessary to properly situate the conflict within a broader historical and political context; first locally (geographically speaking), and then expanding understanding of the conflict's broader relationship with additional regional players and international entities.

Build-Up and Preconditions

In terms of immediate causes, the conflict in Syria can be linked to the so-called Arab Spring as well as to a severe drought in 2010 which functioned to catalyse protests for economic and political reform that then devolved into violence. Many of the preconditions for the present conflict, however, can be traced back further to long-standing historical tensions between Alawite and Sunni groups stemming from the last four decades of the Assad family's rule, but dating back even further to political tensions surrounding the establishment of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in 1947, a fundamentally secular party and hence at cross-purposes with religious Sunnis. Indeed, the Assad family has demonstrated a long-standing ability to pressure allegiance from the otherwise secular Ba'ath Party. Furthermore, as a result of this internal conflict in Syria, nearby regional actors, particularly Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), have sought to capitalise extensively upon such political and social instability. Lastly, the conflict is also fuelled, in part, by a suspected fight between regional and international actors for future control over a potential billion-dollar gas pipeline running directly through Syrian territory (Chang, 2015).

Syria's population is comprised mainly of Sunni Arabs (roughly 60 per cent), as well as Christians (10–12 per cent), Shia Alawites (10–12 per cent), Druze (3 per cent), and various other ethnic minorities, mainly Kurds and Armenians (CPA, 2015). (The population and its distribution across the country, however, has changed due to large waves of refugees leaving the country due to the war. Thus, it is likely that these percentages have changed since 2015.) Prior to 2011, the Assad family had maintained political power in Syria for over four decades despite being Alawites, a minority representation of the overall population. This dynamic between a ruling Alawite minority and a disenfranchised Sunni majority would prove to be a source of much political tension within Syria, eventually leading to the 2011 uprisings. The origins of Shia–Sunni tensions in Syria can be partially traced back to the Christian Michel Aflaq and the Sunni Salah-al-Din al-Bitar's establishment of the otherwise secular Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in 1947. This event marked a significant political shift in the Arab world, as it established a new secular, socialist-leaning form of governance. One of the consequences of this event was a steady rise in secular Ba'athist political power over the next several decades, particularly in Iraq and Syria. In 1963, the growing swell of Ba'athist political power hit a tipping point as Ba'athist army officers seized power not only in Syria but also, for a brief time, in Iraq. After a period of internal coups and political infighting over the next few years, coupled with the destabilising after-effects of the Six Days War between Israel and a number of Arab states in 1967, Hafez al-Assad overthrew then President Nur al-Din al-Atasi in 1970 to firmly establish himself as the new President of Syria. Shortly thereafter, in a bid to emphasise the secular nature of the Ba'ath Party and its leadership, Assad repealed a Syrian constitutional requirement for the President to be Muslim, causing rioting, greater political and religious polarisation, and the underground rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to greater political prominence, partially in Syria and especially in Egypt (Blanga, 2017b).

The year 1982 marked another significant spike in political tensions when Assad ordered the violent military suppression of Muslim Brotherhood protests in Hama, resulting in the estimated deaths of between 10 000 and 40 000 people. After this internal incident of political conflict, much of the 1980s and 1990s marked a turn towards more external and foreign concerns for Syria. In 1982, Israel attacked the Syrian Army during its conflict with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) infrastructure in Lebanon; whereas in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Syria joined the United States (US)-led coalition against Iraq, an action which contributed to improving foreign relations between Syria and the US and Egypt.

The Assads

In order to understand the leadership and political context of Bashar al-Assad, it is important to briefly review the historical and political formation of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who established the political regime that Bashar would eventually inherit. Hafez al-Assad came to power at the age of 40 in a bloodless coup in 1970, after a succession of coups following the coup of Nasim al Qudsi in 1963. Like any new ruler of an unstable regime, Assad was constantly paranoid about being overthrown or deposed, and hence demanded strong loyalty from his political in group in order to constantly maintain control and political power. Throughout the early 1960s, the area of Hama had marked a stronghold for the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, with periodic clashes between it and the secular, nationalist, Ba'ath Party of Assad. During this time period, the area of Hama began to demonstrate increasing signs of a strong anti-regime uprising. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood began targeting Alawite military officers, specifically signalling a threat to the Alawite Assad's rule (Semenov, 2018).

Perceiving the political opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood to be a major threat to the stability and longevity of his regime, Assad ordered the Syrian Army to quell the uprising in Hama. Within a month, the Syrian Army was able to destroy or significantly subdue 'every neighbourhood in the city' (Morrison, 2019). This violent event in Hama not only marked a positional re-establishing of control, but also signalled to the Syrian people and to the international community at large that Assad was now the political strongman of Syria, that would not be pushed around easily by insurrectionist groups and opposing factions (Morrison, 2019). In June 2000, President Hafez al-Assad died and was succeeded by his son, Bashar. Bashar al-Assad's assumption of power signalled a mix of hopeful expectations as well as disappointments, domestically as well as internationally. Bashar's wife Asma, a Sunni, was an investment banker who was born and raised in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, many people felt that such a state of affairs indicated to the world community a step towards a more progressive leadership in Syria. Bashar al-Assad's decision to release 600 political prisoners in November 2000 also seemed to further suggest that he was leaning towards a less authoritarian posture than his father before him. Such expectations were quickly deflated, however, after Assad arrested and detained several pro-reform activists in 2001. Shortly thereafter, in 2002, the United States included Syria (along with Iraq and North Korea) on its list of states comprising an 'axis of evil', claiming that Syria was acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, the US imposed economic sanctions on Syria after claiming that Syria was complicit in its failure to block anti-American militants from entering into Iraq (*CNN*, 2004).

Throughout the mid-2000s, however, Syria demonstrated a series of dip-lomatic overtures that signalled what seemed to be a greater willingness to work with both Turkey and the West. In 2004, for example, Assad became the first Syrian leader to visit Turkey, serving to thaw decades of political tension; while in the same year, Syria and the new Iraqi government restored diplomatic relations after nearly a quarter of a century. In 2007, the European Union (EU) began relaunching dialogues with Syria; while in the same year Israel carried out an aerial strike against a nuclear facility under construction in northern Syria, a raid that was officially confirmed only in 2018 (Holmes, 2018). During the same period, Assad met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, signalling better overall political relations with the West. Up until 2011 there were, largely speaking, only minimal instances of sectarian conflict under Bashar's rule.

2011 Uprising

As increased regional de-stabilisation was occurring around Syria, chiefly in the form of the US invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, and a series of other economic and political events, an inherently oppressive Assad regime coupled with natural events also contributed to Syria's lack of internal stability. Between 2006 and 2011, Syria experienced the largest drought in its national history, the second- and third-order effects of which are still being felt in the current conflict today. Indeed, much of the present conflict between factions at the local level and the Assad government revolve around the continual acquisi-tion of sufficient fresh water. This fact therefore suggests that brute economic factors also played a significant part in bringing about the conflict, aside from mere Shia–Sunni differences. Coupled with this natural event were also other conditions of general economic instability and growing political frustration from the majority of the disenfranchised Sunni populace. The shooting of protesters in Deraa in March 2011 by Assad's security forces, for instance, also helped to catalyse increasing political unrest within the local area that then spilled over into Baniyas, Homs and Damascus in the following months (BBC, 2012).

In May 2011, the Assad regime deployed tanks to the areas of Deraa, Baniyas, Homs and the Damascus suburbs to suppress protests; an action which led to a tightening of US, EU and local Arab nation sanctions against Syria. While the early stages of the Syrian civil war were initially non-sectarian in nature, the face of the conflict would soon begin to polarise along increasingly sectarian lines as more opportunistic groups, both internally and externally, attempted to exploit the growing power vacuum. The official US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 would also significantly contribute to this effect, as members of Hezbollah, IS and al-Nusra Front, as well as Syrian state-sponsored militia

(*shabiha*) would begin to increasingly participate in the conflict in the coming years.

The so-called Arab Spring of 2011, which marked successful political uprisings in nearby Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt, also served to inspire Syrians to establish the Syrian National Council (SNC) and its militant arm, the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Indeed, the SNC was originally established to serve as an alternative representative government of the Syrian people, designed to eventually supplant the existing Assad regime. However, because of internal conflicts and fracturing, the SNC remained weaker as an actor vis-à-vis the existing regime.

2012–2014

Early 2012 marked an increase in bombardments by Assad forces in the area of Homs. After several attacks against Assad forces in Damascus, and a successful seizure of Aleppo in July, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (minus Islamist militant groups) formed in Qatar in November. The US, the United Kingdom (UK), France and Turkey would come to recognise this organisation as the official representative of the Syrian populace the following month. In May 2013, Hezbollah successfully led an assault against Syrian rebels in the border town of Qusayr, marking a key turning point in the conflict and a shift in military momentum in favour of the Assad regime. Also, in 2013, United Nations (UN) inspectors concluded that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons in the Ghouta region of Damascus, killing approximately 300 people. However, Assad's government denied any responsibility for the attack, but nonetheless allowed the UN to complete the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles by June 2014.

2014–2016

Shortly after the failure of several United Nations mediated peace talks in early 2014, the prevalence of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in the Syrian conflict became increasingly prominent as the group launched an aggressive social media campaign, involving videos depicting the enactment of gruesome atrocities which IS viewed as consistent with Sharia law. In January 2014, the city of Raqqa fell completely to IS control; and in June 2014, IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the official establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. This announcement caused a rapid influx of thousands of foreign fighters into Syria to work, and fight, under the IS banner. In September 2014, the United States and five Arab countries responded by launching air strikes against IS in Raqqa and Aleppo.

The year 2015 was marked by the US scrapping a plan to train Syrian rebels that, after spending around $500 million, had reportedly produced just 60 fighters (Shear et al., 2015; McLeary, 2016). In September that same year, Russia began conducting its first air strikes in Syria, officially stating that it was targeting IS forces. Prior to this, from 2011 to 2014, Russia's involvement in Syria, however, was strictly in the capacity of a military advisory and assistance role. Russia's actions were met with strong protest from the West, claiming that Russia was deliberately targeting anti-Assad rebels. Around this same general timeline, Iran offered support to the Assad regime in the form of a $3.6 billion line of credit, as well as conventional and unconventional military aid helping to prop up 50 000 Syrian paramilitary troops coordinated by the elite wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Sadjadpour, 2013). By the end of 2015, after a four-year effort, the Assad government, with the combined assistance from Russia and Iran, was able to successfully reclaim control of Homs, Syria's third-largest city. A sizeable influx of Turkish troops into Syria in 2016 not only functioned to help Syrian rebel groups in their fight against IS militants, but also allowed Turkey to attack Kurdish-led rebels. Assad's troops, backed by Russian air strikes and Iranian-sponsored militias, were able to successfully retake control of Aleppo in December 2016 (Hubbard, 2016).

2017–Present

Russia, Iran and Turkey were able to enforce a ceasefire in January 2017 between the Assad government and rebel factions, after peace talks in Kazakhstan. This period of brief quiet was interrupted, however, after Syrian planes allegedly staged a chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheikhoun in April 2017, killing at least 74 people and injuring over 500. This event resulted in the US launching missile attacks on a Syrian airbase in response. The US decided to provide arms to the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in May 2017, in order to bolster the strength of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who recently captured the important Tabqa Dam from IS control. Since the civil war started in 2011, it has resulted in an estimated 511 000 casualties as of March 2018., with an estimated 6.6 million displaced internally and 5.6 million around the world, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

The US, along with France and the UK, launched further strikes against government and military targets in Syria in April 2018, in response to alleged chemical weapons attacks by Assad forces against civilians in Damascus. Throughout this same general time period, the US also led coalition bombardments of IS targets within the region. Throughout 2019, the US military presence in Northern Syria began to shrink, allowing for a Turkish military push

against Kurdish forces who were fighting against IS. This Turkish military action drew much criticism from the international community, and in October 2019, Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Putin announced a ten-point plan that agreed to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, and aimed to shape the ending of the Syrian civil war (*CNN*, 2020). Most recently, in March 2020, Turkey launched a direct military push into the Idlib province of Northern Syria, after the reported killing of several dozen Turkish troops by Syrian forces.

MAJOR ACTORS

Shia Sects

Assad's network

While distinct from the Assad family, the Alawites nonetheless constitute a major support system for the current Assad regime. The Shia Alawites make up about 10–12 per cent of the overall Syrian population, and have maintained political power in Syria for over four decades through strong alliances with Christian and Druze minorities as well as Sunni businessmen. To many, the Alawites are considered a Shia sub-sect, but they themselves repeatedly distinguished themselves from Shi'ism. While acknowledging certain formal similarities with Shi'ism, Alawite leaders stress that Alawism is distinct from Shia Islam, insofar as it declines certain prior legal rulings, or *fatwas*. Alawite leaders also acknowledge their incorporation of elements of other monotheistic religions into their traditions, most notably Judaism and Christianity, but nonetheless argue that they 'not be seen as marks of deviation from Islam but as elements that bear witness to our riches and universality' (Wyatt, 2016).

Alawites also make up around 140 000 of the approximately 200 000 career soldiers in Assad's military of 300 000 troops. The Assad government has been accused on multiple occasions of developing a clandestine nuclear programme as well as stockpiling and using chemical weapons (*CNN*, 2004). The Assad government has been strongly supported by regional actors Iran and Lebanon, Hezbollah and various Shia militant groups, and by international actors including Russia (and more indirectly, China). The Assad government is locally opposed by the FSA/SNC, the SDF, and by jihadist groups such as IS and al-Nusra Front. Regionally, the Assad government is opposed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel; while internationally speaking, the Assad government is opposed by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in varying degrees.

With support from the Alawites, the Assad family along with other ruling elites close to them form another key component to the current Syrian regime. For instance, Assad's youngest brother, Maher al-Assad, considered to be

Syria's second most powerful man, is the chief of the Syrian Republican Guard, an elite force of six brigades dedicated to protecting the Assad regime from domestic threats. He also commands the 4th Armoured Division, one of Syria's best military units. Maher is reported as being exceptionally violent and short-tempered. After Bashar's ascent to power in 2000 and the 'Damascus Spring' which showed Bashar tending towards a degree of political openness never demonstrated by his father, Maher reportedly persuaded Bashar to return to a suppressive, heavy-handed means of rule. In March 2011, Maher supposedly created many human rights violations by killing dozens of people during the crushing of several pro-democracy protests in Deraa.

In addition to Maher, Rami Makhlouf, Bashar al-Assad's first cousin, has also helped the Assad regime considerably in maintaining its power in Syria, functioning as arguably the single most powerful economic figure in Syria. In 2001, for instance, Makhlouf was awarded one of Syria's two mobile phone operator licences for the company Syriatel. In addition to Syriatel, Makhlouf also controls banks, duty-free shops, a construction company, an airline, TV channels, and imports luxury cars and tobacco. For reasons having to do with suspicion of corruption, the US Treasury banned US firms and individuals from doing business with Mr Makhlouf in 2008. A recent rift in the relationship between Assad and Makhlouf, however, has resulted in a hit to the already fragile Syrian economy, with many Makhlouf-owned employees and executives being arrested for reasons of tax evasion. Makhlouf, however, has seriously denied these allegations of tax evasion, even taking to Facebook to publicly beg his cousin for the charges to be officially dropped.

A final key supporting actor within the existing Assad power structure is the Syrian business community. Since the 1970s, the Assad family has maintained key alliances with certain businessmen (many of whom are Sunnis and Christians) to back the regime and to help it through the economic crisis during the present conflict. Furthermore, many members of the Syrian business community have assisted in facilitating informal money transfers via the highly unregulated Hawala system on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria, and have also helped to flood the Central Bank with cash when needed. While the Syrian pound certainly took a significant hit on the global market, it would have been a lot worse without this deliberate propping-up of the economy by Syrian businessmen. This is not to say, however, that all Syrian businessmen have unanimously supported the Assad regime. Indeed, some business families, such as the Tlass family, the second most influential family in Syria after the Assads, have actively funded forces which oppose the current regime. With the Syrian revolution, many other family figures have also defected and started to fund revolutionary forces.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is a Shia paramilitary group based in Lebanon, loyal to the legacy of the Iranian Revolution. Its origins date back to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Iran's subsequent decision to fund the creation of Hezbollah in order to counter and harass Israeli forces. Hezbollah has members within the Lebanese parliament and constitutes what military experts refer to as a 'hybrid threat': an insurgent group that can successfully fight superior adversaries with a mix of conventional and unconventional military capabilities (Clarke and Serena, 2017). Hezbollah has progressed from functioning in an advise-and-assist role to the Assad regime in 2012 and 2013, through to the training of Syrian militias, expanding all the way to fully fledged combat operations from 2015, such as those operations witnessed in Homs and in the retaking of Aleppo.

With regard to the conflict in Syria, Hezbollah has functioned as an indispensable resource in propping up the Assad regime. While the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah has been marked by long political tensions and jockeying for power, Hezbollah's relationship with Syria and its decision to aid the Assad regime can be seen as one of mutual self-interest as well as necessary self-preservation. Indeed, Hezbollah's intervention in Syria can be seen partially as a pre-emptive method of averting military defeat down the road, as well as a partial method of gaining military and territorial advantage against Israel. In terms of the former, Hezbollah likely sees the loss of Damascus to the Syrian rebels as a falling domino that would signal an existential threat to the so-called 'axis of resistance' against Israel, comprised of Hezbollah, the Assad regime and Iran (Ali, 2019). Hence, Hezbollah's intervention can, in part, be seen as an act of necessary self-preservation. With respect to the latter, Hezbollah's 2012 intervention in Syria has given it a positional advantage relative to the Assad regime, allowing it to exploit the moment to open a potential front against Israel in the Golan Heights (Ali, 2019). In May 2013, Hezbollah successfully led an assault against Syrian rebels in the border town of Qusayr. In February 2014, Hezbollah conducted missions in the Qalamoun mountains north of Damascus. It has also spear-headed campaigns in Deraa, Aleppo and Idlib, and the Damascus suburbs (Atrache, 2014). Since 2015, however, military assistance from Russia has allowed the Assad regime to rebalance its power relationship with Hezbollah within the region (Ali, 2019).

Shia militiamen (other)

Various non-Lebanese Shia militiamen have also entered into the Syrian conflict on the side of Hezbollah and the Assad government, from various regional countries. These militia men are reported to come from Iran, Iraq and Yemen, but predominantly from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The *liwa' fatimiyun* (Fatimiyun Brigade), a branch of Hezbollah Afghanistan,

is reported to fight for the Assad regime and is between 10 000 and 20 000 troops. Militiamen from Pakistan fighting in Syria, known as *liwa' zaynabi-yun* (Zaynabiyun Brigade), are difficult to pin down in terms of actual troop strength; however, they are reportedly growing in number and involvement (Heistein and West, 2015).

Opposition Groups

FSA/SNC

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian National Council (SNC) are the primary rebel factions opposing the Assad regime and have an estimated troop strength of between 40 000 and 70 000 troops. The FSA's political leadership body in exile, the SNC, is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and is dominantly Sunni in make-up, though not exclusively so. Though early reports speculated that the FSA was mainly comprised of defectors from Assad's military, more recent reports suggest that the FSA is overwhelmingly comprised of Sunni civilians. While early protests against Assad were somewhat multi-ethnic and multi-religious, reporter David Enders noted after a month-long stay with the FSA that the rebel group was 'Sunni to a man' (Carpenter, 2012). Along with other rebel factions, the SNC joined the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in 2012, but broke from the group in 2014 after political differences.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is a strict Sunni Islamist organisation founded in the 1920s. Its two main ideological pillars are the introduction of the Islamic Sharia (jurisprudence) as the basis controlling the affairs of state and society, and working 'to achieve unification among the Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperial-ism' (El-Hudaibi, 2010). After an attempted uprising in Hama against the Alawite regime in 1982 that was violently suppressed, the organisation was forced underground in Syria, but remained active elsewhere in the Middle East. Despite its relative dormancy for nearly three decades, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to exploit the lack of central leadership on the side of the rebels in the opening stages of the Syrian conflict. Consequently, this allowed the group to establish itself as the SNC's key leadership core (Hassan, 2013).

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

Backed by a US-led coalition, the SDF is a multi-ethnic – primarily Kurdish YPG and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) – force with an estimated troop strength of around 50 000–80 000 fighters. The SDF is an alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias, founded in 2015, aimed at opposing the Assad regime. The

Kurdish element of the SDF is specifically fighting for sovereignty in northeast Syria (*Al Jazeera*, 2019). The SDF became the US's main regional partner in the fight against IS in 2016 and 2017, and helped significantly in the military effort to drive IS out of Raqqa in October of 2017.

The so-called Islamic State (IS)

IS is a militant jihadist organisation, formerly led by the self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who attempted to establish the Muslim Caliphate in Syria, Iraq and beyond, mainly from 2014 to 2017. The Islamic State's *de facto* capital was in Raqqa, Syria from early 2017 until October 2017 when it was lost against US and SDF forces. Its estimated troop strength has fluctuated considerably, depending on sources and depending on different phases of the conflict. For instance, in summer of 2016, US Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland estimated IS's troop strength to be as low as 15 000 and as high as 20 000. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated IS troop strength to be around 80 000–100 000 in October 2014; and Reuters estimated troop strength to be somewhere between 40 000 and 60 000 in June 2015. Over the past several years, however, IS has suffered significant territorial losses in Mosul, Iraq and in Aleppo and Raqqa, Syria, as well as significant losses to troop strength and key leadership, with IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being killed by US Special Forces in a raid in the autumn of 2019. Despite much rhetoric by the US Trump administration regarding the defeat of IS, reports indicate that the terrorist group still maintains some 20 000 fighters across Iraq and Syria (Giglio and Gilsinan, 2020).

Jabhat Fatah al-Sham/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (al-Qaeda in Syria)

Formally known as al-Nusra Front and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and now branding itself as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), this group is a Salafi-jihadist group and former franchise of al-Qaeda (AQ) in Northern Syria. Despite an earlier alliance with IS, HTS (then Nusra Front) officially split from IS in 2013 after Baghdadi declared the establishment of the Caliphate and then tried to absorb Jabhat al-Nusra into IS, despite Zawahiri's objection. While IS's ideology was more concerned with the establishment of the Caliphate and the fight against the 'near enemy', HTS arguably seeks to use control, primarily of the northern region of Syria, as a platform to project global jihad against the 'far enemy' of the US and the West (John, 2016). In 2016, HTS officially announced its split from AQ, garnering harsh criticism from the AQ leadership, as well as pulling recruits from AQ into its organisational fold (BBC, 2019).

Kurds (PKK, PYD/YPG)

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is primarily a Marxist faction that has fought against the Turkish government since the 1970s to establish an

independent sovereign Kurdish state. While the PKK are Kurdish fighters operating in Turkey, the Rojava Defense Units (YPG), the militant arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), are Kurdish fighters operating in northern Syria (*Al Jazeera*, 2017). Following the major defeat of IS, Turkey turned its military forces against the YPG in October 2019 (Specia, 2019). While the US has provided arms to the YPG as part of the SDF coalition effort, there has nonetheless been ongoing worry from Turkey that the PYD has allocated some of these arms to the PKK (*Rudaw*, 2017). Furthermore, reports of a sophisticated and growing underground criminal smuggling infrastructure heading into Syria has further contributed to the free flow of arms, cash, stolen goods, and so on, in and out of the country (Steenkamp, 2017).

Regional Entities

Iran

Shia Iran is the Syrian regime's closest ally and supporter, providing military aid, air support and advisory assistance to the Assad government since the beginning of the conflict. Iran is also most directly opposed to Sunni Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the Syrian conflict has become a manifestation of greater Sunni Saudi versus Shia Iranian geopolitical tensions via the proxy entities of the Assad/Alawite regime and the Syrian rebel forces. Syria is not exclusive in this regard, however. Indeed, Iran has attempted to de-stabilise Sunni Saudi influence in Bahrain by encouraging anti-Sunni monarchy sentiment in the region, and has also made strong efforts to bolster Shia Iranian influence in the Iraqi government.

Like the Assad regime's relationship to Hezbollah, Syria's alliance with Iran can be seen largely as one of mutual self-interest and strategic necessity. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Syria has been Tehran's most consistent ally. While many other states and factions within the Arab world supported Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran–Iraq War, Syria chose to side with Iran. Iran and Syria's mutual fears regarding the threats of the United States and Israel also helped to bolster their alliance (Sadjadpour, 2013). Iran is also motivated to keep Assad in power in order to prevent the overwhelming Sunni majority within Syria from taking power and then creating a Sunni-based power alignment with Sunni Saudi Arabia against Iran.

Details regarding Iran's specific involvement in Syria are difficult to discern. Some estimate that Iran's annual trade with Syria is only around $700 million per year; but this does not take into account the subsidised oil that Iran has provided to Syria, as well as the $4.6 billion line of credit offered to Syria by Iran since January 2013 (Sadjadpour, 2013). Iran has also offered military aid training to Syria, helping to create a 50 000 personnel paramilitary group known as Jaysh al-Shabi (The People's Army) (Sadjadpour, 2013). Lastly,

in addition to financial and military support, Iran has attempted to strengthen cultural and religious bonds between Iran and Syria by facilitating subsidised travel packages and tours to Damascus.

Saudi Arabia

Sunni Saudi Arabia, particularly Wahhabi Sunnism, has functioned and continues to function as the primary regional political counterbalance to Shia Iran. For instance, it invested security assets in Bahrain in 2011 to counter anti-regime demonstrations encouraged by Tehran. With respect to Iraq, it has been a relatively open secret that wealthy Saudis, and perhaps the Saudi government itself, have funded Sunni militants in Iraq to oppose the Malaki government (*Reuters*, 2014).

With respect to relations to Syria, Saudi Arabia's posture has changed throughout the development of the conflict. During the initial outset of the Syrian conflict, the official Saudi position towards the Assad government was one of reluctant support. In May 2011 the Saudi government even provided 275 million rials of monetary assistance to Syria (Blanga, 2017a). This initial support of Syria can best be explained in terms of Saudi Arabia's desire for general political and regional stability provided by the Assad regime maintaining power, as well as the utility that the Assad regime provided as a broker with Iran. As the conflict wore on and the Assad regime garnered more negative press and rumors of human rights abuses, the tenor of the Saudi relationship to the Assad regime flipped, and relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia began to deteriorate. As Saudi Arabia began to switch its support to the rebels, its goals nonetheless remained primarily focused on blunting Iranian power expansion via Syria. Accordingly, at first Saudi Arabia's support only went to non-Islamist rebels; however, as Iranian influence expanded in the area, Saudi Arabia became increasingly willing to support Salafi groups in the region as a military counterbalance to Iranian influence (Blanga, 2017a).

Turkey

As the third regional actor, Turkey functions as the 'wild card' player in the Syrian conflict. At the onset of the 2011 conflict, the Erdogan government sided somewhat with Saudi Arabia, insofar as it mutually desired a regime change in Syria. This was mainly due to the influence of the ruling conservative Sunni party in Turkey and the growing number of Sunnis being killed by the Assad regime. On account of this, Turkey has provided sanctuary for FSA troops within its borders and it has also resumed its historical geopolitical rivalries with Shia Iraq and Iran. In supporting the FSA, Turkey is hedging that an FSA victory will fundamentally constitute a greater Turkish influence, rather than a Saudi overall influence, in the region. As a counter-measure to this, Syria has lent fluctuating support to the Marxist PKK at times (Cevik,

2018). Accordingly, Turkey is also keen on controlling the growing swell of Kurdish power and organisation within its regions.

Turkey's involvement in the Syrian war has gradually escalated from its initial level of involvement at the outset of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Initially criticising the Syrian regime, Turkey's involvement has morphed from criticism, to providing increased assistance to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to direct use of Turkish troops in northern Syria. Turkey's motivation for its involvement in Syria is in partly defensive against both Syrian forces but also IS. In fact, after an August 2016 child suicide bomber who killed 54 people at a Turkish wedding, Turkey responded with aerial bombardments in the northern region of Syrian (*Sky News*, 2016). Turkey's involvement in the conflict also spiked significantly after a Turkish fighter jet was shot down by Syrian forces in June 2012. Recently, in March 2020, Turkey launched a major direct military offensive against Syria, killing several thousand Syrian troops, after several dozen Turkish troops were killed in the Idlib province of Northern Syria. While Erdogan has been backing Syrian rebels for years, since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, this new action now constitutes a dramatic escalation of the use of military force against the Assad regime. Backed by Russia and Iran, Assad is now attempting to retake the positional ground lost in Idlib. The consequence of this latest development in the Syrian conflict has been that it has left several million refugees trapped in the Idlib province between the two warring factions, with Turkey refusing to take on any more refugees. United States and European involvement in dealing with this potential humanitarian crisis has been minimal so far (Gall, 2020).

Israel

Israel has a long-standing history of conflict with Syria, having waged several wars with it since the 1940s. To Israel, Syria has strong strategic significance since it provides a bridge for Iranian forces to get closer to Israel; forces much bigger and stronger than Hezbollah. Several assassinations, attacks and counter-attacks initiated by Israel in recent years bolster this point. Indeed, on some views, the war in Syria is regarded as an indirect war between Iran and Israel (Baghat, 2018). That being said, Israel likely sees no great appeal to a new hostile Turkish or Saudi-influenced Sunni regime taking Assad's place, nor does it gain from a de-stabilised Assad regime. Accordingly, a complete fracturing of the Assad government could constitute a considerable security risk for Israel, as it might allow for the metastasising and creation of new threat organisations.

International Influencers

United States

While the initial entry of the US into the Syrian conflict was ostensibly in response to the Assad regime's specific use of chemical weapons in Damascus in 2013, the US has more long-standing motivations for its involvement in Syria. Indeed, the US has good reason to care about Syria's future, given its physical proximity to Turkey and Israel, Assad's close relationship with Iran and Russia, Syria's influence in Lebanon, and its historic rivalry with Iraq. The US has sought to influence the Syrian conflict by lending support to the SDF, mainly in the form of air strikes (approximately 11 235) against IS as well as through funding and training to anti-Assad rebels via US special forces (DOD, 2017).

Russia

Ideologically speaking, Russia's motivation for supporting the Assad regime stems from historic suspicions about Western-led regime change that could compromise Syria's statehood, much like in Libya and Iraq. While Russia's official justification for continuing to support the Assad regime is ostensibly for reasons having to do with fighting terrorism, Russia nonetheless has very strong strategic interests in once again being a major power broker in the Middle East. The achievement of such power projection in the greater Middle East is therefore highly contingent upon Russia's successful influence in Syria, ostensibly best achieved via an Assad-led Syrian government.

Russia has proven to be a strong and indispensable ally to the Assad regime since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. From 2011 to 2014, Russia provided mainly indirect political and military aid to Syria. In 2015, however, Russia began providing direct military involvement in Syria, and has done so up to the present day. The motivation for Russia's involvement in the Syria conflict is multi-faceted. For one, increased involvement in Syria can be seen by some strategists as an expression of the 2008 formulated 'Putin Doctrine', as a geopolitical strategy aimed at blunting Western power and influence in the region. Secondly, Russia's involvement in Syria can be seen as an expansion of power in the region, particularly as a means of increasing Russian power projection via access to Tartus, Syria's southeastern port city. Lastly, Russia's involvement in Syria can be seen as a means of combating IS and other radical terrorist threats. However, many within this international community have seen this explanation to be a thinly veiled excuse to mask more realist political motives. So far, Russia has committed approximately 5000 troops in mainly 'assist and advise' capacities, and has provided a significant amount of air support and aerial bombardments that have been critical to the Assad regime's maintenance of power and stability in the region. Many within the interna-

tional community, however, have criticised Russia's use of air strikes, arguing that they have indiscriminately targeted Syrian civilians. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the total civilian death toll in Syria since March 2011 has been 226 247, with at least 6514 killed directly by Russian air strikes. Other estimates place the number of civilian deaths closer to 8400 (Calucci, 2020). Recently, Russia has shifted its geopolitical posture to assist the Assad regime against new pressures coming from Turkey.

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

Since 2011, the Syrian civil war has manifested itself in a variety of strategies and tactics, both conventional and unconventional, employed by various local, regional and international actors throughout each phase of the conflict. The overall strategy of Bashar al-Assad's regime, particularly in regard to the re-taking of Aleppo, appears to be one of basic siegecraft, garnering the name 'surrender or starve' by some opponents. Backed by heavy bombardments and Russian air strikes, Assad has used this combination of siege and bombing tactics to oust rebel forces from what was their last urban positional stronghold in Aleppo, re-establishing full Syrian control of the city in 2016. The Assad regime coupled these tactics with the use of mass-broadcast text messages, air-dropped leaflets, and graffiti that carried messages of imminent bombing along with promises of amnesty. In addition to the use of siege and bombardment tactics, Assad has also relied on chemical gas attacks such as in Ghouta in 2013 and in Khan Shaykhun in April 2017, resulting in the US launching 59 Tomahawk missiles on Syrian military targets as a form of reprisal.

With respect to Syrian rebel forces, their positional defeat in Aleppo has meant that they have had to fall back to insurgent guerrilla tactics aimed at harassment and disruption of Assad's conventional forces. These tactics have largely taken the form of assassinations, armed raids, roadside bombs and largely indiscriminate mortar shelling. As the ongoing battle between the Assad regime and Syrian rebel forces has de-stabilised the social and political order within the region, remnants of IS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (AQ in Syria) have still sought to exploit the political power vacuum for their own benefit. After initial military successes in Raqqa and Mosul in 2014, coupled with an aggressive social media campaign, IS saw an influx of thousands of foreign fighters into Syria. However, over the course of 2015 and 2016, largely due to US targeted drone strikes, IS gave up considerable ground in both Mosul and Raqqa. The Special Forces raid and killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019 also dealt a tremendous blow to IS leadership and morale. Meanwhile, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham has continued to consolidate in northern Syria and is likely using this area as a platform for future power projection against the West.

The US and coalition forces have sought to combat IS and AQ in Syria mainly through the use of Syrian Kurds under the banner of the SDF. In doing so, however, the US-backed SDF has clashed at times with Turkish-led forces looking to contain Kurdish expansionist interests. This is particularly true given the recent expansion of direct Turkish military power into Northern Syria.

Lastly, Russia has continued to provide military support to the Assad regime, mainly in the form of air strikes, but also with troops, since it entered the conflict in September 2015. As noted, Russia's motivations for continuing to back to the Assad regime are mixed, combining a desire to maintain and strengthen their ally's power, to expand global influence via Assad's Syria, particularly via Syria's port city of Tartus, and to prop up the Assad government in its own efforts to fight regional radical Islamist threats to Russia.

TRAJECTORY

Tentative Predictions

The trajectory of the Syrian conflict is still highly uncertain. However, given the major positional re-taking of Aleppo in 2016 by Assad forces, several political theorists believe that a way forward towards an eventual peace is now closer within reach, provided that certain conditions obtain between key actors and within key regions. According to a report published by the Center for a New American Security, Syria has now 'fragmented into several "distinct zones of control", each governed by different local players and heavily influenced by various external powers', a situation which has 'provided the foundation for a tentative cessation of hostilities brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran that has at least reduced violence in some areas' (Clarke and Serena, 2017). Broadly speaking, what transpires in these zones of control or centres of gravity will largely dictate how political order becomes re-established, where, and by whom, or whether further instability and violence continues.

'Zones of Control' Model

Assad's statelet
Since the onset of the Syrian conflict, both Russia and Iran have continued to strongly support the Assad regime and to contribute political pushback to US and Western initiatives against Assad. Assad's statelet, largely in the coastal areas of Syria and sections of Damascus, provides the basis for Russia's and Iran's strategic goals throughout the greater Middle East, though it is still uncertain how much their goals will align or diverge in the near future. For the

foreseeable future, however, Iran and Russia will continue to lend support to the Assad regime.

Al-Qaeda's northwest haven

Areas north and west of Aleppo are approaching another humanitarian crisis due to the Assad government's military efforts aimed at opposition forces in Idlib province. Northern Syria is at an increased risk of becoming a haven for al-Qaeda's Syrian branch. The consolidation of jihadi power in northern Syria could serve as potential platform for future AQ power projection against US and Western interests. Accordingly, this region must be retaken if the US wants to disrupt, contain and diminish the growing AQ threat.

Northern Syria divided between Turkey and the Kurds

Turkey, with the assistance of the US-led coalition, has achieved sizable control in the region north and east of Aleppo. This area is presently serving as a buffer zone and will likely remain under Turkish control for the foreseeable future. Having successfully stymied much of IS's military efforts in this area, Turkey's military priorities have now largely shifted to preventing Kurdish expansionism. This second objective is becoming increasingly difficult for Turkey to control as the (primarily Kurdish) SDF has been gaining momentum, due to positional gains and US backing. Recent Turkish military expansion into this area also adds a new element of heightened antipathy between Turkey and the Assad regime.

Moderate opposition buffer between Jordan and Israel

The so-called 'settlement' agreement of 2018 between the Syrian regime and the rebels, brokered by Russia, allowed for the regime's taking of control of southern Syria (Nofal, 2020). However, recent retaliatory killings of nine Der'a men in the area, as well as increased political demonstrations, have re-ignited military re-escalation in the area, harkening back to the early stages of the Syrian conflict. Strategically speaking, then, Russia has pushed to keep the status quo in the area, in an attempt to prevent intervention by Israel and Jordan which themselves fear the ratcheting-up of military presence from Iranian and pro-Iranian forces (Young, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The war in Syria represents a series of interrelated and layered struggles. On one level, the war represents a local struggle between local factions; while at another level, the war represents a regional struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. The war also represents an international struggle between coalitions of international actors loosely held together by political, cultural

and economic commitments, and by physical, technological and pragmatic constraints. Beneath all of these layers, however, reside the specific minds of individual persons choosing to opt into, reaffirm or deny the legitimacy of these various groups and relations, in accordance with some set of articulated (or unarticulated) reasons, including moral, epistemic and practical ones. The war in Syria therefore represents a momentary fissure in the international space of reasons whereby the balance of these reasons will tend toward greater order and stability, or toward greater dynamism and discord. This trend will likely occur in accordance with these aforementioned factors, with the specific personalities of leaders willing to press their interests, and with the overall set of incentives to be gained, real or imagined, of those who choose to follow them.

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9. Palestine–Israel

Doaa' Elnakhala

BACKGROUND

Palestine is an area of about 26 000 km², located to the southeast of the Mediterranean, and is comprised of modern-day Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This area contains sacred sites for Jews, Christians and Muslims. Since the late 19th century, it has been subjected to conflicting claims by Jewish and Arab national movements. Jewish claims are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants that Palestine was the site of the Jewish kingdom of Israel, destroyed by the Romans. Palestinian claims are based on continuous residence for hundreds of years, and on constituting the majority of the population at various times in the conflict, including the end of the British Mandate and the creation of the State of Israel, in 1948. Some also add that, since Abraham's son Ishmael is the forefather of the Arabs, then God's promise to the children of Abraham also includes the Arabs (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014, p. 1).

Waves of Jewish immigration arrived in Palestine during the Ottoman Rule and the British Mandate.[1] In 1917, the British promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration (Balfour, 1917), which contradicted their promise to the Arabs of Palestine, of their own independent state on the same land (Antonius, 2010).[2] Concerned over a demographic threat and a gradual loss of land to the Jewish migrants, the Palestinian Arabs rioted against the British Authorities, accusing them of conspiring with the Jews. With support from different sources, the influence of the Jewish population expanded as tensions continued to escalate (Pappé, 2006; Elnakhala, 2014).

Palestine was demarcated over various phases during the British Mandate. Article 22 of the League of Nations' Covenant established the Mandate over Palestine, which included today's Jordan. The United Kingdom (UK) decided to detach the land to the east of the River Jordan, giving it to the Hashemites as an independent state that became the modern-day Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Article 25 of the British Mandate for Palestine specifically defines Palestine as the area west of the River Jordan (*Mandate for Palestine*, 1922).

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After World War II, the UK relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and requested the intervention of the United Nations (UN). The UN proposed a partition plan, with a state for the Jews, another for the Palestinian Arabs, and an internationalised Jerusalem. The Arabs rejected the proposal since it gave the Jews more land than the Arab majority; thus, the fighting broke out between the British-trained and armed Jewish militias and the local Palestinians. On the same day that the British departed, the Jews proclaimed the creation of the State of Israel, following which a number of Arab countries immediately attacked Israel and the 1948 war began.[3] After Israel won this war, an armistice agreement was signed between Israel and the Arab states. As a result, Palestine was divided into three sections: 77 per cent under Israeli control; the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, under Jordanian rule; and Gaza Strip under Egyptian control (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014).

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, as well as Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. To religious Jews, this move was necessary to gain control over the holy sites of East Jerusalem. Israel immediately started to build Jewish settlements on West Bank hilltops and in the Gaza Strip, and it established a military administration to govern the Palestinians, tightly controlling the population (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014). By the end of the 1980s, the situation of the Palestinian population was akin to living in a pressure cooker and the resultant explosion of this pressure became the First Palestinian Intifada (or 'uprising').

The Oslo Agreement was signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) following prolonged secret negotiations between the two sides. The Agreement created the beginning of the Oslo Process that sought to create a peace treaty based on the Palestinians' right to self-determination. It divided the Territories into smaller zones (Figure 9.1):

1. Area A: Palestinian population centres; the Palestinian Authority (PA) is fully responsible for internal security, public order and civil affairs.
2. Area B: 450 Palestinian towns in the West Bank; the PA controls civil authorities but Israel maintains overriding security authority.
3. Area C: scarcely populated areas of the West Bank; Israel alone has full administrative and security control (Newman, 2002, pp. 638–639).

By the end of 2005, Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and dismantled all its settlements there, but to this day, Israel maintains control over Gaza's borders, underground resources and airspace (Rynhold and Waxman, 2008). Area C constitutes 60 per cent of the West Bank and, under international law, it is an occupied territory. The Israeli authorities prohibit Palestinian development in Area C, while allowing Israeli settlements to be extensively expanded. Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics estimates the 2018 settler

PHASED REDEPLOYMENT
(ARAS A,B,C)
IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA STRIP

Source: 'Phased redeployment …' (2004).

Figure 9.1   The Palestinian Territories after the Oslo Agreement

population in Area C as 427 800, spread across 132 official settlements.[4] Israel
has approximately 121 outposts in Area C and retains control of security and

land management ('Number of settlers by year', 2018). With Jewish-only roads that link various Jewish settlements cutting through the West Bank, together with the barrier project launched in 2002, the West Bank towns on the map resemble isolated islands rather than a contiguous body of terrain (Figure 9.1). The Israeli settlements have been ruled to violate international law ('Israeli settlements remain …', 2019), although United States (US) President Trump declared in November 2019 that his country does not consider those settlements illegal (Moran, 2019).

In the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Israel took control over the western part of Jerusalem, while Jordan retained control of the eastern part. East Jerusalem includes the old walled city containing important Jewish, Muslim and Christian sites. The 1949 armistice line cut the city into two sections, east and west. In June 1967, Israel captured and immediately annexed East Jerusalem from Jordan. Israel regards Jerusalem as its 'eternal capital', while Arabs and the international community consider East Jerusalem as part of the occupied West Bank (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014). The areas encircling Jerusalem have experienced the highest rates of settlement activities (Thrall, 2015), and the city's holy sites are central to the daily tension, especially around the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif. This site is sacred for both Muslims and Jews and thus has been at the centre of regular disputes (Hassner, 2009). In July 2017, for example, Israel shut down al-Aqsa Mosque when three Palestinians shot two Israeli police officers ('Israel shuts down …', 2017). As expected, these measures were followed by several weeks of protests and civil unrest.

In May 2018, the Trump administration moved the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem. The move was welcomed by Israel, but was condemned by the Palestinians and the international community as it confers a degree of legitimacy on the Israeli control of the city and thereby obstructs the Palestinians' aspiration to establish their future capital there ('US relocates embassy …', 2018).

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

Scholarship on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is riddled with controversies. Some contend that conflict was born from a colonial regime that enabled the creation of the State of Israel and ignored the Palestinians' national aspirations (Klein, 2010, p. 9), while many Israelis simply see the establishment of their state as an outcome of a war that led to national independence (Shlaim, 2008). Overall, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is extremely multi-faceted and involves land, religion and ethnicity, among other issues.

Religion

Muslims believe that Palestine is an Islamic *waqf*, that is, a land that is part of the Muslim religious trust.[5] In 1937, David Ben Gurion repeatedly cited the Bible to remind people of the Jewish right to the land of Israel (Eldad, 2013). When Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, control over the city's holy sites became a central issue. An agreement was reached, concluding that the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosques were Islamic *waqfs* under Jordanian responsibility, while Israel would be in charge of external security of the compound that houses both mosques. Accordingly, non-Muslims, including Jews, can enter the sites, but only as tourists rather than worshippers. As expected, the agreement was not respected at all times ('The protectors …', n.d.), particularly by hard-line groups such as Temple Mount Faithful and the Temple Institute that aspire to rebuild a third Jewish temple on the same site ('Five things …', 2017).

Israel identifies itself as a Jewish state, while the large majority of Palestinians are either Muslims or Christians.[6] Beyond religious beliefs, sacred places are at the heart of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Several sacred places for Jews and Muslims occupy the same locations. For instance, the Temple Mount for the Jews and Haram al-Sharif for the Muslims are believed to be in the same location (Hassner, 2009), as are the Western Wall for the Jews and the Wall of Tears for Muslims, and Hebron's Machpelah Cave for Jews and Haram al-Ibrahimi for Muslims (Abou Ramadan, 2016, pp. 182–183).

Territory

Both the Palestinians and the Israelis make claims about the same territory, and there have been several attempts at dividing this land, but so far all have failed (Allen, 2020). The Israeli West Bank barrier, launched in 2002, is another attempt at partition that annexed large strips of Palestinian land and subsumed them within Israel's borders (Elnakhala, 2014). The fact that Israel annexed more land in the 1967 war, trebling the size of its territory, confirms the territorial dimension of the conflict (*The Economist*, 2017). This expansion continues, with Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank annexing Palestinian land, mostly privately owned, and further adding to the evidence that this conflict has a significant territorial dimension (Hatuqa, 2013).

As a result of the 1948 war, some 750 000 Palestinians fled their homes to seek safety elsewhere. The properties and land of those displaced were mostly taken over by the Israeli government, which reclassified the majority of them as absentee properties, a policy later enshrined in the Absentee Property Law of 1950. The law created the Development Authority which is authorised to sell these properties to the government, the Jewish National Fund or other

public agencies, a practice which resulted in many Palestinians losing their land, possibly forever. This law is still used today by Israel to take over individual houses, agricultural land and property of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Hatuqa, 2013).

Ethnicity

Following the 1967 war, the conflict adopted a more ethnic form. According to Klein:

> Ethnic Nationalism claims a right to National self-determination, with the nation based on a common origin and 'tribal' affiliation of its members, a shared history, culture, language, and most often, a common or dominant religion … both Zionism – the Jewish national movement – and its Palestinian counterpart are ethno-national movements. (Klein, 2010)

The constitutive texts of both sides, such as the Israeli Declaration of Independence and various PLO documents, support the idea advocated here by Klein.

In May 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed the Nation-State Bill, which defines Israel as the 'home of the Jewish people' ('Jewish nation state …', 2018) and emphasises the Jewish character of the State of Israel. There is evidently an inconsistency here. On the one hand the state is claimed to be a Jewish state. On the other hand, the state is claimed to be a democracy. However, since many of the members of this state are not Jewish, the existence of, or at least the commitment of this state to, the democratic political and civil rights of the members of the population who are not Jews becomes questionable. Given that Israel's control system also extends to the Palestinian Gaza Strip and the West Bank, this additionally widens the tension between Israel's dual natures of being democratic and Jewish[7] (Klein, 2010).

Oren Yiftachel contends that an ethnocratic regime fosters the expansion and domination of the dominant group in a contested territory, and he sees Israeli ethnocracy manifesting itself in the long-term Zionist strategy of Judaising[8] the homeland, the very territory perceived by Palestinians as their rightful historic homeland (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 3). On the ground, the ethnic nature of the conflict manifests itself in several forms. Israel has established a two-tier system – economic, legal, social, infrastructural, medical, educational, and so on – in the West Bank; one system for the Palestinians and the other for the Jews. According to Human Rights Watch, this system has resulted in various forms of discrimination against the Palestinians as they are deprived of basic services in certain zones of the West Bank,[9] such as electricity, water, schools

and access roads, while neighbouring Jewish settlers are able to access all these state-provided services ('Israel/West Bank …', 2010).

MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CONFLICT

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict had various phases. In its early days, the conflict was a direct confrontation among states, whereas in the past few decades, it has taken the form of a conflict between a state (Israel) and Palestinian non-state actors, with the Arab states mostly playing the role of mediators. A constant manifestation of the conflict, however, remains the Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian Territories, and the Palestinian response to this occupation.

Inter-State Wars

After continued fighting in Mandate Palestine between Jewish gangs and local Palestinian militants,[10] Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq attacked Israel immediately after the announcement of the creation of the State of Israel (Pappé, 2006). By early 1949, Israel had achieved a decisive victory against the combined armed forces of five Arab countries ('Why the Arabs …', n.d.). The fighting was ended by the UN-mediated Armistice Agreement of 1949. The Armistice Lines, also known as the Green Line, run along the borderlines of British Mandate Palestine, except in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In these latter two areas, the lines were determined by the outcomes of the 1948 war (*1949 Armistice Agreement*, 1949). While Israel calls this conflict 'the war of independence', the Palestinians call it al-Nakba, or 'the Catastrophe', due to the massive negative impact it had upon them.

On 29 October 1956, Israel, France and the UK attacked Egypt after President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal. Until then, the canal was controlled by the Suez Canal Company, which was itself controlled by French and British interests. Nasser also blocked the Gulf of Aqaba, barring Israel's access to the Red Sea. Nasser's decision followed the US and the UK refusing to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Through intervention of several international actors, including the USA, the war ended. A ceasefire came into effect and a UN emergency force was stationed along the canal, which remained under Egypt's control (*Al-Jazeera English*, 2008).

From 1948 until 1967, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian rule and the West Bank was under Jordanian rule. Another war erupted in 1967, this time with a full-scale air and artillery battle between Israel and Syria on 7 April 1967, after a long period of tension. On 13 May, Moscow warned Cairo that Israel was massing troops on the border with Syria. Two days later, Egypt expelled

UN peacekeepers who had been patrolling the border with Israel since the end of the 1956 war, and moved troops into Sinai (Bowen, 2017). On 5 June, Israel launched Operation Focus, which destroyed the Arab air forces on the ground. By the sixth day, Israel had captured the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan (Bowen, 2017).

On 6 October 1973, the Syrian and Egyptian armies took Israel by surprise, by launching an attack on the Israeli holy day of Yom Kippur, in an attempt to regain their respective territories occupied in 1967. Egypt eventually regained possession of Sinai through a US-mediated peace process, but the Syrian surprise assault to regain the Golan Heights was thwarted (Connolly, 2013). Syria and Israel signed an armistice in 1974, and a UN observer force has been in place on the ceasefire line since that year. Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, a move that was not recognised internationally ('Golan Heights profile', 2015), although in March 2019 the Trump administration in the US recognised the Golan Heights as Israeli ('Golan Heights …', 2019).

Invasions and Large-Scale Military Operations

On 6 June 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee, by invading Lebanon to end the threat from the Palestinian militias basing themselves there. Syria iimmediately advanced through the Biqaa Valley, and a clash between Syria and Israel ended with the Israeli Air Force destroying most of Syria's missile batteries located in Lebanon. In collaboration with the Lebanese Christian militias, Israel besieged Beirut to force PLO and Syrian troops out, which happened in August. Christian militias then massacred Palestinian residents in the Sabraa and Shatila refugee camps, while Israeli troops looked on (Security Council Resolution 521, 1982). Afterwards, the US brokered the withdrawal of all foreign armies from Lebanon, including Israel, Syria and the PLO, and it brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. By 1985, Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon, except for the Lebanese buffer zone in the south, from which it eventually withdrew in May 2000 ('1982 Lebanon invasion', 2008).

In February and March 2002, after a series of Palestinian suicide bombings, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, invading Palestinian towns and cities that were under full Palestinian control. Israel justified these incursions as self-defence against Palestinian attacks, and Israeli forces targeted weapons, people, tunnels and infrastructure associated with violence. As Palestinian attacks in Israeli city centres continued, Israel launched a series of additional, similar military operations, some of which continued throughout 2003 (Reich, 2008).

Since December 2008, Israel has launched a number of military operations in the Gaza Strip. Operation Cast Lead occurred between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Operation Pillar of Defence between 14 and 21 November 2012, and Operation Protective Edge between 8 July and 27 August 2014. These operations targeted the militant organisation Hamas,[11] and in particular Hamas's infrastructure and military capabilities. However, all three operations, particularly the first and the third, caused devastating damage and causalities among the civilian population. Operation Cast Lead left more than 1300 civilians, mainly Palestinians, dead and thousands more wounded, plus ten Israeli soldiers and three civilians killed. Operation Protective Edge resulted in 2100 Palestinians being killed, the majority of them civilian, with 66 Israeli soldiers and seven civilians also killed. Israel was heavily criticised by human rights organisations and the UN for its use of disproportionate force and for deliberately targeting civilians. Each operation was followed by a mediated truce between Israel and Hamas, although these did not necessarily end the tensions ('Gaza crisis …', 2014).

Military Occupation

In parallel to direct military action, there is a regime of Israeli military occupation that has been imposed in the Palestinian areas. Observers and politicians are divided over when the occupation started, with some believing that it began in 1948 with the war that gave birth to the State of Israel, while others believe the occupation started with the 1967 war, when Israel annexed the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The 1948 war was followed by international recognition of the State of Israel, while the 1967 war by contrast was followed by condemnation of the occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

Many, however, agree that the Israeli occupation has changed over time. Soon after the 1967 war, Israel established military rule to govern the Palestinian areas. Initially, Israel tried to administer all aspects of Palestinian life and to normalise the occupation while exploiting the territories' resources, including land, water and labour. The 1990s marked a shift towards an Israeli separation from the Palestinians, with Israel abandoning administration of the territories while continuing to exploit their non-human resources such as land and water. This exploitation of resources was facilitated by the Oslo Peace Agreement (Gordon, 2008, pp. xix–xx), which maintained Israeli control over the borders, underground resources and air space (Weizman, 2007, pp. 5–6).

While violence may be a daily characteristic of life in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, two episodes in the history of the conflict are marked as Intifadas. The First Intifada started in late 1987, due to Israel's excessive control measures, its suppression of nationalism, as well as economic and other forms of subjugation. In the First Intifada, the Palestinians largely refrained

from using firearms and explosives. By the early 1990s, Israel was burdened by the costly response to mass riots, which in part motivated it to begin negotiations with the Palestinians (Khalidi, 2007, p. 178; Gordon, 2008).

The Second Palestinian Intifada started in September 2000, largely due to Palestinian disappointment with the peace process. Triggered by a visit by then Opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the Intifada initially consisted of riots, with most of the violence limited to throwing rocks at armed Israeli troops. Two months on, various Palestinian factions started to launch armed attacks against Israel, a feature that distinguishes the Second Intifada from the First Intifada. The employment of extensive Israeli repression confirmed to the Palestinians that they were still under occupation, despite the peace process (Khalidi, 2007). The Second Intifada left many more Palestinians and Israelis dead than the First Intifada[12] (Gordon, 2008).

PROTAGONISTS

Israel

Israel is a representative democracy with a Prime Minister, and a diverse range of policies have been adopted by different prime ministers regarding the conflict. While Rabin signed a peace agreement with the Palestinians, Netanyahu's cabinet expanded Israeli settlements in the West Bank and launched some of the widest-scale military operations against the Gaza Strip. Israel retains control over Palestinian borders, natural resources and even daily movement (Abou Jalal, 2015), and it relies on a very strong military capability, built through extensive Israeli efforts but also with assistance from friendly states. Today, Israel is by far the strongest military power in the region (Vekstein and Mehrez, 1997).

The Palestinians

The Palestinians are far from constituting a unitary actor, and several players have a key role on the Palestinian side. First, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1993 by the Oslo Agreement[13] to implement Palestinian self-rule by administering Palestinian affairs inside Palestinian cities and taking over internal security and public order responsibilities. The PA entered the Palestinian Territories in 1995. In fulfilment of the Agreement, the PA cooperated with Israel on security issues, including terrorism (Roy, 2011). After the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the PA became divided into two bodies, the Fatah-controlled PA based in the West Bank, and the Hamas-controlled PA in the Gaza Strip, which is boycotted by Israel and the West. Since 2007, the Fatah-PA has received international and Arab support

that resulted in it strengthening its security apparatus. It also has been involved in security cooperation with Israel (Zanotti, 2010; Elnakhala, 2014).

Second, since the establishment of Israel, various Palestinian factions have emerged, all of which have had military wings that launched attacks against Israel. They all aspired to the establishment of an independent state of Palestine. Until the early 1980s, all factions operated from abroad, mostly composed of Palestinians who were displaced by the various wars. They organised under the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and until the late 1960s, Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were the most important PLO factions. Both are secular movements that launched attacks against Israel in the 1960s and 1970s, and in 1974 the Arab League and the UN recognised the PLO as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. In the 1980s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas were established in the Palestinian Territories. Both these organisations have religious ideologies (Giacaman, 2013, pp. 24–25).

Since its establishment in 1964, Fatah has been the largest political faction under the PLO. It enjoyed unchallenged popularity among the Palestinians until the 1980s. Until the mid-1980s, Fatah advocated establishing a Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine, which naturally conflicted with Israeli claims to the same land. In November 1988, however, during the PLO's 19th Palestinian National Council's (PNC) meeting in Algiers, the PNC made a declaration proposing a clear and concise peace strategy, along with explicit acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338[14] and the recognition of Israel (Hassassian, 1994).

On 13 September 1993, the Fatah-led PLO and Israel signed the Declaration of Principles, known as Oslo I and later Oslo II, giving the Palestinians control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank cities. The PA was granted limited autonomy to administer Palestinian cities. After settling in Gaza, Arafat's forces did their best to demonstrate commitment to the agreement with Israel (Roy, 2011). The peace negotiations officially collapsed in the summer of 2000, followed by the deterioration of the security situation leading into the Second Palestinian Intifada in September. Fatah veterans in the West Bank established the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in October 2000, units which launched attacks against Israel until 2007 (Atkins, 2004, p. 21).

The death of Arafat, former Palestinian president and former leader of the PLO, in 2004 and Hamas's victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections escalated the ongoing tensions between Hamas and Fatah, which culminated in direct clashes in 2006 and 2007. Hamas forces expelled the Fatah leadership and operatives from the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The Chairman of Fatah and President of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, immediately dismissed the Hamas government and declared a state of emergency in the West Bank ('Timeline …', 2011). This resulted in a political division between the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip, with the first being under Fatah control and the latter controlled by Hamas. Officials of the Fatah-led PA in the West Bank signed a security agreement with Israel, mediated by the USA, and since 2007 there have been several attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the last of which came in October 2017 (Abu Amer, 2017).

Despite the agreement, tension still characterises the relations between the two groups. In 2017, President Abbas slashed salaries by one-third for 45 000 Gaza-based civil servants who were still paid by the PA, and ceased to pay for Gaza's electricity bill supplied by Israel (Harel, 2017). At the end of 2019, Fatah, with Egyptian backing, pressured Hamas to take administrative control over PA institutions in the Gaza Strip (Rasha, 2019). These developments were reported just a few months after President Abbas called for general elections in Palestine, with the participation of both Hamas and Fatah, in 2020 (Abu Amer, 2019).

Since its establishment in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has become increasingly influential in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Hroub, 2009). Hamas's Charter explains that (historic) Palestine is an Islamic trust that should be liberated from the oppressors; that is, Israel. The Charter clearly states that to liberate Palestine, Hamas should adopt jihad as a strategy, which in part entails fighting Israel ('Hamas's Charter', 1988). Over time, Hamas issued several official documents adding to and modifying its founding Charter; the last of those was published in April 2017. The document expressed Hamas's willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which constitutes a remarkable shift, since Hamas previously advocated a Palestinian state comprising the entire area between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean (Salah, 2017).

Hamas established a wide-ranging welfare programme that provides a broad range of social and educational services to the Palestinian society. In addition, Hamas created a military wing known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, responsible for training new militant recruits, developing the organisation's arsenal and conducting attacks against Israel ('The qualitative development …', 2003).

Hamas opposed the peace process with Israel, and it launched a wave of attacks against Israel in the 1990s (Kydd and Walter, 2006, p. 51). It also rejected the institutions established by the Oslo Accords and refused to participate in the Palestinian political process in 1996. Hamas, however, shifted its position in 2005 by participating first in the local elections, and later in the parliamentary elections of 2006 ('Profile: Hamas …', 2014). Although Hamas won the majority of parliamentary seats in the 2006 election, it was boycotted by the international community.

Regional and International Actors

Egypt is a key regional player and was one of the Arab countries that fought in the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars against Israel. Egypt, however, signed a peace agreement with Israel in March 1979, which ended the state of war between the two sides (Gwertzman, 1979). Egypt continues to play a leading role as a regional actor, which is evident in its brokering of several truces between the Palestinians and Israel, as well as mediating reconciliations between Hamas and Fatah. Similar to its predecessors, the Egyptian government controls the Rafah border, south of the Gaza Strip. Since the 2013 military coup, the Rafah border has been open only sporadically (Abou Jalal, 2015). The closure of the Rafah border has been one of the key tactics employed in the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Egyptian President Sisi has been very cooperative with Israel on security issues, particularly those concerning the Gaza Strip and Sinai. He launched several campaigns against the Rafah underground tunnels, such as the one in September 2015 (Hadid and Nassar, 2015).

Jordan is another Arab state that participated in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars. During the wars, Jordan received the highest number of Palestinian refugees. Unlike other Arab countries, Jordan granted full Jordanian citizenship to the majority of those refugees (Oroub, n.d.). In fulfilment of the original Armistice Agreement, Jordan ruled the West Bank until the Arab defeat of 1967 (*1949 Armistice Agreement*, 1949). Following the 1967 war, Jordanian rule of the West Bank ended, but it still maintains guardianship over the Christian and Islamic holy sites of East Jerusalem today. Jordan signed a peace agreement in 1994 (*Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty*, 1994) and has always played an important diplomatic role in support of the Palestinian cause (Zanotti, 2010). Jordan backs a two-state solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis (*US News*, 2017).

Qatar recently mediated several truce agreements between the Palestinians and Israel (Synovitz, 2012). Since Hamas distanced itself from the Syrian regime and its allies in 2012, Qatar has become Hamas's main source of external funding. Qatar has often helped Gaza and Hamas through several projects, for example the development of roads and the construction of schools, hospitals and the residential Hamad City. Following each Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, Qatar was among the first to contribute to its reconstruction ('Qatar launches …', 2012). These projects are believed to help Hamas sustain its rule in the Gaza Strip (Stephens, 2017). In June 2017, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain severed relations with Qatar due to its 'sponsoring terrorist groups and backing Iran's plans in the region' ('Severing relations …', 2017). Several observers explained the move

as playing a pressure card on Qatar, to force it to cut relations with Hamas, and also pressurising Hamas to give up more concessions (Othman, 2017).

Turkey has repeatedly announced its commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflict. Following the violent incident of the MV *Mavi Marmara*,[15] a ship filled with international activists and Turkish citizens that tried to break the Gaza Siege on 31 May 2010, Ankara became very critical of Israel (Gurcan, 2016). Tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv decreased in 2016 when an agreement was reached with Israel, resulting in the payment of $20 million in compensation by Israel, for those killed during the *Mavi Marmara* raid (Sabah, 2017). Despite this, Turkey and Israel expelled each other's senior diplomats on 15 May 2018 during protests along the Israel–Gaza borders.

Despite their Shiite background, Iran, Hezbollah and, formerly, Syria[16] provided significant military resources, logistical support and training to Hamas, a Sunni group. Hamas learnt how to construct rockets and also imported more advanced rockets, transported through underground tunnels along the borders with Egypt from Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. Hamas was also trained by Hezbollah in the use of suicide bombings and tunnel attacks (Elnakhala, 2014).

After Hamas's victory in the 2006 legislative elections, Iran channelled an estimated €15–17 million per month to Hamas, for governing costs. Iranian aid, however, has stopped following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. After years of disagreement over the situation in Syria, there have recently been several signs of rapprochement, most likely due to regional developments such as Egypt's crackdown on underground tunnels along the Rafah borders. This situation, combined with other factors, left Hamas short of funds. Since 2017, Tehran has resumed funding Hamas, although at a much lower rate than pre-2011 (Abu Amer, 2018). Iran is considered a serious threat by Israel, in particular because of its nuclear programme, and its military and covert presence in Syria. Hezbollah has also built an extensive arsenal and significant fighting capabilities that Israel considers a serious threat. Despite its involvement in the war in Syria, Hezbollah is expected to turn south and launch attacks against Israel in the near future (Anderson, 2019)

The US was a key player in the Peace Process of the 1990s, and the Oslo Agreement was signed on the White House's South Lawn. On the one hand, Israel receives the largest amount of US military aid every year, valued at billions of dollars. On the other hand, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been providing assistance in different forms to the Palestinians, particularly to the Fatah-led, West Bank-based, Palestinian Authority (Hammond, 2016). In January 2020, the US administration proposed a peace plan known as the 'deal of the century'. The Israelis welcomed the deal, but the Palestinians felt completely excluded from the negotiations leading to the plan (Bowen, 2020).

Between 2000 and 2019, the European Union (EU) has provided more than €770 million in humanitarian aid to help meet the basic needs of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In 2019, €14.5 million was allocated to humanitarian programmes in Gaza, with another €3.7 million allocated to budget lines such as access to safe education ('Palestine', 2019). European governments of countries such as France, the UK and Germany also provide support for the Palestinians in different forms, mostly backing good governance and state-building efforts.

The UN has practiced different roles since the beginning of the conflict, including mediating peace and proposing solutions, but arguably its most important initiative is the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). This agency specialises in providing aid and basic services for the Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan ('Palestine refugees', n.d.).

TRAJECTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Overall, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict could lead to one of three paths: a two-state solution, one bi-national democratic state, or one undemocratic state with no equal rights for its citizens.[17] The two-state solution, with Palestinian and Israeli states living peacefully side by side, is the solution most widely supported by the international community. UN Resolutions 242 and 338 back this idea with the borders of the Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank ('UN Resolutions …', 2004); it has been behind many international efforts, including those of the US and the EU (Willsher, 2017), and this proposed solution has support from people on both sides of the divide.

Yet, facts on the ground tell a different story. Israel has been expanding its settlements in the occupied West Bank, which makes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with territorial integrity, practically impossible. To solve this problem, Israel would need to dismantle its settlements, which is considered highly unlikely (Levy, 2017). The complete isolation of the Gaza Strip also forms a major obstacle to the territorial integrity of any future Palestinian state. To establish the territorial integrity of a Palestinian state, Israel will need to give up some of the land between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which is again unlikely. Another solution is to build a highway across Israeli-controlled land, connecting northeast of the Gaza Strip to the southern West Bank. The latter was proposed by the Oslo Agreement, as well by President Trump's so-called 'deal of the century', and was implemented for a short period of time in 1999,[18] but any permanent reopening of such a route does not seem to be happening anytime soon.

Resources are one of the necessary elements of an independent state, and land is a highly important resource, especially given that Palestinian land

has been continuously confiscated since 1948. Both land and other resources would therefore be scarce commodities if a Palestinian state were to be established tomorrow. Israel has previously used its Absentee Law to seize property left behind by Palestinians who fled the 1948 war. Since 1967, Israel has relied on several other policies to annex still more land. These measures, all of which bolster Israel's land appropriation policy, have include the construction of the physical barriers which separated many Palestinians from their farmlands, the construction of settlements and their continual expansion, and the by-pass roads used to connect the different settlements. A World Bank report from 2014 noted that the Palestinians could potentially derive an annual income in excess of $3 billion from the resources in Area C of the West Bank, but as discussed above, Palestinians have barely any access to Area C. Its water, land, minerals and other resources, including those in areas under the nominal control of the PA, are still under the de facto control of Israel. As part of its blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israel has imposed a naval siege which deprives Palestinians from access to fishing zones, or to the much-needed gas resources (Jabarin, 2014).

Moreover, the power gap between the Israelis and Palestinians is so profound that it appears scarcely possible that a joint solution can be found through bilateral negotiations. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is not only about the binary concepts of peace and war, but is also about the asymmetric distribution of the means of authoritative rule over Palestine (Beck, 2015). A two-state solution would thus leave the Palestinian side in a very unprivileged situation, given this power gap.

Many observers have declared the death of the two-state solution, which therefore leaves only one likely solution: a bi-national, democratic state. This option is possible in theory, but it would almost certainly be very difficult for it to function in practice. It is possible because Israel's policies have made complete separation between the Jewish and Palestinian populations almost impossible, and because natural and other resources are, in theory at least, shared between both sides. It would be difficult, though, because both the Palestinians and the Israelis would need to rethink everything, including fundamental concepts such as Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. Israelis would have to rethink the very concept of the 'Jewishness' of their state, and also the sharing of privileges with the Palestinians tomorrow that they themselves enjoy today. Indeed, it would be a long and painful road, but it appears currently to be the only practical solution (Levy, 2017).

Israel has a third option, which is to continue the current status quo. This, however, would arguably solidify an undemocratic Israeli state. Different practices, including new discriminatory laws, new settlements, new roads and new means of transportation, indicate that Israel is forcefully heading in exactly this direction. This would result in a one state-solution for the two

nations, but based on undemocratic values and constant violations of basic human rights (Levy, 2017). This trend has been identified by a 2017 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) report that generated considerable controversy, resulting in the resignation of the UN Under-Secretary General and ESCWA Executive Secretary Rima Khalaf (Perry, 2017), and the withdrawal of the conclusion of the reports. Many commented on these developments, noting that even if the entire report is withdrawn, the Israeli practices would remain discriminatory. This is evident in Israel's immigration laws that allow any Jewish person, anywhere in the world, to become an Israeli citizen, even if they have never been to Israel or Palestine. By contrast, Palestinian refugees or their antecedents, who were born in Palestine–Israel and owned land in Palestine, now the modern-day State of Israel, cannot return to their original homes and land (Reimann, 2017).

NOTES

1.   The Mandate for Palestine was granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Nations in 1920 after the partitioning of areas of the Ottoman Empire, following the end of World War I. The Mandate provided for the British administration of Palestine (and Transjordan), lasting until 1948, when the State of Israel was created on the day the British Mandate expired.
2.   The British also struck the Sykes–Picot Agreement with the French and the Russians that contradicted their promises to the Jews and the Arabs. This agreement partitioned the Middle East into French, Russian and British zones of influence.
3.   Transfer of the Arab population began before May 1948. The Jewish militias tended to attack Palestinian towns and villages. Some argue that these attacks amounted to the level of massacres. Before Israel's declaration of independence in May 1948, over 200 Palestinian villages had already been emptied and about 175 000 Palestinians were already refugees. Some had fled in fear; others were expelled by Zionist militias. Such expulsion was no coincidence, and was pre-planned in Jewish military documents such as Plan Dalet (Khalidi, 1988).
4.   According to the Foundation for Middle East Peace, the settler population in all of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, reached 382 031 in mid-2014 ('Settlements', 2014). B'Tselem data of the same year indicate that settlements in East Jerusalem housed 205 220 settlers ('Statistics on settlements …', 2017). Peace Now provides estimates for 2018, setting the number (excluding Jerusalem) at almost half a million. Given the fast pace of settlement expansion, it is likely that the population will have increased by the time this book is published. Moreover, these numbers cover populations in official settlements. Given that there are many unofficial settlements, the settler population on the ground is almost certainly higher than the data presented here.
5.   In Arabic, *waqf* literally means 'detention'. When a property is considered a *waqf*, that means this property is under detention, that is, its produce or income may always be available for religious or charitable purposes. When a *waqf* is created, the property is tied up forever and thereafter becomes non-transferable.

6. There is a small minority of Palestinian Jews and Druze who reside in both the Palestinian Territory and Israel today (Farber, 2010; Strickland, 2013).
7. On 17 May 2020, Benjamin Netanyahu was sworn in as Israel's Prime Minister, heading a unity government in which he shares power with his electoral rival, Benny Gants, in a deal that is expected to see the annexation of large sections of the West Bank ('Netanyahu takes …', 2020).
8. Judaisation means making the land Jewish by emphasising its Jewish elements and ignoring and sometimes eliminating its non-Jewish characteristics.
9. These are largely Palestinians living in Area C.
10. Sometime around February 1947, fights erupted between Jewish gangs and local Palestinians. The Hagana, a Jewish militia, had a detailed plan (Plan Dalet) with a central goal to evacuate the Arab-Palestinian villages of their residents (Pappé, 2006).
11. From an Israeli perspective, Hamas is the most militarily active Palestinian faction with threat capabilities. For more details on the group, please refer to the next section, on 'Protagonists'.
12. The death toll of the Second Intifada, including both military and civilian, is estimated at more than 3000 Palestinians and 900 Israelis, as well as 64 foreigners. In the First Intifada, more than 1300 Palestinian and more than 100 Israelis were killed ('Fatalities', 2020; 'Fatalities in the First Intifada', 2020).
13. The Oslo Agreement was signed by Israel and the PLO. Fatah is the largest Palestinian faction in the PLO.
14. These resolutions called on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967, that is, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem ('UN Resolutions …', 2004).
15. The incident occurred when activists sailed six vessels towards the Israeli naval blockade on the Gaza Strip with the aim of breaching it. Israeli commandos boarded the vessels and fighting broke out between the commandos and activists on the MV *Mavi Marmara*. Ten activists were killed, and the injured included at least 55 activists and ten Israeli commandos.
16. With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Hamas sided with the people against the regime. Ever since, relations between Syria and Hamas have waned (Roy, 2011).
17. Some argue that such a trajectory resembles an apartheid state.
18. As part of implementing the Oslo Agreement, a safe passage was opened between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in October 1999, but this was closed down a year later.

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10. National counter-terrorism responses: United States of America

Michael Robillard

BACKGROUND

The historical context of United States (US) counter-terrorism legislation, strategy and policy can largely be traced back to a Cold War understanding of future threats. From 1970 to roughly around the time of the Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981), the bulk of terrorist threats were anticipated by the US as originating from radical leftist and radical communist state-sponsored groups, such as the Baader-Meinhof Group ('Red Army Faction') operating out of West Germany. The Iran hostage crisis marked a significant shift in terms of US acknowledgment of a new kind of terrorist threat emerging within the geopolitical arena, one that was relatively autonomous and motivated by religious extremism, as opposed to one that was state-sponsored and motivated by communist ideology. The bombings of the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 by religious extremists going by the name of the Islamic Jihad, further re-affirmed this newly emerging threat picture.

The 1980s and the Reagan administration marked a further waning of this Cold War terrorist threat picture, coupled with a significant re-structuring of the US military and the Department of Defense (DOD). The Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986) brought about significant reforms and re-structuring to the US military division of labour. Among some of the major reforms relevant to counter-terrorism were the creation of the concept of the Joint Task Force (JTF), the official formation of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and the official formation of a DOD agency, US Central Command (CENTCOM), specifically to oversee the Central and Middle Eastern theatre of operations. A further fallout from the Goldwater–Nichols reforms was a more stringent clarification of Title 10 versus Title 50 legislation: outlining the jurisdictional strictures and institutional division of labour between agencies and members operating under the auspices of the DOD (Title 10), versus those operating under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency (Title 50). In terms of legislative authority, Title 10 typically covers the legal

authorisation and permission for the military to use deadly force, while Title 50 concerns legal authorisation for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct intelligence-gathering and covert operations. These series of reforms would usher in a new DOD infrastructure that allowed for overall greater inter-agency and inter-service integration, greater forward posturing and in-theatre power project, and overall institutional nimbleness for future conflicts. The formation and codification of the agencies and sub-agencies coming out of the Goldwater–Nichols Act is highly pertinent, since they provide the basic inter-agency blueprint upon which the US presently conducts its wars, to include the current 'war on terror'.

With the winding down of the Cold War, the US terrorist threat picture throughout much of the Bush and Clinton administrations went from one of state-sponsored terrorist groups originating from a single, monolithic adversary to a series of fractured and unrelated one-off attacks stemming from a variety of foreign and domestic sources: the World Trade Center bombing 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing 1995, the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya 1998, and the bombing of the USS *Cole* in 2000. During this post-Cold War period, and perhaps largely because of it, US counter-terrorism strategy and thinking could best be described as reactive in nature, as US military and special operations groups functioned primarily in an 'advise and assist' capacity only. The attacks initiated by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001, however, radically shifted US counter-terrorism strategy from a fundamentally reactive to fundamentally preventive posture, both at home and abroad. This shift from reaction to prevention resulted in significant re-structuring and re-defining of purposes for many US domestic and DOD agencies, as well as a critical re-thinking of the post-9/11 threat picture and overall operational environment. This shift to a primarily preventive warfighting and counter-terrorist strategy posture can best be seen in the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, by the expansive military policies instituted by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from 2003 to 2005, and by the unilateral tone of the so-called 'Bush Doctrine'. Domestically speaking, this shift towards active prevention can likewise be seen in the enhanced surveillance procedures and heightened border security protocols adopted as part of the Patriot Act of 2001.

The US counter-terrorism strategy during the Bush administration focused mainly on the commitment of a robust troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as demonstrated by the 2007 'Surge', which placed 20 000 additional troops in the Iraq region. In conjunction with increased troop presence, the Bush administration focused primarily on the securing of key positional and infrastructural assets (Bagram, Baghdad, Fallujah, and so on) coupled with the erecting of new governmental institutions led by regionally elected leadership (Karzai in Afghanistan, al-Maliki in Iraq). During the Bush administration, the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention camp was also established, which

allowed for the indefinite detention of detainees without trial for suspected ties to terrorist organisations, garnering much criticism from the international community. While there is little evidence of a strong al-Qaeda presence in Iraq at the outset of the Iraq War in 2003, towards the end of the Bush administration the presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq began to pick up increased momentum. This would form the proto-entity that would eventually crystallise into the Islamic State (IS; also referred to interchangeably by many media outlets as ISIS/ISIL) in and around 2013.

As the Bush administration wound down and handed off authority to the Obama administration, US counter-terrorism strategy shifted along with the terrorism threat picture. While the Bush administration's counter-terrorism strategy will likely be most remembered for its emphasis on 'boots on the ground' and detention, the Obama administration will likely be remembered for its significant drawdown of troop presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a drawdown of detainees at Guantanamo, and its heightened emphasis on the use of targeted drone strikes and special operations raids (for example, the killings of Awlaki in Yemen 2011, and bin Laden in Pakistan 2011).

The Obama administration's use of targeted killing marked a new precedent in the 'war on terror'. Compared to the Bush administration, which carried out 48 drone strikes in Pakistan, killing 377 to 588 people according to the New America Foundation, the Obama administration carried out 35 strikes in the same region, killing between 1907 and 3067 people. Some have seen this shift towards a drone strike policy to be a net positive.

There has nonetheless been much criticism of the Obama administration's use of drone strikes, primarily on the grounds that such strikes are serving to kill many innocent civilians instead of legitimate terrorist threats (Brooks, 2015). Furthermore, critics have also argued that the use of drone strikes has not succeeded in thwarting terrorist leadership but instead has functioned to create resentment in the local populace and actually promote support for terrorist groups (Cole, 2016; Sharp, 2016). During this time period, the US also saw several 'inspired' lone wolf terrorist attacks on American soil, such as the Fort Hood shooting (2009), the Boston Marathon bombing (2013) and the San Bernardino shooting (2015).

The US saw the Islamic State (IS) rise to prominence in 2014 in terms of funding, recruitment, internet presence, weapons capabilities, and territorial gains in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. At its peak strength, in 2015, IS appeared more like a conventional fighting force than a non-conventional insurgent group. In 2017, US Special Forces units, working in conjunction with Iraqi and Kurdish forces, helped to reclaim the majority of Mosul from IS forces. The Trump administration's use of decapitation strikes and special operations raids, particularly the Syrian raid in October 2019, led to the successful killing of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and helped to significantly wither IS's

strategic footprint in the area. Since then, much controversy has centred around the US withdrawal from Northern Syria (Schmitt et al., 2019).

THREATS

Terrorist Group Classification

While there has been much dispute within the legal community regarding the specific definitions, terrorism is commonly understood as involving an actor or actors who use violence or the threat of violence, against non-combatants, in order to further some ideological end. There is, of course, a danger in conceptually mixing different terrorist groups under this broad umbrella, (for example, mixing IS with the Irish Republican Army, IRA); hence, further parsing of different kinds of terrorist groups is necessary. We can broadly think of terrorist actors fitting into the following conceptual categories:

1. Single actors or anarchists: actors who use violence for a cause but have no followers (for example, Tim McVeigh, the Unabomber).
2. 'Westphalian' terrorists: insurgents or secessionist movements that use terrorist means (Tamil Tigers, IRA, Basque). These groups use violence against civilian populations in order to politically and symbolically demonstrate to the populace the incapacity of the existing state to protect them. These groups are often thought to be, in principle, appeasable.
3. State-sponsored terrorism: insurgent groups that use terroristic attacks on innocents in coordination with state funding and guidance (for example, Hezbollah, Serbian Black Hand). Here, there is a spectrum of 'sponsorship', going from direct guidance and funding, to guidance without funding or funding without guidance, to 'benign abetment'. For instance, Iran's involvement with Hezbollah placed it on the state-sponsorship list.
4. Tribe-versus-tribe terrorism: involves the use of terrorist tactics, mainly by Pakistani and Afghani tribes for the purpose of revenge or reprisal. This type of terrorism is most prevalent in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region of Pakistan. It is important to note this kind of terrorism, since it resembles other kinds of terrorism, but the intention of the violent act is quite different.
5. Jihadi terrorism: these groups and individuals target not just the West but also Western interests, sources of Western influence, and also those countries and their governance systems that are perceived as being supportive of, and/or sympathetic to, Western ideals. These groups or individuals also generally have some variation of a vision that sees the restoration of an Islamic Caliphate as a goal. While there is a risk of over-inflating the importance of this category of terrorism within the overall US national

defence strategy, it remains a sufficiently salient threat to warrant a working category of its own.

Jihadi Terrorist Threats

The US and the global counter-terrorism (CT) community have developed an increasingly better-informed and more nuanced understanding of terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, IS, Boko Haram and the Nusra Front that can be viewed as ideological offshoots of jihadism (used here to mean groups that espouse an ideological commitment to using violence, and in particular violent terrorist action, in defence of what they view as an attack upon Islam itself). The jihadist movement is a fundamentally diffuse and heterogeneous amalgamation of different terrorist groups that include: core al-Qaeda and associates (that is, those which have formally sworn *bayat*, or official allegiance, to al-Qaeda), those committed to the jihadist ideology but which have not sworn official allegiance (that is, IS), and other inspired individuals and networks. Al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have decentralised, for two likely main reasons: widespread variation in objectives, personalities, geography and ethnic groups; and because of effective counter-terrorism tactics and pressures. A third partial explanation for this diffuse organisational structure, however, is that it is being done deliberately (Jones, 2014, pp. 25–62).

The structure of the jihadist movement shares several structural similarities to the Soviet model of ideological propagation in that it is organised by a centralised ideology and geographic region, a series of insurgent groups, and a 'jihadi *internationale*', so to speak. However, while the communist *internationale* sought to spread communism largely via soft power means and propaganda, coupled with back-and-forth communication from the USSR, the Jihadist model seeks to spread jihad internationally, and mostly with no such back-and-forth communication to a centralised authority. Awlaki's creation of *Inspire* magazine, circa 2010, sought to create 'open source jihad' by encouraging jihadi adherents to spread the message on their own, without necessarily becoming affiliates who communicated back to some higher organisational authority.

The jihadist movement has served as a nexus point and organisational hub for several different radicalised demographics, either as a touchstone of authentic ideological commitment, or as a wave of sentiment being taken advantage of by various opportunist groups. These groups arguably carve into the following six categories:

1. Regional Sunni versus Shia conflicts (Iraq, Syria).
2. Regional Muslim (old Islamic Caliphate) versus old Christian West (Mali, Niger, and so on).

3. Other disgruntled Sunnis (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait).
4. Disenfranchised Westerners (particularly second-generation Muslims).
5. Petty criminals, violence seekers and adventurists.
6. War profiteers.

Much debate still exists between counter-terrorism experts as to the extent to which different Jihadist groups differ over such issues as the scope of the Caliphate, as well as the 'near' versus 'far' enemy (that is, the extent to which Westerners are the 'real' enemy as opposed to local Shia Muslims). In 1992 there were just three groups. One year after 9/11, there were 22, but by 2013 this had increased further to 49.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a radical Salafist terrorist group whose stated mission is to establish a true Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East and achieve global Islamic domination, and to rid the Middle East of what it perceives as the corrupting influences of the West. Formed in 1988 by Osama bin Laden during the Soviet–Afghan War, al-Qaeda derives much of its militant Islamic purism from the writings of bin Laden's predecessor and mentor, Sayyid Qutb. Al-Qaeda's ideology parses its military and terrorism objectives into attacks against the 'near enemy' of secularised Islamic governments within the region of the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, and the 'far enemy' of foreign Western influence, most particularly that of the United States (Byman, 2015). While al-Qaeda and its affiliates are primarily based in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, its network spans the entire globe. This allows for continued attacks against the far enemy of the West and the Western-influenced nations to be conducted, prior to a decisive defeat of near enemies within the Arab speaking world. Accordingly, key attacks against the West conducted by al-Qaeda include the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000, and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Following the death of Osama bin Laden in a 2011 US Special Forces raid in Pakistan, leadership of al-Qaeda fell into the hands of the Egyptian Ayman Zawahiri. Within the global terrorism threat picture, al-Qaeda has been much less active during recent years as its prominence and recruitment efforts have been somewhat overshadowed by the rise of ISIS.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

In his 'Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community to the Senate Armed Services Committee', Director of National Intelligence James

R. Clapper referred to ISIS as 'the preeminent terrorist threat because of its self-described Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world' (Clapper, 2016).

Clapper notes that an estimated 36 500 foreign fighters (to include 6600 Westerners) have travelled to Syria from more than 100 countries to join the organisation since 2012. Clapper also notes ISIS's continued exploitation of weak governance in Syria and surrounding areas as a safe haven and space of expansion for its cause. He likewise notes the benefit ISIS will likely continue to gain from new young recruits adept at exploiting social media, encryption, the dark web and virtual technologies.

While al-Qaeda's primary focus has been on ridding the Middle East of Western influence, with the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate being an ambition in the distant future, ISIS's main mission and priority is to establish the Caliphate in the here and now. Accordingly, as per Islamic law and prophecy, the priority of ISIS's mission is the capturing and defending of the actual land mass of the Caliphate. In contrast, because of its less ambitious timeline, al-Qaeda's mission is not similarly dependent upon such positional and territorial priorities.

Despite early successes in 2014 and 2015, the strength and influence of ISIS has considerably waned in recent years after suffering major positional and territorial losses in both Raqqa and Aleppo, Syria. The death by suicide of its key leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, during a US Special Forces raid in October 2019, further functioned as another decisive blow to the organisation's leadership, morale and international reputation. At present, al-Qaeda and ISIS are competing for leadership and control over future recruits, as well as the dominant vision and direction of future Islamic jihadist efforts both regionally and globally.

Tactics and Terror Acts

Al-Qaeda and ISIS have differed in their use of terror tactics in accordance with their diverging strategic goals and visions. Al-Qaeda, for instance, in its ongoing fight against the United States, has relied upon punctuated and spectacular violent acts in order to marshall support and future recruitment from the greater Muslim world, and to pressure the United States, and the West more broadly, to withdraw its presence and influence in the Middle East (Byman, 2015).

Alternatively, the terror tactics of IS are more regionally contained to the Middle East, and are more intimately linked to its effective use of video-based social media to publicise and promote its terror acts. These terror acts include the beheading of high-profile Western journalists, the burning alive of

a Jordanian military pilot in a cage, the hurling of an alleged homosexual man to his death from a multi-storey building, and the mass execution of innumerable Shia innocents.

The group's social media campaign serves both as terror propaganda, as well as an effective recruitment tool for adherents and sympathisers, since their filmed atrocities are consistent with Sharia law punishments. ISIS also employs the terror tactic of 'open source' jihad, via its online magazine *Inspire*, which provides do-it-yourself instructions for bomb-making and other terror tactics for would-be Western sympathisers and adherents.

INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Intelligence Community–Domestic Policing Gap

Since its creation, the US has had a long history of a deliberate gap between its military and foreign intelligence apparatus and its domestic law enforcement apparatus. This intentional gap, while arguably affording civilians greater immunity from surveillance and privacy obstruction, has nonetheless hampered efficient coordination between the US intelligence community and local law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, prior to 9/11, the integration and coordination between the intelligence community and domestic police was rather poor. Coordination between these two communities is further hindered by the absence of a large, centralised federal law enforcement body. Lastly, the US domestic policing structure itself is layered (for example, at local, county and state levels), with local police actors on the ground often lacking the proper security clearance to gain requisite knowledge of ongoing cases. Without this, they are unable to properly appraise anomalous or suspicious behaviour at the local level (for example, Saudi nationals taking pilot training, but showing no interest in learning how to land an aircraft). Lastly, even if such anomalous or suspicious behaviour is recognised at the local level, at present there is still an absence of an overarching and efficient chain of command, and a lack of horizontal cross-talk, for local authorities to report to in a fast and expedient manner.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the United States' leading foreign intelligence services, primarily focused on human intelligence (HUMINT). The mission of the CIA is 'to preempt threats and further US national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source analysis, conducting effective covert action as directed by the President, and safeguarding the secrets that help keep our nation safe' (US

Senate, 2018). The CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence, functions in an advisory capacity to the President, and has a seat at the National Security Council. The unofficial CIA annual budget is estimated to be around $52.4 billion. The number of persons working for the CIA cannot be publicly disclosed, although estimates are somewhere around 21 000 employees. With respect to counter-terrorism efforts, the CIA works in conjunction with the National Security Agency (NSA), National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the greater US and foreign intelligence community, to gather pertinent intelligence mainly though interpersonal interactions. In the global 'war on terror', the CIA also conducts cyber-operations and covert paramilitary operations under Title 50 authorisation.

National Security Agency (NSA)

The National Security Agency is the leading United States agency dealing with information and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The NSA technically falls under the auspices of the Department of Defense and works in conjunction with the broader US and foreign intelligence communities. The NSA mission is as follows: 'The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) leads the U.S. Government in cryptology that encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Computer Network Operations (CNO) in order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies' (NSA, 2020). The NSA's yearly budget is estimated at around $10 billion (Sahadi, 2013). With respect to counter-terrorism, the NSA functions mainly to gather and interpret bulk electronic surveillance data from internet and phone networks (such as with the PRISM surveillance program leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013).

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The US Department of Homeland Security was created as a direct response to the September 11 attacks. Its mission, to quote Governor Tom Ridge, first DHS director, is 'to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office will coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States' (Ridge, 2002).

The DHS presently has approximately 240 000 employees, and is the third-largest Cabinet department after the DOD and Veterans Affairs (DHS, 2020). The DHS also functions as an umbrella organisation for the following sub-agencies: US Citizenship and Immigration Services, US Customs and Border Protection, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation

Security Administration, US Coast Guard, US Secret Service, National Cybersecurity Center and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In addition to its main role in coordinating between these various sub-agencies and the White House, the DHS is also responsible for the National Terrorism Advisory System. The DHS, in collaboration with the DOJ, has established 'fusion centres' aimed at facilitating information-sharing at the federal level between the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOJ, DOD, and state and local law enforcement agencies. As of 2009, there were 72 DHS fusion centres (DHS, 2020).

National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC)

As a result of the above-mentioned intelligence–policing gap, the National Counter Terrorism Center (under the Department of National Intelligence and DHS) was created as part of the 2004 Intelligence and Terrorism Act (a product of the 9/11 Commission Report). The NCTC functions as the primary node of coordination between the larger intelligence community and domestic law enforcement, as well as serving in an advisory capacity as part of the Counter-Terrorism Support Group (CSG). The NCTC is also responsible for compiling and managing the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), a database containing over 1 200 000 identities of individuals suspected of terror links. This database then informs the creation of terrorist watch lists and 'no-fly' lists.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI functions as the primary, federal law enforcement agency in the United States. Its mission is to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States. Along with its headquarters in Washington, DC, it has 56 field offices and 350 satellites throughout the US as well as 60 international offices worldwide. The FBI employs approximately 35 000 employees and special agents, and in the fiscal year of 2016 had an approximate annual budget of $8.7 billion. The FBI technically falls under the supervision of both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of National Intelligence (DNI). The FBI functions as one of the leading counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence organisations in the US, with its primary counter-terrorism efforts focused through its leadership of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

Terrorism-related information moves from the local level to the federal level primarily through the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). There are JTTFs based in 103 US cities, and at least one in each of the FBI's 56 field offices. This fact is important, since it shows that the NCTC and DHS do not directly receive local intelligence (mainly because of statutory limitations and concerns of domestic 'spying'). The JTTF model has been criticised over the years for several reasons. For instance, since local police departments are usually only privy to the terrorist threat information that JTTFs provide them, either they are rendered as mere adjuncts to the federal intelligence effort, or the information provided to them is often fundamentally unactionable. FBI-led JTTFs have likewise been criticised both for excessive information-gathering encroaching on civilian privacy, as well for their failure to act responsively to intelligence gathered, as in the case of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting (Jenkins et al., 2014, pp. 8–16).

Counter-Terrorism Support Group (CSG)

Following the international debacle of the Iran hostage crisis and the failure of Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the hostages, then-President Reagan tasked Vice President George Bush to create the CSG. The CSG is chaired by an NSC representative and includes representatives from the following agencies:

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
3. Department of Justice.
4. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
5. State Department (CT specialist).
6. State Department (diplomatic security).
7. Department of Energy (for nuclear considerations).
8. Central Intelligence Agency.
9. Department of National Intelligence.
10. National Counter-Terrorism Center.

Since 9/11, the CSG has met each week, with its main purpose being the generation of courses of action (COAs) for immediately occurring terrorist threats, policy prescriptions, and to generate input for national counter-terrorism strategy. Preliminary COAs generated by the CSG are then forwarded on to a Deputies Committee comprised of the under-secretaries of the aforementioned agencies. This guidance is then refined by the Deputies Committee and sent back to the CSG for refinement, or forwarded on to the NSC. Since

9/11, the Deputies Committee has met every two weeks. Once the Deputies Committee has developed its COA, it forwards this guidance either to the NSC, chaired by the President of the USA (POTUS), or to a Principles Committee chaired by the NSA and attended by cabinet secretaries, the Director of the NCTC and the Director of the CIA. Since 9/11, this final-tier CT meeting has occurred on average every 4–6 weeks.

CENTCOM/JSOC (US Central Command / Joint Special Operations Command)

Authorisation for target selection and the use of lethal force or capture on suspected terrorist targets in the Middle Eastern region of the world falls under the authority of the CENTCOM commander, provided the region in question is a 'designated war zone'. If the area of conflict is regarded as a war zone, then authorisation for targeting, killing or capturing ends at the level of the CENTCOM commander and does not require authorisation from the NSC and POTUS. Iraq in 2003 was declared a war zone, thereby capping all decisions for conducting military (versus diplomatic) operations at the level of the CENTCOM commander. If the area of conflict is not regarded as a war zone, then the CENTCOM commander must seek authorisation and guidance from POTUS. Given that there will be issues of encroachment into state sovereignty, the greatest traditional point of friction in the NSC has often been between the DOD and DOS. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) assets are assigned under the authority of the CENTCOM commander, and their employment follows the same authorisation protocols.

Guantanamo (GTMO)

The Guantanamo Bay detention camp is a US military prison located within the Guantanamo Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The camp was established in 2002 as part of the Bush administration's efforts in the 'war on terror'. Despite President Obama's original statement to close down the detention facility in 2009, the detention facility remains open at the time of writing (2020), though several of its sub-camps, such as Camp X-Ray, have been shut down. The total number of detainees incarcerated at Guantanamo was 780, around 500 of whom were released under President Bush's administration. Detainee numbers at the start of Obama presidency were 242, of whom 197 were transferred, repatriated or resettled under the Obama Presidency. Around 40 detainees were still held in Guantanamo in 2020.

LEGISLATION

USA Patriot Act

The USA Patriot Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush on 25 October 2001. The Act is comprised of ten titles, each outlining ten key components of the new US counter-terrorism strategy and institutional adaptations in response to the September 11th attacks. These titles include:

- Title I: Enhancing domestic security against terrorism.
- Title II: Surveillance procedures.
- Title III: Anti-money laundering to prevent terrorism.
- Title IV: Border security.
- Title V: Removing obstacles to investigate terrorism.
- Title VI: Victims and families of terrorism.
- Title VII: Increased sharing for critical infrastructure protection.
- Title IX: Improved intelligence.
- Title X: Miscellaneous.

One of the more controversial parts of the Act was Section 215 (Access to records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). This section modified existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) legislation to allow the FBI to apply for an order to produce materials that assist in an investigation, undertaken to protect against international terrorism.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

The FISA of 1978 was introduced on the recommendations of the Church Committee in 1978, as one of the fallouts from the Watergate scandal. The Committee was designed to investigate the conduct and possible abuses of information gathering conducted by the CIA, FBI and NSA. The FISA legislation also ushered in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC, also referred to as the FISA Court). Immediately after the attacks on 9/11, Congress amended the original 1978 FISA statute in order to improve the overall connectivity and efficiency of the nation's intelligence-gathering apparatus. Beginning in 2006, the US government began using these FISA amendments under Section 215 to compel commercial telephone and cellular phone providers to hand over large amounts of metadata of their customers' phone activity. The 2013 leak by Edward Snowden about this metadata-gathering programme raised considerable controversy about the limits of government bulk surveillance of US citizens, with no specific person or specific cause for search being present. Defenders of the programme argued that the benefits of

recognising and pre-empting future terrorist threats outweighed the perceived privacy invasions of citizens; and furthermore, that the gathering of metadata did not technically violate Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure (Pfeffer, 2015).

USA Freedom Act

In an attempt to maintain effective information-gathering capabilities while not encroaching on the privacy rights of US citizens, Congress adopted the USA Freedom Act in 2015. As Glenn Gerstell, General Counsel of the NSA puts it:

> The FBI (on behalf of NSA) can apply to the FISA Court for specific authority to inquire about a particular phone number or other identifying element, but only if based on a 'reasonable, articulable suspicion' that it is associated with international terrorism … under no circumstances does NSA get access to the content of any calls under this arrangement. (Gerstell, 2016)

Accordingly, the USA Freedom Act aims at maintaining effective information-gathering by the US intelligence community while upholding certain protections for phone companies and their customers.

2001 Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Terrorists (AUMF) and Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) 2013

The legal justification for US counter-terrorism efforts in recognised 'areas of active hostilities' finds its grounding in the 2001 AUMF. The 2001 AUMF grants to the President of the United States (POTUS) the legal authority to use all necessary and appropriate force against those who they determine to have 'planned, authorised, committed, or aided' the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This legal document, along with its 2002 Iraq-specific instantiation, has provided the main legal justification for continued US counter-terrorism efforts for the last two administrations.

A more updated *casus belli* for US counter-terrorism efforts, as well as an attempt to account for new drone technologies, has been articulated in the Obama administration's PPG of 2013, which establishes the standard operating procedures for 'when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities' (Obama, 2013).

The 2013 PPG outlines certain guidelines for permissible lethal targeting. These include that the target poses 'a continuing, imminent threat to US persons,

near certainty that the target is present, near certainty that non-combatants will not be harmed, infeasibility of capture, inability or unwillingness of the host country to effectively address the threat to US persons; and an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist' (Lederman, 2016).

The Trump administration has since loosened some of these constraints on lethal targeting, declaring three provinces in Yemen to be 'areas of active hostilities', ostensibly providing justification for the Special Operations raid of January 2017.

Title 10 and Title 50

Title 10 provides the legal basis for all DOD and military actions, while Title 50 provides the legal basis for all CIA and covert actions. The Obama administration and the 2013 PPG arguably attempt to rein in the use and authorisation of targeted strikes within Title 10/DOD jurisdiction, and therefore within the spirit of the broader 'just war' convention. Since its inception, the Trump administration has moved the use and authorisation of targeted strikes in the opposite direction toward Title 50/CIA authority, and therefore more into domain of covert operations (Welna, 2017). Critics have argued that as the production of drone technology becomes cheaper and more expedient, and eventually in the hands of US enemies (both state and non-state actors), an international drone regime might be necessary in order to prevent drone proliferation, much as in the case of nuclear weapons (Buchanan and Keohane, 2015). It could be argued that an established precedent of increasingly covert US drone strikes might significantly undermine the establishment of just such a convention, thereby making US citizens markedly less safe from the blow-back of drone strikes in the long run.

Detainee Treatment Act 2005 and Legislation on Torture

Following First Lieutenant Ian Fishback's letter sent to Senator John McCain in September 2005, concerning the absence of clear legal and ethical guidance for the treatment of detainees as part of the ongoing global 'war on terror', the Detainee Treatment Act was passed by Congress on 30 December 2005. The Act outlines provisions concerning treatment of persons under the custody of the DOD and at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The specifics of the Act include the prohibition of 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment', the requirement that all interrogations be performed under the guidelines stated in the US Army *Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, directing the DOD to establish Combatant Status Review Tribunals, and granting legal immunity to government and military personnel who used interrogation techniques that 'were

officially authorised and determined to be lawful at the time they were conducted'. In April 2009, then-President Obama banned the use of waterboarding as an advanced interrogation method, consistent with DOD Directive 2310 (2006) that prohibited the use of cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of detainees.

COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Broad Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) of 2018 published by the Trump administration is the most current explicit articulation to date of the United States' broad CT aims and objectives. The NSCT recognises the pre-eminent security threat to the US continues to be al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents, as well as ISIS. The NSCT outlines six overarching CT strategy goals:

1. Pursue terrorist threats to their source.
2. Isolate terrorists from financial, material and logistical sources of support.
3. Modernise and integrate a broader set of United States tools and authorities to counter terrorism and protect the homeland.
4. Protect United States infrastructure and enhance preparedness.
5. Counter terrorist radicalisation and recruitment.
6. Strengthen the counter-terrorism abilities of international partners.

The US NSCT then articulates how these goals are to be specifically met for key areas, including: the homeland, South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Europe, Iraq, the Maghreb and Sahel, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the area of 'information and ideas'. The United States' ultimate strategic end goal with respect to counter-terrorism is therefore to defeat not only al-Qaeda (and ISIS) but also the conditions which gave rise to its ideology and adherents (NSCT, 2018).

Domestic Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The 2016 document 'A National Strategy to Win the War Against Islamist Terror', by Chairman Michael McCaul of the House Homeland Security Committee, further outlines the US's key domestic CT priorities. These include: (1) thwarting attacks and protecting our communities; (2) stopping recruitment and radicalisation at home; (3) keeping terrorists out of the US; and (4) winning the 'war of ideas'.

Domestic Counter-Terrorism Tactics

These broad domestic strategic goals translate into real-world CT tactics in a variety of ways. For instance, McCaul lists several tactical prescriptions, which include: JTTFs scanning social media as part of criminal background checks; denying 'virtual safe-havens' on the internet through vigilant cyber-security efforts; tightening Transportation Security Administration (TSA) vetting procedures for private sector personnel and technologies; ensuring community preparedness to respond to 'do-it-yourself'-style terrorism at home; helping local communities to be aware of red flags; developing 'off-ramps' for radicalisation; allocating significant spending for counter-terrorism counter-messaging narratives at home; enhancing screening of visitors, immigrants and refugees; and preventing prisons from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism.

In addition to these prescriptions, the NCTC's use of the TIDE database to generate terror watch lists and 'no-fly' lists functions as yet another tool in the overall set of US counter-terrorism tactics. The FBI's recent increase in the use of undercover and online sting operations (those involving the use of agents and informants to pose as jihadists, bomb-makers, weapons dealers or online 'friends') has also shown itself to be an effective tactic in thwarting potential terrorist recruitment, coordination and radicalisation efforts (Lichtblau, 2016).

Foreign Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The US CT community (and DOD more broadly) employs the diplomacy, information, military, economic (DIME) conceptual framework and the corresponding institutional agencies (State Department, NSA/CIA, Department of Defense and Treasury Department) to fight the 'war on terror'. The focus of this DIME strategy is to leverage these various powers of the state primarily to mitigate or eliminate the conditions that often give rise to terrorist threats. In this sense, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) was chiefly a de-radicalisation strategy achieved mainly by way of robust troop presence on the ground, the securing of positional and infrastructural assets, the detention of adversaries, and the propping-up of new regional leadership and institutions. The 2015 NSS counter-terrorism strategy, however, diverges sharply from the 2006 NSS in several respects.

Contrary to the 2006 NSS, the 2015 NSS can be described as more of a decapitation strategy, achieved primarily through the use of targeted strikes on key leadership. The key theory driving this strategic initiative is the general notion that key leadership removal will serve the greatest positive yield in disrupting or collapsing terrorist networks. This strategic posture, however, is not without its critics, some of whom argue that such a decapitation strategy might

fundamentally be a short-term tactical win, but ultimately a long-term strategic loss.[1] More specifically, the argument against such a decapitation strategy is that the act of killing key leadership results in the mid- and long-term downstream effect of turning such local leaders into martyrs, as well as providing new substantive content for terrorist groups to utilise in future recruitment and radicalisation efforts. Despite such criticism, US counter-terrorism efforts have still relied heavily on this strategy, garnering several noteworthy strikes on high-value targets. These have included drone strikes, such as the one which killed Awlaki in Yemen in 2011; and the surgical use of special operations units for 'kill or capture' missions, such as the raid against Osama Bin Laden in his Abbotabad compound in Pakistan in 2011. This major shift in counter-terrorism strategy has coincided with a significant drawdown of US boots on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a hand-off of power to local authorities in these regions, and significantly less instances of detention. This shift to a more decapitation-oriented strategy has garnered serious criticism from both within the military and outside it.

Foreign Counter-Terrorism Tactics

Given this strategic framework, US CT tactics vary significantly according to each of the four main DIME elements. On the diplomatic front, the US State Department has taken such counter-terrorism measures as officially designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), as well as officially designating FTO affiliates (such as ISIS affiliates in Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). The US State Department has also made great efforts to prevent foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from travelling to and from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria.

In the military domain, since the official troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the US has shifted its military tactical posture primarily to one of targeted drone strikes and special operations raids. For instance, under the Obama administration, a total of 563 targeted drone strikes were conducted. That being said, the US military footprint in Afghanistan still presently stands at around 14 000 troops, acting mainly in an 'advise and assist' capacity alongside Afghan troops. US Army CENTCOM reports around 60 000 to 70 000 troops deployed to the overall Middle East area of operations (Ayesh, 2020).

On the economic front, the US Department of Treasury has also led strong efforts in the 'war on terror' by tracking the sources of suspected terrorist financing. Immediately after 9/11, the US Department of Treasury initiated the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) to identify, track and pursue terrorists and their financial networks. Specifically, the Treasury Department has issued subpoenas to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a multinational company based in Belgium

that handles a global financial transaction network used by banks all over the world, requesting information about suspected terrorists believed to be using the SWIFT network. Under the terms of the subpoenas, the US government was only permitted to review information as 'part of specific terrorism investigations' (Sahadi, 2013). Based on information gathered, the US government is able to conduct targeted searches against the limited subset of records provided by SWIFT in order to trace financial transactions related to suspected terrorist activity.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed some of the major elements of the US counter-terrorism landscape. Specifically, it has investigated some of the major historical and geopolitical stage-setting conditions of the last half-century with respect to global terrorism. It has also looked at the US terrorism threat picture since 9/11, detailing features of al-Qaeda and ISIS. It has likewise looked at the major foreign and domestic institutional architectures within the US CT space, as well as the key CT legislation, both domestic and international. Finally, it has examined some of the major strategic and tactical means and methods currently being applied to CT operations. As the counter-terrorism threat picture continues to shift and evolve as we move further into the 21st century, we can anticipate similar shifting and adaptation within these CT institutions and agencies.

NOTE

1.   See Johnston's (2012) paper for a thorough coverage of critics of decapitation.

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11. National counter-terrorism responses: United Kingdom

Paul Burke

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT OF UK TERRORISM

The evolution of the various definitions of terrorism in the United Kingdom (UK) is central to understanding the political and security background of what has evolved into the UK's counter-terrorism (CT) landscape. The historical context of the UK's CT legislation is derived in large part from the problems of Irish and Northern Irish terrorism. Although the problem can be traced back as far as the Eleven Years War (1641–1653), a more pragmatic starting point is 'the Troubles' and the bombing campaign that came with their expansion in the early 1970s. Days after the Birmingham pub bombings, which killed 21 people and injured 182 more on 21 November 1974, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the prime suspect for the attacks, was proscribed and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) became law (Walker, 1992, pp. 31–32; Donohue, 2000, pp. 2–5). One of the provisions of the PTA allowed the police to detain and question terrorist suspects for up to seven days. Other extraordinary measures were introduced, with varying degrees of success in combating the problem of terrorism. To combat the rise of intimidation of juries in terrorism cases in Northern Ireland, a drastic solution was introduced: the so-called 'Diplock Courts' (Arthur and Jeffrey, 1996). Instead of the traditional use of a jury and a judge, the Diplock Courts instead employed a sole judge to hear the initial case. Any further hearings or appeals were subsequently heard by a panel of three judges. The Diplock Courts were an unusual departure for the UK's justice system, as the necessity for the jury system to safeguard the legal process is such an important cornerstone in English law.

Another controversial tool was internment without trial, which was introduced in 1971 to combat the rise in terrorist violence in Northern Ireland. Internment had been used as a military tactic by the British Army in the colonial wars following the end of World War II, including in Malaya, Kenya and

Cyprus. Its introduction in Northern Ireland was highly controversial and led to fresh outbreaks of internecine violence between Catholic and Protestant communities. Internment was less suited to the urban, first-world environment of Northern Ireland than to the jungles of Malaya, and was not widely supported by senior British military officers, who believed it would be counter-productive (Neumann, 2003, p. 98). The average length of detention under internment, in April 1973, was around six weeks (*Hansard*, 1973). Just over one year later this had increased to an average period of six months (Northern Ireland Office, 1975, para. 155), resulting in more sympathy for the Republican movement from the local population (Neumann, 2003, p. 98). Once a peace agreement was signed in 1998, the context of the UK's legal definition evolved from one that was focused on Northern Irish-related terrorism to one that recognised the increasingly potent threat of international terrorism.

International Terrorism

The Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998 and was central to ending the majority of the sectarian violence that had plagued Northern Ireland for decades. In that same year, the government commissioned Lord Lloyd of Berwick to produce a paper on terrorism legislation. This was aimed at replacing the emergency legislation with permanent legislation that would provide full, UK-wide counter-terrorism provisions. Based on Lord Lloyd's report, the government published its consultation paper in December 1998 (Lloyd, 1998, para. 1.2) which highlighted that, in a post-Good Friday Agreement environment, terrorism had more forms than a simply Northern Irish-related model, and it needed to be considered as more than primarily a Northern Irish problem. The PTA 1974 temporary legislation was finally replaced after 26 years by the Terrorism Act 2000 (Parliament, 2000). The passing into law of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) brought in a more comprehensive, encompassing definition of terrorism:

(1) 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where –
  (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
  (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government, or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
  (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it –
  (a) involves serious violence against a person,
  (b) involves serious damage to property,

    (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

    (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

    (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (Parliament, 2000, pt I)

TERRORISM THREATS TO THE UK

At strategic level, threats to the UK are identified in the government's National Security Strategy (NSS). This is a quinquennial review, the most recent being published in 2015.[1] It sets out three primary objectives, prior to identifying and assessing any threats to the UK: 'to protect our people … to project our global influence … to promote our prosperity' (HM Government, 2015, secs 1.10–1.14).

It also identified four challenges expected to drive the UK's security priorities over the next decade. First is the threat of terrorism and extremism; second is the resurgence of state-level threats; third is the increasing impact of technology, in particular in the cyber domain; and finally, the continual erosion of the international order (HM Government, 2015, sec. 3.3).

The NSS includes terrorism and extremism in the same threat category, including a number of component threats. Islamist terrorism is identified as the first threat, which includes the activities of the so-called Islamic State (IS, but also widely referred to in the media as ISIS or ISIL). The associated threat of foreign fighters is also noted, with the assessment that by 2015, around 800 British nationals had travelled to Syria to participate in the fighting. By 2019 this had increased to around 850–900, half of whom had returned to UK, bringing with them an increased threat of terrorist actions carried out by returnees from the fighting (BBC, 2017b; Dearden, 2019; Grierson, 2019).

The changing vector of terrorist attack methods was also highlighted, from recent attacks using knives, through to more complex terrorist operations using multiple attackers equipped with firearms and explosives. The assessment considers that the targeting of the aviation sector is unlikely to diminish in the near future and it reiterates that al-Qaeda (AQ), IS and others will continue their efforts to obtain chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials (HM Government, 2015, secs 3.5–3.7).

The use of the internet and social media is viewed as a key driver for recruitment purposes and for the propagation of terrorist and extremist propaganda. The NSS considers that future attacks may be more difficult to interdict due to the increased use of encryption tools by terrorists. It also raises some of the difficulties involved in investigating terrorist plots emanating from other

countries which may lack the necessary investigation skills, or which may have lower standards of human rights compliance (HM Government, 2015, sec. 3.8). Northern Irish terrorism persists on the UK threat radar, primarily from dissident Irish Republican groups (HM Government, 2015, sec. 3.10).

Using Syria and Iraq as examples, the NSS explains how wide-scale regional instability can assist terrorist groups in exploiting the resulting security and governance vacuum. While not explicitly linking the problems caused by mass migration with the issue of terrorism, it is clear from recent attacks that increased vigilance is required in securing national borders at immigration control points, to assist in the fight against terrorism (HM Government, 2015, secs 3.11–3.15).

The linkages between terrorism and serious and organised crime are not easily bifurcated, as organised crime groups often act as a supply chain for terrorists (with varying degrees of awareness of this fact), providing services such as facilitating the illicit movement of people and goods, particularly arms, across borders.[2] Likewise, the threats from money-laundering intersect across both terrorism and criminality, and cannot be tackled using isolated policies (HM Government, 2015, secs 3.14–3.15). The cyber-threat is not excluded as a terrorist threat, but the larger-scale, sophisticated hacking attacks seen previously have almost certainly been conducted by state-sponsored or state-controlled groups. The cyber-threat is thus considered more extensively as a state-sponsored threat (HM Government, 2015, sec. 3.26).

Previous Terrorist Attacks in the UK

From the 1970s through to 2001, the majority of terrorist attacks committed in the UK were a result of Northern Irish terrorism. Following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, terrorist activity by the IRA rapidly dwindled, and in July 2005 the IRA formally declared the end of its military campaign, while in June 2009, the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) confirmed that it had fully decommissioned its military capability.

The deadliest terrorist attack against the UK took place in London in July 2005, when four coordinated suicide attacks were conducted by Islamist terrorists who targeted the London transport network. The coordinated attacks targeted three London Underground trains and one London bus, during the morning rush-hour. In addition to the four attackers, 52 people were killed in the attacks and a further 784 people were injured (House of Commons, 2006). A 'martyrdom' video recorded by the leader of the group, Mohammed Siddique Khan (MSK), was released shortly after the attacks, confirming the allegiance of MSK and his group to al-Qaeda and to Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri (House of Commons, 2006).

Two weeks after these bomb attacks, another series of almost identical suicide attacks was attempted by another Islamist terrorist cell, again targeting the London transport network. These attacks failed, due to issues in the detonators and also due to the organic compound used in the manufacture of the explosive substance in the devices (Crown Prosecution Service, 2007a). Another massive police operation was launched (Operation Vivace) to identify and apprehend the bombers, who were arrested, successfully prosecuted and sentenced to long prison terms.

On 29 June 2007, two car bombs were planted in central London by Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed. The improvised devices were configured to detonate a mixture of petrol, gas cylinders and nails, but they did not explode, and both devices were recovered intact for forensic examination. Following the failed attempt in London, both men then drove to Scotland and configured another vehicle as a car bomb, before driving it to Glasgow airport to attempt a ramming attack on the passenger terminal. The vehicle hit security bollards, which prevented it from continuing into the passenger terminal, although the cabin of the vehicle caught fire. Ahmed was arrested and treated for 90 per cent burns, but died of his injuries four weeks later. Abdullah was also arrested, and following the police investigation into both attacks (Operation Seagram), subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum of 32 years.

On 22 May 2013, a British Army soldier, Fusilier Lee Rigby, was returning home from his work at an Army Recruiting Office in London when he was attacked by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. The pair drove their car into Rigby before continuing their attack against the injured soldier on the pavement, using a meat cleaver and knives (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2014, p. 1). They then dragged his body into the road and told passers-by that the attack was in revenge for British involvement in military action in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Whitehead, 2013). Adebolajo had become known to the Security Service through a number of operations before the attack (Operations Beech, Cedar, Dogwood, Elm and Ash). Adebowale was also the target of two separate Security Service investigations that focused on possible links between UK-based individuals believed to have an interest in media with an extremist content (Operations Fir and Gum). Both attackers were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, Adebolajo receiving a 'whole life order' with no possibility of parole, and Adebowale receiving a minimum term of 45 years.

On 22 March 2017, Khalid Masood drove his car onto the pavement of Westminster Bridge at an assessed speed of 75 mph in a deliberate and targeted attack upon pedestrians, which killed four innocent bystanders and injured more than 50 others (BBC, 2017a). Masood's car finally crashed into security railings outside the Houses of Parliament, and Masood abandoned the vehicle and ran into the entrance to Parliament, where he fatally stabbed

Police Constable Keith Palmer, an officer serving with the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command (Metropolitan Police, 2017). Masood was then shot by an armed police officer and died at the scene of the stabbing. Masood is known to have used the WhatsApp encrypted messaging tool minutes before the attack started. The attack re-ignited the debate in the UK over the rights to individual digital privacy and the necessity for the police and the Security Service to have access to the encrypted communications of suspected terrorists, subject to the necessary warrants being in place (Rayner, 2017; Sparrow, 2017; Hill, 2018).

While the threat of Islamist terrorism is currently the most serious for the UK, other forms of terrorism also present a threat. Single-issue terrorism still occurs, although infrequently, such as Miles Cooper's 2007 mail bomb attacks in protest at what he saw as the rise of a surveillance society (BBC, 2007). The threat from extreme right-wing terrorism has become a resurgent one in the UK. In 2015, a serving Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, was shot and stabbed to death by Thomas Mair, a right-wing extremist, who was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment (Burgis, 2016). In 2019 the Metropolitan Police confirmed the increase in extreme right-wing threats, highlighting that more than 25 per cent of all terrorism arrests in 2019 were linked to far-right violence (Dodd and Grierson, 2019).

Radicalisation and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

The problem of radicalisation has become more widespread since the 9/11 attacks against the United States of America (USA), and it has been significantly facilitated by the instantaneous nature of the internet. Naturally there are other drivers for radicalisation which do not depend on the internet, and this is easily overlooked in an 'always-on' society. Prisons are a recognised source of radicalisation, whether by Islamists, extreme right-wingers or otherwise. The closed nature of prison sub-cultures reinforces the pressures created by incarceration and magnifies conflicts, such as those based on race, religion, colour, sexual orientation and other similar factors. In 2009, a report published by the Quilliam Foundation highlighted the risks of radicalisation in British prisons, focusing on four individuals who were considered to have been radicalised during their incarceration in prison, and who were subsequently convicted and imprisoned for offences of terrorism (Brandon, 2009, p. 14).

THE ARCHITECTURE OF UK COUNTER-TERRORISM

More than 35 agencies, departments and bodies are involved in UK counter-terrorism, from sectors including defence, legal, border security, counter-radicalisation, immigration, finance, Cabinet, prisons and the

Treasury. A small number of these bodies set policy, while others collect and produce intelligence as a core function, and a large number of them are more generally involved in the wider CT landscape, such as in emergency planning, infrastructure protection, counter-radicalisation, and so on. In the event of a major terrorist attack, other agencies and stakeholders can be co-opted into the post-attack recovery phase. There are around 40 or 50 bodies and departments involved, but all of these stakeholder bodies are integral components of the UK's national CT strategy called CONTEST (an acronym derived from Counter-Terrorism Strategy).

The UK has traditionally divided the threat of terrorism (as well as other threats such as espionage, subversion, and so on) on a 'domestic versus overseas' approach, with the Security Service (also referred to as MI5) and the police having primacy for domestic threats and the Secret Intelligence Service (also referred to as SIS or MI6) having primacy for overseas issues. As the nature of global or international terrorism has morphed, the distinction between these two spheres has become increasingly opaque. The complexity of a transnational threat is now more common and this has resulted in 'an unprecedented degree' of collaboration between SIS, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service and the police (Burke, 2013, sec. 138).

In operational terms, the bulk of CT work in the UK still falls to the three primary intelligence agencies (SIS, Security Service and GCHQ) and to specialist police elements, such as Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC or SO15) of the Metropolitan Police Service, and the regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs). The Security Service leads on countering the terrorist threat to the UK and it is legislated by the Security Service Act 1989 (Parliament, 1989). Officers from the Security Service have no powers of arrest or executive powers and work very closely with the police (Security Service, 2020). In 2017 there were nine regional CTUs in the UK, and these combine Security Service officers with specialist police staff, such as detectives, financial investigators, community contact teams, intelligence analysts, forensic specialists and high-tech investigators (West Yorkshire Police, 2017). By 2020, this had increased to 11 CTUs (National Police Chiefs' Council, 2020) and this partnership allows the CTUs to deliver a more coordinated response to terrorist threats, while also being able to supply more specialist counter-terrorism advice to the police forces in their region.

Overseas, much of the counter-terrorism work lies with SIS, working in cooperation with other UK and foreign agencies to collect sensitive intelligence (primarily human intelligence, HUMINT) on a range of targets including international terrorism (SIS, 2020). SIS also mounts covert operations overseas in support of counter-terrorism and national security, and it also has a highly developed capability for technical intelligence collection. The

main instrument legislating SIS is the Intelligence Services Act (ISA) of 1994 (Parliament, 1994).

The third primary agency is GCHQ, which supports counter-terrorism primarily through the collection and production of signals intelligence (SIGINT). One of the agency's two primary roles is to conduct SIGINT operations in support of UK national security and the economic well-being of the UK, as well as supporting the operational capacity of the UK Armed Forces and the UK law enforcement community. Its second role is conducting information assurance (IA), which aims to secure and protect the sensitive information of the UK government and its associated entities. Like SIS, GCHQ is also regulated by the Intelligence Services Act of 1994.

Although not a collection body, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), created in 2003, is a key partner of the three primary agencies. Its role is to analyse and assess all intelligence that pertains to international terrorism, whether domestic or abroad (Security Service, 2015). JTAC sets threat levels for the UK, it issues threat warnings on terrorism, and produces in-depth reports on terrorist trends, networks and capabilities. The formation of JTAC brought a unique and unprecedented ability for inter-agency collaboration in UK counter-terrorism, as it allowed all of the key intelligence and law enforcement agencies, together with the relevant departments and ministries, to be co-located in a single workspace. More importantly, each agency brings its own information technology (IT) systems that allow for intelligence-sharing, all-source fusion and multi-agency assessments all to be conducted in real time.

Another of JTAC's unique attributes is the ability to rapidly add 'bolt-on' sections to the core body of 16 agencies and departments, in the event of a crisis. The terrorist attacks against the London transport network in 2005 were one example of when this additional capability was very quickly deployed. Staff from agencies not traditionally involved in counter-terrorism were brought into the post-attack phase to assist with critical areas such as traffic management, coordination of medical support and communications management.

UK COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The UK intends its various legislative instruments to criminalise terrorism offences sufficiently that such offences can be tried as standard criminal offences whenever possible. Pre-dating the 9/11 attacks by a year, the Terrorism Act (2000) introduced the power to proscribe named groups or organisations; it provided for the power of arrest on suspicion of terrorism without an actual warrant; and allowed suspects to be detained for a maximum

pre-charge period of seven days (Parliament, 2000, sec. 3 and sch. 8). It also introduced new offences, such as seeking or providing terrorism training, in the UK or overseas; the provision of training and/or instruction in weapons, covering the whole range from handguns through to nuclear weapons; and finally, inciting terrorism (Parliament, 2000, secs 54, 55, 59–61). After al-Qaeda's 11 September attacks against the USA, Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ACTSA 2001) (Parliament, 2001), which allowed for the potentially indefinite detention of suspected foreign terrorists without charge, if it was not possible to deport such suspects for legal reasons (for example, if the suspect could face torture or the death penalty if deported).

In 2004, the Law Lords ruled that the incarceration of a group of detainees being held in Her Majesty's Prison (HMP) Belmarsh was unlawful. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 introduced a measure called a 'Control Order', defined by the Act as 'an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public' (Parliament, 2005, sec. 2.1). The highest number of individuals subject to a Control Order at any one time was 20, during 2009 (Allen and Kirk-Wade, 2020, p. 27). The Act was replaced in 2011 with the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act of 2011 (Parliament, 2011).

After the 2005 suicide bombing attacks on the London transport network, the government was faced with a number of high-profile and widely reported public displays of support for the bombers. The introduction of the Terrorism Act 2006 was mostly aimed at disrupting the ability for terrorist groups to recruit, train and deploy supporters for terrorist purposes. The Act brought in new offences, such as the so-called 'glorification' offence (covering 'any form of praise or celebration' of 'the commission or preparation of (terrorist) acts' and carrying a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment (Parliament, 2006, sub-secs 20–21). Also criminalised were the dissemination of terrorist publications, and the providing or receiving of training in terrorist techniques, while the powers of the police to detain terrorist suspects without charge were extended from 14 days to 28 days (Parliament, 2006, secs 2, 6, 8, 23). This increase was mainly to address concerns about the ability of the police to process increasingly massive volumes of evidence before being able to charge a suspect (House of Commons, 2006, sec. 74).

The passage of this Bill between the House of Commons and the House of Lords was contentious, in part because of the plan to extend pre-charge detention to 90 days for terrorist suspects, a significant increase on the 14 days' pre-charge detention period authorised by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Parliament, 2003). The Bill was rejected five times by the House of Lords before it was finally passed in amended form (BBC, 2006).

In January 2007, following a six-month investigation and surveillance operation (Operation Gamble), a large-scale police operation took place to arrest

nine people suspected of planning to kidnap, torture and behead a Muslim member of the British Army. Five of the group were subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment (Crown Prosecution Service, 2016). The following year, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 was passed, which created a new offence of eliciting, or attempting to elicit, information about members of the Armed Forces, a member of any of the intelligence services, or a police officer, which would be of use to someone preparing to commit acts of terrorism (Parliament, 2008, sec. 76). The Bill for this Act originally attempted to extend pre-charge detention to 42 days, but this was eventually dropped. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation supported the proposal, adding that the 42-day detention period would only affect 'maybe five or six people in the next four or five years' (*Hansard*, 2008, col. 506).

Repealing the use of Control Measures, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act (2011) was designed to impose restrictions on individuals who 'pose a real terrorist threat, but whom we cannot prosecute or, in the case of foreign nationals, deport' (Home Office, 2016). The new TPIM had a higher threshold for the imposition of measures, and it introduced a more targeted system of use. The TPIM also has a finite limit of two years, which can only be extended if the individual has re-engaged in terrorist activities during the period in which they are subject to the conditions of a TPIM. Measures available in a TPIM include electronic tagging, financial restrictions and regularly reporting one's location to the police. Unlike the previous Control Orders, a TPIM permits the use of a mobile phones and the internet. By the end of 2019, the maximum number of TPIM orders in force at any one time was ten, which occurred in 2012 (Allen and Kirk-Wade, 2020, p. 28). TPIMs have been criticised for being a 'Control Order lite' (Travis, 2012) and two suspects absconded while subject to a TPIM, one of whom entered a mosque in West London, illegally removed his tracking tag, donned a burqa and escaped (Home Affairs Committee, 2014, sec. 108).

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) was largely introduced to prevent citizens from the UK travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight for or support IS. It introduced new powers to prevent the travel of anyone suspected of involvement in terrorism, by seizing their passport; and also provided for the power to temporarily bar someone entering the UK, enforced with an exclusion order (Parliament, 2015, secs 1,2-4). Internet service providers (ISPs) were also mandated to retain more data than previously, especially that pertaining to the ability to match an internet protocol (IP) address with a specific computer (Parliament, 2015, sec. 21). More controversial among some parts of academia was the imposition of a statutory duty on schools, universities, councils and prisons to prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism (MacDonald, 2015; Adams, 2016). The Act also empowered the Home Office to issue a court order which would legally oblige one of the aforemen-

tioned bodies to comply with a directive regarding this threat, such as the order to prevent someone preaching extremist views (Parliament, 2015, secs 26–35).

On 30 December 2016, a new law came into force with the aim of providing a legislative framework governing both the use and the oversight of a wide range of investigatory powers used by the police and the intelligence agencies (UK Government, 2016). The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016 made three significant advances in the UK's counter-terrorism legislation. First, it gathered together the existing powers available to the police and intelligence agencies for the collection of communications data and metadata. Second, a new tool was introduced for the approval and oversight of interception warrants: the so-called 'double-lock'. This new mechanism means that any application for a warrant for the most intrusive techniques must be approved by both the executive (Secretary of State) and the judiciary. In this case, it means a judge sitting on the Investigatory Powers Commission, which was itself a new addition brought in by the IPA 2016. Finally, the Act was designed to provide as much 'future-proofing' as possible, to ensure that the legislation remains valid despite advances in communications methods and technology.

In addition to confirming existing powers, the IPA also added new offences, including those of unlawfully intercepting communications and of unlawfully obtaining communications data. The Act also added new powers, including the requirement for communications service providers (CSPs) to retain records on individuals for a period of one year (Parliament, 2016). The new oversight body of the Investigatory Powers Commission was created by the IPA and it became operational on 3 March 2017, performing the 'watchdog' function for investigatory powers and working in close cooperation with other relevant oversight bodies.

UK COUNTER-TERRORISM TOOLS AND TACTICS

The UK government has an array of tools and tactics at its disposal to deal with terrorism across a broad front. Since its inception in 2003, CONTEST has been the UK's national-level counter-terrorism strategy. The aim of the most recent (2018) strategy is to 'reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence' (Home Office, 2018, p. 13). The CONTEST strategy encompasses a very wide spectrum of policy options: from the softer end, such as intervention efforts including the CHANNEL programme which is aimed at helping individuals to break the hold of an extremist or terrorist ideology, through to the more kinetic options, such as dynamic assault techniques, which are used as a last resort to protect public safety.

The strategy comprises four pillars: Prevent (reduce intent), Pursue (reduce capability), Protect (reduce vulnerability) and Prepare (reduce impact).

Designed to work in union with each other, the four pillars reduce the threats and the vulnerabilities, resulting in an overall risk reduction in a terrorist attack being successfully carried out against the UK (Burke, 2013, p. 112).

CONTEST: The Four Ps

The aim of Pursue is 'to stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and overseas' (Home Office, 2018, para. 85). Clearly focused on intelligence-led interdiction, disruption and criminal prosecution, Pursue covers the UK's counter-terrorism legislation; the ability to prosecute and deport those involved in terrorism-related offences; the capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats; the ability of the courts to more effectively use classified intelligence; and the international cooperation necessary for dealing with terrorist threats to the UK and overseas.

The Prevent pillar seeks to tackle the root causes of radicalisation and to reduce the potential for individuals to progress to violent extremism or terrorism. A Home Office department has defined radicalisation as 'the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups' (BSU, 2008), and the 2011 CONTEST strategy defines it almost identically (Home Office, 2011, sec. 2.59). Prevent has employed a variety of outreach programmes in its attempts to aim to counter the narratives of extremist and terrorist dogmas that play such an important role in recruiting followers to these causes (Home Office, 2011, pp. 58–77; HM Government, 2018, sec. 110). The Prevent pillar does not imply that disrupting terrorist groups is the only tactic relied on to neutralise the possibility of an attack occurring; rather, it is accepted that close collaboration is required amongst a wider partnership of bodies spanning law enforcement, government (both central and local) and the community itself.

The Protect pillar works towards keeping 'the public safe by strengthening our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas, and so reduc[ing] our vulnerability' (HM Government, 2018, sec. 181) and it directs particular focus to critical national infrastructure (CNI), the transport network, crowded places and the UK border. Protect is a more defensive pillar, which aims to reduce the vulnerabilities, rather than tackle the causes and manifestations of terrorism, and is largely conducted by the Security Service working in close cooperation with the private sector.

Following the 2005 attacks in London, there has been a drive to increase the physical protection of key facilities from explosive damage. One example is the increased knowledge of improvised explosive device (IED) manufacturing techniques and their explosive effects being shared at the appropriate levels with architectural and construction professionals, to enhance mitigation measures at the design stage. The government's counter-terrorism security advisers

(CTSAs), working with the police, are the most public face of this bilateral counter-terrorism discussion between the government and the public sector (Metropolitan Police Service, 2014). The other focus areas for Protect are the UK's transport sector and crowded places, both of which have been previously targeted by terrorist groups with the intention of carrying out mass-casualty attacks. Both these attacks were defeated through intelligence-led operations (Operation Crevice and Operation Rhyme) which resulted in the effective disruption of the group and the arrest and conviction of the key individuals (Crown Prosecution Service, 2005, 2007b; Clarke, 2007)

Unlike the other pillars, Prepare concentrates on dealing with the impact and immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. This phase is known as post-attack recovery, and it relies on sound planning, communications, well-rehearsed drills, inter-agency cooperation and effective decision-making delegated down to the lowest possible level. The key aims of Prepare are to mitigate the effects of an attack, to be resilient in the immediate post-attack period, and to achieve a return to normal operations as quickly as possible.

In addition to the threat of now traditional attack vectors, such as the use of suicide bombers and of vehicles used as weapon platforms, Prepare also has to contend with the low-probability but high-impact threat of attack from CBRN devices. The capability and the intent still exists for weaponising biological, chemical and radiological elements by terrorist groups, as evidenced by the Tokyo subway attacks in 1994 and 1995, the radiological scare in Moscow in 1995, and the ricin attacks against the USA in 2001 (Seto, 2001, pp. 14–17; Heinrich, 2003, pp. 1–3; Bale, 2004). These events, combined with the stated aim of al-Qaeda to obtain nuclear components, and the proliferation of nuclear materials by the AQ Khan network, have forced the CBRN issue to be taken seriously for post-attack planning purposes (CIA, 2003, pp. 1–2; Butler, 2004, pp. 17–21, 26–27).

Pre-Charge Detention in the UK

The use of pre-charge detention creates a tension between the need for the police and the Security Service to detain a terrorist suspect for sufficient time to conduct investigations, and a suspect's right to not be detained without charge for any longer than necessary. In the UK, both legislation and the agreement of the judiciary are used in combination, to decide the maximum period for which an individual can be detained without charge. The Habeas Corpus Act was passed by Parliament in 1679 (Parliament, 1679), although the legal principle enshrined in it is believed to have existed in English common law even before the publication of the Magna Carta in 1215. '*Habeas corpus (ad subjiciendum)*' is an important legal principle in English law, translating as

'you may have the body (subject to examination)', that is, a person should only be held in detention so long as their detention is proved to be lawful.

Pre-charge detention limits in the UK have fluctuated between seven and 28 days, and a number of attempts have been made by different governments to increase this limit. The Terrorism Act (2000) provided for a maximum period of seven days, which was increased to 14 days through the Criminal Justice Act (2003). An attempt in 2006 to increase the limit to 90 days was defeated in Parliament, but the Terrorism Act (2006) raised the maximum period to 28 days, subject to annual review. Another attempt was made by the government in 2008 to legislate for a maximum period of 42 days, but this was again defeated. After a review of counter-terrorism and security powers carried out by Lord Macdonald, a strong case was made to reduce the maximum period form 28 days to 14 days (MacDonald, 2011, p. 3). In 2011, the 28-day period was allowed to expire naturally without renewal, resulting in the maximum period reverting to 14 days. Notwithstanding emergency legislation, 14 days is the current maximum allowed for pre-charge detention in the UK. A summary of pre-charge detention periods is below:

1. Until January 2004: 7 days.
2. Until July 2006: 14 days.
3. Until January 2011: 28 days.
4. Current maximum period: 14 days.

CHANNEL: The UK's Counter-Radicalisation Programme

The CHANNEL programme was launched as a pilot initiative in 2007, as a direct response to the London bombings of 7 July 2005. Designed as a multi-agency, early intervention programme, CHANNEL is funded by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and works with people of all ages, including children, who are assessed to be at serious risk of exploitation, not just from terrorist dialogue but also from extremist dialogue (Peters, 2012, p. 3). Individuals are referred to the scheme on a voluntary basis, and engagement with the CHANNEL process is not enforceable.

The first stage of the CHANNEL process is the identification of a person or persons deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. This assessment will usually be derived from concerns that a person is demonstrating behavioural traits which indicate that they are either considered as susceptible to radicalisation, or that they closely identify with a belief system or dialogue which supports extremist, terrorist or radical beliefs. The next stage is the conducting of a multi-agency risk assessment of the individual's case, aiming to identify any issues of concern that may need to be dealt with. The final stage is the provision of dedicated support and, if necessary, subsequent referral to specialists.

A targeted package of support measures is then designed and delivered, supported by a continuous review mechanism, to provide the required assistance to blunt the radical or extremist influences which the vulnerable individual may be subjected to (HM Government, 2018, p. 22).

The CHANNEL programme is able to deliver a variety of assistance mechanisms to vulnerable individuals, such as the provision of a support network, basic counselling, faith-specific guidance such as the involvement of moderate religious leaders, and more typical mainstream services such as housing advice and support, health guidance, social services assistance, education support, and employment counselling and support. CHANNEL employs an ambitious spread of partners that collaborate using the strength of their individual specialist areas.

These partners can include stakeholders, such as the police, social services, youth services, prison and probation services, the wider education sector, children's services, and other agencies with a statutory duty to assist, while other partners can come from a wider societal and governmental ecosphere.

Other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), charities and welfare groups, also become involved in the CHANNEL process. A key actor often overlooked in the model is the community policing team from the local police force, who bring the depth of local knowledge often lacking from other partners. Another key factor, sometimes a contentious one, is the willing provision of valuable information from elements of the local community, and this can often provide the first indications that an individual is being exposed to radical or extremist influences. At the far end of the community policing spectrum, such information can provide the police and security services with the initial indicators that a terrorist attack may be in the planning stage.

NOTES

1. The 2020 NSS is unlikely to be completed on schedule, largely due to the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic (Curtis, 2019; Gallardo, 2020).
2. See, for example, Elnakhala's paper on 'Walls and fences', where she discusses Hamas imposing taxes on tunnel-building and on illegally imported commodities (Elnakhala, 2014, p. 108); Malik's (2019) article on the terrorism–criminality nexus; and Clarke's (2017) article on the commercial relationship between IS and the drug trade.

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12. National counter-terrorism responses: France

Doaa' Elnakhala

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT

According to the Global Terrorism Index, France is ranked 36th amongst the most likely country targets of terrorism in 2018, making it the second most likely European target after the United Kingdom (UK) (*Global Terrorism Index*, 2019, p. 86). France's terror alert status has alternated between high and very high since October 2015, and the country has suffered a wave of Islamist attacks since 2012 (Chassany, 2017; Donadio, 2019). The pace of terrorist assaults particularly accelerated after January 2015, following the murders of *Charlie Hebdo* staff, police officers and customers of a Jewish supermarket in Paris. Between January 2015 and mid-2018, terrorism claimed the lives of more than 224 persons in France and left additional hundreds injured ('Deadly terror …', 2018). According to government reports, in 2019 more than 21 000 people were registered under the File for the Prevention of Terrorism Radicalisation, 10 092 of whom were either 'being examined', 10 616 were 'closed' cases, 167 were cases that needed 'further assessment' and 164 were classified as 'on hold'. Earlier numbers indicate that nearly 2000 people were confirmed to have been directly or indirectly involved in radicalisation and Jihadist recruitment by mid-2017[1] ('The fight …', 2017a; Diard and Poulliat, 2019).

Terrorism is not new to France, as early terrorist acts can be traced to the French Revolution era (Shapiro and Bénédicte, 2003, p. 68) but, until the 1990s, terrorism in France had mainly taken the form of short-term campaigns, conducted across a number of waves of terrorism. The longest campaign lasted for eight years and was launched by the Action Directe group, an extreme left-wing group opposed to the influence of the United States of America (USA) and in particular, the presence and influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Western European nations such as France (Dartnell, 1990; Foley, 2013, p. 18). Within the contemporary timescale, three types of groups have attacked the French Republic. In the early 1980s, the

most prominent groups were the home-grown radical leftists such as Action Directe. The goal of such groups was to overthrow the capitalist system and what they viewed as American-led imperialism. The second type were regional separatists who advocated autonomy or independence of certain regions such as the Basque region and Corsica. The third type is international terrorism, which has mostly originated from the Middle East[2] (Shapiro and Bénédicte, 2003; Body-Gendrot, 2012, p. 87)

NATURE OF THE THREAT

In 2015, France experience a series of terrorist attacks that have almost certainly left their mark on the country forever. In January 2015, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists shot and killed 11 people at the office of the Paris-based magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*. Two days later, a gunman killed three customers and an employee at the Hyper Cacher supermarket in a Paris suburb. In November of the same year, a Belgo-French terrorist network affiliated with the so-called Islamic State (IS) plotted and executed a well-coordinated attack in central Paris which left 130 people dead and 413 injured in different cafés and the Bataclan music hall.

According to the French Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, France was the most targeted European Union (EU) country in 2019, with one terrorist attack, three attempted attacks and four attack projects ('Terrorism in the European Union', 2019). Between 2016 and 2018, France experienced nine actual terrorist attacks, 13 attempted attacks and 42 foiled attacks. While this confirms the solid existence of a terrorist threat, it has evolved considerably in the past few years. Until 2017 IS was a direct source of this threat, but with the considerable setbacks suffered by the group, such as the massive loss of its territorial control in Iraq and Syria, threats from planned actions by IS declined sharply. The endogenous threat from IS, partly fed by the IS ideology, remains high across the country and potential attacks by IS sympathisers on French soil are now some of the most serious threats faced by France today. While attacks such as the *Charlie Hebdo* and the Bataclan hall assaults were more complex, attacks in the past couple of years have relied on low-tech methods such as the use of knives or vehicles. That said, this does not rule out the use of explosives, drones or booby-traps in future attacks (Action Plan, 2018, pp. 7–8). The terrorist threat in France manifests itself in various forms, discussed in the following sections.

Terrorist Networks

In 2015 and 2016, local and international militants demonstrated a capacity to develop networks within France and Belgium to spread their ideology

and recruit new militants and sympathisers. Through such networks, these operatives can provide support and financing, as well as plan and execute new attacks. Given such developments, radical Islamist terrorism has become a central, social and political problem in both countries (Dugulin, 2017). Despite the rapid weakening of IS in Iraq and Syria, these networks continue to pose the main source of threats for France and they are still able to disseminate their propaganda over the internet. IS continues to threaten Europe in general and France in particular, through sympathisers responding to its calls and identifying with its ideology, some of whom have previously travelled to Syria and Iraq, where they received training and indoctrination. A variety of social media and messaging applications were – and are expected to continue being – used amongst the different terrorist cells in France, which interestingly have links with local criminal gangs (Renard, 2017; 'Nemmouche …', 2019).

Overall, the fact that the French authorities have foiled several attacks with direct or indirect links to terrorist networks in France and Belgium indicates that efforts to attack France have continued, even after the waning of IS power in the Middle East. In March 2016, for example, several suspects who were planning to stage new attacks were arrested, including Reda Kriket, a French jihadist and a member of the Belgium 'Zerkani network'. The French police seized several weapons and quantities of explosives held by the suspects. At least four of the terrorists involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks were part of the same network, including Abdelhamid Abaaoud (CAT, 2016). Additionally, investigations of the 2015 Paris attacks continue to expose the wide reach of the terrorist network involved. As of January 2021, several people were being still being tried for their involvement in, or support of, those attacks, such as Jawad Bendaoud, known as the 'Daesh landlord', who received a four-year sentence in March 2019 for providing support for the attackers ('Daesh landlord …', 2019).

Returnees

According to government sources, almost 2000 French citizens or holders of French residency left France for Syria and Iraq to fight for and/or provide support to, IS ('French Islamic State …', 2019), around 718 of whom were still in Syria and Iraq in mid-2018. This group poses a serious threat, due to the involvement of many of them in preparing for terrorist acts and in their ability to influence others in France and elsewhere. A number of French citizens or residents have already returned from Iraq and Syria, and still more are expected to return in due course. There are concerns that a sizeable number of these people will still be committed to the IS ideology and may plot more attacks or establish new cells. Returns are expected to continue following the

large-scale territorial losses and military defeats suffered by IS in Iraq and Syria (Action Plan, 2018; 'What is the status …', n.d.).

In the past few years, returnees have indeed been involved in terrorist plots in France. Tyler Vilus, for example, was a French returnee who coordinated with two prisoners, Sofiane Amghar and Khalid ben Larbi (known associates of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the ringleader of the Paris attacks), to plot attacks against prisons and other locations upon the release of Amghar and ben Larbi. The scheme was uncovered by the French authorities in July 2019 and Vilus was arrested and convicted for his part in planning these attacks ('French intelligence …', 2019).

Lone Wolf Attacks

By the summer of 2016, lone wolf attacks inspired by IS were already on the rise (Chrisafis, 2017). The majority of attackers had links with European or Middle East-based IS networks, in most cases through social media, personal contact or messaging applications. The perpetrators are generally low-skilled and poorly educated, with their attacks requiring very little planning or communication. Due to these characteristics, lone wolf attackers tend to keep a low profile, especially given that many of them avoid obtaining firearms and ammunition. While lone wolf attacks demonstrate the IS group's continued reach, they also divert security service resources away from investigating potential larger-scale attacks or more complex groups (Dugulin, 2016). Most of the recent terrorist attacks in France can be classified as lone wolf attacks, such as the knifing attack in Romans-sur-Isère in early April 2020, when a Sudanese refugee entered a shop and stabbed a number of people, killing two and injuring seven more (Marotte, 2020).

Radicalisation

In late 2019, the French government estimated the number of people subjected to radicalisation as being around 21 000, a major increase compared to previous years. While it is accepted that not all radicalised individuals resort to carrying out acts of violence, all cases are followed up, including those in the early phases of radicalisation (Action Plan, 2018; 'What is the status …', n.d.). Prisons in France have become an established breeding ground for radicalisation, and as in other environments, when sharing a prison cell with two or three others, weaker inmates are often at significantly higher risk of being indoctrinated by stronger inmates. In the prison environment, an extremist or radical agenda can develop very quickly, often due to isolation, boredom, coercion or even anger (de Bellaigue, 2016). In June 2018, French prisons held 512 individuals convicted for acts of terrorism, and 1145 inmates additionally held

under common law who had been identified as being radicalised,[3] numbers which mark a considerable rise compared to those from 2016 (Action Plan, 2018, p. 8).

Right-Wing Terrorism

More recently France and other European countries have experienced a wave of right-wing, mainly racist, terrorism. The 2011 attack by Anders Breivik in Norway is often seen as a precursor of this wave of terrorism. Muslim and Jewish communities are common targets of such terrorism. Filiu (2019) identifies this terrorism as the main source of the current threat to France. However, due to the understandable focus on jihadist terrorism, fewer measures have been taken by the authorities to fight this form of terrorism in France.

FRENCH COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Until the 1980s, legislation was France's most common response to terrorism (Rault, 2010; Body-Gendrot, 2012). When terrorism hit France during this period, French officials were reluctant to create specific counter-terrorism legislation to deal with the issue, possibly due to France's history of violent responses to such laws (Cahn, 2010, p. 467). Instead, French legislators chose to adapt the existing criminal law and procedures (Body-Gendrot, 2012), introducing some 15 terrorism-related laws between 1986 and mid-2015 (Maire, 2015). Like other European states, France deals with terrorism offences through the mechanisms of the penal code, and like the UK, intends its various legislative instruments to criminalise terrorism offences sufficiently that such offences can be tried as standard criminal offences whenever possible.[4] Although France considers Islamist terrorism to be a major threat, it does not view terrorist actions as acts of war against France or against the West, instead choosing to define terrorism as the violent expression of extremism, motivated by religion or other different factors (Rault, 2010). The following section briefly details a selection of France's counter-terrorism laws.

Counter-Terrorism Law

From November 2015 until November 2017, France was under a State of Emergency which was ended by the government with the introduction of a new counter-terrorism law that institutionalised elements of the special emergency police powers (Chrisafis, 2017). Similar to the State of Emergency, the counter-terrorism law granted police and investigators extensive powers to conduct raids and to detain and question terrorism suspects, in an attempt to

strengthen national security and counter-terrorism efforts ('Bill to strengthen …', 2017; Vinocur, 2017). Moreover, the law enabled prefects (local representatives of the Minister of Interior) to designate public spaces as security zones. These measures limited who could enter and leave these spaces, limited the movement of people considered as national security threats, allowed for the closing of mosques and other places of worship, and also allowed for searches of private property. The courts would have no say on at least the first three measures, and the law additionally limited the right of appeal against orders restricting where a person has to live, and for closing places of worship. Moreover, a judge has limited oversight over search powers ('France: don't …', 2017).

As expected, the law raised concerns among human rights and other organisations. In June 2018, Human Rights Watch said that the law normalises the State of Emergency, as it would move some obviously broad emergency powers into a more normal, criminal and administrative law without the necessary judicial safeguards. The lack of time limits, and the law's vague definitions of terrorism and threats to national security, exacerbate such concerns ('France: don't …', 2017; Serhan, 2017).

The Penal Code (Last Amended in March 2016)

The Penal Code deals with terrorism as a crime and it states that 'an intention to commit a [terrorist] crime is a crime itself'. By accusing an individual of 'association with wrong-doers involved in a terrorist enterprise', the French judiciary can arrest and detain any suspect for any crime that could have ultimately assisted terrorist activity. Thus French law authorises the arrest and prosecution of any individual who has played a role, however minimal and remote, in connection with a terrorist plot or 'enterprise' ('Penal Code', 2016).

The Penal Code permits use of undercover officers to prevent potential terrorist attacks. Specifically, the 2006 modifications to the Penal Code allowed counter-terrorism officers to investigate cases and testify anonymously by providing the judiciary with their administrative registration number (*Code of Penal Procedures*, 2010). A human source's actual identity can be identified only upon a decision of the Attorney General at the Court of Appeal in Paris. Thus, the law authorises the officers to 'enter', or infiltrate, networks under the supervision of their agencies (Rault, 2010).

The 2015 Intelligence Law

The official powers covering surveillance of suspects was extended by this law, and it also established a coherent and comprehensive legislative framework to regulate the activities of the intelligence agencies (Boring, 2016).

More specifically, it permitted the interception of communications without the prior consent of a judge being necessary, and it also permitted wide-scale internet surveillance. Expectedly, this legislation was met with reservations from several concerned judges and human rights organisations, particularly for its intrusive nature and for its vagueness regarding issues such as the installation of a 'black box' among access providers and large websites to automatically analyse data to 'uncover terrorist threats', without indicating the employed mechanism, such as whether this will be targeted or large-scale surveillance. Debates on the Intelligence Law between government officials and concerned stakeholders revealed that all data should pass through a so-called 'black box', which in turn would collect all of this data. It would, however, impose filters to separate the relevant data. Only this relevant data would be analysed by specially trained analysts; thus the government argued that this would not constitute mass surveillance. Nevertheless several stakeholders voiced their concerns over the potential infringement of citizens' rights and freedoms, as well as the potential for collecting more data than authorised (Untersinger, 2015).

The 2014 Individual Terrorist Offence

This offence complemented another offence, the 'association of criminals to a terrorist enterprise', which has been in force since the 1980s. The Individual Terrorist Offence restricted the ability of French nationals to travel to Syria or Libya and it was also intended to help identify potential 'lone wolf' attackers. It criminalised possession of weapons and explosives, training on use of arms, consultation of internet sites, Twitter accounts, books, magazines and other sources that encourage terrorism, and staying in areas where terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity are committed (Maire, 2015).

Loppsi 2 of 2011

While this law deals with various issues, including road safety and child pornography, it also covers terrorism. For instance, it permits the covert capture of computer data and authorises the security agencies to place 'Trojan horse' software on targeted computers, and to extract data from them, without the intervention of a judge. It also provided for the blocking of certain internet sites and extended the 48-hour maximum detention period in police custody to 96 or 144 hours, if a terrorist attack is imminent. This law also made video surveillance compulsory in three specific cases: the prevention of acts of terrorism, the protection of important sites, and in the 'fundamental interests of the nation', but it was criticised for violating privacy and freedom of expression (Maire, 2015).

Counter-Terrorism Law of 2006

Enacted after the coordinated al-Qaeda suicide bombing attacks in London in 2005, this law was designed to improve state security and strengthen border controls. It provided for more advanced technological equipment and better training and an expansion of the powers of the police and the special courts. Generally, this law increased the range of punitive measures for criminal association, it strengthened the centralisation of justice in the Paris area and provided the government with wider access to online personal information (Body-Gendrot, 2012; Maire, 2015). Several other measures were introduced or expanded by this law. For example, it authorised law enforcement agencies to covertly access personal computers of certain individuals to prevent an act of terrorism, and it required cybercafés to keep their connection data records for one year and to provide them if requested. Moreover, it empowered the authorities to access customer data of a mobile phone operator without needing permission from either a judge or the National Security Interception Control Commission. Police custody was extended from four days to six, in the event of an imminent terrorist action in France or abroad; while identity checks, particularly on international trains, were also strengthened (Maire, 2015).

Loppsi 1 2002 and 2003

Passed in 2002, Loppsi 1 was reinforced in 2003 by then-President Sarkozy's law for internal security. This law expanded the efficacy of intelligence research by strengthening intelligence collection and collaboration and it further developed institutional cooperation at the international level. Furthermore, it authorised the control, verification and identification of any person when 'there is one or more plausible reasons' for suspicion on grounds of internal security, and it imposed an obligation on internet service providers (ISPs) to store their logs (that is, their subscriber connection data) for one year (Maire, 2015).

Counter-Terrorism Statute of 1996

This was enacted in reaction to the bombing of the RER train (the local train serving Paris and its surroundings) in 1996. This law changed the notion of the Criminal Code's 'association of criminals for a terrorist enterprise', introduced in 1992, and it became an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years. Under this law, the authorities are able to take preventive measures in advance (Maire, 2015).

The Fight against Terrorism Law of 1986 (Last Amended in April 2018)

Following the sweeping public demand in France to increase security following the numerous attacks in Paris, this law transferred the judgment of terrorist cases from ordinary courts to specialised magistrates and provided a definition of terrorism, and listed the penalties incurred, which are considered aggravated when linked to terrorism (Maire, 2015). Under the Ministry of Interior, this law established the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (CTCU). Under the Ministry of Justice, it created the Coordination Service for the Anti-Terrorist Fight (CSATF). These two institutions are specialised in maintaining relationships and flow of information (*Law n° 86-1020*, 2018).

FRENCH COUNTER-TERRORISM INSTITUTIONS

Several official institutions are tasked with counter-terrorism responsibilities, and not all of these are new institutions. After identifying terrorism as a serious and real threat to the French territory in 2005, France repeatedly re-organised its bureaucracies to better respond to terrorism (Body-Gendrot, 2012). Generally speaking, French counter-terrorism institutions have always suffered from serious coordination gaps, and despite many attempts at bridging these gaps, the French counter-terrorism community remains highly fragmented (Hellmuth, 2015, pp. 194–195).

Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (CTCU)

Under the Ministry of Interior, the CTCU is in charge of the operational coordination of services involved in combating terrorism, including the National Police and the National Gendarmerie. It was created in 1984, but in April 2014 it was designated as the core institution in the new system against violent radicalisation and jihadist channels (Body-Gendrot, 2012). Practically, the CTCU produces terrorist threat assessments to support the Minister of the Interior in applying security measures, but it also centralises the reporting of radicalisation and coordinates all administrative policing measures aimed at prevention of terrorism in cooperation with specialised services. The CTCU raises awareness about the threat of radicalisation; contributes to combating jihadism and to the elaboration of a counter-narrative on social networks; and conducts prospective analyses ('CUFT …', n.d.; 'Terrorism', n.d.).

  To evaluate the terrorist threat, the CTCU receives information from various sources including the police and security services, the Directorate of International Cooperation, and specialist international bodies. Additionally, it analyses information gathered during weekly and other meetings to establish general, sectoral and individual evaluations, and also analyses the phenomena

of terrorism and radicalisation through the production of retrospective and prospective notes for the counter-terrorism community that it coordinates. It collects reports received at the National Assistance and Radicalisation Prevention Centre (NARPC) via a toll-free national hotline, known as the green number, and e-forms via the internet. The CTCU also centralises reports from the Security Staff (EMS) and administers the Terrorism Prevention and Radicalisation Reporting File (FSPRT). The CTCU provides support for families of victims of terrorism. Additionally, it centralises and coordinates the administrative police measures under the State of Emergency, and provides training on detection of terrorism and radicalisation ('CUFT …', n.d.).

The CTCU represents the General Directorate of the National Police in interdepartmental relations via inter-ministerial bodies such as the Directorate General of Civil Aviation and the General Secretariat of Defence and National Security. It also acts as the representative of the French National Police at the European level, in the Police Working Group on Terrorism, in Europol, Interpol, the Group of Seven (G7), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other strategic multilateral fora involved in counter-terrorism ('CUFT …', n.d.). The CTCU is composed of several structures. It has a central level, with permanent links to the administrative authorities, the police, the gendarmerie and the intelligence and prison administration directorates. It has liaison offices in Pau (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) and also in Europe, under the Directorate of International Cooperation, mostly working on terrorism in Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK ('CUFT …', n.d.).

The National Counter-Terrorism Centre

Soon after his election in 2017, President Macron established a counter-terrorism taskforce specialised in intelligence sharing, known as the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), partly in response to intelligence failings in several previous terror attacks. The NCTC comes under the authority of the presidential palace and is headed by Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, former head of a counter-espionage agency. The NCTC is comprised of around 20 intelligence analysts who oversee all counter-terrorism efforts under the President's authority (Chassany, 2017; Chrisafis, 2017). The NCTC determines strategies to deal with radicalisation on the internet, and also shares instructions on how to prepare for an attack. The taskforce also focuses on French citizens attempting to return from fighting with the IS in Syria and Iraq (Chrisafis, 2017). It also reviews intelligence gathered by the Interior, Defence and Justice ministries, and is intended to centralise and facilitate exchanges of information between agencies (Chassany, 2017).

The Police

President Macron has tried to bolster police powers to adapt to a fast-changing terror threat and the police now have two operational units, the Research, Assistance, Intervention and Deterrence (RAID) and Brigades of Research and Intervention (BRI), both commissioned to counter serious threats to public security ('Terrorism', n.d.). RAID is a 200-strong, special-purpose force founded in 1985 to counter major robberies, organised crime and terrorism. Although it operates in areas around Paris, RAID can be deployed anywhere in France, as shown in 2012 when the unit killed Mohamed Merah in Toulouse, rescuing 21 kindergarten children and their teacher after a two-day hostage crisis (Bienaimé, 2015).

BRI-Paris is another special force that operates under Paris's Police Department and intervenes within and around the city. BRI falls structurally under the Central Bureau for the Fight against Organized Crime; it has about 48 full members, although it can field up to 72, and mostly specialises in surveillance, with only 5 per cent of their work spent on actual field interventions (Bienaimé, 2015). In total, France has 15 BRIs, based in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Nice, Nantes, Rouen, Lille, Versailles, Strasbourg, Bayonne, Toulouse, Ajaccio, Orleans, in addition to a National BRI in Nantes ('BRI …', n.d.).

The National Gendarmerie

The National Gendarmerie has an important elite force known as the Intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie (IGNG), founded in 1974 as a response to the Munich attacks in the Summer Olympics of 1972. As of early 2015, IGNG had a military force of 400 members, based in Versailles (Quinault-Maupoil, 2015). The unit is trained to conduct airborne missions, it can operate in rural and urban operations and since its creation, IGNG has launched over 1000 operations and rescued more than 600 hostages ('Missions', n.d.).

The Military

The French Army is in charge of defending the country's national interests and protecting its territory and borders, but due to the rise in the number of terrorist attacks, the Army was commissioned with a number of responsibilities inside French territory. The Army was first deployed inside France through Operation Sentinel, to protect the population from the terrorist threat after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and it is also involved in counter-terrorism efforts abroad (Rouden, 2016). As of February 2020, 5100 French soldiers were in the

Sahel region ('France to send 600 …', 2020) and France also participated in the international campaign against IS (Schweitzer et al., 2016).

Intelligence Agencies

France has six intelligence units under various ministerial structures, including the ministries of Interior, Defence and Economy (Chrisafis, 2017). Three of those agencies, the Directorate General for Exterior Security (DGES), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Directorate for Defence Protection and Security (DPSD), fall under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Two agencies come under the authority of the Ministry of Finance, namely the Service Against the Laundering of Capital and the Financing of Terrorism (SLCFT) and the National Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations (NDCII). The final agency, the General Directorate for Internal Security (GDIS), falls under the Ministry of the Interior ('DGSE …', 2017). In addition to these six units, France also has the National Coordination of Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (NCICT) department and the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

General Directorate of Internal Security (GDIS)
The GDIS is an internal security organisation mainly responsible for domestic intelligence, and runs human intelligence (HUMINT) sources (Porch, 2007). It enjoys broad, working arrangements with the National Police and was created in June 2008 by merging the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DTS) with the Central Directorate for General Intelligence (DCRG). Fighting terrorism is one of the main priorities of the GDIS. As of July 2018, the GDIS became the operational coordinator of intelligence, of judicial inquiries under court authority, and of the Ministry of the Interior's national and international cooperation strategies on counter-terrorism (Action Plan, 2018, p. 19).

Directorate General of External Security (DGES)
The DGES is France's foreign intelligence agency. It operates under the French Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with its domestic counterparts, and is commissioned to collect intelligence and protect the country's national security, mostly by performing paramilitary and counter-intelligence operations aboard. The counter-terrorism unit at has been given increased manpower and resources ('Counterterrorism', 2017), and it conducts large-scale communications interception, sharing the collected metadata across the French intelligence network (Boring, 2016).

   The DGES collects and processes intelligence on terrorists and terrorist activities in order to detect and identify the sources of threats, to locate their structures, to understand their strategies and determine their potential targets.

To achieve these ends, the DGES employs multiple intelligence sources and methods, including human intelligence sources (HUMINT), open source (OSINT), technical sensors including signals intelligence (SIGINT), satellite and other imagery collection (IMINT) ('Counterterrorism', 2017; 'DGSE', 2017). The DGES coordinates with national, European and other foreign intelligence services involved in counter-terrorism ('Counterterrorism', 2017). The agency has six directorates: the General Directorate,[5] the Directorate of Administration, the Directorate of Strategy, the Directorate of Intelligence, the Technical Directorate and the Directorate of Operations ('DGSE …', 2017).

Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)

The DMI is tasked with collecting and centralising information for the French Armed Forces, and is responsible for tactical and operational military intelligence matters. It was created in 1992 and its assets are all military, with no covert branches. The DMI reports directly to the Chief of Staff and to the President, who is also the supreme commander of the French armed forces (Porch, 2007, p. 125; 'DGSE …', 2017).

National Coordination of Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (NCICT)

In an attempt to coordinate the work of France's six intelligence agencies, the NCICT was founded in June 2017.[6] The NCICT coordinates and guides the counter-terrorism work of the intelligence agencies, among the various services and ministries. This body also ensures optimal use of legally authorised intelligence techniques by all relevant services, and works with the relevant departments and ministerial cabinets to draft a counter-terrorism doctrine. Lastly, the NCICT has further developed European and other international cooperation on intelligence and counter-terrorism (Action Plan, 2018, p. 12; 'The national coordination …', n.d.).

National Intelligence Council (NIC)

Created in 2009, the NIC defines the strategic directions and priorities for French intelligence and prepares the planning for human and technical resources of specialised intelligence services. The Council was established to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence services by coordinating their work at a senior-official level, and it is located at the presidential palace, setting the national intelligence strategy. One of the Council's groups is specialised in evaluating the terrorist threat ('The national coordination …', n.d.). The Council is headed by the Prime Minister, and its members are the concerned ministers and the directors of the intelligence services whose presence is required by the agenda. This is in addition to the National Intelligence Coordinator, who reports to the President. The Coordinator advises the President on intelligence-related issues, prepares the NIC meetings and

ensures the implementation of the decisions ('National Intelligence Council', 2017; 'Terrorism', n.d.).

Others

The Directorate on Defence Protection and Security (DDPS) was formerly known as Military Security and is responsible for military counter-intelligence operations and information security, as well as the political surveillance of the military (Porch, 2007; Lowenthal, 2016), and ensures the protection of army personnel and defence establishments against terrorism (Lobjois and Olivier, 2016). The Service Against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (SMLFT), established in 2007 following a G7 summit, collects intelligence and acts against illegal financing. One of the roles of the SMLFT is to help develop a healthy economy by combating illegal financial circuits, money laundering and terrorism financing ('SLCFT – the missions', 2017) and it cooperates and exchanges information with various national and international counterparts including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and French and European agencies working in similar domains ('SLCFT', n.d.) and with French financial institutions ('Countering terrorist financing', 2015). The National Directorate on Customs Intelligence and Investigations (NDCII) works closely with the Customs directorate and it carries out investigations into smuggling, counterfeit currency and customs fraud. In 2009, the NDCII established a unit called Cyberdouane (Cybercustoms) to fight cyber trafficking; for example, illegal online gambling, money laundering through online casinos, and the sale of illegal products online (such as narcotics, weapons and counterfeit products). The NDCII workforce has doubled over time and its staff operate in airports, seaports and land crossings, working in intelligence collection, analysis and counter-terrorism ('National Directorate …', 2016; 'The fight …', 2017b).

FRENCH COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Throughout France's history, the French counter-terrorism strategy has evolved from prevention (early 1980s) to accommodation (mid-1980s) to suppression (early 2000s) (Shapiro and Bénédicte, 2003). After the terrorist attacks of 2015, the French counter-terrorism strategy has developed again to present a mix of preventive, protective and punitive measures.

Counter-Terrorism Tactics

Following the attacks of January 2015 at the *Charlie Hebdo* premises and at the Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket, the French government launched a series

of measures to prevent and curb terrorist attacks under the government's comprehensive counter-terrorism plan of May 2016, also known as the Action Plan against Terrorism and Radicalisation (PART). The plan was updated in 2018, taking the changing security situation into consideration and introducing two new plans: first, a separate National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation (NPPR); and second, the Action Plan against Terrorism (APT). Several measures were adapted and others introduced in response to the new security situation, which included the end of the IS Caliphate project, the potential for an influx of returning foreign fighters and the possible resurgence of al-Qaeda (Action Plan, 2018).

The Action Plan against Terrorism (APT)
Introduced in July 2018, APT is composed of 32 measures, that can be classified as preventive, protective and punitive (National Plan, 2018), and it intends:

1. 'To know: better identify and understand the terrorist threat and how it evolves by improving coordination among intelligence services.'
2. 'To curb: preventing acting-outs depends in part on anticipating prison releases and on international initiatives against terrorism funding.'
3. 'To protect: reducing risks requires the cooperation of private operators, communities and the population in order to develop a common security culture.'
4. 'To repress: the creation of a national, anti-terrorist public prosecution office (parquet national anti-terroriste, PNAT) is aimed at strengthening the repression of terrorism offences' ('France: a comprehensive plan …', 2019).

APT measures include strengthening the DCSI operational management in the fight against terrorism, by assuming a wider, more strategic coordination role for intelligence, judicial inquiries and national and international cooperation. APT established an inter-service unit to carry out profiling of perpetrators, aimed at identifying criteria to measure the dangerousness of radicalised persons and to shed light on the processes underlying a person's (or a group's) decision to radicalise. Prison intelligence was integrated into the intelligence community by APT. APT also encouraged preparedness for developments in security technologies, and adapting the legal framework that affected use of these technologies. It also established a feedback method involving operational, intelligence and investigation services, to learn lessons from previous attacks.

APT created a permanent unit to monitor released prisoners, and it reinforced judicial controls intended to ensure the compliance of individuals charged with

terrorist acts and, subject to various obligations and prohibitions, placed under judicial control or house arrest. It stepped up enforcement of anti-terrorist sentences by establishing a new department composed of three judges, reporting to a departmental vice-president. The anti-terrorist asset-freezing system was consolidated by APT. It also maintained the policy on the suspension of social benefits for individuals who departed from France to join terrorist groups. It strengthened the monitoring of commitments made on international forums, and made the fight against terrorism a priority during the French presidency of the G7. Within civil society, APT encouraged a common culture of security, to increase vigilance among the various social actors. It optimised the deployment of the armed forces based on the evolving threat; it improved the protection of sensitive sites; and it facilitated compensation for victims of terrorism. APT consolidated the carrying out of administrative background checks; it encouraged the anticipation of potential responses to emerging threats of varying natures; and it increased the protection of French nationals abroad. APT created the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecution service and provided judges with additional training on counter-terrorism trials; while on the international front APT encouraged diplomatic contributions towards conflict resolution and stabilisation in vulnerable and crisis areas (Action Plan, 2018).

National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation (NPPR)

Published in February 2018, the NPPR introduced 60 measures to refocus prevention of radicalisation and protection against it (National Plan, 2018, p. 7). This plan is centred around:

1. Improving the detection and segregation of radicalised inmates in French prisons.
2. Providing improved psychological counselling for and monitoring of young French minors returning from Syria and Iraq.
3. Removing government agents (especially members of law enforcement and the military) who have been radicalised.
4. Improving the monitoring of religiously affiliated schools.
5. Working with mental health professionals to find better ways to detect and deal with radicalised individuals.
6. Working with social network providers to ensure the removal of illicit content within an hour of posting.
7. Developing educational tools to fight against conspiracy theories on the internet.
8. Creating a scientific committee to better understand the phenomenon of radicalisation and find ways to counter it more efficiently (National Plan, 2018).

As a result, a number of actions were launched in the context of the NPPR. These included training and initiatives for countering radicalisation in schools, support efforts for after-school hours, better detection capabilities inside schools, monitoring education and shielding students against radicalisation; with similar measures introduced in the sporting sector. Other actions included improving the removal of illegal content on the internet in collaboration with stakeholders, the production of counter-narratives, and the combating of exposure to content that encourages radicalisation. Additionally, this Plan provided concerned civil servants with tools to collaborate with the government. The Plan also permitted improved exchange of information amongst relevant parties and developed detection, reporting and handling of radicalised persons. Some of the measures involve businesses and include raising awareness within the business community, and collaboration of this community with the government. Other measures address awareness amongst higher education and research professionals, and encourage the appointment of a radicalisation contact officer (National Plan, 2018).

The NPPR also encouraged research on the topic, and collaboration with international partners. Moreover, it revived the involvement of health professionals, social workers and women's rights advocates. It strengthened the monitoring of stakeholders involved in counter-radicalisation initiatives, and bolstered the involvement of local authorities. The NPPR also developed an assessment mechanism through feedback from international experience and the deployment of scientific expertise. Furthermore, the Plan focused on reintegrating returned minors from areas of terrorist groups operations. It also offers tools to monitor inmates in prison. As a result of the NPPR, specialised facilities were set up to handle radicalised persons and those in the process of becoming radicalised in custody (National Plan, 2018).

On 18 February 2020, President Macron launched a campaign against what he called Islamist 'separatism' and political Islam. He announced measures that would tighten controls on foreign financing of mosques, and end the nomination of imams to France from countries such as Algeria and Morocco. According to Macron, the imams are allegedly linked to Salafism or the Muslim Brotherhood, and they 'preach against the republic' (Mallet, 2020)

Plan Vigipirate

It is worth noting that France had introduced a two-level security alert as early as 1978, known as 'Plan Vigipirate'. Until the end of 2016, the French alert system was divided under two security situations: 'vigilance' and 'reinforced security/risk of attack'. In December 2016, the authorities introduced a third level, known as 'attack emergency', for an imminent attack or directly after an attack. The new threat level permits several measures, including closing

of roads, metro lines or schools at times of extreme danger. Some of the measures are secretive and are intended to respond to cyber and drone attacks. The system is also intended to disseminate information about terrorism and how to fight it, as well as teaching protective actions ('Attack emergency …', 2016; Barluet, 2016). Currently, Vigipirate is set on 'reinforced security/risk of attack' ('Understanding Plan Vigipirate', 2019).

International Cooperation

France has participated in the International Coalition against the so-called IS in Iraq since September 2014 and its efforts in the Coalition notably increased after the attacks of 2015 and 2016. At the beginning, France deployed an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf (Graham, 2015). In some strikes, the French Air Force heavily bombarded the so-called IS stronghold of Raqqa, east of Syria ('Paris attacks …', 2015). By the end of 2015, France and the United States had expanded their cooperation on intelligence in Syria (Graham, 2015).[7]

France has been also participating in the Coalition's working groups on cutting off the so-called IS financing. It is also playing a key role in the Financial Action Task Force ('What is France doing to stem …', 2016).

France was performing humanitarian missions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey even before the emergence of IS. In 2015–2016, France also contributed to the support for the United Nation's efforts in the region with a one-off contribution of €100 million for refugees ('What is France doing to help …', 2016)

France is also working with its European neighbours in combating terrorism within the EU framework. It is one of the countries that has encouraged intensifying measures to combat different forms of trafficking, especially oil and antiquities, as a source of income for the so-called IS. France has been also trying to push for asset-freezing provisions at the EU level ('What is France doing to stem …', 2016).

CONCLUSIONS

With a long history of battling terrorism, France has built a rather complicated counter-terrorism system. In parallel to the evolving terrorist threat, the French institutions, legal framework, and counter-terrorism strategy and tactics developed and expanded. In an attempt to respond to terrorism, the French authorities have always resorted to its legal arsenal, frequently by expanding it. While this is a common practice in democracies, as implied above, this left France with a long list of laws guiding counter-terrorism efforts. The fact that France keeps adding to its legal framework may entail the need for a different

legal strategy. One potential solution is merging all these laws into one Act or a few Acts. The Counter-Terrorism Law of 2017 could be a step in this direction. Observers, however, are worried that this law normalises the state of emergency, allowing the authorities to use measures that are not permitted otherwise.

The same applies for the French counter-terrorism institutions. Sometimes, it is difficult to keep up with the number of the counter-terrorism organisations. In addition, despite the many efforts to bridge the gaps, experience tells that these institutions generally suffer from lack of coordination. While it is possible that this problem of coordination can be inherent in the relationship amongst these institutions, the fact there is a large number of institutions makes coordination a challenge.

In the French counter-terrorism tactics, there is a clear distinction between radicalisation and terrorism. Indeed, the French response to terrorism focuses on punishing and preventing terrorism; but a similar weight is given to battling radicalisation that may cause terrorism. Knowing that not all radicalised individuals become terrorists, the French government has been investing much in combating radicalisation, rather than in only cracking down on terrorists.

NOTES

1. More current numbers could not be found, and recent publications tend to provide the same numbers and sources cited here.
2. From the French perspective, Algerian terrorism staged in the 1950s and 1960s was considered a domestic problem.
3. Please refer to note 1 above.
4. For more detail on this approach, see Chapter 11 on the UK's counter-terrorism landscape.
5. This directorate was reorganised by a law enacted in April 2017.
6. A 2016 parliamentary report revealed that these agencies had failed to collect or analyse information that could have helped to prevent the terrorist attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* and in November 2015, concluding that the country's six intelligence agencies should be overhauled (De Luce and Groll, 2016).
7. The number of French boots on the ground decreased with the fall of IS in the region. Additionally, all French forces left Iraq by the end of March 2020, due to the Covid-19 crisis ('French forces …', 2020).

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13. National counter-terrorism responses: Israel

Doaa' Elnakhala

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT

Israel's counter-terrorism experience has developed in the context of its conflict with the Palestinians, which developed back in the late 19th century and was born with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In the 1950s violent, non-state organisations started to appear amongst Palestinians who were displaced by the 1948 war.[1] Most of those groups adopted a tactic that became known as armed resistance, to liberate their homeland of Palestine. For some of these groups, Palestine extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean in the west, the establishment of which requires the elimination of today's Israel. Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel started in the 1950s when Israel faced waves of attacks by the fedayeen[2] (Sayigh, 1999, p. 62; Byman, 2011, pp. 1–2), who mostly infiltrated Israel's borders from neighbouring Arab countries to perpetrate attacks against Israel. Yet it is important to recall that unlike terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (IS), the Palestinian armed groups have particular and small-scale goals, such as self-determination, liberation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[3] To Israel, these groups constitute the source of an existential threat. Existing face-to-face with such groups since their creation, the Israeli law enforcement agencies, military and intelligence services have built a unique arsenal to fight non-state violence. This has resulted in diverse counter-terrorism tactics and a sophisticated institutional design of its counter-terrorism landscape. Such characteristics are further strengthened by cutting-edge technologies, training and other capabilities.

Nature of the Conflict

While the two sides are clearly fighting over land, there is also a religious element to the conflict, given that Israel is a Jewish state and the majority of Palestinians are either Muslims or Christians. Additionally, various disputed

sacred places constitute a central issue in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The Temple Mount for the Jews, and Haram al-Sharif for the Muslims, are sacred places of utmost centrality to their respective religions. The problem is that these sacred places occupy the same location (Hassner, 2009). The Western Wall for the Jews and the Wall of Tears for Muslims, as well as Hebron's Machpelah Cave for Jews and Haram al-Ibrahimi for Muslims, also share the same locations (Abou Ramadan, 2016, pp. 182–183). Until the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had no control over the holy sites in East Jerusalem. After occupying the eastern part of the city, the issue of control over these sites was negotiated and an agreement was reached, concluding that the Dome of the Rock would continue being an Islamic *waqf*, or trust. Jews were allowed into the site as tourists but were not allowed to pray there, although this agreement was not respected at all times ('The struggle …', 2015). In sum, the religious dimension adds additional complications to an already complex territorial dispute.

Proliferation of Insurgent Groups

Several armed groups were created in the diaspora after the establishment of Israel in 1948. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),[4] established in the 1960s and 1970s, are some of the most important groups. These groups organised together under the umbrella movement of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was recognised by the Arab League and the United Nations (UN) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 (Giacaman, 2013, pp. 24–27). The Palestinian–Israeli conflict escalated with Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967. A decade into the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, other groups appeared, this time inside the Territories themselves, the most famous of which are Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which were officially established in the early and the late 1980s respectively. Several other smaller groups proliferated between 2000 and 2010; for example, the Popular Resistance Committees (Elnakhala, 2014, p. 130). The influence of the latter groups on the conflict is much more limited compared to that of Hamas or Fatah, however.

While these organisations have different ideological leanings, they all identify the liberation of Palestine (or parts of it) and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as their goal. Moreover, all of them have carried out attacks against Israel in an attempt to attract international attention to the Palestine question, or simply to impose real or symbolic harm on the State of Israel. Some of these organisations, especially the larger and older ones, have witnessed shifts in their strategies. The Fatah leadership, for example, adapted

its techniques in dealing with Israel, from an armed struggle in the 1960s and 1970s, to peace talks in the 1980s. At present, Hamas is the most militarily active Palestinian militant group on the scene.

NATURE OF THE THREAT

Generally, terrorism can undermine public confidence and security (Weisburd et al., 2009b, p. 1265). Israeli citizens feel threatened by the Palestinian militants as well as by other actors in the region at large, such as Hezbollah and Iran. Despite Israel's military might, there is a constant sense of collective insecurity and fear. These insecurities peak during periods of high tension with the Palestinians, such as in 2018 when a survey revealed that 52 per cent of Israelis feared that war was imminent ('Poll …', 2018). Other, previous studies presented similar results and demonstrated a similar sense of fear and insecurity (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, pp. 224–225; Clarno, 2017, p. 161).

Since its last war against an Arab conventional army – that is, those of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 – Israel has been exposed to a range of non-conventional threats, including Hamas's military capabilities and its will to attack Israel. Until the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987, terrorism was perceived among the Israeli decision-makers as an ongoing security concern. But it has since been transformed into an existential threat, a perception that further deepened after military confrontations with Hamas in 2008–2009, 2012 and 2014 (Erbay, 2012, p. 42).

Hamas today is the most threatening of the Palestinian groups espousing violence, primarily because it has made the most advanced progress in building a quasi-military capability to launch multi-faceted, complex attacks against Israel that embrace a more strategic approach, rather than simply relying on tactical nuisance attacks. Through support from Iran[5] and Hezbollah, Hamas has managed to improve and expand its fighting capabilities over time. In the past, Hamas, like other violent organisations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, relied on roadside and settlement attacks, as well as suicide bombings. In 2001, as the political and security situation was deteriorating, Hamas and other militant groups started to use homemade rockets in attacking Israel. While these rockets were initially very rudimentary and barely caused any damage, they became more effective over time, by virtue of their increased range and destructive power. In the summer of 2014, Israel realised that Hamas's rockets had evolved into a much more strategic threat, since they landed near Israel's international airport and hit important city centres such as Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Jerusalem. Currently, there is a concern that Hamas's attack tactics will expand to include armed drones. Until now, Hamas has mostly been using unmanned drones to collect intelligence[6] (Ahronheim, 2017). Many in Israeli circles have raised doubts about Israel's ability to neutralise the threat from

Hamas (Rabinovich, 2015, p. 4). There is some criticism within Israel of the government's approach to Hamas and the Gaza Strip at large. A report by the Israeli State Comptroller Joseph Shapira stated that there is a direct link between the siege of Gaza, the growing military strength of Hamas, and the rockets fired at southern Israeli towns and villages (Eldar, 2017).

Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, unlike groups such as al-Qaeda and IS, are motivated by specific nationalistic and territorial goals, including ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state. They also have short-term tactical and operational goals such as conducting bombing and rocket attacks and tunnelling (to import weapons and attack Israel) that pave the way for the more strategic, longer-term goals. The persistence of its long-term goals keeps Hamas continuously motivated to attack Israel, despite all the obstacles and deterrence policies, even given it may not necessarily gain much from any specific attack, as its short-term goals are usually to inflict harm on Israel and its citizens (Elnakhala, 2014).

The years 2015 and 2016 witnessed a wave of knifing and ramming attacks, mostly conducted by young Palestinians in the West Bank, including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Between October 2015 and March 2016 alone, 211 stabbings of Israelis were reported, in addition to 83 shootings and 42 car-ramming attacks, resulting in the deaths of 30 Israelis and two US citizens. During the same period more than 200 Palestinians were killed, of whom more than 130 died while allegedly carrying out attacks on Israelis. Hamas claimed a small number of these attacks, although many of the attackers involved had no political affiliation. Some attributed this wave of attacks to a growing Palestinian sense of alienation and marginalisation, as well as a loss of hope for any possibility of positive change (Beaumont, 2016).

At present, the Palestinians suffer at least three hardships which if unaddressed might jointly lead to a Third Intifada: namely, economic hardship (arising partly as a result of Israeli policies), complexities of daily life (such as Israeli security checks, closures, and so on) and restrictions on freedom of movement, including visits to the holy city of Jerusalem. While the Palestinian Authority (PA) is expected to play a role in suppressing such developments, a swift deterioration is always possible. Moreover, countering an intifada usually costs many lives and absorbs multiple resources. Several Israeli and international reports warned against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, as the result of the more than decade-long Israeli siege. Coupled with continued Israeli attacks, this state of affairs may result in a complete collapse of the economic, humanitarian, health and environmental systems, from which Israel would be far from immune (Tolan, 2018).

ISRAELI COUNTER-TERRORISM INSTITUTIONS

Intelligence Services

Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, described intelligence as 'the first line of defence'. The contemporary Israeli intelligence community is still enveloped in a high level of secrecy, which to some extent has contributed to the well-being of the agencies (Rodman, 2013, p. 737). Israel has three main intelligence agencies: the Shin Bet, Mossad and Aman. While these agencies work closely together, some of their tasks overlap, which generates internal conflicts (Bitton, 2016, p. 142). The three agencies prepare an annual terrorism threat assessment for the Prime Minister, and information is usually disseminated fairly quickly amongst these agencies, as well as the Israeli security institutions (Tucker, 2008). Unlike their counterparts in most other democracies, the Shin Bet and Mossad are directly supervised by the Prime Minister's Office. In 2009, the position of the Minister for Intelligence and Strategic Affairs was created, and whilst the holder of this post is considered the ministerial supervisor of the intelligence community in Israel, the heads of the three Israeli intelligence agencies remain subordinated to other ministers, viz. the Prime Minister for the Shin Bet and Mossad, and the Minister of Defense for Aman (Bitton, 2016).

Shin Bet
Shin Bet is also known as Shabak, or the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and is responsible for domestic intelligence, counter-espionage, internal security and the prevention of domestic terrorist acts. It is also responsible for the security of important officials, aviation and other strategic assets, as well as verifying the security clearances of members of the defence and intelligence communities, in addition to other officials (Bitton, 2016, p. 143). The Arab Affairs Division of the Shin Bet conducts political surveillance of Arab militants, while the Protection and Security Division safeguards Israeli government buildings and embassies, defence contractors, scientific installations, key industrial plants and the national airline, El Al (Tucker, 2008). Despite being Israel's domestic intelligence organisation, the Shin Bet still fulfils some foreign intelligence functions by collecting and analysing data from areas such as Lebanon and Sinai, as well as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Bitton, 2016). Given that the Shin Bet operates both inside Israel and in these external areas, it functions as an information bridge between the police and the military (Byman, 2011).

The powers of the Shin Bet were extended after the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, and it became responsible for preventing the terrorist activities of residents of the Territories directed

against Jewish and Israeli targets (Bitton, 2016; 'The Six Day War', 2020). Although it was founded soon after the creation of the State of Israel, the Shin Bet's functions, structure and powers were not comprehensively legislated until February 2002 ('The ISA Statute', 2020).

Mossad

Israel's foreign intelligence agency is known as Mossad (Hebrew for 'institute') and it was established in 1951 by former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. The Mossad charter details the organisation's goals as:

> Secretly collecting information (strategic, diplomatic and operative) outside the State's borders; conducting special operations beyond the State of Israel's borders; stopping hostile countries from developing unconventional weapons and arming themselves with them; thwarting terrorist activities against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad; bringing Jews from countries which are preventing them from immigrating and creating a defense framework for the Jews in those countries. (Bergman, 2016)

The number of Mossad official employees was estimated at around 7000 in 2018 (Rodman, 2013). Mossad spearheaded counter-terrorism efforts against the Palestinian groups operating from Jordan, Lebanon and elsewhere in the world. It also focuses on Arab nations and organisations worldwide. The agency has a foreign liaison programme that serves as the gateway for most intelligence-sharing (Tucker, 2008; Byman, 2011)

Mossad collects intelligence, largely from human sources (HUMINT). Unlike other intelligence agencies, Mossad is required not only to provide intelligence but also to carry out special operations, such as rescue missions, assassinations, and so on. Mossad's specialised unit, Caesarea, spearheads such operations. It is responsible for both intelligence relations and diplomatic relations with countries which do not have open ties with Israel. The agency is also mandated to protect the citizens of the State of Israel, but importantly, it also sees itself as the defender of all Jews in the world, and as an organisation it is required to help smuggle Jews out of hostile countries and into Israel (Bergman, 2016; Younes, 2018).

Although details of the agency's internal organisation remain obscure, it is reported that Mossad has a Collections Department, a Political Action and Liaison Department, a Special Operations Division (known as Metsada), a Psychological Warfare Department (LAP), a Research Department and a Technology Department (Ostrovsky and Hoy, 1991).

Aman

The military intelligence organisation, Aman, is an independent service and has more staff, assets and analytical capabilities than its sister organisations. Aman controls most of the signals intelligence (SIGINT) and aerial reconnais-

sance assets necessary for counter-terrorism. Aman produces comprehensive national intelligence estimates for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as well as daily intelligence reports, risk of war estimates, target studies on neighbouring Arab countries and also communications intercepts. Aman also conducts cross-border agent operations. Its staff was estimated at 7000 personnel in 2011 ('The State …', 2005; Byman, 2011).

Aman's Unit 8200 is the biggest in the military, and is also named the Central Collection Unit. Unit 8200 collects SIGINT for the military, as well as the entire intelligence community (Byman, 2011, p. 339). Moreover, Aman collects human intelligence through Unit 504, and has Israel's prime operational unit, Sayeret Maktal (special reconnaissance unit, also called Unit 269), under its command. Compared to its foreign equivalents, Aman is unique in two respects: first, its leading role in technology-based intelligence and its intelligence analysis; and second, that it holds a leading role as Israel's 'national analyst', acting as the primary, national-level intelligence analysis body in the country[7] (Bitton, 2016). Aman's Foreign Relations Department is responsible for liaison with foreign intelligence services and the activities of Israeli military attachés abroad ('The State …', 2005).

Oversight over the intel community
Aman is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, and Mossad and the Shin Bet by the Prime Minister. Structurally, the Director of Aman comes under the command of the Chief of Staff. Given that Aman has Israel's main research and analysis department, its SIGINT and IMINT units, as well as being responsible for other technology-based intelligence collection functions, the Israeli Minister of Defense oversees a substantial portion of the work of the Israeli intelligence community. By contrast, Mossad and the Shin Bet, which mostly specialise in the production of HUMINT, differ from similar agencies in other democracies by being supervised by the head of the government, instead of having a ministerial supervisor. Some doubts have been raised about the efficacy of any prime ministerial supervision, due to the latter's extremely busy schedule (Bitton, 2016, p. 146).

Other bodies, such as the Ministerial Committee for the Service's Affairs, also perform supervisory roles over Shabak. This Committee consists of five members, including the Prime Minister and the ministers of Defense, Justice and Homeland Security, and is the government's designated oversight body to which the Shin Bet reports quarterly (at least) on its activities. It also approves regulations by the Prime Minister to govern Shin Bet activities.[8] It is unclear whether Aman and Mossad have parallel oversight ministerial bodies for their oversight. The Ministerial Committee for Security and Foreign Policy (which is hierarchically under the Cabinet) is the supreme executive forum on defence and intelligence. Consequently, the Cabinet conducts some aspects of ministe-

rial supervision over the entire intelligence community in Israel (Bitton, 2016, p. 147).

There are other supervision and oversight mechanisms covering Israel's intelligence community. One of these is parliamentary supervision by the Sub-Committee for Intelligence and Secret Services of the Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs. Another is the Committee of Heads of Services (VARASH), which includes the directors of the three security agencies, as well as the Prime Minister's Military Secretary. A third mechanism is the legal counsel provided by various legal advisors. All three intelligence agencies are scrutinised by the Attorney General (the government's legal advisor), in addition to each agency's own internal legal advisors. This is in addition to oversight carried out via the State Comptroller, internal investigations, judicial scrutiny, non-governemtal organisations (NGOs) and media coverage (Bitton, 2016, pp. 147–148).

The Israeli National Police (INP)

The INP operates within the areas under Israeli jurisdiction, though until the mid-1990s it also operated inside the Palestinian towns. The primary responsibility of the INP is to maintain public safety by preventing crimes, investigating and resolving crimes, identifying offenders and bringing them to justice, supervising and controlling traffic, preserving public order and safety, providing prison security, and maintaining homeland security. The overarching goal of the Israeli police force is to allow Israeli citizens to continue their normal routines despite terrorist threats, and to this end, all police officers receive counter-terrorism training (Weisburd et al., 2009a, pp. 2, 10).

INP units are commanded by the Commissioner of Police, who is appointed by the government following the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security. The INP is divided into six geographical districts: Northern, Tel-Aviv, Central, West Bank, Jerusalem and Southern districts. Each district is divided into two to four sub-districts, under which there are local police stations. These levels also represent the hierarchy of command, and all are subordinate to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the National Police. Generally, the INP has two organisational units: the regular police force, usually known as the Blue Police, and the border police. It also has units such as the Civil Guards, the Operations Division and Yamam under its command (Weisburd et al., 2009a, pp. 6–7).

The INP works within a highly coordinated and centralised system through which counter-terrorism functions are delegated to subordinate levels of command, usually for reasons of operational effectiveness. The police identify their counter-terrorism role under three broad tasks: (1) early prevention, interdiction and treatment of the sources of terrorism; (2) response activities

once the attack process has started; and (3) post-attack response activities, following the attack. Additionally, the police assist with the investigation into violent attacks through the Identification and Forensic Science Unit.

The INP also has authority over the Civil Guard, the largest voluntary organisation in Israel, that was formed in 1974 with the goal of fighting terrorism and crime. Armed by the police, the Civil Guard volunteers assist the INP in all domains and all over the country. Additionally, the Civil Guard is considered an important instrument to foster police–community relations (Weisburd et al., 2009a, p. 8).

The Israeli Border Police division, a subordinate of the INP established in 1950, is commissioned to protect Israeli ports, border towns and the zones between Palestinian and Israeli areas. The Border Police plays a central role in policing towns with special security concerns, such as Jerusalem. It also functions as an auxiliary for the military to preserve order in the Palestinian Territories, and it participates in securing the borders. The border guards formed about one-third of the INP personnel around 2010 and are recruited as part of the national military draft, and thus their uniform is military green, rather than blue. Border guards have a counter-terrorism unit, known as Yamam, established in 1974. It also carries out offensive missions, such as the interception and arrests of militants and special missions such as hostage rescue (Weisburd et al., 2009b, p. 1261; Byman, 2011).

The INP works closely with private security firms and plays a central role in supervising private security activities. In Israel, all malls, shopping areas, restaurants, hospitals, office buildings or any other public spaces have private security guards who check customers entering the facility and conduct other activities. Cooperation with these firms reduces the chances for violent actors to reach certain public facilities (Weisburd et al., 2009b, pp. 24–25). Experts note that the military model is deeply rooted in the organisation, culture and procedures of the INP. The continuing strong links between the police and the military, especially in their cooperation in the Palestinian Territories and the role of the border guards, provide strong structural differences that distinguish Israel from Western democracies (Weisburd et al., 2009b, pp. 6–7, 10).

The Military

The Israeli military, known as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), ranks among the most battle-tested militaries in the world. Its security objectives are 'to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, deter all enemies, and curb all forms of terrorism that threaten daily life' ('The state …', 2005). Its main tasks include: protecting the peace agreements; ensuring overall security in the West Bank in coordination with the Palestinian Authority; fighting terrorism inside and outside Israel; and maintaining a deterrence capability

to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The Israeli military has three service branches: Ground Forces, Air Force, and Navy, all of which function under the unified command of the Chief of the General Staff, who in turn is responsible to the Minister of Defense and is personally appointed by the government, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense ('The state …', 2005; Ganor, 2007, p. 227). The military is not legally empowered to engage in ordinary police functions within the borders of the State of Israel, yet in the Palestinian areas, which are under military occupation, it is the military which has primary responsibilities for violent activities. During military operations in the territories, the Israeli military uses assistance from the INP (Weisburd et al., 2009a, p. 9).

Despite the questionable effectiveness of any regular army in fighting an irregular war, Israel heavily relies on its military in its counter-terrorism activities and, more generally, in its attempts to suppress Palestinian militancy. One of the unique features of the experience of the Israeli military is its presence in the Occupied Territories, which requires direct involvement in fighting non-conventional battles. Early on, the operations of the Israeli army were conventional missions that quickly switched to imposing curfews, administering prisons for the detention of Palestinians and suppressing public protests. The army also established and manned checkpoints between the Palestinian Territories and Israel, as well as inside the West Bank, to prevent militants from entering Israel (Erbay, 2012, pp. 42–44).

It was the First Intifada that motivated the army to consider 'terrorism' a top priority, which is in turn a product of a change in the official perception of the Palestinian violence, from an ongoing security concern to an existential threat. This required reforms in the army's fighting style, operationally and tactically. On the ground, the army switched from reliance on an aggressive, offensive style, which had previously been successful when fighting Arab armies, to a 'war of attrition' style, which required long commitment from the military, as well as additional economic resources. By 1990, the army became accustomed to fighting non-state actors and it focused on achieving satisfactory outcomes with an emphasis on a minimal loss of soldiers, rather than aiming for a decisive victory. Additionally, to respond to these changing circumstances, the army established new units to suppress demonstrations (Erbay, 2012, pp. 42–44).

In the late 1990s, the Israeli military improved its intelligence collection and sharing capabilities in order to better able it to fight an asymmetric war. After about a decade of relative calm and peace negotiations, a controversial visit by former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the courtyards of the al-Aqsa Mosque ignited the Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. The Second Intifada witnessed the use of more deadly tactics by Palestinian militants, such as suicide bombings and short-range rockets, in addition to

traditional tactics such as roadside bombings and sniping attacks. Within this context, the Israeli military responded by also employing more lethal weapons and tactics, such as F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft, Apache and Cobra attack helicopters, and Merkava main battle tanks (Erbay, 2012, p. 45). However, this time the military had adapted to fighting an urban war, such as using engineering units equipped with heavy machinery to break through walls and disarm enemy booby traps (Byman, 2011).

ISRAELI COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION

New Israeli Anti-Terror Law of 2016

The Israeli Anti-Terror Law provides the authorities with the tools needed for counter-terrorism efforts. It also attempts to coordinate the relevant legislations, which are largely dispersed in a number of statutes. Once enacted, the new law replaced, but did not revoke, the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulation. A key concept underlying this comprehensive legislation is that terrorism is a complex activity, employing various methods and with a variety of goals, and thus requiring a multi-faceted and robust response (Rosenzweig and Shany, 2010).

Approved by the Knesset in mid-2016, the law was heavily criticised for its vague definition of terrorism. It was additionally criticised for not distinguishing between attacks on civilians and attacks upon military personnel. Furthermore, its loose criteria for designating terrorist organisations meant that some non-governmental humanitarian organisations were deemed to be designated terrorist organisations, and as a result, their work was adversely affected. The legislation also allows for administrative detention, and provides the Shin Bet with wide-ranging powers to hack into the private devices of citizens, thereby potentially infringing the right to privacy. Several lawyers and human rights organisations additionally criticised the law for equating the opposition to Israel's occupation of the Palestinian Territories, including public protests and public support of victims, with committing terrorist acts. It also enables the use of 'secret evidence' in order to take preventative measures against these activities, which impedes any possibility of objecting to repressive decisions ('Israel's new Anti-Terror Law …', 2016)

Other Israeli Counter-Terrorism Laws

In the use of its counter-terrorism tactics, Israel has relied on a myriad of laws and regulations, some of which are inherited from the era of the British Mandate for Palestine which ended in 1948. While there are laws and regula-

tions that directly address the issue of terrorism, others deal with the matter indirectly (Salzberger, 2016, p. 4).

The declaration of the 'state of emergency' brought with it legislation that permitted a raft of preventive and punitive measures, and enabled the government to introduce regulations that overrode existing legislation. The state of emergency is renewed every year by the Knesset ('Declaring a State of Emergency', n.d.; Omer-Man, 2016). The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were enacted by the British High Commissioner as a result of tensions between Jews and Arabs in Mandate-era Palestine. The Israeli Anti-Terrorism Law (see above) is intended to replace these regulations ('Defense (Emergency) Regulations', n.d.; Salzberger, 2016). The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1948, which was last amended in 1993, is legally in force whenever a declaration of emergency is in operation. By enacting this Act, Israel recognises that Palestinian non-state violence is a danger beyond the general state of emergency and must be directly addressed ('Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (September 1948)', 1948; Buhler, 2010).

The Emergency Powers Detention Law (1979) allowed the Minister of Defense to detain a person based on 'reasonable grounds to presume that such detention is necessary for reasons of state security or public safety' (Chen and Hamilton, 2006). This law applies to Israeli territory; that is, not to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. The Order Regarding Administrative Detention no. 1591 (5767-2007) is applied in the West Bank, which falls under Israeli military rule. According to this Order, the military commander can detain a person for a maximum period of six months, with the possibility for this to be renewed indefinitely. In some cases, prisoners have been held without charge or trial for several years (Nakhala and Hakala, 2012, p. 5). The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law (2002) enables Israel to detain members of violent and guerrilla groups, including the so-called 'cook in the Hezbollah Kitchen'.[9] Unlike prisoners of war, those interned may or may not face criminal charges.[10] Unlike those arrested for criminal charges, there is no fixed-term limit for detention (Byman, 2011). This law additionally provides the legal basis for holding Gaza Strip residents under administrative detention.

ISRAELI COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND TACTICS

There is no official Israeli doctrine defining the country's overall counter-terrorism strategy, but Israel's actions in this domain are guided by conceptual and operational guidelines. Generally speaking, deterrence, prevention and retaliation are at the heart of Israel's counter-terrorism policies (Freilich, 2015, p. 363). In Israel, the first priority is usually intelligence, then counter-terrorism operations, and finally, defence and civil protection.

Intelligence

Israel has developed a highly coordinated and efficient intelligence apparatus. Israeli government agencies work continuously to identify violent operatives and cells, employing human and technological means. Intelligence classifies threats into three categories: first, those that appear imminent and require immediate attention; second, those that are less probable but could emerge in future; third, those that are unlikely to happen but are still possible (Tucker, 2008).

According to security experts, the average Israeli is highly aware of suspicious packages, individuals and actions that could pose a threat to public safety, and they would not hesitate to notify the police. In the mid-2000s, ordinary citizens foiled more than 80 per cent of attempted attacks in Israel.[11] Moreover, Israeli government agencies gather human intelligence on violent actors by deploying undercover officers in the Palestinian areas and by recruiting covert human intelligence sources inside, or close to, violent organisations (Tucker, 2008; Magid, 2018).

Interrogation during detention is another important source of human intelligence in Israel, and the Israeli security agencies frequently round up and interrogate Palestinian suspects and their associates. Some coercive interrogation methods used by Israeli interrogators are deemed to be torture by human rights organisations. Indeed, torture was legalised for a period. Interrogation of suspects in Israel routinely involves the use of threats, coercion and rewards ('Torture and abuse …', 2017).

Israel has developed sophisticated technologies for signals intelligence, imagery intelligence using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and detecting explosives and weapons at a stand-off distance. Nevertheless, Israeli intelligence agencies give priority to human intelligence over some of these other high-tech methods (Tucker, 2008).

Limited and Wide Invasions

Israel often launches military operations to disrupt militant networks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by cracking down on violent cells, seizing their arms, attacking bomb factories, neutralising safe-houses, and arresting or killing key leaders and bomb-makers. One of the focal goals of these operations is to prevent Palestinian militants from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from infiltrating Israel to stage attacks. With a shift amongst Palestinian militant groups from suicide bombing to rocket attacks, these operations mostly target Palestinian short-range rocket capabilities (Tucker, 2008).

These operations were largely employed by Israel after the escalation of violence in late 2000. Some of those operations were limited; that is, rapid

incursions aiming at the capture or killing of wanted activists, the destruction of organisational structures and facilities of violent groups, and so on. Such operations are usually short, and have a clear and specific target. Other operations are more extensive and could continue for weeks or even months, such as the partial re-occupation of Palestinian cities or areas, like those seen in Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 and Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009.

Assassinations

In the Palestinian Territories, both the Israeli military and the Shin Bet have the final decision in a planned assassination. The Shin Bet approves the intelligence to ensure the plan is accurate, while the military decides whether or not to execute the strike, and which weapon platform to use. Israel has used a variety of methods to execute assassinations, including missiles launched by helicopter and tank, aimed at cars and homes of suspects, while more recently UAVs have become one of the most frequently used platforms (Byman, 2011, p. 319).

Assassinations of militant leaders and bomb-makers, usually conducted by the Shin Bet, Mossad or military undercover units, are particularly controversial in Israel. Advocates argue that this tactic not only interdicts imminent attacks but also undermines the militant group's stability and morale, increases tensions and rivalries among would-be successors, and forces the militants to devote resources to hiding and protecting their leadership. Nevertheless, assassinations in the Israeli context raise complex issues of legality, cost-effectiveness (Tucker, 2008) and ethics, especially the potential killing of innocent people in the vicinity of the strike (Byman, 2011).

In early 2002, a number of rules were brought in regarding Israeli assassinations policy. As of that date, assassinations became possible only if:

1. They are well supported by information that the suspect has organised attacks in the past and is planning to carry out another in the near future.
2. Appeals to the Palestinian Authority to arrest the suspect have been ignored.
3. Attempts by Israeli troops to arrest the suspect have failed.
4. The killing is not intended as retribution for violent past acts, but is designed to prevent an incipient attack that is likely to inflict multiple casualties (Tucker, 2008).

Detention

The number of Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli prisons usually peaks during times of escalations. In 2002 alone, for instance, Israel detained 1456

Palestinians; while in 2007, more than 9000 were in Israeli detention centres (Byman, 2011). Israel uses different forms of detention when dealing with Palestinian violence. Once a Palestinian is detained for terrorism offences, they are either tried before an Israeli military court or detained administratively (Guiora, 2007, p. 522). As of January 2020, there were at least 4520 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons for security reasons. Moreover, 527 more Palestinians were held in Israel Prison Service facilities for being in Israel illegally, and are thus considered as criminal offenders by the Israeli legal system. Additionally, several dozen Palestinians are held at military facilities for short periods of time ('Statistics on Palestinians …', 2020).

Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial, and is authorised by an administrative order rather than by judicial decree. Generally speaking, international law permits administrative detention only under stringent restrictions. Specifically, administrative detention can be used only in very exceptional cases, as the last means available for preventing danger that cannot be thwarted by less harmful means ('Administrative detention', 2017). In these cases, the Shin Bet orders that the intelligence information cannot be shared with an open court of law, and thus the concerned person can be detained administratively after approval from the Israeli military legal advisor. The West Bank or Gaza Strip Israeli military commander then signs a detention order, after which the person is brought before a military judge for a review of the intelligence leading to the detention, rather than a full, legal trial. If approved, the detention order is reviewed by a higher-ranking military judge and petitions can be filed to the High Court of Justice. The first six months of administrative detention are indefinitely renewable, but each extension is reviewable by an independent judiciary, and although the defendant has a right to a lawyer, witnesses are not called (Guiora, 2007; Byman, 2011).

Use of administrative detention in Israel has become particularly problematic, since Israel has repeatedly used administrative detention for rather vague reasons and has imprisoned many Palestinians for years, without them going on trial (Nakhala and Hakala, 2012).

Control Measures

While some Israeli control measures, such as checkpoints, roadblocks and the like, are aimed at reducing violence, it is also true that the use of these measures has greatly increased over the past two decades or so (Rijke, 2020). The reasoning behind these measures is threefold. First, the tactics detailed in this section help the authorities to separate the Israelis from the Palestinians, thereby limiting militants' access to their targets. The second justification pertains to the imposition of tight controls over border crossings. These measures serve to funnel the movement of militants through specific crossing points,

which makes detection easier, and also facilitates the disruption of violent operations before they can attack their targets. Third, these control measures also make it easier for Israel to lock down the Palestinian areas, in the event of attack warnings, or directly after an attack. These latter measures assist with locating and detaining suspects. The control methods employed by Israel mostly utilise barriers, checkpoints and closures, but also rely on security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.

The first Israeli barrier was built around the Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s in reaction to the emergence of Palestinian suicide bombings (Elnakhala, 2014). Finished by mid-1995, the construction of the Gaza fence came with a sophisticated system of buffer zones, magnetic cards and permits that tightly controlled the movement of any Gazan in and out of the Strip. The barrier itself has four crossings: Erez, Karni, Kisufim and Sufa. It was also complete with a number of interlocking systems, all of which were upgraded over time, including buffer zones, sensors, surveillance, and military technologies including the 'iron dome' anti-missile defence system designed to intercept and destroy incoming Palestinian rockets (Byman, 2011; Elnakhala, 2014; Elster et al., 2019).

Following a wave of suicide attacks, a second Israeli barrier was built in the West Bank amid intense international criticism, since it deviates from the agreed Green Line (Byman, 2011).[12] Despite claims that this barrier was intended to separate the West Bank Palestinians from Israel, in practice it does not achieve this (Elnakhala, 2014). The barrier largely runs through Palestinian lands, and its genesis came from a wave of suicide attacks (Byman, 2011), although it did not make Israeli control over the movement of Palestinians any easier. The barrier is surrounded by an intrusion detection system on both sides, plus video cameras, other sensors, soft dirt strips to detect footprints, military-patrolled roads, deep ditches and razor wire entanglements. If completed, the West Bank barrier will run over 700 km. Today, the construction is on halt at a length of 400 km (Byman, 2011; Elnakhala, 2014).

As mentioned above, Israel has developed other mechanisms to control movement of Palestinians and to close off Palestinian areas, including checkpoints, roadblocks and closures. These policies pre-dated the barrier-building, though they did become part of the barrier regime described in the previous paragraphs ('Checkpoints', 2011). In the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Israel's closure policy started in 1967, but in 1972 Israel emphasised the economic integration of the Palestinians and granted them freedom of movement ('Checkpoints', 2011).[13] Israel also started to set up a checkpoint regime, and requested different sorts of movement permits for Palestinians, through the introduction of a magnetic card system for border crossings.[14] In early 1991, Israel officially revoked the general exit permits of 1972, and every Palestinian from the Palestinian Territories was henceforward required to hold a personal

exit permit in order to enter Israel and East Jerusalem. This permit policy became more restrictive in 1993, and even more so in 2000. After signing the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Israel introduced its system of closures which sealed off access to Israel and East Jerusalem, enforced through a series of checkpoints ('Checkpoints', 2011; 'The humanitarian impact …', 2012). Until today, Israel alone decides who can enter and exit the Palestinian Territories.

Counter-Terrorism Technology

Over time, Israel has developed a cutting-edge security and military industry that markets counter-terrorism technology, products and services throughout the world. Some scholars describe Israel as the 'capital of homeland security', since Israeli homeland security and surveillance products and services are aimed at helping not only the Israeli government but also foreign governments to conduct their operations more efficiently and cost-effectively. The technology variable is a cross-cutting element as it is used in all of the counter-terrorism tactics detailed above. Israel's surveillance technologies, for example, are highly efficient in intelligence-gathering, while its modern weaponry is used to effectively eliminate militant leaders, and a wide variety of technologies and sensors are installed on Israeli security barriers and in commercial aviation facilities (Gordon, 2011, pp. 153–154).[15]

The Israeli military and the state-owned military industry have had a great impact on the country's technology sector, especially as this sector was initially propagated by the military and the security establishment, an effect that can be traced back to its pre-state, Zionist history. Israel's aerospace industry, established in 1953, is the country's largest military exporter, and following the establishment of associated private companies in the 1950s, this sector now exports 25 per cent of Israel's arms sales. These developments were empowered by Israel's research and development division, known as RAFAEL, also established in the 1950s as part of the state-owned military sector (Vekstein and Mehrez, 1997). In recent years, Israel has consistently been ranked among the top ten military exporters worldwide ('Top 10 arms exporters', 2019).

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike other contemporary liberal democracies, Israel's involvement in counter-terrorism should be examined within the context of a complex territorial and religious conflict. In contrast to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS, the Palestinian violent groups involved in attacking Israel have specific and small-scale goals that can be summarised as self-determination, liberation from occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. For its part, Israel regards the threat from such groups as existential.

The Israeli intelligence, military and police agencies have a great deal of experience in countering violent actors. As a result, they have developed and adapted their understanding of terrorism and how to respond to it. They have designed an efficient, highly sophisticated, institutional arrangement and set of counter-terrorism measures, backed by cutting-edge technologies, advanced training and other capabilities. There have been recent efforts in Israel to consolidate its laws for dealing with terrorism, by ratifying an Israeli anti-terrorism law, but Israel continues to rely on a number of other laws. These laws seem to be problematic, however, as they severely restrict freedom of association and expression among the Palestinian minority in Israel and the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Studies of counter-terrorism refer to Israel as a leading example for other liberal democracies facing violence by non-state actors. The Israeli strategy aims at deterrence, prevention and retaliation, and uses a large suite of tactics to fulfil these goals.

NOTES

1. Before 1948, some local armed Palestinian-Arab groups attacked Jewish property and Jewish interests in Palestine, but most of this effort was not coordinated. Additionally, they had much less sophisticated military training and equipment than the Jewish militias. Research on such groups shows that the Palestinian armed groups of the 1930s and 1940s had no military training at all, and that most members were, in fact, merely males who owned rifles (Morris, 2004, p. 29).
2. Arabic for those who are willing to sacrifice their life, usually for their homeland.
3. The author refrains from describing the Palestinian groups as 'terrorist', for several reasons. First, despite various serious efforts at defining the term, the concept of 'terrorism' is generally vague, which mostly stems from the fact that terrorism is always perceived in relative terms. Second, there is no agreement on who designates whom as a terrorist. For instance, Israel and the United States designate Hamas, while the United Kingdom and Australia designate only the armed wing of Hamas as terrorist. Many other countries do not designate any Palestinian group at all. Third, Hamas was designated a terrorist group by the European Union (EU) until 2014, when the European Court removed Hamas from the proscribed list. Following an appeal by the EU Commission, the European Court decision was suspended in 2017 and Hamas was listed again. The point is: the issue of casting any group in this context as terrorist raises many contentions, which the author would prefer to avoid. Alternatively, the terms 'violence' and 'militancy', as well as their derivatives, are used.
4. Fatah and PFLP were established by the Palestinian diaspora between the 1948 and 1967 wars. The DFLP was split from the PFLP in 1969.
5. Iran poses a conventional military threat to Israel at the regional level. Yet, so far, its involvement in the conflict has been indirect, in what can be called a proxy war, through backing Hamas.
6. Other non-state actors – that is, Hezbollah – launched Ababil drones against Israel in the 2006 war.
7. Peer organisations in other countries are mostly civilian.
8. These regulations have to be approved by the Knesset as well.

9. This implies that anyone who is linked with Hezbollah can be detained under this law.
10. Prisoners of war do not necessarily face criminal charges. Normally, they are held prisoner until the cessation of hostilities.
11. Detailed studies were carried out covering the role of the citizens in reporting suspicious objects and threats (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014).
12. The Green or Armistice Line is a product of agreements signed in 1948 between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan under UN mediation. The Armistice Lines overlapped the borderlines of British Mandate Palestine, except for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In these two areas the lines were determined by the outcomes of war between the Jewish militias and the Arab countries in 1948 ('The Constituent Assembly …', 1949).
13. Palestinians were not allowed to exit their areas of residence.
14. This could be in response to the First Palestinian Intifada (1987–1991); international developments, for example negotiations between Israel and the PLO, and the Gulf War; and/or simply development in the separation ideology in Israel.
15. To list a few examples, clients of Israeli technologies include American Express, City Bank, JP Morgan Chase, the US Federal Aviation Authority, the European Space Agency, Motorola and Intel (Gordon, 2011).

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14. National counter-terrorism responses: India

Anthony Davis

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT

Contemporary Terrorism in India

The challenge of terrorism that has confronted India in the post-independence era has arguably been more complex, sustained and destructive than that faced by any other liberal democratic order in the same period. Reflecting India's size, ethnic and religious diversity, and the perennially toxic nature of south Asian geopolitics, terrorism in some shape or form is less a recent aberration than a constantly mutating norm. The *South Asia Terrorism Portal* (SATP) has listed some 180 terrorist groups that have operated within India over the last 20 years, many of them co-listed as transnational terror networks operating in or from neighbouring South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan ('Indian Terrorist, Insurgent and Extremist Groups', 2018).

Terrorism in the contemporary Indian context can be seen as falling into three essentially distinct but occasionally overlapping categories: firstly, terrorism employed by ethno-nationalist movements seeking either greater autonomy or statehood in the federal structure of the Indian Union or complete separation from it; secondly, terrorism used by left-wing extremist movements seeking a fundamental overturning of the nation's capitalist economic order and liberal democracy; and thirdly, terrorism driven by religious ideologies. Most salient among India's religious divides has been that between Hindus and Muslims, that in the wrenching 1947 Partition of British India defined the birth of both modern India as a secular polity and Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. It was a partition that was to leave within India a Muslim minority that today, at 165 million or around 13 per cent of the national population, is among the largest Muslim populations worldwide, after those of Indonesia and Pakistan itself (Rukmini and Singh, 2017).

The trauma first of Partition and then, almost immediately, of war over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, sowed the seeds of an abiding enmity

between India and Pakistan that to date has provoked three conventional wars and is now overshadowed by a nuclear stand-off. It has been an enmity which has also profoundly influenced the nature and scope of the terrorist threat confronting India. From 1947 onwards, Pakistan has seldom missed an opportunity to use proxy actors to foment or exacerbate religious, social and ethnic divides within its larger, more powerful neighbour. Pakistan's strategy of waging a war of attrition by proxy has blurred the line between terrorism and insurgency to a degree that is unique in the context of liberal democracies. Against this regional backdrop, India has confronted several concerted terrorist campaigns since Independence. Arguably the first of these was the violence associated with the radical communist Naxalite movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Following a peasant uprising in Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, terrorist violence spread across West Bengal, the state capital of Kolkata in particular, and north India more broadly (Central Intelligence Agency, 1970).

Since the eruption of the Naxalite movement in the late 1960s, left-wing extremism and its terrorist manifestations have posed an almost continuous internal security challenge to the Indian state. In the 1980s and 1990s, left-wing terror morphed into the threat posed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, better known as the People's War Group (PWG). Centred in the south-central states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, PWG violence targeted local police and administration in rural areas as well as state-level politicians (Singh, 1995).

In this century, the 2004 merger of the PWG with the northern-based Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) gave birth to the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI-Maoist, which stepped up its activities across a wide swathe of south-central and northern India. In 2006 it was described by then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as 'the single biggest internal security challenge' facing the country (*Hindu*, 2016). That said, the dogmatically Maoist ideology of the party has dictated a strategy of armed struggle based on rural guerrilla warfare, leading to the creation of 'liberated zones' and a uniformed People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). Drawing primarily on a tribal support base in the forests of central India – notably Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and northern Andhra Pradesh states – PLGA guerrillas have occasionally inflicted heavy casualties on police and paramilitary forces. They have also sabotaged railway tracks in several states. On one occasion in 2010, this resulted in the death of 141 passengers in West Bengal, when derailed carriages of a passenger train were hit by a goods train speeding in the opposite direction. However, as a matter of policy the CPI-Maoist has consistently eschewed mass-casualty attacks on civilian targets, and to this extent falls outside the scope of this chapter.

Naxalite terrorism targeted specifically on individual 'class enemies' and 'anti-people' politicians paled into insignificance when set against the brutal and protracted terrorist campaign waged by the Khalistan movement, centred on Punjab. Between 1981 and 1995, almost 21 000 people died in a campaign aimed ostensibly at achieving secession from the Indian Union for an independent Sikh homeland in the northwest, that notionally covered the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and parts of Rajasthan with its capital in Chandigarh ('Annual Casualties in Punjab Datasheet', 2018). Simmering violence exploded following the Indian Army's June 1984 assault on militants holed up in the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar. Operation Blue Star prompted the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October, which in turn triggered an orgy of anti-Sikh communal rioting and slaughter in the capital, New Delhi. Prosecuted by a clutch of Sikh terrorist groups, the Khalistan campaign degenerated rapidly into essentially nihilistic terrorism, involving repeated and indiscriminate massacres of Hindus on buses and trains in Punjab, along with occasional bombings and assassinations of senior officials and moderate Sikh leaders.

Intimately linked to the Sikh diaspora in North America and Europe, Khalistani terrorism also brought one of the world's first mass-casualty aviation attacks: the June 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182, a Boeing 747 which was brought down over the Atlantic Ocean with the loss of all 329 lives (*Global News*, 2020). By the time the Khalistan movement was crushed in an often controversial, police-led campaign of counter-terrorism in the early 1990s, increased arms support from Pakistan to the terrorists had effectively blurred the lines between terrorism and insurgency. For a period, terrorists armed with assault rifles, light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades effectively outgunned the state police (Gill, 2001). The decline of the Khalistan campaign overlapped with the rekindling of conflict in Kashmir. Against a backdrop of significant popular support from the bitterly disaffected majority Muslim population, the Kashmir revolt aimed at securing either the independence of Kashmir or its accession to Pakistan, and began in 1989. Fanned by generous logistical support from a Pakistani military eager to replicate the success of the anti-Soviet jihad it had supported in Afghanistan, hostilities escalated sharply in the early 1990s and continued for the rest of the decade.

Assuming an increasingly Islamist animus as the result of Pakistani support to jihadist factions, the conflict unfolded as a guerrilla insurgency punctuated by explicitly terrorist massacres targeted against Hindu pilgrims and Sikh communities (Davis, 2000). Between 1989 and the end of 2016 over 44 000 had been killed ('Annual Casualties in Jammu and Kashmir Datasheet', 2018). Similarly blurred lines between terrorism and insurgency have characterised ethno-nationalist and tribal conflicts in India's perennially troubled northeast.

Of the region's seven states, the most volatile in recent decades have been Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. Militant organisations in these states have generally aspired to wage popularly supported guerrilla struggles in pursuit of autonomy or separation from India. Larger factions such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) have raised uniformed guerrilla forces and sought to purchase large quantities of weapons on the regional arms market. Predictably, at various times they have also benefited from financial and training support from Pakistan as well as (depending on the government of the day) from Bangladesh (Kiessling, 2016, p. 21).

At the same time, several groups, most notably ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), a Christian faction active in districts of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River, have staged repeated terrorist bombings and indiscriminate small-arms fire attacks on markets, trains and other civilian targets. In some instances, these have resulted in significant casualty tolls ('National Democratic Front of Bodoland …', 2018). In contrast to tribal violence in the remote northeast, Islamist terrorism targeted squarely on the cities of the India's heartlands has gained far greater salience both domestically and internationally. And conducted in the shadow of the Subcontinent's nuclear stand-off, it too has tended to blur the line between domestically and internationally driven terrorism; between guerrilla warfare and terrorism; and between conventional and unconventional warfare.

The event that acted as a fateful catalyst in the onset of jihadist terrorism in India owed nothing to Pakistani influence or machination, however. On 6 December 1992, following weeks of mounting tension, a mob of radical Hindu zealots associated with the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) finally demolished the centuries-old Babri Mosque in northern India. Built by the Moghul emperor Aurangzeb, the mosque had earlier, according to the hard-line Hindu narrative, been the site of a temple to the Hindu God Rama. In short, it had become a defining flashpoint for the Subcontinent's primary religious divide, a rift exacerbated by a rising tide of Hindu nationalist populism impacting upon Indian electoral politics. The demolition of the mosque was followed by weeks of murderous communal rioting across northern and central India, with casualties rising to an estimated 9000 dead. The nation's commercial capital of Mumbai bore the brunt of the violence in two distinct waves. Initial rioting by Muslims incensed over the demolition flared immediately in December 1992; then in January 1993 a Hindu backlash against Muslim communities in the city left some 900 Muslims dead (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 14).

The worst communal violence since Independence triggered a terrorist response carried out by Mumbai's Muslim-dominated mafia, specifically the so-called 'D Company' of Daoud Ibrahim Kaskar and his lieutenants. With an intimate knowledge of the city, and benefiting from logistical support extended

by the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), D Company operatives were a lethal terrorist force in waiting. On 12 March 1993, 15 bombs exploded across multiple prominent locations in Mumbai. Leaving 257 dead and 713 wounded, this onslaught marked the most lethal coordinated urban terror attack in Indian history up to that date. It also opened the floodgates to two decades of high-casualty urban terror attacks.

A decade after the 1993 Mumbai bombings, an already strained situation was further exacerbated by a similar dynamic involving widespread communal violence triggering a terrorist response. In early 2002, anti-Muslim pogroms swept eastern Gujarat state. They were triggered by a 27 February fire on a train carrying Hindu pilgrims back from Ayodhya, site of the demolished Babri Mosque. Fifty-nine people were burned to death near the town of Godhra, where the train had stopped. Despite the fact that the fire was very likely accidental rather than a 'pre-planned conspiracy' by local Muslims, another wave of anti-Muslim communal rioting erupted across several major urban centres of the state. Senior elements of the state government, run by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and local police were allegedly complicit in well-organised attacks by Hindu extremists on communities and mosques. According to official figures, this wave of killing resulted in the deaths of 790 Muslims. Clashes also left 254 Hindus dead, with another 2500 people of both faiths injured (BBC, 2005).

The Gujarat pogroms served as the inspirational fuel for yet another wave of terror attacks by young Indian Islamists associated with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Proscribed in 2002, SIMI was to morph into the avowedly terrorist Indian Mujahideen (IM). Predictably, logistical, financial and training support was again forthcoming from Pakistan. The most horrific of these attacks was undoubtedly the coordinated wave of bomb attacks on commuter trains in Mumbai on 11 July 2006, which killed 189 and wounded around 700 (Sayed and Hakim, 2016).

A critical component of the threat posed by radicalised Muslim youth associated with SIMI and IM were two Pakistan-based jihadist organisations that had emerged from the insurgencies that wracked Afghanistan and more importantly Kashmir in the 1980s and 1990s: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, or Army of the Pure) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM, or Army of Muhammad). Both groups operated openly in Pakistan, recruiting mainly in Pakistani Punjab for the jihad in Kashmir. The Kashmir conflict, which had flowed almost seamlessly from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, reflected the extent to which jihad as one of the five pillars of Islam had become embedded in the ideological underpinnings of the Pakistan Army, while at the same time resonating through wide swathes of conservative Pakistani society beyond. With the tacit support of the military's ISI, both LeT and JeM ran guerrilla training camps in what in India

is known as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan is known as Azad (Free) Kashmir (Tankel, 2011, p. 47).

Of the two, LeT and its civilian wing the Markaz ud Dawah w'al Irshad (the Centre for Proselytising and Guidance, later to be re-branded the Jamaat ud Dawah) has remained the larger and more influential. As an instrument of terrorism in India, the role of LeT has been multifaceted but never far from the guiding hand of the ISI, and central to the low-intensity, proxy war waged by Pakistan's military to keep India off-balance and destabilised. At one level, LeT has been an independent actor capable of using trained Pakistani nationals executing guerrilla-style fedayeen attacks, first within Kashmir and then inside India proper against both civilian and military targets near the border. The assault on Delhi's iconic Red Fort in December 2000 by LeT-affiliated operatives was an early example of this species of terrorism (Tankel, 2011, pp. 65–66). It was dwarfed by the sea-borne assault by ten LeT gunmen on targets across Mumbai in November 2008, an operation in which the guiding hand of ISI control has been well established (Tankel, 2011, pp. 207–233).

LeT also played a key role in the training, in POK camps, of disaffected or suborned Indian Muslim citizens. These recruits, in many cases earlier members of SIMI, usually travelled covertly to Pakistan via the Gulf States or Iran (Sayed and Hakim, 2016, p. 158). Having undergone training in guerrilla fieldcraft and demolition and bomb-making techniques, they then returned to India by similar indirect routes, with no Pakistani visas in their passports. Their participation in terrorist attacks in India might follow months or even years later, on some occasions undertaken independently, and on others with assistance from Pakistani terrorists who had entered India covertly (frequently through Nepal) to provide support and guidance.

International Terrorism

To date, the 'internationalisation' of terrorism in India has occurred only insofar as Pakistan's military and the Pakistani jihadist groups it has supported have worked to exploit and exacerbate India's own religious and ethnic fissures. It is important to note that, up to the present, neither of the world's two most potent Islamist terrorist franchises, al-Qaeda (AQ) and so-called Islamic State (IS) have yet succeeded in gaining any serious traction among disaffected Indian Muslim youth. This, despite the fact that in September 2014, impelled by the rising fortunes of IS, AQ launched a jihadist franchise targeted specifically on South Asia and in particular India: al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (Roggio, 2014).

By comparison with other important regional AQ franchises, notably AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), AQIS has been strikingly ineffective inside India. The same to date has been

true of IS. The IS call to join the struggle in Syria and Iraq has attracted a miniscule number of less than 100 Indian citizens from a Muslim population of 165 million (Sahni, 2016). In the cases of both AQIS and IS, Pakistan and Bangladesh have apparently proved more fertile ground for recruitment.

Current Terrorism Threats to India

Nature of the threats today

India's primary terrorist threat remains, as it has been since the turn of the century, the jihadist challenge. Over recent years this has evolved into an essentially three-pronged threat. One facet involves cross-border fedayeen-style attacks. Carried out by groups such as LeT and JeM which enjoy a close relationship with Pakistan's military establishment, these operations target security force installations along the international frontier and Line of Control (LOC), and indeed deeper inside Kashmir. Begun in the mid-1990s with LeT's strategy of fedayeen assaults in Kashmir, such attacks have been evident as recently as September 2016, when LeT operatives stormed an Indian Army base at Uri close to the LOC, killing 18 Indian soldiers; and in late November 2016, when another army base at Nagrota, near the state's summer capital of Jammu, was attacked.

A second prong consists of terror attacks, typically bombings, by disaffected Indian Muslim youth from groups such as IM, who enjoy not only connectivity with Pakistan but also training, logistical and, potentially, operational support. In both cases the potential for terrorist strikes raises a fundamental question which has deeply troubling implications for the security of the South Asian region as a whole, and to which the answer is far from clear: to what extent do Pakistan-based groups operate with the connivance and support of the ISI, and to what extent do they operate on their own initiative? In other words, is the Pakistani state in full control of its jihadi proxies? As noted by two American analysts in a recent article: 'If a new high-casualty terrorist attack occurs in India, especially in the heartland, a Modi government will be pressed to retaliate more dramatically than before. This, in turn, will put enormous pressure on Rawalpindi (i.e. Pakistan Army headquarters) to escalate in kind' (Dalton and Perkovich, 2017). The prescience of this observation became alarmingly clear in February 2019, when a Kashmiri youth, affiliated with JeM, carried out a suicide car-bomb attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary troops on the main Jammu–Srinagar highway. The explosion killed 40 soldiers, the worst loss of life in any encounter in Kashmir to that date, and did indeed provoke retaliatory Indian air strikes on a suspected terrorist base at Balakot, beyond disputed Kashmir in the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The strikes and the downing of an India fighter brought the two countries to the brink of wider conflict.

A third and, to date at least, far less threatening prong of the jihadist menace is posed by disaffected Muslim self-starters inspired by IS's global call for attacks on targets of opportunity. What appeared to be the first instance of this threat surfaced in early March 2017, with an attack deploying a fairly crude, low-intensity, improvised explosive device (IED), in this case an ammonium nitrate-based pipe-bomb, on a train running between the cities of Bhopal and Ujjain in Madhya Pradesh state, which wounded ten people. According to police, the cell involved had been radicalised online by IS propaganda, it had acquired weapons and explosives locally, and had intended the train bombing as a trial run for more ambitious attacks. The cell was swiftly broken up after the attack, with the group's leader shot dead three days later during a police raid on a house in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, where a hand-painted IS-style flag was found. Six other suspects were later arrested in Madhya Pradesh (Jain et al., 2018). In notable contrast to other IS-linked attacks in the Subcontinent, such as the July 2016 café attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, or the March 2017 attack on the military hospital in Kabul by IS-Khorasan militants, the train bombing passed entirely without mention from the IS media outlet Amaq, suggesting that there had been no connectivity between the cell and the IS parent organisation.

Given the reverses suffered by IS in the Middle East and the current difficulties of travelling to join the group, it is difficult to see the Ujjain train bombing as marking the beginning of a new wave of dispersed, IS-inspired terrorism in India. That said, over the medium to long term, ensuring the political and economic inclusion of India's Muslim minority will be a critical challenge for both central and state governments. This will be the case particularly in states run by the Hindu-nationalist BJP, a party with no shortage of inflammatory, Muslim-baiting politicians in its ranks. In the second term of Narendra Modi's BJP government, the prognosis is hardly encouraging.

Residual Khalistan terror
The Khalistan terror campaign of the 1980s and early 1990s was convincingly defeated. Nevertheless, Khalistan-inspired terrorism, fanned by elements both in Europe and in Pakistan, poses a perennial challenge, albeit a relatively minor one when set alongside that of jihadist terrorism. Arrests at various locations in August 2016 involved three operatives of the Khalistan Zindabad Force, allegedly under instructions from Khalistan exiles in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Pakistan, to assess prospects for reviving the movement and to carry out 'disruptive activities'. In November 2016, a Khalistan Liberation Force Leader, Harminder Singh Mintoo, was freed from a high-security facility at Nabha, Punjab in a dramatic jail break that revealed the connections between Khalistan terrorism and well-armed local organised crime. Harminder Singh,

who in late 2014 had been extradited from Thailand, was re-arrested in Delhi the following day (*New Indian Express*, 2018). He died in jail in April 2018.

Northeastern terrorism

Equally, terrorism remains a persistent threat in Northeast India where multiple groups remain active, many of them riven by internal factional squabbles. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland is arguably the most vicious faction in terms of its targeting of civilians. Muslims and Adivasi tribal people, who arrived in Assam from Bihar and Jharkand states to work the tea plantations in the colonial era, have been the targets of choice. A December 2014 attack by NDFB gunman slaughtered 79 Adivasis across three districts. The massacre prompted a major Army response called Operation All Out, which reduced the NDFB considerably, while underscoring the extent to which in the Northeast counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency have become all but indistinguishable (*India Today*, 2014).

In addition to massacres and occasional bombings, Northeastern terrorism has been also been exacerbated by a relatively new cross-border threat, in the form of an alliance of ethnic factions based in ungoverned space in northwestern Myanmar (Burma). In April 2015, four factions – ULFA, NSCN-K, NDFB and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) – established the so-called United Liberation Front of West Southeast Asia (UNLF-WS). In the months following its creation, the umbrella grouping staged several cross-border attacks into Manipur and Nagaland, killing Indian security forces and prompting a June 2015 helicopter-borne raid by Indian commandos on two camps inside Myanmar (Davis, 2015). The emergence of the UNLF-WS marked the first time that such a broad alliance of disparate groups had been formally set up, and does not bode well for stability along India's far-flung northeastern border.

As the government in New Delhi has recognised for years, effectively reducing the terrorism and insurgent threat in the Northeast will hinge crucially on cooperation from Myanmar's military in denying the rebels cross-border sanctuary. As India has sought to expand economic and security ties with its eastern neighbour and to offset China's influence, achieving that cooperation has been a primary diplomatic goal. And in February 2019, tentative Myanmar military operations against a complex of insurgent camps at Taga in Sagaing Division suggested that progress had been made (*Guwahati Times*, 2019). However, Myanmar is still a long way from being able to make the sustained commitment of manpower and resources across its ungoverned northwestern marches that would be needed to root out Indian insurgent sanctuaries.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF INDIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM

Stakeholders in Indian Counter-Terrorism (CT)

Given India's sheer size and federal structure a multiplicity of actors is involved, directly and indirectly in the counter-terrorism mission. These include, importantly, the following.

Union government organisations and services

National Security Council (NSC)
Established in 1998 and headed by the National Security Advisor, the NSC is the apex body advising the Prime Minister's Office on matters of national security and strategic interest including, importantly, terrorist threats. The heads of leading agencies tasked with counter-terrorism, notably the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing and the National Technical Research Organisation, all answer directly to the National Security Advisor. In addition to the National Security Advisor and his deputy, the NSC – which meets on at least a monthly basis – also includes representatives of the ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, External Affairs and Finance.

Strategic Policy Group
The Strategic Policy Group serves effectively as the decision-making and operational nucleus of the NSC. It includes the heads of India's most important defence and security ministries, services and agencies, not least those tasked with the counter-terrorism.

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
Part of the Secretariat of the National Security Council, the JIC is tasked with analysing intelligence data from the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Defence Intelligence Agency, and the Directorates of Military, Naval and Air Intelligence.

National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)
Composed of distinguished personalities from outside government, the National Security Advisory Board, which meets monthly, brings together a wide range of expertise in matters of security and defence. The body is intended to provide the NSC with 'big-picture' analysis of, and long-term recommendations for, security policy, almost certainly including policy on counter-terrorism. The NSAB has been criticised, however, as tending to

reflect the ideological biases of the government of the day, and lacks direct access to key operational agencies.

Intelligence Bureau (IB)

Tracing its roots to the colonial period, the IB stands as the nodal agency for domestic counter-terrorism in India. Its Director (DIB) is the most senior police officer in the country, outranking all state-level police chiefs or heads of paramilitary Central Armed Police Forces. Always drawn from the cadre of the Indian Police Service (IPS), he answers directly to the Minister for Home Affairs. IB's Operations Wing represents the organisation's cutting edge, and is headed by a Director-General Operations (DG Ops). Deputies or 'Special Directors' are responsible for various aspects of internal security and major regions of the country. DG Ops and his deputies liaise with both IB's own bureaus at state level, as well as state-level police Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS).

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

Set up in 1968 following intelligence failures surrounding the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the RAW took over foreign intelligence collection and analysis which had earlier been the remit of the IB. As India's primary external intelligence service, its key responsibilities include the collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorist threats emanating from beyond the nation's borders. The RAW is headed by a Secretary (Research) in the Cabinet Secretariat, who answers to the Prime Minister and reports on a daily basis to the National Security Advisor. Two Special Secretaries and a number of Additional Secretaries are responsible for foreign intelligence processed through regional and country desks headed by Joint Secretaries. The RAW runs stations in Indian diplomatic missions in many countries, with a predictable emphasis on Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

National Investigation Agency (NIA)

Emerging directly from the intelligence weaknesses surrounding the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, the NIA was established later the same year with the passing by Parliament of the National Investigation Agency Bill. Unlike other point agencies involved in the CT mission, notably the IB and RAW, the NIA is dedicated exclusively to the terrorism threat, and is empowered to conduct investigations into terrorist incidents and conspiracies across India's states and union territories. Following an amendment to the National Investigation Agency Act (2008) it also conducts investigations into offences surrounding the smuggling of fake Indian currency into the country, which has been identified as a serious threat to India's monetary stability. The NIA does not, however, recruit or run its own intelligence assets.

National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO)
Set up in 2004, the NTRO is India's pre-eminent technical intelligence-gathering agency. Answering to the National Security Adviser in the Prime Minister's Office, as of May 2017 the NTRO was listed by the Home Ministry as on a par with the RAW and IB under the Intelligence Organisations (Restrictions of Rights) Act of 1985. Described as a 'super-feeder' for technical intelligence to other agencies, the organisation's activities are centred on the techno-logically sophisticated realms of internet monitoring, telephone intercepts, cyber-security, cryptology and satellite surveillance.

Aviation Research Centre (ARC)
The ARC is part of India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and is tasked with aerial surveillance, photo recon-naissance, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) along and across India's borders. Operating from several airbases around the country, the ARC's fleet of aircraft reportedly include Russian-built Ilyushin Il-76s and Antonov AN-32s as well as more modern Gulf Stream and Global 500 jets. The ARC was specifically commended by senior Air Force and Army officials for aerial imagery and surveillance found 'invaluable' in support of air strikes during the Kargil conflict of 1999. In recent years, however, the organisation is understood to have lost some of its functions to the NTRO.

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The DIA was established in 2002, following intelligence failings revealed by the 1999 Kargil war. Operating under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, the DIA is part of the tri-service Integrated Defence Staff. As its name indi-cates, the agency is focused on overtly military threats to India's security. However, the hybrid challenge posed by cross-border jihadist and insurgent attacks on India's northwestern and northeastern flanks that means the DIA is necessarily also focused on the terrorist threat and the gathering of intelli-gence aimed at countering it. Key elements of this mission are undertaken by the Indian Army's Directorate of Signals Intelligence and the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC), both of which are run by the DIA. The DIA is headed by a Director-General of three-star rank who is drawn in rotation from the three defence services and advises the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff and the Minister of Defence. The DIA also liaises regularly with both the RAW and the IB, not least on CT issues.

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)
Part of the Ministry of Finance, under the ministry's Central Board of Excise and Customs, the DRI is India's primary anti-smuggling intelligence and investigation agency, with a focus on firearms, gold, narcotics and fake Indian

currency. To this extent it plays a potentially important role at the intersection of terrorism and transnational organised crime.

Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

Coming under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, and headed by a Director-General of Police, the CBI is India's leading agency countering corruption, bribery, embezzlement and fraud. It plays a peripheral role in CT investigations.

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

Emerging from the sweeping overhaul of intelligence and security agencies and procedures prompted by the 2008 Mumbai attacks, NATGRID is envisaged – but not yet fully operationalised – as an information-sharing network to facilitate the dissemination of data held by a range of central and state agencies, thereby promoting more effective cooperation within the Indian intelligence community. Coming under the Ministry of Home Affairs and initiated in 2011, it will eventually bring together 22 separate databases covering areas such as driving licences, passports, visa and immigration records, income tax, credit card transactions, and taxation and bank account details. NATGRID is not intended as a repository for operationally sensitive data.

Paramilitary organisations

National Security Guard (NSG)

Formed in 1984 under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the NSG provides the kinetic 'sharp end' of India's CT capability. While it is a leading armed counter-terrorist service, the NSG is not technically one of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), however. The NSG's core anti-terrorist, anti-hijack capability is provided by two Special Action Groups whose personnel are seconded from the Indian Army. The police and CAPFs provide personnel for three Special Ranger Groups tasked with VIP protection, and so on. Following criticism of the NSG's slow response to the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008, the force now deploys contingents in several major Indian cities. The National Bomb Data Centre tasked with monitoring, recording and analysing all bomb and IED incidents across India comes under the NSG.

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)

With a sanctioned strength of over 310 000 personnel, the CRPF is the largest of India's Central Armed Police Forces. Under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, it plays a leading role in supporting state police forces in maintaining civil order, as well as in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist

situations. Its lightly armed battalions have been widely deployed across all of India's zones of domestic conflict, most notably Kashmir, the Northeast and Maoist-affected areas of central India.

Border Security Force (BSF)

The BSF is the second-largest of India's Central Armed Police Forces and, as its name indicates, is deployed primarily in a border security role that has an obvious counter-terrorist dimension. BSF battalions have also frequently been deployed in internal security duties, not least in Kashmir. With an authorised strength of over 250 000 it falls – like the CRPF – under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and is commanded by a Director-General drawn from the Indian Police Service (IPS). Given its front-line border role, the BSF is more heavily armed than the CRPF, and can deploy infantry support weaponry such as mortars and light artillery and some aviation assets. It also fields specialised commando units.

Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)

The CISF was established as one of India's Central Armed Police Forces by an Act of Parliament in 1983. Under the Ministry of Home Affairs, it has expanded significantly in recent years and today has a sanctioned strength of some 180 000 personnel committed to the security of a wide range of government installations and critical infrastructure. All potentially at risk from terrorist attack, these include ports, airports, power plants, oil fields and refineries, atomic energy facilities and aerospace installations.

Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)

Raised in 1962 as a result of the border war with China, the ITBP was originally intended for deployment along the country's border with Chinese-ruled Tibet. However, its remit has been broadened to include border security and anti-smuggling in other parts of India, as well as a role in maintaining civil order, VIP protection and disaster response. One of the country's Central Armed Police Forces under the Home Affairs Ministry, the ITBP today has an authorised strength of around 90 000.

Shashastra Seema Baal (SSB) or Armed Border Force

The smallest of India's Central Armed Police Forces, with a strength of nearly 80 000 personnel, the SSB emerged – like the ITBP – from the Indian defeat in the 1962 war with China as the Special Service Bureau. Established in 1963, it was envisaged as a 'stay-behind' force to mobilise the civilian population and conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of northern border areas being again overrun by Chinese invaders; as well as to provide support for the external intelligence service, the RAW. The SSB was reputed to have played

an important role in 1971 in support of *mukti bahini* guerrillas in East Pakistan prior to the birth of Bangladesh. It has subsequently deployed in border areas across northern and northeastern India, notably along the 1751 km length of the Indo-Nepal border, an important zone of terrorist infiltration into India; and was involved in the 1999 Kargil theatre. The force has also been deployed in internal security and counter-insurgency roles in Maoist-affected states such as Bihar, Jharkand and Chhattisgarh.

Railway Protection Force (RPF)
With a strength of some 65 000 personnel, the Railway Protection Force is a reflection of the size and economic importance of a railway network which is the world's third-largest and carries some 22 million passengers each day. Overseen by the Ministry of Railways, the Railway Protection Force is the only one of India's Central Armed Police Forces that does not fall under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is also the only CAPF which has powers of arrest, investigation and prosecution. Its function is primarily to counter crime and anti-social behaviour, but given that the national railway network has been a perennial target of terrorist attack, the RPF also constitutes a link in the CT chain.

State Government Organisations and Services

State Police Services and State Police Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS)
In liaison with the IB and RAW, state police forces, and specifically their Anti-Terrorism Squads, form the front-line in India's counter-terrorism campaign. State-level ATSs typically involve both an intelligence wing and a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) element. The pioneer in the development of a dedicated police CT wing was Maharashtra, of which Mumbai is the capital. While not all state police forces field an ATS, states that have found it necessary to adopt the same broad Maharashtra model include Gujarat, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar.

COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Given the virulence and scale of the terrorist threats it has faced in recent decades, along with the shortcomings of government agencies operating in strikingly different contexts, India has struggled to devise a comprehensive legal framework for its counter-terrorist response. Inherited from the British colonial era, India's default framework has been to deal with terrorist acts as criminal offences to be handled by state police forces. However, the nature of the threat has often spilled into protracted insurgency situations that have

overwhelmed the capacity of state police and demanded the intervention of central paramilitary forces and the national military. These circumstances have resulted in the enactment, and in some cases the repeal, of several important legislative platforms drawn up specifically to meet the challenge of terrorism.

The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act

First promulgated in May 1985 and later amended in 1987, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, commonly known as TADA, was a direct response to the Khalistan terrorist campaign which swept Punjab in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. TADA was the first piece of legislation to provide a comprehensive definition of terrorism as seen by the Indian state. Coming in the Act's third paragraph, it is worth citing in full:

> Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause or as is likely to cause death of, or injuries to, any person or persons, or loss of or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.

Against this backdrop, TADA extended sweeping powers to law enforcement agencies. These included the right to detain an accused individual for up to one year without formal charges; made confessions given to police officers of superintendent rank or above admissible evidence in courts of law; and reversed the presumption of innocence until proved guilty, with the burden of proof placed on the accused to establish their innocence. The Act also established special courts which allowed for trials to be held in closed court and for the identities of witnesses to remain secret. Further, it barred appeals from those accused to higher courts other than the Supreme Court. Predictably, given the scale of the Punjab crisis, once on the books TADA was widely used and abused. By June 1994, nine years after its promulgation, some 76 000 individuals had been detained under its provisions. Of these cases only 35 per cent ever went to trial, and of those, convictions were secured in a mere 2 per cent of cases. Amid widespread allegations of abuse, the law was finally allowed to elapse in 1995 ('The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act', 1987).

Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002)

Seven years after the discontinuation of TADA, the Indian parliament promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in March 2002. The passing of the new Act, which replaced the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2001, was driven by an increasing number of terrorist attacks, and in particular by the December 2001 assault on the Parliament building in New Delhi. It was nonetheless controversial from the outset, with the Parliament's Upper House (Rajya Sabha) voting it down and the bill passing only through a rare joint session that included the larger Lower House (Lok Sabha) (*Economic Times*, 2002). Like TADA, POTA rested, importantly, on several controversial clauses, notably that suspects could be detained for up to 180 days without charge; that law enforcement agencies were permitted to withhold the identities of witnesses; and that confessions made to police were admissible as evidence. At the same time the Act contained safeguards that had been absent from TADA. Importantly, it had no provisions permitting preventive detention; and appealing the verdict of the POTA Special Courts could be made to a division bench of the High Court.

As had been the case with TADA, there were soon renewed allegations of abuses of POTA legislation by state governments and law enforcement agencies. In particular these centred on the arbitrary harassment of political opponents. In December 2003, the Act was amended with an ordinance aimed at extending the scope of judicial review. A review committee which had earlier acted in a purely advisory capacity was strengthened, with review commissions armed with authority to issue orders binding on state governments and police. That said, the central review committee was still unable to initiate an investigation without an initial complaint by an 'aggrieved person'. In practice these were mostly individuals with political connections in central government, rather than terrorist suspects. POTA had been introduced by the National Democratic Alliance government. In October 2004, after approval in Cabinet, it was repealed by the centre-left United Progressive Alliance government.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

Passed into law in December 1967, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) was intended primarily to counter secessionist activities and associations threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indian Union. Following several amendments, it has today become the primary plank of counter-terrorism legislation. UAPA had its roots in the recommendations of a Committee on national integration and regionalisation which in 1963 resulted in the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act. In the interests of national sovereignty, this empowered Parliament to impose reasonable restric-

tions on freedom of speech and expression, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to form associations. UAPA was later introduced in Parliament to implement the provision of that Act.

Since it was passed into law in 1967, UAPA has been amended seven times (in 1969, 1972, 1986, 2004, 2008, 2012 and, most recently, in 2019). In the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act 2004, which followed the repeal of POTA, many of the provisions of the latter were re-incorporated in it. The Amendment Act (2008) which followed the November 2008 Mumbai attacks further strengthened the legislation. The Amendment Act (2012) was designed to meet commitments made at the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF), aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing; while the Amendment Act (2019) was intended to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related crimes by the National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Armed Forces Special Powers Acts

With roots in colonial legislation aimed at countering the nationalist 'Quit India' movement of 1942, Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) are area-specific pieces of legislation contingent on any given area, usually along India's borders, being declared 'disturbed'. Such contingencies go well beyond a state government's declaration of a state of emergency. In state of emergency situations in which local police and administration are unable to fulfil their normal functions, the state government can call on the central government to provide paramilitary assistance, typically with the deployment of either the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) or the Border Security Force (BSF), or both. By contrast, AFSPAs imply the need to deploy regular armed forces 'in aid of the civil power' (under Article 246 of the Indian Constitution) in an area or entire state where the situation is deemed 'warlike' and which has been designated a 'disturbed area' by the central government.

Under an AFSPA in a 'disturbed area' the armed forces are accorded a range of powers covered by legal immunity from later prosecution. These include firing on persons after due warning; arresting persons without warrant (who must then be handed over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay); entering and searching houses to make arrests; and stopping and searching vehicles and vessels suspected of transporting arms. To date, AFSPAs have been passed on three occasions. The first was the Armed Forces Special Powers (Assam and Manipur) Act 1958. The geographical scope of the Act, renamed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958, was later extended to cover all seven states of the Northeast, although Tripura has since withdrawn, citing a marked improvement in the terrorist situation. The second was the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act

1983, which gave legal sanction to army intervention in support of state police and central paramilitary forces countering the Khalistan campaign. The Act was withdrawn in 1997. The third occasion was the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990.

AFSPAs have been predictably controversial, with widespread allegations of 'faked encounters', and have invited sharp criticism both from the United Nations Human Rights Commission and international human rights organisations. Their extension (in six-monthly increments) for years at a stretch has also drawn criticism. In a landmark ruling in July 2016, the Supreme Court of India rescinded the AFSPA provision of immunity from prosecution for military personnel. The judgment noted that:

> It does not matter whether the victim was a common person or a militant or a terrorist; nor does it matter whether the aggressor was a common person or the state. The law is the same for both and is equally applicable to both … This is the requirement of a democracy and the requirement of preservation of the rule of law and the preservation of individual liberties. (Rajagopal, 2016)

It is worth noting that under AFSPA legislation approximately one-third of the Indian Army's manpower of 1.4 million active duty personnel is today committed to internal security duties; a situation over which senior echelons of the Army have made their unhappiness well known.

COUNTER-TERRORISM TOOLS AND TACTICS

The complex and variegated nature of the terrorist threat in India, and a federal Constitution which reserves policing and public order as state subjects, have effectively precluded the defining of any one overarching national counter-terrorism strategy. Indeed, following the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, the lack of any single agency with a nationwide remit exclusively tasked with coordinating counter-terrorism, became the focus of debate and controversy. The proposal to establish a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) met stubborn opposition from state governments which viewed the nationwide intelligence-gathering and operational remit of such an agency as infringing on state powers. Effectively shelved in 2012, the NCTC concept appears since then to have died a natural death. The main institutional innovation emerging from the Mumbai debacle was the establishment of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), with its powers to conduct nationwide investigations into terrorist conspiracies.

As matters stand today, India's response to terrorism consists of a multi-pronged approach that, as its critics argue, continues to lack adequate coordination and cohesion. On the international stage, ratcheting up diplomatic

pressure on Pakistan to desist from actively supporting terrorist organisations such as LeT and JeM has long been a central element of that overall approach. India has pushed its case against Pakistan in various fora such as the United Nations, the Group of Twenty (G20), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and, not least, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF in particular has continued to shine a harsh light on Pakistan's less than convincing efforts to crack down on terrorist financing. Domestically, improving the management of often porous borders by means of infrastructure as well as military and paramilitary patrolling has been defined as one element in the counter-terrorism mix. But arguably more important has been strengthening intelligence-gathering capabilities and coordination. The RAW externally, the IB domestically, and military agencies along and across borders, all play critical front-line roles supported by liaison and intelligence-sharing with foreign intelligence services.

Finally, and perhaps least noted, there have also been efforts to improve government and government-supported responses to the threat of radicalisation at local and community level. A multifaceted response marked by considerable regional variation, this essentially preventive prong of the counter-terrorism effort has involved modernisation of madrassahs, community policing initiatives, strengthening relations with local Muslim leaders and imams, and de-radicalisation programmes. In a country the size of India, its impact is almost impossible to gauge, but its importance should not be underestimated.

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